Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting certain aspects of defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 and ADA actions that pertained to four grievances that related to plaintiff’s hearing impairment, an excessive force claim and failure to provide plaintiff with hearing device claim. Basis of Dist. Ct.’s order was belief that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit, and plaintiff’s failure to allege viable remedy with respect to certain claims. With respect to plaintiff’s excessive force claim, dismissal of claim for failure to exhaust remedies was improper, where defendants had failed to clearly inform plaintiff as to when he could appeal any denial of his grievance. However, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s claim that defendants failed to give him prescribed medications, where plaintiff did not file grievance until after he had filed instant lawsuit. With respect to claim concerning defendants’ limited provision of listening device, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing said claim, where, contrary to Dist. Ct.’s belief, plaintiff had actually provided evidence that linked his alleged physical injury to failure to provide listening devise, since plaintiff claimed that failure to provide said device caused him to miss medications for his dental abscess. However, dismissal of claim regarding failure to provide access to special telephone was proper, where said failure was not linked to any physical injury, and where plaintiff sought only compensatory damages for said claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing without prejudice plaintiff’s section 1983 and section 1985 actions, alleging that defendants-her ex-husband, her children’s guardian ad litem and state court judge conspired to violate her and her children’s rights to family association and her right to fair and unbiased trier of fact, when state court judge entered order that modified visitation schedule to require that all of plaintiff’s visitation time with her children be supervised. Record showed that plaintiff had appealed state court judge’s order to appellate court, and that appellate dismissed her appeal after plaintiff had failed to file her opening brief. Plaintiff then filed instant action after dismissal of her appeal. Ct. of Appeals held that Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied to deprive Dist. Ct. of jurisdiction to resolve plaintiff’s claims, since: (1) allegations in federal complaint asserted that state court judgment caused plaintiff’s injuries at issue in instant federal case; and (2) analyzing plaintiff’s allegations of corruption would require federal court to improperly review propriety of final state court judgment, which only U.S. Supreme Court can do. Ct. of Appeals also overruled prior decisions that held that Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply, where plaintiff presents claim that state court judge was corrupt in rendering decision at issue in federal lawsuit. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-government’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action under 18 USC section 925 that sought order directing government to approve plaintiff’s attempted online purchase of handgun, where government’s denial was based on its finding that plaintiff was prohibited from possessing handgun pursuant to 18 USC section 922(g)(4) as either person who had been adjudicated as mental defective or person who had been committed to mental institution. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff had previously been examined by doctor and admitted to inpatient mental health unit under New York State Mental Hygiene Law; (2) doctor’s notes indicated during said stay, plaintiff was experiencing auditory hallucinations, depression and suicidal thoughts with plans to carry them out; and (3) plaintiff was discharged 11 days later with diagnoses of mild depressive disorder, social anxiety disorder, panic disorder and autism spectrum disorder. Ct. of Appeals held that because plaintiff was involuntarily “committed to mental institution” by lawful authority under New York law, section 922(g)(4) prohibited him from possessing handgun.

Ct. of Appeals entered contempt order against respondent under circumstances where: (1) petitioner-National Labor Relations Board (Board) sought and received from Ct. of Appeals order summarily enforcing Board’s order that required, among other things, respondent to re-hire employee, who had been wrongfully terminated, and to remove references to its unlawful termination from employee’s record, post notices of employees’ rights in its stores and file sworn certification with Board attesting to its compliance with said order; (2) respondent failed to satisfy three aspects of Board’s order; (3) Board subsequently filed petition with Court of Appeals, seeking entry of contempt order arising out of respondent’s failure to comply with Board’s order; (4) Ct. of Appeals directed respondent to show cause why Board’s contempt petition should not be granted; and (5) respondent disregarded rule to show cause order. Ct. of Appeals held that contempt order was warranted, where record showed that: (1) respondent failed to comply with Board’s order that Ct. of Appeals had enforced; (2) respondent ‘s violation was significant; and (3) respondent failed to make reasonable and diligent effort to comply with said order. Instant contempt order included requirement that respondent fully comply with enforced order, as well as to pay to Board all of its reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, and to pay $1,000 fine, plus daily fines until respondent fully complies with Board’s order.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated her 4th Amendment rights by arresting her on disorderly conduct charge, under circumstances where defendants encountered plaintiff, who had exposed rifle with bolted bayonet and handgun, while seated in bleachers in public park. While Ct. of Appeals declined to rule on whether officers had probable cause to support their arrest of plaintiff on disorderly conduct charge, it held that officers were entitled to qualified immunity, where plaintiff had failed to identify any legal precedent that found existence of 4th Amendment violation under similar circumstances. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals further found that officers could have reasonably determined that plaintiff’s reported conduct was “otherwise disorderly” for purposes of satisfying Wisconsin disorderly conduct statute, under circumstances, where: (1) it was reported that plaintiff openly carried instant rifle and handgun in crowded park while watching families; and (2) officers had learned prior to her arrest that plaintiff had previously resisted arrest, had threatened police officers and had been subject of mental health proceedings.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-County and Sewage District’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-property owner’s federal takings-clause action, alleging that defendants’ removal of dam on Milwaukee River, which led to four-foot drop in river’s previous high-water mark along his river front property amounted to taking of his riparian right to prior surface water level without prior compensation. Record showed that Wisconsin’s Dept. of Natural Resources authorized removal of dam, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff had no property right to have river remain at prior, artificially created surface level. Moreover, plaintiff’s interest in river’s surface level was only privilege that must yield to government’s authority to regulate navigable waterways under public trust doctrine.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s action, alleging that defendants-prison officials violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to physical and sexual abuse, excessive force, and mistreatment at hands of prison employees. Basis of Dist. Ct.’s dismissal was belief that exhaustion requirement applied because plaintiff had failed to exhaust prison grievance procedures by first attempting to resolve dispute informally prior to filing grievance. While record supported finding that plaintiff had failed to follow said requirement prior to filing his grievance, Ct. of Appeals, in reversing Dist. Ct., found that exhaustion requirement may not apply to plaintiff, because there was contested factual dispute as to whether said prison grievance process was available to plaintiff, where there was some evidence of his low IQ and lack of access to anyone during relevant period to assist him in understanding/complying with grievance process. Moreover, record showed that plaintiff had attempted to file 21 other grievances, and not once had plaintiff successfully navigated grievance through exhaustion. As such, Dist. Ct. should have conducted prior to any dismissal of plaintiff’s lawsuit Peavy hearing to resolve contested issues regarding whether administrative remedies were available to plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting in remanded matter defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-police chief’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants terminated him from his position without affording him due process, when said termination occurred without notice or opportunity for hearing. During plaintiff’s prior appeal defendants conceded that plaintiff had protected property interest in his police chief position for purposes of his due process claim without making any effort to qualify or limit said concession or reserve their ability to dispute said issue in instant remand. However, record showed that defendants did subsequently dispute plaintiff’s claim that he had protected property interest in his police chief position, and Dist. Ct. based its summary judgment ruling on belief that plaintiff had no property interest in his police chief position. Ct of Appeals, though, in reversing Dist. Ct., found that defendants should be held to their concession that plaintiff had protected property interest in his police chief position, and that they could not contest that issue in instant remand. Moreover, it held that plaintiff was entitled to judgment on issue of liability with respect to his due process claim based on said concession and findings made in prior appeal. Ct. also remanded matter for determination as to whether defendant Mayor of Village was entitled to qualified immunity arising out of her role in termination decision.

Ct. of Appeals denied plaintiffs-appellants’ “Motion Requesting Judicial Notice” under Rule 201, where plaintiffs wanted to substitute current Indiana Secretary of State (Diego Morales) for prior Indiana Secretary of State, who was named party in instant case, and where plaintiffs sought judicial notice as to Morales’s position on enforcement of specific campaign finance laws. Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice regarding substitution of Morales as party in case was not necessary as said substitution was governed by Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) and happens automatically. Moreover, plaintiffs could not seek judicial notice with respect to Morales’s position on enforcement of specific campaign finance laws, since likelihood that Morales would enforce said laws was open to debate, and thus was not adjudicative fact that was not subject to reasonable dispute. Also, plaintiffs could not attempt to highlight any gap in evidentiary record via filing of instant motion, since record speaks for itself.

Dist Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s motion for return of forfeited property under Rule 41(g). Record showed that DEA agents seized $146,000 in cash found in plaintiff’s car, which agents deemed to be drug proceeds, and subsequently filed action to administratively forfeit said funds under 21 USC section 881(a)(6), Instead of filing “claim” with DEA to contest forfeiture, plaintiff’s counsel filed petition for remission. After deadline for filing claim had elapsed, DEA issued declaration of forfeiture, which precipitated plaintiff’s motion to return forfeited property. While Dist. Ct. found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s motion, Ct. of Appeals held that Dist. Ct. had jurisdiction to consider said motion under 28 USC section 1355. However, plaintiff’s motion failed on merits, where: (1) Rule 41(g) is not proper vehicle for challenging administrative forfeiture; and (2) counsel’s mistake in filing wrong pleading was not sufficient circumstance that would allow courts to exercise their equitable powers to override instant statutory requirement for filing timely claim. Also, 18 USC section 983(e) , which allows individuals to file motion to set aside declaration of forfeiture only if individual never received notice of government intent to forfeit property, did not apply to plaintiff’s circumstances.