Federal Civil Practice

Record failed to contained sufficient evidence to support defendant-agency’s determination under Food Security Act that plaintiff’s removal of 9 trees from plaintiff’s land improperly converted several acres of wetlands into cropland so as to render plaintiff’s entire farm ineligible for USDA benefits. Agency decision was arbitrary and capricious where it was based on untrue assumptions that said property had been drained through use of tile and was located in depressed area of plaintiff’s land. Moreover, agency consideration of other property to establish that plaintiff’s land was wetland was not proper, since comparable property did not have similar traits to plaintiff’s land. Also, applicable regulation precluded agency from relying on fact that plaintiff had removed nine trees to support finding that plaintiff’s land was now “converted wetland,” and expert had noted that there was only minimal impact on land due to instant removal. As such, agency could not withhold benefits from plaintiff, since subject land never qualified as wetlands that could have been converted illegally into cropland.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his nasal polyps condition, where said dismissal was sanction for plaintiff’s failure to participate in his own discovery deposition. Plaintiff claimed that at time defendants came to prison to take his deposition he had not yet received defendants’ notice to take his deposition that was mailed five days prior to defendants’ appearance at prison, and that he was unprepared to participate in his own deposition at that time. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could not base dismissal on violation of Rule 37(d), since: (1) taking facts most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff had not been served with notice of deposition at time defendants came to take his deposition; and (2) other cases involving prison litigants contained evidence that there is typical delay in distributing mail to prisoners. Also, without plaintiff receiving proper notice of deposition, sanctions were not appropriate under Dist. Ct.’s inherent authority, since defendant was not required to sit for what amounted to be surprise-attack deposition.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-County officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by banning him from entering County’s Administration Building, where plaintiff’s employer maintained office, after plaintiff had denied County Administrator’s request to divert some funds in plaintiff’s employer’s budget to help pay salary of probation officer whose job was in jeopardy. Record showed that: (1) instant ban was imposed shortly after plaintiff had PTSD episode that resulted in plaintiff threatening police officer and kicking out window of squad car; and (2) plaintiff’s workplace was not public forum, but rather was mere office building. Moreover, instant ban was viewpoint neutral and reasonably motivated by legitimate safety concerns. Too, plaintiff failed to establish causation element in any retaliation claim, where alleged protected conduct in form of plaintiff’s rejection of county’s money request took place two years prior to imposition of instant ban. Alternatively, plaintiff could not establish any due process violation arising out of defendants’ alleged failure to abide by rules contained in County’s personnel policy handbook prior to imposing instant ban, since plaintiff failed to identify any property interest that attached to said rules.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on res judicata grounds plaintiff’s action alleging breach of contract and forgery on alleged guaranty contract, where: (1) plaintiff had alleged similar claims as affirmative defenses in prior guaranty action filed by defendant in instant case against plaintiff and others seeking to obtain recovery on same guaranty contract; and (2) defendant had obtained default judgment in guaranty action against another individual and dismissed without prejudice its action against plaintiff in guaranty action. While Dist. Ct. found that res judicata applied so as to dismiss instant action because plaintiff should have asserted such claims in guaranty action, Ct. of Appeals found that res judicata did not apply, since: (1) most cases applying res judicata involve plaintiffs in first action bringing same or similar claims in second action, and not where defendant in first action brings independent claims in second action based on affirmative defenses filed in first action; and (2) default judgment in first action applied to different defendant. Ct. further noted that defendant in instant case never had to address plaintiff’s affirmative defenses in guaranty action, and that even if plaintiff prevailed in instant case, defendant’s interest in guaranty action, i.e., its default judgment, would remain in place.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in plaintiffs’ section 1983 action alleging that defendant-police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct Terry stop, after officer had stopped plaintiffs riding in grey car during their investigation of nearby shooting. Officer had received dispatch that shooting involved three black males riding in grey car, and officer told plaintiffs that reason for stop was fact that shooting had occurred earlier that day. As such, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where instant stop did not clearly violate established law. Fact that officer could not remember instant stop, that make of plaintiffs’ car did not match make of car in dispatch, or that shooting occurred hours before stop did not require different result. Also, defendants could use police report to support instant qualified immunity claim, because statements contained in report were not offered for truth of matters asserted, but rather were offered to establish defendants' mind set at time of instant stop.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, where: (1) plaintiff informed defendants that he had Post Traumatic Stress Disorder that required that they not stand directly behind him, because doing so triggered his mental health symptoms; and (2) defendants thereafter stood behind him on increased occasions while patrolling commons areas. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to show that at time of defendants’ actions there was clear constitutional right to have accommodation of inmate-reported mental diagnosis without confirmation from medical staff or existence of treatment plan. Ct. emphasized that it is essential that non-medical correctional staff comply with orders from medical staff, and instant record reflected that there were no such orders. Result might be different if medical staff had ordered correctional staff to provide accommodation for plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. in four separate cases did not abuse its discretion in dismissing as sanction claims by plaintiff-attorney seeking to collect on judgment that had been entered against his former clients following attorney fee dispute that plaintiff had with his former clients. Record showed that Dist. Ct. Judge had previously disqualified plaintiff from attempting to collect on said judgment, and that plaintiff had willfully defied said order by continuing to collect on said judgment by filing instant four lawsuits. While plaintiff argued that Dist. Ct.’s disqualification order was wrongly decided, defendant had failed to properly appeal said order and could not seek to challenge said order by filing instant lawsuits. Moreover, dismissal as opposed to any lesser sanction was appropriate due to plaintiffs’ continued violation of disqualification order.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison guards’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoners’ section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs’ 8^th Amendment rights by discharging their shotguns that scattered buckshot over crowded prison dining hall that injured plaintiffs during disturbance that involved two other prisoners. While defendants claimed that they fired their shotguns as necessary warning to other inmates whom defendants claimed were still resisting efforts to breakup conflict, record contained other evidence indicating that disturbance was over at time shotguns had been fired, and that shotguns had either been aimed at plaintiffs or were aimed at area in ceiling that had likelihood of buckshot ricocheting to prisoners. As such, reasonable jury could conclude that there was no need for any warning shots, and thus there was some evidence that defendants discharged their shotguns with malice and/or sadism, which would counter defendants' claim that they acted in good faith by discharging shotguns to restore order. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that City and defendant-police officer withheld material impeachment evidence concerning officer’s drug and racketeering crimes in violation of Brady that led to plaintiff’s conviction and subsequent vacatur of said conviction. While plaintiff argued that City could be liable for actions taken by police officer because it had practice of using paid criminal informants, and because it had failed to supervise officer’s use of said informant that played role in officer’s criminal convictions, fact that City used informants did not constitute violation of any federal right. Also, plaintiff failed to show that City engaged in any deliberate indifference to fact that City’s use of criminal informants would lead to officer’s violation of federal law. However, while jury found in favor of police officer, plaintiff was entitled to new trial, where: (1) Dist. Ct. erred in failing to instruct jury to disregard officer’s claim on witness stand that he would “love to testify” but was invoking his 5^th Amendment right due to pending nature of his own criminal charges; and (2) Dist. Ct. failed to properly instruct jury that only time witness can invoke 5^th Amendment is when witness has reasonable fear that truthful answers may incriminate him.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-certain prison medical personnel’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs regarding his hernia condition. Plaintiff’s action against defendant-medical director was time-barred, where instant amended complaint was filed more than two years after medical director left prison. Fact that original complaint was filed within two-year period did not require different result, where original complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Also, summary judgment was properly granted as to defendant-prison nurse, where nurse used her medical judgment to provide reasonable treatment instead of plaintiff’s request for surgery. Too, defendant-entity employing medical personnel was entitled to summary judgment, even though plaintiff argued that entity had policy against providing surgical intervention for prisoners, where actual policy did not contain flat prohibition against surgical intervention, and where entity’s employees testified that they used their own medical judgment on case-by-case basis. However, defendant- medical doctor was not entitled to summary judgment where, if jury believed plaintiff, doctor was aware of plaintiff's pain arising out of his hernia condition for 14-month period and never took actions to address said pain.