Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion under Rule of Crim. Pro. 41(g) for return of property seized by govt., where govt. had initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings under 18 USC section 983 with respect to plaintiff’s watch, $4,035 in cash, plaintiff’s car and nine firearms that had been seized following his arrest on wire fraud charge. Govt. sent plaintiff required notice that plaintiff needed to submit claim for each property seized, and record showed that after govt. denied plaintiff’s claims, plaintiff failed to request reconsideration, which triggered govt.’s entry into “Declaration of Abandonment.” Plaintiff could not use Rule 41(g) to seek return of his property, since instant administrative forfeiture proceedings were civil in nature, and Rule 41(g) could only be used in criminal proceedings. As such, plaintiff’s claims that seized property was illegally seized or that govt. violated plea agreement in seeking instant forfeiture was outside scope of Ct.’s review. Ct. further noted that although govt. had failed to abide by certain deadlines in seeking instant forfeiture, plaintiff failed to raise said failure in Dist. Ct. or on appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his 8^th Amendment rights by providing inadequate nutrition through prison “brunch” program that served only two meals per day. Record showed that brunch program provided adequate nutrition as designed, and plaintiff failed to show that instant defendants were aware of his claim that subordinate prison staff were not serving brunch menus as designed in brunch program and were instead providing inadequate amounts of food to prisoners.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed plaintiff’s appeal of dismissal of her Title VII and ADA actions, where: (1) plaintiff missed relevant 30-day deadline for filing notice of appeal under 28 USC section 2107(a); and (2) while plaintiff timely filed motion to extend time to file notice of appeal, plaintiff’s excuse for seeking extension was fact that she was attempting to find counsel to take case. Instant 30-day deadline for filing notice of appeal is jurisdictional, and plaintiff’s unsworn and unsupported statement that she needed extra time to obtain counsel was insufficient to demonstrate excusable neglect or good cause as required under 28 USC section 2107(c).

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that prohibition for possession of firearms on individuals who have been convicted of crimes having maximum sentences exceeding one year, as contained in 18 USC section 922(g)(1), violated Second Amendment, even though Dist. Ct. found that section 922(g)(1) prevents nonviolent felons from possessing firearms. Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct. decision conflicted with Kanter, 919 F.3d 437.  Moreover, Ct. of Appeals held that section 922(g)(1) applied to plaintiff, where, as here, his maximum sentence on his wire fraud conviction exceeded one year, even though plaintiff received sentence of  three-years' probation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant’s refusal to place his name on primary ballot for Cook County Sheriff due to his inability to obtain 8,236 valid signatures violated his 1^st and 14^th Amendment rights. Instant access requirement was only slight burden, and burden of obtaining said signatures was justified by Illinois’s legitimate interests in preventing voter confusion, blocking frivolous candidates from ballot and protecting integrity of elections. Plaintiff obtained over 5,400 valid signatures, and Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that strict scrutiny analysis applies whenever statute imposes higher ballot-access requirement for countywide office than 5,000 valid signature requirement for statewide offices.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendant-election board’s decision to not approve in-person early voting satellite offices for elections taking place from 2010 to 2016 violated voters’ First and 14^th Amendment rights, Ct. of Appeals vacated Dist. Ct.’s Consent Decree that required defendant to establish five in-person early voting satellite offices for future general elections and two in-person early voting satellite offices for primary elections. Defendant changed voting scheme after issuance of Consent Decree, which replaced precinct-based structure at time of issuance of Consent Decree with vote center plan that required County to have two in-person early voting satellite offices for primary elections and six in-person early voting satellite offices for general elections. As such, Ct. found that vacatur of Consent Decree was required because both parties agreed that Decree should no longer be in effect given change in voting scheme.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants deprived plaintiff of fair trial by eliciting false testimony through coercive interrogation techniques and suggestive identification procedures and by suppressing impeachment evidence that led to his wrongful conviction that was eventually overturned. Although one witness reluctantly identified plaintiff as one of several culprits, plaintiff failed to show that defendants knew that said identification was false, even though coercive techniques were used, since coercive testimony is not necessarily fabricated. Moreover, one victim’s identifications of plaintiff as culprit were sufficiently reliable for defendants to rely on them, where victim stated that she observed plaintiff’s face for three minutes during incident that led to charged offenses and had been previously acquainted with plaintiff for number of years. Also, plaintiff failed to establish that withheld line-up photo that showed discrepancy in wristbands worn by line-up participants was material or played any role in witness’s identification of plaintiff as culprit, where witness did not notice wristbands, but based identification on her recognition of defendant’s face.

Bd. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s appeal of ALJ’s order granting defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant fired plaintiff in retaliation for filing complaint with OSHA. Applicable rules required that plaintiff file petition for review of ALJ’s decision within 14 days of date of decision, and record showed that said petition was not filed until 25 days after date of decision. Moreover, while record showed that decision was mailed to plaintiff’s old address, and that plaintiff’s attorney did not receive ALJ’s decision until the last day of filing period, plaintiff could not invoke equitable tolling to render her petition timely, since: (1) plaintiff’s counsel received email five days prior to deadline that alerted counsel to fact that ALJ had rendered decision in case; and (2) plaintiff’s counsel failed to either file petition or file motion seeking extension of time to file said petition within remaining five days of filing period.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiff’s counsel $10,875 in attorney fees, where plaintiff prevailed in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Fair Credit Reporting Act claim, even though plaintiff’s counsel sought $187,410 in said fees. Record showed that plaintiff was awarded only $1,000 in damages on said claim, and that defendants had prevailed in lion’s share of plaintiff’s other claims, and that plaintiff had disregarded multiple offers to settle case both at outset of action and after defendant had prevailed on summary judgment. Dist. Ct. could also look to fact that defendant had initially offered to settle case for $3,501 plus reasonable fees when determining reasonableness of instant fee request. Moreover, $3,501 plus fees offer was reasonable, where it was more than three times maximum statutory damages that plaintiff could receive, and Dist. Ct. could conclude that vast majority of fees requested by plaintiff’s counsel was for time spent on pursuing unsuccessful and ill-advised efforts to win much bigger payoff than what was remotely possible.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant-police officer’s appeal of Dist. Ct. order denying his motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant used excessive force by shooting him during plaintiff’s arrest, where basis of Dist. Ct.’s denial was finding that record contained disputed facts regarding whether plaintiff was following defendant’s directives at time of shooting. Order denying qualified immunity can be appealed to extent it raised issue of law. However, Dist. Ct.’s determination that factual questions existed surrounding circumstances of shooting precluded instant interlocutory appeal. Moreover, defendant failed to satisfy any route to interlocutory appeal, where defendant failed to accept facts most favorable to plaintiff nor facts assumed by Dist. Ct. when asserting qualified immunity. Fact that shooting incident was captured on video did to require different result.