Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint alleging that defendant-County’s ban on assault rifles and large-capacity magazines violated plaintiffs’ 2^nd Amendment rights. Ct. noted that plaintiffs’ lawsuit was materially indistinguishable from 2^nd Amendment challenge contained in ordinance at issue in Friedman, 784 F.3d 406, in which Ct. had upheld similar ban on assault rifles, and plaintiff failed to articulate compelling reason to revisit outcome in Friedman, where: (1) reducing dangerousness of crime and making public feel safer were substantial interests that justified instant ban; and (2) instant ban did not leave residents without other means of self-defense. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that there were material distinctions between Highland Park residents in Friedman and Cook County residents in instant case so as to justify different outcome than in Friedman.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s negligence action, where Dist. Ct. found that instant lawsuit was untimely because, although plaintiff tendered complaint to prison official prior to expiration of limitations period, court clerk did not receive complaint until after expiration of limitations period. Under Indiana’s prison mail box rule, court filing is timely if pro se prisoner litigant submits filing to prison official for mailing on or before its due date and prisoner provides verifiable documentation supporting claim that document was timely submitted to prison official for mailing. Plaintiff satisfied said rule by submitting affidavit from prison counselor, who stated that plaintiff submitted complaint to him six days before limitations period had expired, and that he notarized and delivered it to mail room on same day.

In prosecution on section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-police officers used excessive force by shooting plaintiff during his apprehension in parking lot incident in which defendants claimed that plaintiff had aimed gun at them, Dist. Ct. did not err in giving jury Gilbert (512 F.3d 899) instruction that informed jurors that plaintiff was bound by prior finding of guilt in probation revocation proceeding, during which court found that plaintiff had gun during instant parking lot incident. Record showed that Dist. Ct. read such instruction each time plaintiff or his witnesses testified that plaintiff did not have handgun during said incident. Gilbert instruction is essentially issue-preclusion instruction that properly served to preclude plaintiff from disputing fact that he possessed gun during parking lot due to prior finding that he had gun during said incident. Similarly, Dist. Ct. did not err in barring testimony of lab technician, where said testimony was proffered to bolster plaintiff’s claim that he had no gun during incident.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison nurses’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs associated with his sickle cell disease, where defendants did not continue to prescribe oxycodone and hydrocodone, as prescribed by outside physicians and prescribed instead milder Tylenol #3 for plaintiff’s pain complaints. Prisoner generally cannot prevail on claim that prison medical staff had preference for one medication over another, unless there was evidence of substantial departure from acceptable professional judgment. Moreover, one defendant used such medical judgment in treating plaintiff’s pain via Tylenol #3, given risks associated with opiod use and high amount of oxycodone prescribed for plaintiff. Also, plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to his claim that second defendant failed to treat his pain, where, although plaintiff contended that he had filed internal appeal with prison authorities, record suggested that he had not filed such appeal, and plaintiff failed to make inquiry of prison officials as to why he had not received receipt indicating that he had filed said appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiffs’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction, alleging that Indiana’s law (“Act 442“), which allowed State to immediately remove voters based on information received from third-party database, rather than in response to direct contact with voters violated National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). Plaintiffs-non-profit organizations had standing to bring instant action, where plaintiffs established that they would suffer concrete and particularized injury in terms of diverted limited resources that they would be forced to use to correct erroneous voter removal, which had “real-world” impact on their specific core missions. Moreover, plaintiffs established likelihood of success on merits of case, since new process under Act 442 for removing voters would not comport with NVRA, because Act 442 improperly omits any requirement that State have direct contact with voter prior to voter’s removal. Ct. further noted that accuracy or lack thereof of State’s information concerning voter’s change in residence made no difference under NVRA, and mere fact that voter registered in different state did not constitute evidence that said voter requested removal from Indiana’s voter roll.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s request for issuance of preliminary injunction to ban enforcement of Indiana law that required parental notification of minor’s planned abortion unless judge found in bypass proceeding that such notice was not in minor’s “best interest.” Plaintiff showed likelihood of success on merits of case, where Indiana’s notice law created substantial risk of practical veto over mature, but yet unemancipated minor’s choice to obtain abortion. This is so, Ct. observed, since: (1) parental notification bypass granted to plaintiff’s minor patients had generally been based on juvenile court’s finding that minor was sufficiently mature, which was not basis for excusing parental notice under instant Indiana law; and (2) statute’s effect for mature minors would deter such individuals from even seeking bypass in first place. Ct. further noted that: (1) new parental notification requirement did not address any problem that it was intended to solve; and (2) burden of instant law on minors considering judicial bypass was greater than effect of judicial bypass on parent’s authority. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-jail officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants unreasonably denied plaintiff’s request for mattress during day-time hours to accommodate his osteoarthritis condition, as well as violated his due process rights by writing false disciplinary tickets to keep him locked up. Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss his due process claim, since plaintiff had failed to administratively exhaust his administrative remedies, where he never successfully appealed said discipline arising out of said tickets to jail’s administrator as required by jail’s rules. Also, with respect to plaintiff’s medical claim, record showed that defendants diligently attended to plaintiff’s medical needs and adjusted his treatment plan in response to plaintiff’s complaints. Moreover, record established that defendants had provided mattress for his cell, and that plaintiff’s request for second mattress was medically unnecessary.

In action by plaintiff-provider of medication abortions, alleging that various aspects of Indiana’s abortion regime violated 14^th Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses, under circumstances where defendants-state officials had failed to grant plaintiff’s application to operate abortion facility, Dist. Ct. erred in entering preliminary injunction to extent that said injunction would exempt plaintiff from defendant’s licensing requirements, since defendants may use licensing as legitimate means of vetting and monitoring abortion providers. However, issue remains as to whether defendants have used licensing requirements to improperly mask decision to deny all such licensing requests by making unreasonable requests for information. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that entry of preliminary injunction was necessary because defendants’ handling of plaintiff’s application was unsupported and outweighed by substantial burden state was imposing on women. Ct., however, modified injunction to direct defendants to treat plaintiff as if it had provisional license to operate abortion facility until Dist. Ct. issues final decision on plaintiff’s due process and equal protection claims.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ action, alleging that defendants violated Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, when defendant’s misled plaintiffs to believe that cat food sold by defendants required pet prescription from veterinarian, where said cat food was not materially different from lower-priced nonprescription cat food, and where prescription requirement was illusory. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s claim was barred by statutory safe harbor for conduct specifically authorized by U.S. Food and Drug Administration, safe harbor provision did not apply, since FDA issued guidance did not specifically authorize conduct alleged here. Moreover, plaintiffs adequately alleged that defendants’ marketing practices were deceptive, where no prescription was necessary to obtain instant cat food, and where plaintiffs saw specific prescription language when they made their purchases and suffered damages because they paid higher price for said cat food.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment alleging that they were entitled to qualified immunity in plaintiff-transgender prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s repeated requests for sex-reassignment surgery instead of defendant providing cross-gender hormone treatment violated her 8^th Amendment rights because defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs. Plaintiff failed to provide any case law that warned defendants that treating inmates’ gender dysphoria with hormone therapy and deferring consideration of sex-reassignment surgery violated Constitution. As such, defendants were immune from liability. Ct. further noted that it was doubtful that plaintiff could establish case of deliberate indifference, where defendants followed accepted medical standards that recommended that individuals such as plaintiff undergo “real life” experiences as person of their self-identified gender for one year before resorting to irreversible surgical options. (Dissent filed.)