Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in only partially granting plaintiff’s request for $200,000 in attorney’s fees as prevailing party in Fair Labor Standards Act claim, where Dist. Ct. awarded only $70,000 in fees. Dist. Ct. could properly reduce plaintiff’s counsel’s requested billing rate of $450 per hour to $350 per hour and could properly strike time spent by counsel in: (1) litigating counsel’s ability to act as class counsel; (2) time spent generating second motion for summary judgment; and (3) performing paralegal work in calculating damages. Also, Dist. Ct. could reduce lodestar figure to reflect fact that plaintiff’s counsel failed in lawsuit’s primary goal of obtaining judgment on behalf of class and collective. Ct. further noted that additional reduction in fee award was reasonable, where plaintiffs recovered only $60,000 out of $103,500 sought in claimed damages.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction on lack of finality grounds to consider propriety of Dist. Ct.’s order denying company’s motion to quash administrative warrant issued by Dist. Ct. at request of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) seeking to inspect company’s premises after employee of company made telephonic complaint about forklift accident. Record showed that Dist. Ct.’s denial of motion to quash was not final under 28 USC section 1291, where there remained pending in Dist. Ct. OSHA’s motion for contempt against company regarding company’s failure to comply with warrant, as well as OSHA’s motion to toll limitations period. Ct. rejected company’s claim that exception to finality rule applied, where Ct. observed that company had opportunity to raise propriety regarding issuance of warrant in pending contempt proceeding.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-jail probation officers’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-pretrial detainee’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his due process rights by authorizing his continued detention for period of four days after they were either aware or should have been aware that he was not person identified in 2015 arrest warrant that formed basis of his detention. Record showed that plaintiff’s brother had lied to police in 2015 and identified himself by giving them name and birth date of his brother (plaintiff), and 2015 arrest warrant was subsequently issued in plaintiff’s name when his brother failed to report for probation. Plaintiff was subsequently arrested on unrelated offense, but was held on 2015 arrest warrant. On next day, plaintiff’s girlfriend told defendants that they had wrong person in custody, that plaintiff’s brother was actual person subject to warrant, and that plaintiff was on parole in Pennsylvania at time of issuance of 2015 arrest warrant in Wisconsin. While defendants did not release plaintiff until 4 days later, plaintiff failed to show any due process violation, where: (1) defendants took steps to investigate girlfriend’s claim, and (2) plaintiff failed to show that defendants ignored evidence, and defendants otherwise could properly take steps to verify girlfriend’s information. Fact that defendants might have been negligent in delaying confirmation that plaintiff was wrong person in custody was insufficient to establish due process claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to remand its breach of contract action back to state court that had been removed to federal court and then granting defendants’ motion to dismiss instant case based on arbitration clause contained in said contract. Dist. Ct. could properly reject plaintiff’s claim that removal, which occurred months after case had been filed and certain discovery had occurred, was untimely, where: (1) complaint did not specify amount in controversy; (2) instant removal occurred seven days after plaintiff’s counsel emailed defendants' counsel with statement that plaintiff was seeking $250,000 in damages; and (3) said email was first notice that case was removable, and thus removal was timely, since it occurred within 30 days of said notice. Fact that defendants filed in state court motion to dismiss and began discovery prior to removing case did not constitute waiver of any right to remove case. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing case based on arbitration clause, where plaintiff’s claims came within scope of said clause. Moreover, plaintiff’s contention that defendants had fraudulently misrepresented subject-matter of contract did not require different result, where plaintiff never claimed that it was fraudulently induced into agreeing to arbitrate said issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated decedent’s 4th Amendment rights by using excessive force during decedent’s encounter with defendant-officer, where record showed that: (1) while officer was investigating reports at 3:30 a.m. that someone was stealing items from cars, decedent picked up hunting knife and approached officer; (2) officer instructed decedent to put knife down and stand still; (3) decedent instead held up knife and came within three feet of officer; (4) decedent threw knife at officer and hit him in arm with knife; and (5) officer fired gun and fatally shot decedent in torso. While plaintiff asserted that decedent posed no danger to officer at time officer shot decedent, physical evidence, such as bullet track, supported officer’s version of simultaneous actions of decedent throwing knife and officer firing gun. Moreover, plaintiff cannot withstand summary judgment by merely doubting officer’s version of events without presenting evidence to support its theory of case, since mere disbelief of only witness to encounter would mean that record is “empty,” and empty record means that plaintiff loses, because plaintiff had burden of production and persuasion. Ct. further observed that officer’s use of force remained reasonable after decedent deployed weapon, did not surrender and remained dangerous when advancing on officer.

In section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner, alleging that defendants-police officials violated his 4th Amendment rights by providing false information to obtain search warrant and by executing warrant in unreasonable manner, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing certain defendants, who had been misidentified or identified through code in original complaint, where Dist. Ct. held improper belief that it was too late for plaintiff to attempt to substitute properly identified defendants. While plaintiff must complete substitution prior to expiration of stature of limitations, said period was tolled by time spent by Dist. Ct. screening plaintiff’s complaint under section 1915A. Moreover, Dist. Ct. improperly attributed said time to plaintiff. Also, remand was necessary for determination under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) as to whether newly identified defendants knew or should have known that they would have been party to plaintiff’s lawsuit but for mistake in filing original complaint.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-pretrial detainee’s complaint, alleging that defendant-City’s policy of selling or throwing away property surrendered by pre-trial detainees upon entry into jail, where detainee fails to make arrangements to have said property claimed within 30 days after entry into jail, violated his 4th Amendment and due process rights. Plaintiff’s arguments had previously been rejected in Conyers, 10 F.4th 704, where court held that 4th Amendment did not regulate disposition of seized property, and that due process clause was not violated, where defendant provided notice and opportunity to reclaim detainee’s property. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that defendant must serve as unpaid custodian of his property for as long as it takes for him or his designee to retrieve his property.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed as moot appeal by defendant (plaintiff’s father) of Dist. Ct.’s order that remanded back to state court plaintiff’s state court action that had been removed by defendant to federal court, where instant removal had occurred more than one year after state court action had been filed. State court action concerned plaintiff’s attempt to obtain both constructive trust over defendant’s voting shares in corporation, as well as injunction to stop defendant from voting his shares in way that would adversely affect corporation or plaintiff’s interest in said corporation. During pendency of appeal, defendant died. As such, appeal became moot, where: (1) defendant’s death precluded any need for constructive trust, where agreement by plaintiff’s parents required defendant to transfer his shares in corporation to plaintiff at defendant’s death; and (2) there was no longer any need to enjoin defendant from taking any action that might adversely affect corporation.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison nurse and prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his knee condition by persisting in conservative treatment of his knee and failing to timely perform complete examination of his knee. Plaintiff’s expert provided un-rebutted opinion that there was critical six-week period to treat plaintiff’s ACL injury to avoid further damage, and although plaintiff was seen by medical personnel at least 15 times for his knee condition and was prescribed different medications and received several x-rays and physical therapy, as well as made no recorded complaints for over one year, jury could still find that defendants’ treatment of plaintiffs’ knee condition was ineffective and delayed proper treatment of his knee condition.. In this regard, record showed that: (1) defendant-nurse failed to perform complete examination of plaintiff’s knee over seven-week period and did not refer plaintiff for MRI, which could have revealed existence of ACL tear; and (2) defendant-doctor also did not complete examination of plaintiff’s knee and persisted in giving plaintiff conservative treatment.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that defendants’ strip search of plaintiff in presence of guard who is transgender male, violated moral tenets of his Muslim religion, where defendant-warden denied plaintiff’s request for exemption from future cross-sex strip searches and told him that he would be disciplined if he objected to said searches in future. Record showed that plaintiff’s objection to cross-sex strip searches was both religious and sincere in nature, and burden on plaintiff’s religion was unjustified under RLUIPA’s strict-scrutiny standard. Ct. further rejected defendants’ argument that exemption from cross-sex strip searches would violate anti-discrimination rights of transgender employees either under Title VII (since exemption of plaintiff from cross-sex strip searches would not inflict sufficient adverse act on transgender employees) or equal protection clause. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ summary judgment motion with respect to plaintiff’s 4th Amendment claim to be free from unreasonable searches, where Dist. Ct. improperly found that prisoners have no 4th Amendment interest against visual inspections of their bodies.