Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in entering Stipulated Final Judgment Order in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-County police officials violated his 4^th Amendment rights by detaining him after resolution of his traffic offense for purpose of cooperating with ICE officials who had previously requested that plaintiff be detained so that they could resolve plaintiff’s immigration issues, where said Order contained permanent injunction precluding defendants from cooperating with ICE official who do not have at time of detention request warrants establishing probable cause on criminal offense. Plaintiff failed to establish case or controversy with defendants to support issuance of permanent injunction, where plaintiff incurred only single incident, and where plaintiff failed to show likelihood that he would experience another incident given fact that he did not live in defendant’s County. As such, plaintiff could not seek and Dist. Ct. could not order instant permanent injunctive relief. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in denying State of Indiana’s motion to intervene that was filed within 30 days after entry of instant Order. State demonstrated that it had direct and significant interest in defending state statute that allowed defendants to cooperate with ICE officials’ detention requests. Moreover, no party named in complaint shared State's interests, and State’s motion was otherwise timely where it was filed prior to due date for notice of appeal, and where State could not be faulted for failing to file said request sooner, even though case was widely reported by media prior to entry of instant Order.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support govt. complaint under section 15(b) of Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), where defendant’s subsidiary failed to timely report to govt. potentially hazardous product defect regarding handle on its 12-cup coffee carafe that caused handle to split from carafe and cause consumers to burn themselves, where by time it filed said report in 2012, defendant had received around 1,600 consumer complaints regarding said defect after defendant had initially received 60 complaints about defect by May of 2009. While defendant argued that instant complaint was not timely under relevant 5-year limitation period, since plaintiff could have initiated proceeding in May of 2009, Ct. of Appeals found that instant reporting requirement was continuing one, such that limitation period did not start until defendant had actually filed required report in 2012. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly enter into forward-looking injunction to prevent future violations of CPSA, and could also require defendant to hire expert to assist it in said compliance.

Dist. Ct. erred in failing to grant plaintiff-legally blind prisoner’s motion for recruitment of counsel in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. While Dist. Ct. found that based on plaintiff’s adequate pleadings plaintiff was competent to litigate case on his own during advanced pre-trial stages of his litigation, Ct. of Appeals vacated Dist. Ct.’s order granting defendants’ summary judgment motion, where Dist. Ct. should have granted plaintiff’s motion to recruit counsel. Specifically, Dist. Ct.: (1) failed to provide particularized analysis regarding plaintiff’s ability to litigate his case; and (2) failed to consider legal and practical difficulties that plaintiff’s case presented given his blindness and his allegation that discovery would be especially difficult because defendants had already engaged in uncooperative behavior, and because underlying claims occurred at different prison facilities, which created challenges in identifying defendants. Ct. rejected defendants’ claim that lawyer would not have made difference in outcome of case and noted that plaintiff did not procure medical expert, failed to take any depositions and failed to compel defendants to provide answers to many of his interrogatories.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants denied him due process/committed Brady violation by withholding videotape showing lineup in which several witnesses identified different individual as shooter, as well as interview notes showing that other suspect in instant murder had switched his story about his whereabouts at time of shooting. Plaintiff had previously obtained writ of habeas corpus, after court found that Brady violation had occurred, and state decided not to re-try him. Moreover, record contained evidence of possible due process/Brady violation with respect to suppression of videotape, where trier-of fact could conclude that defendant had intentionally withheld videotape from prosecutors after holding said videotape for 14 months and otherwise concealing said videotape from prosecutors. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in finding, with respect to suppression of interview notes, that: (1) deposition of third-party indicating that he was aware that other suspect had changed his story relieved defendants of any liability for withholding of notes; and (2) there was no Brady violation by instant defendants since prosecution was aware of information found in notes. Ct. further found that withholding of such evidence was material, and that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable cause of action plaintiff’s defamation action, alleging that it incurred reputational harm from article published in American Bar Association law journal. While plaintiffs argued that four statements contained in article were defamatory per se because they falsely implied that its forensic experts do not meet published professional training standards for forensic examiners, fair reading of article indicated that subject statements were expressions of author’s opinions on how judges should attend to their gate-keeping obligations under Daubert that were protected under First Amendment and were not objectively verifiable facts. As such, plaintiff appropriate avenue for expressing contrary point of view was through rebuttal article and not defamation lawsuit.  Also, plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim for deceptive advertising was also not viable, where article only expressed author’s opinion.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff-tribe’s action under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) seeking to enjoin defendant-competing tribe from expanding its casino to include more slot machines, as well as restaurant and hotel on grounds that defendant’s casino was not located on parcel of land that was held in trust on behalf of defendant-tribe as of October 17, 1988, and that defendant-tribe’s existing casino was “primary” gaming facility, as opposed to “ancillary” gaming facility as required in defendant-State’s contract with defendant tribe. Record showed that Dept. of Interior took subject parcel into trust for defendant-tribe in 1986, and plaintiff’s claim that Dept. should not have done so expired in 1992. Moreover, while plaintiff wants defendant-State of Wisconsin to enforce “ancillary” language, said request is not cognizable remedy under IGRA, and thus plaintiff lacks any federal rights under Wisconsin’s contract with defendant-tribe to enforce said language. Ct. further found that Wisconsin’s six-year limitation period applied to plaintiff’s contract claim, and that instant lawsuit was filed beyond said period.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss her complaint with prejudice. Record showed that plaintiff did not explicitly say in her motion that she sought dismissal without prejudice, that defendants had already filed answer to said complaint, and that although defendants urged Dist. Ct. to dismiss case with prejudice, plaintiff filed reply indicating that she sought dismissal without prejudice. As such, under Rule 41(a)(2), Dist. Ct. should have given plaintiff opportunity to withdraw her voluntary dismissal motion before entering instant dismissal with prejudice order.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-debt-collector’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-debtor’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim, alleging that defendant wrongfully attempted to collect time-barred debt. Record showed that plaintiff had made last payment on debt in August of 2010 and attempted to make another payment in June of 2011, but said payment did not clear. Defendant, whose client purchased plaintiff’s delinquent account from original creditor, then sued plaintiff in February of 2016, and state court dismissed said lawsuit because last actual payment in August of 2010 occurred outside applicable 5-year limitation period. Dist. Ct. could properly find that bona fide error defense applied, where: (1) defendant made mere factual mistake by using wrong date of plaintiff’s last payment from data supplied to defendant by its client; (2) defendant was unaware that June 2011 payment did not clear; (3) defendant had received affidavit from client that data in report was accurate; and (4) procedures used by defendant, which included review by attorney on limitations issues, as well as automated scrub that culled out-of-statute debts, were reasonable precautions designed to prevent attempts to collect time-barred debts, even though mistake was made in instant case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion to preliminarily enjoin plaintiff from installing billboard without complying with ordinance that required plaintiff to obtain sign permit prior to constructing billboard. While plaintiff argued that ordinance’s ban on plaintiff constructing instant “off premises” sign or instant pole sign constituted violation of 1^st Amendment, Dist. Ct. could properly enter instant restraining order until Dist. Ct. could rule on plaintiff’s 1^st Amendment claims. Moreover, Dist. Ct. properly rejected plaintiff’s motion for entry of preliminary injunction on its procedural due process claim based on its contention that stop work order drafted by defendant failed to include certain information, since such claim had no likelihood of success, where: (1) plaintiff had no constitutional due process right to defendant’s compliance with state mandated procedures; and (2) plaintiff had post-deprivation remedy under Indiana Tort Claims Act to address its alternative procedural due process claim that defendant’s issuance of arrest threats improperly served to stop plaintiff from constructing billboard. Ct also observed that defendant’s threats of arrest were too tepid to support substantive due process claim.