Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-two officers’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when third defendant-officer used excessive force during wellness check of plaintiff, where officer tased plaintiff twice and struck him several times. Plaintiff conceded that he was not cooperative with said officer, and record showed that all three officers had probable cause to believe at time that plaintiff had committed battery on his mother who had requested wellness check. Plaintiff failed to counter sworn allegations contained in summary judgment motion with anything other than allegations in instant complaint, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that officer’s use of force was reasonable under instant circumstances. Also, plaintiff was not entitled to new trial on his unlawful entry claim, even though plaintiff alleged that Dist. Ct. gave erroneous jury instruction that attempted to define outer contours of plaintiff’s home, where plaintiff failed to establish any prejudice arising out of giving said instruction, where defendants argued and jury accepted claim that exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry through plaintiff s doorway.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-police officer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-17-year-old student’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated her equal protection and due process rights under 14th Amendment, as well as her 4th Amendment rights, when defendant subjected her to sexual harassment while plaintiff was in defendant’s squad car during class assignment to go on “ride along” with law enforcement officer. While case law varies on several doctrinal pathways to support instant sexual harassment claim, sexual assault by official acting under color of law has potential remedies under either equal protection or due process clauses under 14th Amendment. In this regard, plaintiff sufficiently alleged either equal protection or substantive due process claim, where she asserted that defendant touched her in sexually offensive ways while she was in squad car, as well as suggested to another police officer that plaintiff wanted to be prostitute. Also, same allegations supported plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim, since “seizure” by police officer for Fourth Amendment purposes does not require that seizure occur during criminal investigation. Fact that plaintiff did not identify similarly-situated individual whom defendant treated more favorably did not defeat her equal protection claim. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s similar claim against defendant-police chief, where complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that police chief, as police officer’s supervisor, played some role in alleged harassment by either facilitating, approving or ignoring officer’s offensive conduct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-credit data furnisher’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action under Fair Credit Reporting Act, alleging that defendant provided inaccurate information about status of her mortgage and her payment history on same, after unreasonably investigating dispute of its data. While plaintiff asserted that defendant provided Equifax with inaccurate amended Pay Data and Account History, Dist. Ct. could reasonably find that no reasonable jury could find that defendant provided patently inaccurate or misleading information, where record showed that plaintiff’s examples of inaccurate information were either not materially misleading or not inaccurate.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s False Claims Act action, alleging that defendants-tribal hospital and several employees of hospital retaliated against plaintiff by terminating her from her hospital position after she had flagged irregularities in hospital’s billing practices that she believed reflected fraud. Dist. Ct. could properly have found that defendants were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, since hospital could be viewed as arm of Tribe. Moreover, individual defendants could also assert tribal sovereign immunity because plaintiff essentially sued them in their official capacities. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that tribal sovereign immunity did not apply, because: (1) according to plaintiff, anti-retaliation provisions of False Claims Act abrogated tribal sovereign immunity; and (2) defendants could not otherwise assert tribal sovereign immunity. Ct. of appeals, though, held that defendant-hospital could assert tribal sovereign immunity, where record showed that hospital was acting in tribal capacity, where relevant factors pointed to common understanding that hospital further Tribe’s self-sufficiency and self governance.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s Bivens action, seeking monetary recovery from defendant-special agent with DEA, where plaintiff alleged that defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights when he used excessive force when arresting plaintiff at public hotel pursuant to arrest warrant. While Dist. Ct. held belief that instant action was sufficiently different from factual setting in Bivens so as to preclude plaintiff from pursuing instant Bivens action, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff could pursue instant action, where there was no meaningful distinction between plaintiff’s case and factual setting in Bivens. This is so, Ct. of Appeals concluded, where: (1) both instant case and Bivens concerned defendant’s use of alleged excessive force in arresting offender accused of violating federal drug laws; (2) defendants in Bivens and instant case concerned same kind of line-level federal narcotics officer; (3) both plaintiffs alleged that defendants used excessive force when making arrest; and (4) legal landscape of excessive-force claim is well-settled. Fact that arrest in Bivens took place at plaintiff’s home and was without warrant or probable cause, as opposed to instant arrest that took place at public hotel pursuant to arrest warrant and probable cause did not present “new context” of Bivens that would support dismissal of plaintiff’s action.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his First and 14th Amendment rights, by allowing Christian prisoners to practice their religion in open areas of prison and in group settings, while they limited plaintiff and other Muslim prisoners to practice their religion in their individual cells. While Dist. Ct. found that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, where plaintiff failed to identify relevant case law that would establish that such limitations on prayer within prison setting violated any Constitutional provision, Ct. of Appeals found that remand was required for parties to clarify record to determine what actions individual defendants took with respect to plaintiff’s claims. Moreover, case law would support plaintiff's claims of unequal treatment. As such, no qualified immunity finding could be made under this record. Moreover, defendants’ claim that security concerns necessitated instant prayer restrictions does not require different result, where said restriction must apply equally to all religious groups, and where plaintiff maintained that said restrictions were not applied equally.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing breach of contract action, after finding that plaintiff-resident of Arizona, lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant-California firm, even though defendant signed subject contract with plaintiff’s former law firm located in Chicago. Dist. Ct. could properly find that contract alone was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over defendant, especially where plaintiff’s own statements, indicating that he and defendant negotiated and executed contract in Arizona, and that he would perform on contract in or from Arizona negated plaintiff’s contention that defendant purposely availed itself of Illinois law when it contracted with plaintiff’s law firm. Also, while 28 USC section 1631 requires Dist. Ct. to transfer cause of action to appropriate Dist. Ct. ”in the interest of justice,” Dist. Ct.’s failure to transfer action to California Dist. Ct. did not require remand, where plaintiff never sought such transfer in Dist. Ct., and where plaintiff conceded that he had seven months after instant dismissal to re-file action in California Dist. Ct., but had failed to do so.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-officials within in Sheriff’s Dept.’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-Deputy Sheriff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his First and 14th Amendment rights by retaliating against him for seeking Sheriff’s office by attempting to demote him, criticizing him to others, as well as increasing police patrols in plaintiff’s neighborhood and for generating investigation to seek his termination for failure to list 2007 sexual assault charge (that was ultimately expunged) on his application for Deputy Sheriff. Defendant’s criticism of plaintiff to otters did not support instant retaliation claim since said criticisms were simply type of criticisms that came with territory of plaintiff’s running for office. Moreover attempt to demote plaintiff came prior to knowledge of his candidacy. Dist. Ct. could also properly find that plaintiff’s claim of increased police patrol of plaintiff’s neighborhood was not supported by record. Also, defendants’ recommendation to terminate plaintiff, which came three months after defendants' knowledge of plaintiff’s candidacy, was too attenuated to support retaliation claim, and defendants’ recommendation that plaintiff be terminated due to plaintiff’s dishonesty in failing to note 2007 arrest on his job application was belief supported by record.

Ct. of Appeals vacated Dist. Ct.’s granting of defendant’s summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ actions that were consolidated in multidistrict litigation, where plaintiffs alleged that they were injured by defective vena cava filter device manufactured by defendants. Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct. lacked diversity jurisdiction to act on said complaints, because neither plaintiff could establish $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. Under “legal certainty” test plaintiffs’ allegations about amount in controversy control unless court concludes to legal certainty that face of pleading demonstrates that plaintiff cannot recover jurisdictional minimum or that proofs show that plaintiff never was entitled to recover said amount. Under relevant state laws, neither plaintiff could make required showing, where, at time they had filed their complaints: (1) both plaintiffs alleged only that they suffered asymptomatic IVC perforation of their veins that was caused by defective filter; (2) neither plaintiff could allege in good faith that they experienced pain or other compensable symptoms arising out of defective filter or that they were at risk of future injury; and (3) relevant state courts would find that $75,000 verdict for either plaintiff would be excessive under instant circumstances.