Federal Civil Practice

Plaintiffs-civil detainees under Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act at Big Muddy Correctional Center filed section 1983 action, alleging that their continued detention violated their Due Process rights, since treatment plan offered by defendants that was used to determine whether they were sufficiently rehabbed from their disorders so as to allow for their release was constitutionally deficient. Record showed that defendants offered one-hour core group therapy session one time per week, while expert testified that minimum core therapy group sessions should be five hours per week. Moreover, while defendant offered offense-specific and didactic therapy groups, said groups were on hold at time of lawsuit. While Dist. Ct. entered permanent injunction requiring defendants to provide 7.5 hours of core group therapy per week, to reinstate all offense-specific and didactic therapy groups pn weekly basis, and to employ different independent evaluator of detainees’ progress on plan, Ct. of Appeals found that remand was required, since instant injunction was overbroad under Prison Litigation Review Act, where injunction required defendants to provide more services than was constitutionally required. This is so, because: (1) expert testimony indicated that five hours per week for core group therapy was constitutional minimum of what was required to be provided; (2) injunction did not provide defendants with flexibility to determine which offense-specific or didactic therapy sessions should be offered on weekly basis; and (3) record did not support requirement that defendants employ different independent evaluator.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim in plaintiff’s action, alleging that two unsolicited faxes sent by defendants violated Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Instant faxes, which invited plaintiff’s veterinarians and owner to RSVP for two free dinner programs, were titled “Canine and Feline Disease Prevention Hot Topics” and “Rethinking Management of Osteoarthritis” and indicated that both programs had been approved for continuing education credits. Dist. Ct. could properly find that neither fax constituted unsolicited advertisement as required under TCPA, since faxes did not indicate either directly or indirectly to reasonable recipient that defendants were promoting or selling some good, service or product. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that said faxes were actionable under TCPA, because free dinner programs were used to market or sell defendants’ animal health goods and services, since Ct. found that texts of faxes did not allude to commercial availability or quality of defendants’ products. Ct. also declined to follow FCC’s guidance on TCPA, which advised that free seminars served in many instances as pretext to advertise commercial products or services.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action, plaintiff’s action, alleging that act of defendant-lender of money to other defendants (producers of broiler chickens), in urging said defendants to cut production of broiler chickens, constituted violation of section 1 of Sherman Act. Section 1 of Sherman Act requires allegation that defendants had agreed with each other to perform anti-trust act, and instant allegations fell short of alleging existence of actual agreement between defendant and other defendants to do anything, where plaintiffs only alleged that defendant set out to protect its own interests through unilateral action. Moreover, instant amended complaint, which added defendant to plaintiffs’ existing anti-trust action against other defendants, did not allege that defendant facilitated any agreement with other defendants or helped with enforcement of any such agreement; and (2) various communications between defendant and other defendants did nothing more than remind other defendants of basic rule of economics.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ (States Attorney, City and County) motion to dismiss for failure to state valid claim in plaintiff’s (unsuccessful States Attorney candidate) section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, where plaintiff asserted that: (1) defendants improperly subpoenaed his Facebook account information as part of investigation into his potential involvement in perjury/bribery case; (2) County Board member improperly removed one of plaintiff’s campaign signs; and (3) Chief of Police improperly endorsed plaintiff’s opponent by posting picture of himself and opponent on police’s official Facebook page. Plaintiff failed to identify any authority to support his improper endorsement claim. Moreover, plaintiff sought to enjoin Circuit Court Judge from releasing Facebook account information, and plaintiff failed to allege either existence of any declarative decree violation or that any declaratory relief was unavailable to him. With respect to improper removal of his campaign sign, Board member indicated to Board that he mistakenly believed that sign was placed without permission, and County Board thereafter determined that no further action needed to be taken. Plaintiff could not sue Board member under section 1983 because plaintiff failed to allege that Board member was acting under color of law. Also, plaintiff could not sue County, where plaintiff failed to allege that Board member had revealed any unconstitutional motivation for sign removal or that County had approved any unconstitutional motivation for sign removal.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-jail correctional officer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-estate of jail detainee’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant’s delay in responding to intercom call by detainee’s cellmate, who indicated that detainee was experiencing medical emergency, caused detainee harm and his eventual death. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence of causation, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create triable issue on causation question, where record showed that: (1) there was 13-minute delay between first and second intercom calls from detainee’s cellmate, indicating that detainee had breathing problems; (2) while defendant argued that detainee was dead long time prior to second intercom call, cellmate indicated that detainee was still breathing just prior to arrival of jail personnel following second intercom call; and (3) medical expert’s testimony that detainee’s death from cardiac arrhythmia occurred over several minutes supports plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s delay in responding to first intercom call harmed detainee. Fact that defendant asserted that delay was caused by his inability to understand cellmate’s first intercom call and by history of jail inmates misusing intercom for non-emergency reasons did not require different result, since said matters were appropriate for jury’s consideration.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for partial judgment on pleadings with respect to plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s decedent’s substantive due process rights when defendant, while driving to work at 78 miles per hour on 45 mile per hour stretch of highway, illegally changed lanes, crossed fog line onto shoulder of highway, and fatally struck decedent on shoulder of road without seeing her while still traveling 55 miles per hour. Plaintiff was required to plead sufficient facts to establish that defendant acted with “criminal recklessness,” and plaintiff's allegations that defendant’s speeding on highway and illegal lane change, when coupled with allegation that defendant never saw decedent prior to fatal collision, did not suggest that defendant disregarded extreme or obvious risks and was willing to let fatal collision occur. Moreover, plaintiff’s allegations, which were grounded in negligence rather than recklessness, failed to allege constitutional violation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison correctional officers’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his reports that his cellmate had physically threatened him in months leading up to physical assault of plaintiff by cellmate on day cellmate was scheduled to be transferred from plaintiff’s cell. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff had submitted several transfer requests to one defendant, who had authority to grant said requests, but failed to act on any request; and (2) other defendant had actually assisted plaintiff in drafting one transfer request and advised him on how to make request more meritorious. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff had failed to establish indifference on part of defendant who had helped him draft transfer request. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff had failed to causally connect his injuries to other defendant’s failure to act on his transfer requests, where record showed that plaintiff voluntarily approached cellmate and began interaction that led to his injuries.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment filed by two defendants-prison’s chief engineer and dietary manager in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to dangerous condition of prison kitchen, where plaintiff suffered severe burns after tripping on kitchen floor while carrying bucket of scalding water from stove to sink because hot water faucets in kitchen were not working. Plaintiff was required to show that defendants were actually exposed to information concerning risk of danger, and plaintiff failed to show that: (1) defendant dietary engineer knew or must have known that plaintiff was carrying dangerously hot water at time of his injuries; and (2) defendant chief engineer was aware that inmates were instructed to carry scalding water across kitchen floor. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in dismissing at pleading stage plaintiff’s claim against defendant-kitchen supervisor, where plaintiff alleged that supervisor was present in kitchen at time of plaintiff’s injuries, and where complaint pleaded sufficient facts to permit inference that supervisor was aware of floor condition that contained holes and broken tiles and was ware that water plaintiff was carrying was dangerously hot.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-debt collector’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-wife of debtor’s action, under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging that defendant repeatedly called plaintiff’s phone after debtor had sent email challenging validity of debt, and after plaintiff had told defendant that she was not responsible for debtor’s debt. Defendant was entitled to invoke bona fide error defense under section 1692k(c) of FDCPA, where: (1) debtor sent email challenging validity of debt to defendant’s CEO, which was not mentioned as suitable method to inform defendant of debtor’s challenge to validity of debt; (2) had debtor properly submitted his dispute via methods set forth in letter sent to debtor, defendant could have followed its policy and practice of stopping all collection activity until debt was validated; and (3) collector at defendant had failed to properly code plaintiff’s phone number on its do-not-call list to prevent plaintiff from receiving future calls. Ct. further found that defendant maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid error, and that fact that human error was cause of instant failure to place plaintiff’s phone on do-not-call list, which, in urn, resulted in plaintiff receiving series of telephone calls, did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s class action, alleging violations of Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, as well as breach of contract, unjust enrichment, interference with contract and intrusion upon seclusion claims, arising out of defendant-University’s transfer of plaintiff’s anonymized medical records to defendant-Google for purposes of advancing research project designed to develop software capable of anticipating patients’ future healthcare needs. Plaintiff lacked standing to bring instant claims, where plaintiff failed to allege that he suffered injury in fact that was concrete and particularized, actual or imminent and was otherwise traceable to defendants’ conduct. Fact that plaintiff claimed potential risk that he might be identified from instant records in future was insufficient to confer standing, especially where plaintiff had not alleged that defendant-Google took any steps to identify him. Plaintiff also could not obtain standing on his breach of contract claim alleging that transfer of his medical records by University represented compensable “overpayment” that he made to University for his medical care. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s contention that any breach of contract allegation, by itself, establishes concrete injury.