Federal Civil Practice

In action alleging that defendant violated Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (Act) by establishing online “instant quote” feature on its auto insurance website that disclosed applicant’s driver’s license number in its auto-fill program, where applicant merely supplied name and address, Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing, where plaintiffs could not identify concrete injury arising out of said disclosure of their driver’s license numbers. While one plaintiff asserted that she was required to purchase credit-monitoring service because of said disclosure, and another plaintiff asserted that fraudulent brokerage account was registered in his name after said disclosure, plaintiffs failed to show how disclosure of driver’s license number played any role either in their credit or in opening of brokerage account. Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegation that said disclosure caused them worry and anxiety was insufficient to establish concrete injury. Similarly, plaintiff could not establish concrete injury arising out of fact that two bogus unemployment claims were generated in New York after said disclosure, where there was no showing that said claims required disclosure of driver’s license number. Fact that Act allows “liquidated damages” did not confer standing on instant plaintiffs. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police detective and prosecutor’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants subjected him to false arrest on sexual assault of minor charge, where: (1) said charge was eventually dismissed; and (2) defendants withheld certain facts in criminal complaint that, according to plaintiff, would have negated any finding of probable cause to support his arrest. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, where no reasonable jury could find that it would be clear to reasonable officer that information omitted from complaint would have negated probable cause to arrest plaintiff. This is so, Ct. of Appeals determined, because 15-year-old victim gave clear account of alleged assault and any inconsistencies between statements by victim and victim’s mother were minor, and because defendants lacked any indication that victim and her mother had any motive to lie. Also, plaintiff failed to cite to any analogous case that clearly established that sort of facts omitted by defendants, such as certain inconsistencies in versions of assault given by victim and her mother and lack of video evidence to corroborate claim of sexual assault, was material to probable cause determination.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-Indiana election officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-Indiana voters’ section 1983 action, alleging that state’s actions in allowing voters 65 years old and older to vote by mail, but failing to allow same privilege for voters under age 65, who failed to qualify for one of twelve other categories of voters who also could vote by mail, violated their rights under 26th Amendment. Plaintiffs failed to establish that Indiana’s extension of absentee voting to elderly imposed any unconstitutional burden on right of those under sixty-five years old to vote, especially where all voters could vote on election day, as well as vote at certain locations up to 28 days prior to election day. As such, plaintiffs failed to establish any “abridgement” of their right to vote as that term is contemplated in Supreme Court case law. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on Article III standing grounds plaintiff’s action under Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA). In said action, plaintiff alleged that he incurred injury arising out of receipt of false, misleading and deceptive letter from defendants regarding whether defendants would seek statutory attorney’s fees in underlying state-court collection action, and that plaintiff lost sleep over attorney’s fee issue and hired attorney to ascertain actual amount owed and paid appearance fee in state-court action. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff lacked standing, where: (1) plaintiff’s decisions to hire attorney and to pay appearance fee are insufficient to establish standing; and (2) plaintiff’s lost sleep was not concrete harm that would support plaintiff’s standing. Also, plaintiff’s confusion as to attorney’s fees issue, which led to hiring of his attorney, was insufficient to establish his standing to bring instant lawsuit. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison clinical services supervisor’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for refusing to sign release form, when defendant directed that disciplinary ticket be issued to him. Record showed that on day plaintiff was scheduled to be released from prison and go on mandatory supervised release, defendant gave plaintiff instant electronic monitoring form that stated it was to be signed by only sex offenders, (where plaintiff was not sex offender), and that defendant directed that disciplinary ticket be issued against plaintiff, (which resulted in plaintiff being placed in segregation), after plaintiff refused defendant’s directive to sign said form on four occasions. Issuance of said ticket ultimately resulted in revocation of his supervised release and imposition of additional 18-month prison sentence. Illinois law, though, did not require plaintiff’s signature on said form, and defendant did not seek guidance from either supervisor or legal authority on applicability of form to plaintiff and refused to answer plaintiff’s question as to why he had to sign said form. Defendant could not prevail on her summary judgment motion, where record showed that: (1) defendant was sufficiently involved in issuance of disciplinary ticket and resulting placement of plaintiff into segregation that formed basis of adverse act; (2) plaintiff’s refusal to sign form was protected activity under First Amendment, where plaintiff was merely seeking explanation for why form applied to him; and (3) there is material dispute as to defendant’s motivation as to why disciplinary ticket was issued. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on 11th Immunity grounds plaintiffs’ section 1983 act6ion, alleging that defendant-director of Ill. Dept. of Employment Security (IDES) deprived them of equal protection rights, when plaintiffs applied for unemployment benefits during COVID-19 pandemic, but never received any benefits or any notice that their applications had been denied, so as to allow them ability to appeal any denial. Defendant, who was sued in his official capacity, was entitled to 11th Amendment immunity from being sued in federal court, and exception to said immunity under Ex Parte Young, did not apply because plaintiffs’ allegations for said claim referred to only past conduct. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims, arising out of their contention that IDES failed to promptly provide them with appealable determinations regarding any denial of their claims for benefits and/or their hearing rights, where mandamus action offered plaintiffs adequate state-law route for remedy they seek.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officer and Village’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights when officer, who responded to report that plaintiffs’ daughter had been victim of possible criminal conduct, shot plaintiffs’ family dog six seconds after officer appeared at plaintiffs’ front door. While Dist. Ct. relied on video contained in officer video-camera to find that officer was justified in shooting dog, Ct. of Appeals also looked at video and found that video did not support officer’s version of incident, since: (1) video did not reveal whether dog was growing or barking as officer claimed; and (2) video also did not reveal what dog was doing during six-second interval up to time video showed that dog had been shot. As such, because other evidence contained conflicting versions of incident, summary judgment could not be used to resolve said factual discrepancies in favor of officer.

Plaintiff filed action alleging fraud, fraudulent inducement, promissory estoppel and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of defendant’s hiring of petitioner for new position under assurances that defendant’s company was financially secure, but then terminating plaintiff one week later for purported financial reasons. During pendency of defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff filed motion to amend complaint to add new facts to support existing claims. Dist. Ct. denied plaintiff’s motion as moot, where it had also denied defendant’s motion to dismiss. During pendency of defendant’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff in footnote in her response sought to add new claim. Dist. Ct. denied plaintiff’s motion to amend and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s first motion to amend was moot, where she could proceed on her existing claims without new facts, and where defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied. Plaintiff also failed to renew said motion, although Dist. Ct. gave her 30 days to do so. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly deny plaintiff's second motion to amend during pendency of motion for summary judgment, where it was too late to add new claim that alleged different fraud than was alleged in existing complaint, even though plaintiff asserted that facts contained in her proposed first motion to amend would have supported new claim.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison official’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant denied plaintiff due process during his prison hearing to determine merits of disciplinary charges arising out of his receipt of $10,000 check that plaintiff claimed was gift. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant, who had actually seized said check and conducted investigation that led to issuance of disciplinary charges based on defendant’s claim that check was actually contraband, sat next to hearing officer, controlled every step of hearing and directed actions of hearing officer to ensure that plaintiff would be found guilty of charges and would not get his $10,000 back. As such, plaintiff’s impartial decision-maker claim could not be resolved at summary judgment stage, where, according to plaintiff, defendant, as officer substantially involved in investigation of charges, cannot decide outcome of prison hearing. Moreover, plaintiff presented evidence that defendant told him prior to start of hearing that plaintiff’s $10,000 would not be returned to him regardless of outcome of hearing. Fact that plaintiff failed to produce direct evidence of any communication between defendant and hearing officer did not require different result. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s motion to add hearing officer as defendant in instant action.

Plaintiff originally filed in Canada breach of contract action against defendant Menasha and trade secret violations under U.S. statutes against defendants Menasha and Deloitte. Contract contained forum selection clause that designed that any dispute arising out of contract be filed in Toronto Canada court. Deloitte, though, contested Canadian court jurisdiction over it, and plaintiff thereafter voluntarily dismissed trade secret actions against both defendants, and re-filed said actions in Illinois Dist. Ct. Menasha then filed motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds trade secret actions against it based on forum selection clause in contract. Dist. Ct. could properly grant said motion as to defendant Menasha, where trade secret actions arose out of said contract, and where plaintiff agreed to litigate said claims in Canada. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in also dismissing on same grounds defendant Deloitte, where Deloitte had not signed agreement containing said clause, and where Deloitte continued to insist that Canadian courts had no jurisdiction over it.