Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ action alleging that defendant’s ordinance, which required residential property owners to either obtain license from City or hire licensed contractor to repair residential property, but allowed homeowners who resided in their homes to make such repairs on their own without obtaining such license, violated dormant commerce clause, because, according to plaintiffs, said licensing requirement placed impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Dormant commerce clause is not implicated since ordinance treats equally all landlords, whether residing in Indiana or elsewhere, and ordinance can treat differently homeowners who reside in their homes, where landlords are using residential properties differently than homeowners who actually reside in their homes. Also, under dormant commerce clause, ordinance was subject to only rational basis review, and ordinance satisfied said review, where defendant had interest in safety and habitability of homes, and ordinance was legitimate exercise of defendant’s authority to promote that interest.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing without leave to amend plaintiffs’ action, alleging that they were assignees of certain private insurers-Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs) seeking recovery of medical costs that MAOs paid on behalf of covered individuals, where defendant, as primary insurer, should have paid said costs. Record showed that different entity to which plaintiffs had no contractual relationship had actually paid medical costs at issue in instant complaint. As such, without evidence that plaintiffs had obtained rights to recover from said entity, plaintiffs had no rights to enforce and no standing to sue. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ third attempt at identifying MAO to which they had received assignment of rights that had actually paid medical costs at issue in instant complaint. However, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing instant case “with prejudice” where dismissal was based on lack of standing. Too, Dist. Ct. erred in sanctioning plaintiff’s attorneys, where most of alleged misrepresentations were result of honest mistakes concerning complicated corporate arrangements.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff-death row prisoner’s claim under Freedom of Information Act, seeking copy of every document pertaining to his homicide convictions, where plaintiff asserted that defendant could not rely on Exemption 7(C) to redact all personal information, including names and contact information of individuals named in said documents, including reports of interviews, fingerprints and rap sheets of third-parties. Ct. of Appeals found that privacy interests of affected persons contained in said documents outweighed public interest in disclosure of redacted information, where: (1) plaintiff failed to present evidence that would warrant belief by reasonable person that redacted information would uncover govt. impropriety; and (2) prisoner’s interest in attacking his own conviction via FOIA request was not “public interest” sufficient to allow plaintiff’s challenge concerning defendant’s invocation of Exemption 7(C) to go forward.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s action against defendant-self regulatory organization formed under Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, alleging that defendant denied plaintiff’s due process rights by not providing plaintiff with notice of investigation into alleged wrongdoing by one of defendant’s members or opportunity for hearing prior to publication of settlement documents pertaining to resolution of claims against member, where statements contained in settlement documents were allegedly false and defamatory with respect to certain transactions between plaintiff and member. Dist. Ct. could properly find that dismissal was proper, because plaintiff had no Bivens remedy that would allow it to have cause of action against defendant. Ct. of Appeals further observed that plaintiff may have certain administrative remedies under Commission Exchange Act, such as requesting Commodities Future Trading Commission to sua sponte review instant settlement documents. Also, plaintiff’s state-law defamation claims were preempted by Commodity Exchange Act.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in granting motion for summary judgment by defendant-hospital operated by religious non-profit organization in plaintiff-employee’s ERISA action seeking declaration that pension plans operated by defendants are not eligible for church exemption, and thus were covered under ERISA so as to require that said plans be adequately funded, where said order was entered despite plaintiff’s motion under Rule 56(d) to postpone summary decision so that plaintiff could complete additional discovery. Record showed that instant summary judgment motion was filed long before discovery was to close, and discovery sought by plaintiff was material to summary judgment issue regarding whether plan committees were “principal-purpose” organizations within meaning of ERISA. Ct. further noted that plaintiff established strong record of diligence in pursuing discovery that included generation of pending discovery disputes, and that additional discovery sought in plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) motion would not have been futile.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed appeals of defendants-police officials and interpreter, who challenged Dist. Ct.’s denial of their motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his 5^th Amendment rights by coercing him to say that he killed son in self-defense. Dist. Ct found that plaintiff, who spoke Korean with limited understanding of English, did not understand Miranda warnings that were given in English, and record contained dispute as to whether interpreter accurately informed plaintiff of his Miranda rights. Moreover, police officials’ claim on appeal, that there was no prior case law establishing that their conduct violated 5^th Amendment, was impermissible factual challenge on Dist. Ct’s findings regarding plaintiff’s confusion during two interrogations, as well as impact of plaintiff’s lack of medications and sleep on statements made by plaintiff during said interrogations, that could not be challenged in instant interlocutory appeal. Similarly, defendant interpreter also participated in interrogation of plaintiff and could not challenge in instant appeal Dist. Ct.’s factual determinations regarding his role in alleged coerced interrogations.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiffs-prisoners’ civil actions in which plaintiff sought in forma pauperis treatment, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiffs had committed fraud on court by failing to list on in forma pauperis application all prior actions that plaintiff had filed. In one case, plaintiff had failed to list two prior lawsuits, which had not resulted in imposition of any “strike,” and plaintiff could have proceeded in forma pauperis in instant lawsuit had he listed said lawsuits. In other case, plaintiff failed to list three prior lawsuits, but had not incurred strike in any of said lawsuits. Ct. of Appeals found that neither omission constituted material misstatement necessary for fraud finding, and plaintiffs’ explanations that they simply forget about said cases did not provide enough evidence to support Dist. Ct.’s belief that omissions were intentional.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for partial summary judgment, in section 1983 action alleging that defendants unlawfully stopped his car in traffic stop and subjected him to false arrest and unlawful search. While plaintiff could receive damages for unlawful stop, since trial court had previously granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on said stop, plaintiff could not receive damages for false arrest and for unlawful search, where plaintiff’s arrest (and subsequent incarceration) was supported by probable cause when defendants found gun and drugs in defendant’s car. Moreover, given jury’s verdict for defendants as to plaintiff’s false arrest and unlawful search claims, plaintiff could only receive damages for his brief seizure occasioned by stop of his car prior to officers seeking production of plaintiff’s driver’s license, and that jury accounted for such brief seizure by awarding plaintiff one dollar in nominal damages on his unlawful stop claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants-jail officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs-pre-trial detainees’ action alleging that defendants violated their 14^th Amendment due process rights, when defendants shut off all water to jail for three days without warning and provided plaintiffs only five bottles of water per day during said time for their personal use. Plaintiffs’ action focused on claim that defendants denied them less than minimal amounts of water needed for necessary activities of life, including drinking water and water to maintain sanitation, and plaintiffs’ claims, if proved, would constitute violation of Constitution so as to support denial of defendant’s claim of qualified immunity. Fact that defendants claimed that shut off was necessary to replace water booster pump did not require different result, where defendants had other options to procure necessary water for its pretrial detainees.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff-bank in action against defendant-attorney, alleging that defendant committed fraud by facilitating sales of condominiums by straw purchasers, who made misrepresentations on loans applications that allowed members of scheme to pocket mortgage proceeds without paying anything on properties. While plaintiff claimed that he was not aware of mortgage fraud scheme, others testified that defendant knew that buyers were part of scheme, and that defendant was aware about misrepresentations in loan applications. Moreover, while defendant asserted that as owner of title company that closed on said properties, he could not be personally liable for torts committed as member of title company, record showed that defendant participated in scheme as both owner of title company and as attorney for sellers, and that plaintiff could pursue instant action against defendant for defendant’s own individual acts. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that attorney cannot aid and abet client’s fraud as matter of law.