Federal Civil Practice

Dist Ct. did not err in dismissing on timeliness grounds plaintiff-employee’s action, alleging that defendant-employer violated Stored Communications Act (Act) by confronting and disciplining plaintiff after discovering on co-worker’s work computer certain Facebook messages authored by plaintiff that had disparaged plaintiff’s bosses. Relevant limitations period required that plaintiff file instant lawsuit within two years after date upon which plaintiff first discovered or had reasonable opportunity to discover violation of said Act, and appropriate accrual rule required that plaintiff file instant lawsuit within two years when reasonable person would have begun investigation in case. As such, instant lawsuit that was file in March of 2021 was untimely, since: (1) plaintiff was shown by her supervisor screenshots of instant messages in meeting in January of 2019 when supervisor told plaintiff that said messages came from co-worker’s work computer; and (2) said meeting with supervisor was enough to alert reasonable person to investigate supervisor’s knowledge about plaintiff’s Facebook messages, so as to begin applicable limitations period lawsuit untimely. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that her claim accrued at later date, because she was afraid in January of 2019 that she would be terminated if she had investigated violation of Act at that time.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction in their section 1983 action, alleging that Indiana’s statutory scheme that required abortion providers to dispose of fetal remains by either burial or cremation, but allowed women to take custody of said fetal remains and to dispose of them as they pleased violated First Amendment. Ct. of Appeals found that there was no First Amendment violation, where instant statutory scheme did not require women who obtained abortions to violate any religious or secular belief. Moreover, requirement that physicians and other providers tell patrons about their statutory options does not offend First Amendment, where there is no contention that notice required by statute contained false or misleading information. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ claim that statutory scheme violated First Amendment, because it implies that fetus is actual person, which is viewpoint that they do not share.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated Brady by suppressing police report suggesting that someone else committed shootings at issue in plaintiff’s criminal conviction that was eventually vacated. Plaintiff’s allegation in his complaint that prosecutor was aware of said report was judicial admission that precluded plaintiff from establishing civil Brady violation with respect to police defendants. Moreover, even without judicial admission, plaintiff could not show that any defendant acted either intentionally or recklessly, where: (1) two defendants were not aware of said report; (2) one defendant who was aware of said report testified that he only mistakenly failed to bring report to prosecutor’s attention; and (3) plaintiff’s ability to cast doubt on said defendant’s version of facts did not produce evidence that opposite of said defendant’s version of facts is true or that he acted intentionally. Dist. Ct. also did not err in failing to grant plaintiff’s motion to file amended complaint that removed allegation that prosecutor was aware of said report prior to trial, where said motion was not filed until after summary judgment motion was filed. With respect to other reports or identifications, Ct. of Appeals found that either prosecution was aware of said evidence, which precluded plaintiff from obtaining recovery under civil Brady claim, or that defendant and prosecution were aware of said evidence, which also precluded plaintiff from recovery.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant subjected him to false arrest on drug distribution charges by arresting him without probable cause. Record showed that defendant arrested plaintiff pursuant to arrest warrant, and thus plaintiff faced uphill battle to overcome presumption of validity accorded to warrant and information underlying it. Moreover, while plaintiff asserted that Myers lied in his warrant application by stating that confidential informant identified plaintiff from plaintiff’s driver’s license photograph as drug seller, plaintiff could only muster bare allegations that defendant had lied on his warrant application, which was insufficient to overcome presumption that arrest warrant was valid and that his arrest was supported by probable cause. Ct. further noted that without plaintiff's driver’s license in record, it could only guess as to whether reasonable officer in defendant’s position would have found plaintiff’s match to drug seller or whether defendant had made false statements in his warrant application.

Dist. Ct. erred in decertifying class action under circumstances where class of disabled inmates who sought use of prison showers and toilets, but could not do so because said facilities lacked grab bars and other fixtures, had previously been certified. Dist. Ct. held belief that certification was not appropriate because some members of class, although using wheelchairs, might not be disabled within meaning of federal law. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that certification was appropriate, since class certification under Rule 23(c0(4) would only resolve legal issue as to whether said prison facilities require grab bars and other fixtures. As such, once instant legal issue has been resolved, Dist. Ct. can resolve whether each class member would be entitled to any relief. Also, Dist. Ct. failed to explain why application of Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards, which require accessible toilets and showers, could not be applied class-wide.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff-prisoner’s Bivens claims against defendants-federal judges, prosecutor, defendant’s court-appointed counsel and court reporter, alleging that said defendants mishandled his 2014 federal drug crimes trial. Judges and prosecutor were absolutely immune from instant lawsuit, and defendant’s claim against court-reporter for producing transcript with errors did not arise under either Fourth, Fifth or Eighth Amendment for purposes of bringing Bivens claim. Also, plaintiff’s lawsuit against his court-appointed counsel fell outside contours of Bivens action, where said counsel did not act under color of law.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing at pleading stage plaintiff-prisoner’s action, alleging violations of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act, where plaintiff, who was confined to wheelchair and incontinent, defecated on himself on three occasions when he could not use handicapped restroom. Record showed that at times plaintiff attempted to use handicapped restroom, it was occupied by non-disabled inmate, and that each time plaintiff complained to defendants-prison officials about lack of access to restroom, his grievances resulted in prison staff merely saying that they could not reserve restroom time for him or control actions taken by other inmates. Instant complaint was sufficient to allege ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations, where: (1) plaintiff’s confinement to wheelchair and his incontinence rendered him disabled under both statutes; (2) plaintiff plausibly alleged that defendants intentionally denied him prison service or program, i.e., use of handicap-accessible restroom; and (3) plaintiff plausibly alleged that defendants breached their obligation of accommodating his disability by failing to ensure reasonable access to handicapped restroom.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants-police officers’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants had failed to disclose existence of agreement between defendants and non-citizen victim to help victim apply for U visa in exchange for victim’s testimony at plaintiff’s criminal trial. Ct. of Appeals held that finding of qualified immunity was not appropriate at early stage of instant lawsuit, where it was not evident based on allegations in complaint that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and where discovery was necessary to determine whether defendants had informed prosecution about alleged agreement. In such case, Ct. of Appeals held, defendants could not be liable, since ultimate disclosure obligation would have rested on prosecutors and not on defendants.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-insurance company’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-insured’s breach of contract claim arising out of defendant’s failure to defend plaintiff in underlying intellectual-property action, under circumstances where plaintiff had previously prevailed in state-court action under declaratory-judgment statute (735 ILCS 5/2-701(c)) that concerned similar duty to defend plaintiff in same underlying action, and where plaintiff had received certain incidental relief in prior action. Record showed that: (1) prior declaratory action did not allow plaintiff to receive consequential damages or certain fees arising out of defendant’s failure to defend plaintiff in underlying lawsuit; (2) plaintiff subsequently filed in state and federal courts similar breach of contract claims that sought consequential damages arising out of defendant’s failure to defend plaintiff in same underlying action; and (3) state court eventually granted plaintiff’s voluntary motion to dismiss state-court action and expressly reserved plaintiff’s ability to proceed on his federal court breach of contract action. While Dist. Ct. granted defendant’s motion to dismiss on claim and issue preclusion grounds, claim preclusion did not apply, where second state-court action expressly reserved plaintiff’s ability to proceed on instant breach of contract action. Moreover, issue preclusion did not apply, where certain consequential damages and fees sought in instant breach of contract claim could not have been asserted in prior declaratory relief action.

Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) claim against defendant-bank, alleging that defendant had failed to investigate two credit reporting disputes regarding plaintiff’s loan payments. Plaintiff was required to show injury that was something more than statutory violation for purposes of Article III standing, and plaintiff’s alleged injury in form of lower credit score was not traceable to defendant’s alleged failure to investigate, where subject disputes arose from notices that were issued in January of 2012, while plaintiff’s alleged drop in credit score occurred in November of 2011. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly grant defendant’s summary judgment motion with respect to plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of fiduciary claims, where plaintiff’s proffered evidence of his damages was only speculative.