Federal Civil Practice

Magistrate Judge did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s due process rights by failing to call favorable witness to testify on his behalf during prison’s Adjustment Committee hearing that resulted in decision by prison’s Administrative Review Bd. that plaintiff was guilty of certain prison infractions and in imposition of punishment that included one year of segregation, various status and access restrictions and revocation of one month good-time credits. Defendants were entitled to invoke “favorable-termination” rule set forth in Heck, 512 U.S. 477, that would require dismissal without prejudice of plaintiff’s lawsuit, since any damages award in instant action based on finding that defendants had violated plaintiff’s due process rights would imply invalidity of plaintiff’s punishment. As such, plaintiff could bring instant section 1983 action only after state court had invalidated his punishment. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that he could avoid Heck bar by abandoning portion of his claim involving duration of his sentence and focusing claim on other aspects of his punishment involving conditions of his confinement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his schizoaffective disorder, as well as subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff could not establish subjective elements of his claims because defendants, who are all non-medical officials, appropriately relied on judgment of medical officials with respect to their decisions regarding plaintiff’s medical treatment, as well as their opinion that plaintiff could withstand rigors of continued segregation confinement. Moreover, other complaints regarding conditions of his prison facility were not sufficiently severe to qualify as constitutional violation. Also, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in handling plaintiff’s request for recruitment of counsel, where: (1) Dist. Ct. granted said request and circulated said request to court’s list of approximately 50 attorneys on three separate occasions over course of one year; and (2) no attorney accepted said request. As such, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion under these circumstances in acting on pending summary judgment motion even though plaintiff was unrepresented.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated his 4^th Amendment rights by submitting false police reports that led to generation of felon in unlawful possession of firearm and armed habitual criminal charges, as well as trial court’s finding of existence of probable cause with respect to said charges and plaintiff's 2-year pretrial incarceration prior to dismissal of said charges. Under Manual, 903 F.3d 667, instant complaint alleging 4^th Amendment violation was timely, since it was filed within two years after he had been released from said detention. However, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s related 14^th Amendment due process claim arising out of same alleged misconduct, since any claim alleging that form of legal process that resulted in pretrial detention that was unsupported by probable cause rests exclusively with 4^th Amendment.

Ct. of Appeals remanded plaintiff’s appeal for determination as to whether plaintiff had filed timely notice of appeal. On remand, Dist. Ct. conducted hearing that resulted in finding that plaintiff had failed to carry his burden of showing that instant notice of appeal was filed by August 10, 2015 due date, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s testimony was not believable, and that record otherwise supported finding that notice of appeal was not filed until sometime after October 15, 2015. As such, Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction to resolve appeal.

Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert violation of section 1681a(y)(2) of Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), arising out of claim that defendant-employer failed to provide them with copy of investigation report generated by defendant’s attorney that was used to support their terminations. Defendant was required to only give oral summary of said report after their terminations, and as such, any alleged violation constituted only procedural violation that was unaccompanied by any concrete harm or risk of harm to plaintiffs that was protected by FCRA. Moreover, because plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue FCRA claim, Dist. Ct. could not adjudicate plaintiffs’ defamation claims under supplemental jurisdiction provision of 28 USC section 1367(a), since supplemental jurisdiction may only be invoked where Dist. Ct. has original subject matter jurisdiction over another claim in case. Original opinion addressed merits of defamation claims and found that record had failed to support jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiffs on said defamation claims. (Original opinion filed October 31, 2018.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment alleging that he was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that he was wrongfully arrested on murder charge, where, according to plaintiff, defendant submitted affidavit in support of arrest warrant that contained falsehoods and failed to contain exculpatory evidence that would have defeated probable cause finding by trial court. Defendant failed to inform trial court that DNA test did not implicate plaintiff in murder, and defendant otherwise: (1) failed to use accurate information regarding plaintiff’s phone records to support claim that plaintiff had phoned his brother at his mother’s house prior to alerting 911 operator about his mother’s fatal injuries; (2) mischaracterized video of plaintiff placing object in trash can; (3) failing to tell trial court that mother’s purse and medication were missing at time of plaintiff’s 911 call; (4) mischaracterized plaintiff as lacking concern for his mother; and (5) mischaracterized plaintiff’s refusal to take polygraph test. As such, defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity where defendant’s affidavit, when stripped of alleged falsehoods and when alleged exculpatory is added to affidavit, lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff on murder charge. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that Dist Ct. should have reviewed inculpatory evidence that defendant had failed to include in affidavit when determining existence of probable cause to arrest plaintiff.

Ct. of Appeals vacated Dist. Ct’s orders denying plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction and dismissing without prejudice certain claims made by plaintiffs in action alleging that defendant’s Shared Housing Ordinance that regulated home-sharing activities, including services offered by Airbnb was unconstitutional, where record failed to establish that any of individual plaintiffs or organization plaintiff had standing to bring instant lawsuit. Record showed that individual plaintiffs either no longer owned property subject to said Ordinance, or could not articulate how Ordinance is preventing/hampering any of their home-sharing activities in Chicago, or could not articulate how Ordinance prevented/inhibited them from visiting Chicago. Also, organization plaintiff lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit, where said plaintiff: (1) failed to show that it owned any property or engaged in any activity regulated by Ordinance; (2) failed to allege any concrete or particularized injury to said plaintiff caused by Ordinance; and (3) made only generalized allegation that Ordinance caused drain on its educational activities. On remand, plaintiffs will be given another opportunity to establish standing and will be able to substitute any party that has requisite standing to bring instant lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as untimely plaintiff-former prisoner’s section 1983 action that was filed on January 11, 2017, alleging that: (1) defendants-police officials coerced plaintiff into giving false confession to double murder and maliciously prosecuting him on double murder charges that resulted in conviction and sentence of 40 to 80 years; (2) Governor of Illinois commuted plaintiff’s sentence in December of 2011; and (3) different Governor of Illinois on January 12, 2015 issued pardon that “acquitted and discharged” plaintiff’s convictions. Instant section 1983 claim was timely, since: (1) relevant limitations period was two years; (2) under Heck, 512 U.S. 477, plaintiff could not bring his section 1983 claim until he had obtained favorable termination of challenge to his conviction; and (3) instant section 1983 action did not accrue until plaintiff had received pardon on January 12, 2015, which would make instant claim timely. Ct. rejected defendants’ contention that limitations period began in 2011 when Governor commuted plaintiff’s sentence, since plaintiff’s murder convictions were still intact at that time. It also found that Heck's “favorable-termination” requirement still applied even in circumstances where plaintiff could not obtain habeas relief because his sentence had already been served.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated plaintiff’s 4^th Amendment’s rights by arresting her without probable cause on charge of electronic communication harassment, where Dist. Ct. based dismissal on case law foreclosing claims for unlawful detention after initiation of formal legal process. While Supreme Ct. subsequently found in Manual, 137 S.Ct. 911 that plaintiff had potential 4^th Amendment cause of action, remand was required to determine timeliness of plaintiff’s 4^th Amendment claim, where: (1) applicable 2-year limitation period starts when plaintiff’s detention ended; (2) plaintiff was released on bond shortly after her arrest, which was more than two years prior to filing instant lawsuit; and (3) record failed to identify conditions of her bond so as to know one way or another as to whether her conditions of her bond imposed significant restrictions on her liberty to demonstrate that she was still “in custody” until she was exonerated at trial on her charge.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action seeking damages on allegation that defendants violated his rights under First Amendment Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, where: (1) defendants restricted plaintiff from participating in certain aspects of worship services of Moorish Science Temple of America (MSTA) after MSTA minister who led said services at prison advised prison chaplain that defendant’s status as “sovereign citizen” precluded him from participating in certain aspects of MTSA worship services, although he could be present as “guest;” (2) prison chaplain directed plaintiff to abide by MSTA minister’s conditions for plaintiff’s presence at MTSA worship services; and (3) plaintiff was punished by defendants for not abiding by chaplain’s directive. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, since: (1) there was no clearly established law that prison officials cannot deny prisoner’s exercise of instant First Amendment rights, where religious entity itself established limitations for plaintiff to follow; and (2) any forced inclusion of unwanted person in group infringes on group’s freedom of expressive association if presence of said person affects in significant way group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoint. However, Dist. Ct. erred in failing to consider plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief under Free Exercise Clause and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act to determine whether there was sufficient penological reasons for instant restrictions, but that Dist. Ct. should consider on remand whether instant claim for injunctive relief is moot due to plaintiff’s relocation to different prison.