Federal Civil Practice

Magistrate Judge had authority to dismiss instant section 1983 action filed by plaintiff-prisoner, alleging that defendants-prison nurses were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, where said dismissal occurred at initial screening stage of proceeding prior to time defendants had been served with lawsuit and after Magistrate Judge had found that plaintiff had failed to state viable cause of action. Record showed that Wisc. Dept. of Justice had entered into memorandum of understanding that granted limited consent for Magistrate Judge to conduct initial screenings of civil cases involving prisoners, and plaintiff had given general consent for Magistrate Judge to resolve entire case. As such, Magistrate Judge had authority to screen case and issue instant dismissal order under 28 USC section 636(c). Also, Magistrate Judge could properly find that plaintiff had failed to state viable cause of action, where: (1) allegations in complaint merely showed that defendants exercised medical judgment when examining plaintiff; and (2) plaintiff’s allegations showed, at best, that defendants were negligent in failing to refer defendant to emergency room at earlier time.

Record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support removal of instant state-court class action, alleging that defendant improperly used class members’ photographs to promote defendant’s product, where defendant’s notice of removal merely stated that proposed class “undoubtedly would include at least some undetermined number of non-Illinois and Non-Delaware citizens as class plaintiffs.” Class Action Fairness Act permits removal of proposed class action as long as defendant can show that one member of class is citizen of state different from any one defendant, and defendant’s notice of removal failed to identify said member. As such, limited remand (which would allow defendant to conduct discovery) was required for defendant to identify such class member in order for Dist. Ct. to acquire jurisdiction over case and to allow Ct. of Appeals to consider issues raised by plaintiff class on appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-former employer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-former employee’s defamation action, alleging that defendant’s placement of plaintiff’s name on restriction list and statement that plaintiff was suspended in connection with corruption investigation and that he posed significant and unacceptable compliance risk, falsely suggested that he had engaged in criminal misconduct. Fact that plaintiff had been suspended in connection with corruption investigation was not defamatory because it was true statement. Moreover, defendant’s expression that plaintiff posed compliance risk was not defamatory because it was statement of opinion that could not be proven false.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-prisoner and former prison psychologist’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants' denial of their request to marry violated their fundamental right to marry. Record showed that both plaintiffs had violated prison rules by engaging in romantic relationship while plaintiff psychologist worked at plaintiff’s prison, and that psychologist had violated code of professional conduct in maintaining said relationship. As such, defendants could properly deny instant request to marry, given defendants’ right to maintain secure prison facility that was capable of monitoring inmate contacts, and given their right to promote respect for prison’s rules. Ct. noted, though, that plaintiff-prisoner was not precluded from making marriage request in future.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs by failing to treat stroke that occurred during weekend when defendant was on call. Record showed that defendant had previously undergone treatment for kidney dialysis and had reported symptoms of asymmetrical grip strength and facial droop that were both stroke symptoms and side effects of said dialysis. Moreover, defendant, after being told of said symptoms, was also told by prison nurse that plaintiff did not have stroke. Thereafter, defendant instructed nurse to inform him during weekend if plaintiff’s symptoms got worse, and record did not indicate that defendant was ever told of plaintiff’s deteriorating symptoms during weekend until defendant examined plaintiff on following Monday. As such, plaintiff could not prevail on instant 8^th Amendment claim, where there was no evidence that: (1) information relayed to defendant would have led minimally competent doctor to conclude that plaintiff was at risk of stroke, as opposed to side effects of dialysis; (2) defendant actually believed that plaintiff was victim of stroke when first told of his symptoms and then failed to take appropriate measures to address said belief.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to modify his 2013 settlement agreement that served to satisfy forfeiture order that required defendant to pay govt. $15 million plus his entire interest in entity that was involved in racketeering and wire and mail fraud charges that formed basis of his conviction. Instant action was essentially civil in nature, where defendant sought injunctive relief via immediate transfer of property at issue in contract between himself and govt. However, defendant could not prevail on his claim that agreement was either procedurally or substantively unconscionable, where: (1) agreement was product of intensive negotiation between govt. and defendant; (2) agreement contained language indicating that defendant accepted terms of settlement’s property division in lieu of any prior claims to properties mentioned in agreement; and (3) defendant had previously obtained favorable ruling by seeking strict enforcement of language in agreement. Ct. similarly rejected defendant’s ex-wife’s appeal of denial of her motion to intervene in defendant’s action for purposes of asserting her own rights to properties at issue in defendant’s settlement agreement, where: (1) ex-wife had her own 2010 settlement agreement with govt. that awarded her $7.7 million arising out of said properties; and (2) terms of her own settlement precluded her from asserting rights to properties at issue in defendant’s settlement agreement until govt. had asserted no further interests in said properties, and record showed govt. was still asserting its interests in said properties at time of ex-wife’s motion to intervene.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff’s primary insurance company’s action against defendants-two Taiwan insurance companies, where plaintiff sought indemnification for products-liability settlement that plaintiff paid on insured’s behalf for accident that occurred in Texas, where each defendant provided insured with “worldwide” products-liability coverage in agreements with insured. Dist. Ct. could properly find that neither defendant had purposely availed themselves of privilege of conducting business in Wisc., where: (1) neither defendant had solicited insured’s business or targeted Wisc. market; (2) defendants’ agreement were negotiated and drafted in Taiwan with Taiwanese companies; (3) said agreements required that disputes be resolved in Taiwan through use of Taiwan law; and (4) neither defendant visited Wisc. or contacted anyone residing there. Fact that defendants provided “worldwide coverage” or that defendants may be liable to insured did not require different result or establish sufficient contact with state of Wisc. to establish personal jurisdiction over defendants.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officials and prosecutors' motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his 4^th Amendment rights by generating false statements in first of three probable cause affidavits that led to his arrest and retrial on murder charges for which plaintiff was eventually acquitted. Statements linking plaintiff to murders contained in first probable cause affidavit that were known to be false by certain defendants came from clearly unqualified forensic expert, and thus jury in instant case could properly conclude that said statements, which formed core of affidavit’s inculpatory information against plaintiff, were made intentionally or with reckless disregard for truth. Moreover, remaining evidence in affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause against plaintiff. However, Dist. Ct. could properly grant defendants’ summary judgment motion with respect to second-and third probable cause affidavits at issue in subsequent retrial of murder charges, where: (1) other qualified experts had confirmed blood-splatter conclusion of expert in first affidavit; and (2) govt. produced other evidence in said affidavits linking plaintiff to murders. Also, plaintiff may proceed to trial on Brady claim that defendants withheld favorable evidence where record showed that: (1) defendants failed to inform plaintiff of lack of qualifications of first expert; and (2) defendants failed to inform plaintiff that it had failed to run DNA test that it had promised to do. Too, instant Brady claim was timely, where it was filed within two years of date that criminal proceedings had terminated in plaintiff’s favor.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-deputy marshall’s action under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that U.S. Marshall’s directive to plaintiff’s co-workers not to speak with defendant without prior approval during plaintiff’s attempts to gather evidence in support of his defense on charges of witness tampering and use of excessive force in violation of third-party’s civil rights, where Dist Ct. found that said action was precluded under FTCA. Plaintiff accused govt. of malicious prosecution with respect to instant charges that were eventually dismissed. However, Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s claim was precluded under discretionary-function exemption of section 2680(a) of FTCA, where: (1) U.S. Marshall’s directive to plaintiff’s co-workers not to speak with defendant entailed element of judgment or choice; and (2) said directive was based on considerations of public policy. Ct. further observed that while plaintiff argued that instant directive violated Constitution, he still could not prevail under FTCA, since FTCA is inapplicable to constitutional torts.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-medical personnel’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action filed by plaintiff-patient in County medical facility, where plaintiff alleged that defendants violated his substantive due process rights by providing constitutionally inadequate medical care, including taking him off 1 to 1 observation that had been in place to control his severe mental problems, and by placing scissors in his room that allowed him to self-mutilate himself. Record showed that removing plaintiff from 1 to 1 observation was matter of professional judgment that was supported by other medical personnel and was insufficient to establish viable section 1983 action. Moreover, although Constitution imposes on State affirmative duty of care and protection to certain individuals, plaintiff failed to show that medical decisions made by defendants were substantial departures from accepted professional judgment, especially where plaintiff underwent frequent mental assessments, and where defendants had perception that plaintiff’s mental state had improved at time of removal of 1 to 1 observation. Also, plaintiff failed to establish who had left scissors in his hospital room.