Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal of Dist. Ct. orders striking plaintiff’s defense that statute of limitations contained in 28 USC section 2462 applied to preclude govt. from imposing tax assessment and denying plaintiff’s motion for judgment on pleadings, even though Dist. Ct. had certified both orders for interlocutory review. Under 28 USC section 1292(b), plaintiff had ten days to seek permission from Ct. of Appeals to review said orders, and instant request was filed 13 days after Dist. Ct.’s certification. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could not enter second certification order for purposes of giving plaintiff another 10-day window to seek interlocutory review with Ct. of Appeals, because 10-day filing period in section 1292(b) is jurisdictional. Ct. overruled Nuclear Engineering, 660 F.2d 241, which had allowed Dist. Ct. to enter second certification order.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed instant appeal of Dist. Ct. order denying plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction, which sought to prevent defendant from awarding state contracts for provision of case management services for individuals with developmental disabilities. Counsel for plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that it would be too disruptive for individuals receiving such services to reinstate original contracts held by plaintiffs at issue in preliminary injunction request, and thus only remedy was to remand case back to Dist. Ct. for consideration of merits of plaintiffs' underlying complaint.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-hospital and police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 claim, alleging that defendants-police and hospital officials violated his 4^th Amendment rights and violated HIPAA provisions when defendants-police officials requested and defendants-hospital official disclosed without plaintiff’s permission results of his blood-test results for presence of alcohol that ultimately led to plaintiff pleading guilty to charge of operating vehicle while intoxicated. Plaintiff could not proceed on any HIPAA claim, since HIPAA provides plaintiff with no private right of action. Moreover, defendants-police officers possessed qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff’s 4^th Amendment claim, where: (1) Indiana statute gave defendants ability to obtain blood-test results from medical personnel; and (2) police officials had no reason to believe via case law that 4^th Amendment barred police from seeking results of blood test that doctor had ordered for medical purposes.

Ct. of Appeals granted portion of petition for writ of mandamus filed by Community Futures Trading Commission seeking to preclude Dist. Ct. from requiring various members of Commission to appear before Dist. Ct. to explain their thinking behind language in press release regarding settlement of case that arguably conflicted with court order precluding parties from making public statements about terms of settlement. While hearing before Dist. Ct. was for purpose of determining whether any Commissioner was guilty of contempt, said Commissioners were not parties to instant settlement, and every member of Commission has right to publicly explain his or her vote. As such, instant consent decree seeking to silence members of Commission was ineffectual. Moreover, while Dist. Ct. was free to determine whether Commission itself was in civil contempt of consent decree, Dist. Ct. could only make such determination through examination of four corners of written statements and other documents, as opposed to summoning Commissioners for purposes of seeking their thoughts behind such statements.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in class action by plaintiffs-condominium owners, who purchased from defendants disclosure documents required for resale of their condominium units, where plaintiff asserted that fees for said documents charged by defendants were excessive in violation of Ill. Condominium Act. Relevant Ill. Condominium Act provision allowing condominium associations ability to charge “reasonable” fee for such documents does not provide plaintiffs with private right of action, and Illinois law does not otherwise imply private right of action for condominium owners, since said Act works for benefit of condominium purchasers as opposed to condominium owners. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ similar Ill. Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act claim, since charging too much for goods or services, standing alone, is not unfair practice under said Act.

Ct. of Appeals entered limited remand for purposes of allowing Dist. Ct. to comply with Rule 65(d) with respect to entry of three orders purporting to impose preliminary injunction. Rule 65(d) requires Dist. Ct. to set forth injunction without referring to any other document, and Dist. Ct. failed to generate document that contained terms of injunction separate from its opinion. Ct. further noted that parties should file new notices of appeal and then file new appellate briefs that covered original injunction, as well as any modifications of original permanent injunction. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-assistant principal’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated her First Amendment rights by retaliating against her for complaining about supervisor’s decision on student discipline issue and violated her due process rights by coercing her resignation. Record showed that plaintiff registered her complaint in her status as employee, as opposed to private citizen, because subject matter of complaint fell within her official duties, and thus First Amendment did not protect her speech. Also, plaintiff failed to establish any due process claim, even though she had protected interest in her continued employment, because employee who resigns and relinquishes her interest in continued employment may not complain about lack of due process. Moreover, although plaintiff could prevail if she showed that her resignation had been involuntary, plaintiff did not show that she had been subjected to constructive discharge, where supervisor merely asked for her resignation, or that her resignation had been coerced, since supervisor, at best, only threatened to fire her.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-City and certain police officers’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant officers violated her 4^th Amendment rights on two occasions when officers entered her home without consent after Airbnb guest reported theft in plaintiff’s home, and when officers subsequently entered plaintiff’s home to help with evacuation of plaintiff’s home after building inspectors discovered 32 code violations. Police had valid consent to enter plaintiff’s home on first occasion when Airbnb guest gave officer code to unlock front gate, and where two other guests allowed officer to enter plaintiff’s home. With respect to second entry, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting officers qualified immunity, where: (1) plaintiff acknowledged that officers’ entry was due to safety concerns; and (2) officers relied on inspectors’ representations that plaintiff’s home was danger to its occupants and to public due to existence of code violations. As such, reasonable officer could have believed that entry into plaintiff’s home was reasonable.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoners’ section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his primary lateral sclerosis condition by failing to ensure that he received proper follow-up care after his surgery and by allowing undue delays in his treatment by outside specialists. Plaintiff was required to show that delay in his treatment, as opposed to his underlying medical condition, caused some harm, and that defendants’ actions caused delays in treatment. Moreover, plaintiff failed to make such requisite showing, where: (1) defendant-physician’s decision to wait for test results before referring defendant to specialists was not evidence of deliberate indifference and was consistent with reasonable medical judgment; (2) defendant-physician responded to plaintiff’s changing symptoms and was responsive to specialists’ recommendations; and (3) defendant did was he could within limits of his role in treating plaintiff. Also, plaintiff failed to show that defendant-entity was indifferent to his medical needs, where: (1) plaintiff failed to show that prison’s onsite medical facilities were insufficient to cover plaintiff’s medical needs during periods in which plaintiff was waiting for treatment provided by outside specialists; and (2) plaintiff lacked evidence that defendant entity was on notice that wait times for outside treatment were likely to cause constitutional violations.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine to consider and then resolve plaintiffs’ action alleging that defendants conspired to deprive them of several goats and horses, where state-court had previously entered orders finding probable cause to seize said animals and then ordering permanent placement of said animals. Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments, applied where instant federal action was “inextricably intertwined” with prior state court action, and state court’s finding of probable cause and seizure of said animals produced injury claimed by plaintiffs in instant action. Moreover, plaintiffs had opportunities to litigate instant claims in state court.