Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction plaintiffs-Illinois residents’ action against defendants-residents of Virginia and Canada, alleging breach of contract and fraud arising out of alleged failure to pay plaintiffs for royalties on sales of plaintiffs’ patented products. Defendants submitted affidavits indicating that it lacked sufficient contacts in Illinois to establish personal jurisdiction. Fact that plaintiffs’ counsel submitted online purchase receipt from defendant’s website plus declaration that he purchased and received in Illinois single patented product at issue in case did not require different result, since: (1) specific jurisdiction should not be exercised based on single sale in forum; (2) Illinois sale of plaintiffs’ patented products was not issue in case; and (3) plaintiffs’ attempt to salvage personal jurisdiction by luring defendants into shipping product into Illinois came only after defendants had filed instant motion to dismiss.

Dist. Ct. lacked authority to enter order directing defendants in instant condemnation action to transfer $2.8 million in reserved funds held by HUD to account designated by plaintiff for benefit of certain properties at issue in condemnation action. Defendants had no control over reserve funds, condemnation action had been completed at time of entry of instant order, and HUD had already been dismissed as party in condemnation action. As such, to extent that defendants claim ownership of reserve funds due to contract they had with HUD, defendants must file new action against HUD in either Ct. of Federal Claims or in Dist. Ct., where 18 USC section 1702 provides jurisdiction to resolve question regarding ownership of reserve funds.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant violated Fair Credit Reporting Act, when defendant reported to plaintiff’s prospective landlord that plaintiff had pleaded guilty to battery charge in 1996 and received six-month supervision sentence that caused landlord to reject plaintiff’s rental application. Act prohibits disclosure of any arrest record of over seven years, but allows agencies to report convictions no matter how old, and Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that her successful completion of her supervision sentence precluded defendant from reporting her battery conviction, even though under state law her battery charge was dismissed after her completion of her supervision sentence. Ct. further found that federal definition of conviction applied, and that plaintiff’s guilty plea and sentence of supervision qualified as conviction under federal law. As such, defendant did not violate Act when it reported plaintiff’s battery conviction to her prospective landlord.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-State’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act (Act) violated Second Amendment as applied to plaintiffs-out-of-state residents, where defendant refused to issue concealed carry licenses to plaintiffs, because they live in states that did not have substantially similar licensing standards to standards used by defendant for issuance of concealed carry licenses to in-state residents under said Act. Record showed that: (1) monitoring compliance of out-of-state residents is limited in material ways by defendant’s inability to obtain complete and timely information about nonresidents, especially concerning arrests for domestic violence or mental health commitments that occur after submission of license application; (2) Illinois cannot compel such information from other states or obtain said information from national databases; and (3) instant plaintiffs reside in states that do not have comparable concealed carry licensing standards. As such, said Act did not violate Second Amendment since Act’s approach to issue concealed carry licenses only to in-state residents and out-of-state residents who live in states that have substantially similar licensing requirements serves as adequate assurance that individuals licensed to carry firearms in public remain fit and qualified to do so. Ct. further rejected plaintiffs’ claim that said Act violated Privileges and Immunities Clause. (Dissent filed.)

Ct. of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction plaintiff’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order dismissing under Cable Communications Policy Act plaintiff’s action against certain defendants alleging that defendants’ addition of fiber optic communications wire to utilities transmission tower located on plaintiff’s property exceeded scope of utilities easement that authorized said tower. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff’s similar action against defendant-tower owner remained pending after portion of plaintiff’s case against remaining defendants had been dismissed; and (2) plaintiff subsequently entered into agreement with defendant-tower owner to conditionally dismiss his case against said defendant, but that plaintiff could revive said claim if Ct. of Appeals had reversed dismissal of plaintiff’s case against remaining defendants in instant appeal. As such, said conditional dismissal rendered dismissal order at issue in instant appeal non-final and not appealable under 28 USC section 1291. Ct. further noted that plaintiff could have attempted to seek appeal under Rule 54(b) or 28 USC section 1292(b).

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment filed by defendants-entity providing medical treatment to prisoners and four individuals providing said treatment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that pain experienced by defendants’ delay in rendering various treatments/surgeries on his knees constituted 8^th Amendment violation. Dist. Ct. could properly find that instant delays between treatments were consistent with appropriate medical judgment, and that plaintiff’s failure to establish that any of the four individual defendants/employees of defendant-entity were negligent in treating plaintiff precluded plaintiff from establishing that defendant-entity was liable to plaintiff under doctrine of respondeat superior based on employees' conduct. Also, Ct. noted that although defendant-entity could be liable for its own unconstitutional policies, defendant-entity could not be liable here, where none of said policies cited by plaintiff resulted in plaintiff receiving inappropriate medical treatment.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for lack of standing/lack of jurisdiction plaintiffs’ action under Telephone Consumer Protection Act, alleging that defendants sent plaintiffs unsolicited fax advertisements. Plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged viable injury, where plaintiffs asserted that instant fax ads wasted their paper and ink, as well as their time. Also, defendants could not point to potential affirmative defense that they had preexisting business relationship with plaintiffs to resolve instant matter on its merits at pleading stage of proceeding. Ct. further rejected defendants’ proposition that unless plaintiffs could prove injury from violation of law, their lawsuit must be dismissed for lack of case or controversy, since any failure by plaintiffs to establish case on merits did not divest Dist. Ct. of jurisdiction over instant case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-school district’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-private school’s action alleging that defendant’s policy providing that it would only bus plaintiff’s students to plaintiff’s school if said children lived more than one mile from nearest public transportation stop, while providing busing for public school students who attended citywide schools or non-attendance area schools violated equal protection clause. Dist. Ct. could properly apply rational-basis test to instant lawsuit and find that defendant satisfied said test, where policy addressed defendant’s legitimate interest in reducing overcapacity in crowded public school attendance-area schools and in expanding special program access to its students, and where easing transportation for private school students would do little to further defendant’s goals. Also, defendant could use cost savings argument to justify policy. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in granting defendant’s summary judgment motion with respect to defendant’s requirement that private schools submit by July 1, list of students needing busing services, since, although such requirement is constitutional on its face, remand was required for determination as to whether there were heightened burdens associated with private school students who enrolled after July 1 deadline that did not exist for similar late-enrolling public-school students. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s action alleging that 18 USC section 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat section 941.29(1m), which prohibited plaintiff from possessing firearm due to his felony mail fraud conviction, were unconstitutional under Second Amendment, even though defendant argued that both statutes were unconstitutional as applied to him, where his felony conviction was for non-violent offense. Dist. Ct. could properly find that both statutes were substantially related to govt.’s important interest in preventing gun violence, and that both statutes could properly disqualify all felons from having firearms, even those individuals committing non-violent felonies, because felons are more likely to abuse firearms. Ct. of Appeals further noted that: (1) prior case law has concluded that section 922(g)(1) does not violate Second Amendment on its face; (2) evidence is inconclusive as to whether individuals committing non-violent felonies historically enjoyed Second Amendment rights; and (3) defendant’s serious mail fraud conviction precluded him from challenging constitutionality of section 922(g)(1) as applied to him.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that 26 USC section 107(2) of Internal Revenue Code, which excludes housing allowances from ministers’ taxable income, was unconstitutional under First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Ct. of Appeals, in finding section 107(2) to be constitutional under test set forth in Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, concluded that section 107(2) had secular purpose that neither endorsed nor inhibited religion and did not otherwise cause excessive government entanglement in religion. Ct. further found that section 107(2) passed historical significance test, where plaintiff failed to provide evidence that exemption like one contained in section 107(2) was historically viewed as establishment of religion.