Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs-University and University officials’ request to enjoin defendants-prosecutors from enforcing Indiana statute that prohibited individuals from acquiring, receiving, transferring or selling fetal tissue. While Dist. Ct. found that terms “acquires,” “receives,” and “transfers” in statute were vague, Ct. of Appeals found that core meanings of said terms were sufficiently clear so as to preclude any vagueness challenge, and that state courts already provided adequate forums to clarify scope of statute. Also, Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that: (1) statute violates notions of equal protection, even though statute distinguishes between fetal tissue obtained from abortions and tissue obtained from miscarriages; (2) statute violates First Amendment, after noting that statute regulates conduct and not speech; (3) statute violates Commerce Clause, after noting that statute treats equally tissue obtained from within and outside of Indiana; and (4) statute violates Takings Clause, after noting that none of individual plaintiffs had any property interest in any particular fetal tissue. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as untimely plaintiff-former pretrial detainee’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-City violated his due process rights, where: (1) plaintiff was initially arrested on charge of failing to report change of address as required for sex offenders under Ill. Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA); and (2) plaintiff remained incarcerated for 17 months before Ill. trial court found him not guilty on said charge. Ct. of Appeals construed as malicious prosecution claim plaintiff’s allegation that defendant’s police officers used improper process when steering homeless sex offenders to shelters that caused plaintiff to violate SORA’s sex offender registration requirements. As such, plaintiff’s complaint was timely, since it was filed within two years of his acquittal on SORA charge. On remand, plaintiff will need to show that high-ranking members of police force knew of differing practices of registering sex offenders and allowed them to continue. Moreover, basis for any constitutional violation is 4^th Amendment, rather than due process rights under 14^th Amendment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on statute of limitations grounds plaintiff’s conversion action, alleging that defendant stole plaintiff’s airplane in or before 1984. Instant action was untimely since applicable limitations period was five years, which began in 1985, when plaintiff accused defendant of said theft. Moreover, discovery rule did not require different result, where plaintiff knew by 1985 that his plane had vanished and had taken steps at that time to investigate said loss. Also, plaintiff could not characterize instant alleged theft as continuing violation, since disappearance of plaintiff’s plane was discreet act.

In action seeking declaration that Indiana vehicle forfeiture statute (I.C. 34-24-1-1(a)(1)) was unconstitutional, Ct. of Appeals remanded defendant’s appeal to Dist. Ct. for determination as to whether amendments to said statute addressed any constitutional concerns identified by Dist. Ct., where said amendments were enacted while instant appeal was pending. Dist. Ct. found that said statute was unconstitutional on due process grounds because it allowed for seizure and retention of vehicles without opportunity for individual to challenge pre-forfeiture deprivation. While defendant argued that instant amendments, which provided for probable cause affidavit, motion for provisional release, and shortened window for prosecutor to file forfeiture complaint, satisfied Dist. Ct.’s concerns, Dist. Ct. should have opportunity to address defendants arguments prior to review by Ct. of Appeals.

Defendant-prison violated plaintiff-prisoner’s rights under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where defendant’s refusal to provide plaintiff-prisoner with meat in plaintiff’s meals substantially burdened plaintiff’s exercise of his religion. Record showed that plaintiff observed Islamic hahal dietary restrictions that generally followed Jewish kosher requirements, and that, as cost saving measure, defendant stopped offering defendant and other prisoners kosher meal trays and put defendant and others on vegan diet that would comply with kosher requirements, except that plaintiff’s sect of Islam required its follower to consume meat. Record also showed defendant was providing kosher trays with meat at other prison facilities, and that giving plaintiff kosher trays with meat would not impose any incremental costs to defendant. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly find that for purposes of RLUIPA, providing plaintiff with meatless diet would violate his sincerely held religious beliefs and create substantial burden on his religious exercise, especially where plaintiff could not earn enough in weekly prison wages to purchase meat for the week through prison commissary.  (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion by defendants-plaintiff’s neighbor and Village to dismiss plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants conspired to violate his First Amendment rights by neighbor filing false police reports complaining that plaintiff improperly photographed and filmed neighbor in and around shared condominium building and by police threatening plaintiff with arrest for disorderly conduct if he persisted in photographing and filming neighbor. Plaintiff could not bring section 1983 action against neighbor, since section 1983 does not permit lawsuits based on private conduct. Moreover, plaintiff failed to state viable claim that neighbor and Village acted in concerted effort to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights, since plaintiff did not allege that Village’s police agreed to arrest plaintiff if directed to do so by neighbor. Also, plaintiff could not bring Monell claim against Village, since: (1) plaintiff did not allege that Village anticipated or intended that disorderly conduct ordinance would be enforced to chill lawful, expressive conduct like photography; and (2) plaintiff failed to plausibly allege existence of express policy by defendant to enforce disorderly conduct ordinance unconstitutionally.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-union’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant’s ordinance, which banned all signs on public right-of-way, violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, where plaintiff attempted to place six-foot, “Scabby the Rat” inflatable balloon in public right-of-way at construction site to protest fact that masonry company in defendant’s town was not paying area standard wages and benefits. While plaintiff argued that said ordinance allowed inspector to selectively enforce instant ban so as to render any enforcement as discrimination based on content of speech, Dist. Ct. could properly reject said argument, where inspector testified that he reviewed for compliance all signs that were brought to his attention and enforced ban whenever he saw violation. However, Dist. Ct. improperly acted on plaintiff’s claim that 2015 ordinance, which replaced 2014 ordinance, also violated First Amendment, since plaintiff’s contention regarding protests it might have conducted under 2015 ordinance was too speculative to create concrete dispute.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion to rescind class certification in action alleging that defendant wrongfully imposed interest fees during period when: (1) defendant entered into floor plan agreements with plaintiffs-car dealers that called for defendant to issue plaintiffs line of credit for plaintiffs’ purchase of used vehicles at automobile auctions; and (2) defendant charged plaintiffs interest at time when defendant had not paid funds to auction company that had sold used cars to plaintiffs. While Dist. Ct. found that class certification was inappropriate because floor plan agreements were ambiguous as to when interest charges could begin and because said ambiguities would require extrinsic evidence from plaintiffs as to representations made from defendant, Ct. of Appeals found that record failed to sustain Dist. Ct.’s assumption that commonality and predominance factors were lacking, where: (1) instant floor plan agreements were standard form contracts that would support uniform application and interpretation of contract clauses; (2) ruling on any ambiguity in contract would apply to all signatories of contract; and (3) mere need for extrinsic evidence, by itself, would not render case inappropriate for class litigation.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants wrongfully confiscated his Chicago Daily Law Bulletin that plaintiff’s family bought for him in order to help him with his trial on bank robbery charges, where defendants argued that said legal publication was “newspaper” that violated jail’s ban on prisoners receiving newspapers. Remand was required since Dist. Ct. improperly treated issue in case as to whether jail’s ban on all newspapers violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, rather than on narrower issue as to whether plaintiff had right to receive legal publication like Law Bulletin. Ct. further noted that resolution of such issue required Dist. Ct to consider to consider fact that instant prison had no law library and lacked materials on federal criminal law, and that prison allowed prisoners to receive other publications such as Prison Legal News. Dist. Ct. also should focus on determination as to whether permitting inmates to receive subscriptions to legal publications jeopardized prison’s objectives so as to justify prison’s confiscation of Law Bulletin.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order remanding back to state court plaintiff’s breach of contract, breach of fiduciary, tortious interference and unfair competition claims arising out of contention that defendant had wrongfully transferred investment accounts of plaintiff’s customers to defendant, even though defendant had removed said claims based on contention that plaintiff’s response to previously-filed motion to dismiss raised federal questions regarding legality of plaintiff’s direct participation in security industry that was regulated by Securities Act. Under 28 USC section 1447(d) orders remanding cases back to state court from which they had been removed are generally not reviewable on appeal or otherwise. However, Dist. Ct.’s award of costs and fees to plaintiff as sanction under 28 USC section 1447(c) are reviewable, and Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in awarding $9,035.61 in costs and fees to plaintiff associated with instant removal and remand, where Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant lacked objectively reasonable basis for removing case, where: (1) plaintiff’s complaint did not raise any federal question; and (2) any potential federal defense cannot form basis for removal of essentially state law claims. Moreover, defendant’s removal was untimely, where defendant was or should have been aware of his grounds for removal more than 30 days prior to filing his notice of removal.