Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting summary judgment with respect to two defendants-prison lieutenant and prison nurse in section 1983 action alleging that said defendants failed to act on plaintiff-prisoner’s complaints of severe back pain that, according to plaintiff, precluded him from getting out of his prison bunk bed. Plaintiff’s diagnosed muscle spasm was sufficiently severe to qualify as serious medical condition for 8^th Amendment purposes, and jury could reasonably find that said defendants exhibited deliberate indifference by delaying plaintiff’s treatment for 1.5 hours between time they learned of plaintiff’s severe pain to time defendant’s were prompted to do something by prison doctor. Fact that both defendants had blamed plaintiff for their inaction because plaintiff had failed to follow their directives did not require different result, since, under plaintiff’s version of facts, he could not physically comply with said directives. Ct. further expressed concern about defendant’s inability to produce videotape of plaintiff’s cell for two-hour period when plaintiff initially reported his pain.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that she was subjected to false arrest and malicious prosecution based on incident, where plaintiff was arrested for criminal trespass on land that she used to own, but where land had been foreclosed on by third-party. Record showed existence of probable cause to support plaintiff’s arrest, where third-party had sent plaintiff email on day before her arrest warning her to stay off land, and that her continued presence on land would be addressed by police. As such, plaintiff’s conduct met all elements of offense for criminal trespass under 720 ILCS section 5/21-3(a)(1)-(3), where plaintiff had received prior warning that landowner had not authorized her trespass. Fact that plaintiff claimed that she entered land as employee of another entity, or that police could have removed her from land without arresting her were immaterial.

In action seeking damages to granulator manufactured by defendant that plaintiff claimed were caused by either failure to install fire-suppression system or by defects in filters essential to eliminate flammable dust stemming from exhaust of said machine, Dist. Ct. did not err in allowing plaintiff to argue to jury that filters in granulator were defective even though plaintiff had admitted prior to trial that it “was not presently aware of anyone that observed cracked, chipped or poorly fitting filters in granulator” or that plaintiff had not discovered “any evidence that one or more of the granulator filters or filter housings was cracked, chipped or poorly fitting” at time of fire. Evidence used by plaintiff at trial did not controvert its admissions, since plaintiff had only “indirect evidence” suggesting that one or more filters may have been cracked at time of fire. Moreover, while plaintiff should have used procedures set forth in Rule 36(b) to seek withdrawal of any prior admission, Dist. Ct. had informally used said procedure in allowing plaintiff to argue that filters were defective, and any failure to formally invoke Rule 36(b) was harmless, when all evidence in case is considered. (Dissent filed.)

In section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants-prison guards were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, where said officers had failed to prevent his attempted suicide, Dist. Ct. did not err in failing to admit videotaped statement of plaintiff’s witness, who indicated that defendants had ignored plaintiff’s requests to see members of jail’s crisis staff shortly before plaintiff’s attempted suicide. Defendant’s counsel had previously stipulated to not objecting to admission of statement, which was made three hours after suicide attempt, and exclusion of statement was prejudicial, where: (1) although witness testified at trial, witness had poor recollection of incident; (2) videotaped statement included damaging statements about what defendants knew immediately prior to plaintiff’s attempted suicide; and (3) evidence at trial was closely balanced. Fact that statement constituted hearsay evidence did not require different result, since: (1) defendant had stipulated to its admission; and (2) agreements to waive hearsay objections are enforceable. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to order colonoscopy and endoscopy to diagnose his persistent abdominal pain. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff’s abdominal pain and colon spasms were investigated thoroughly, and that defendants’ investigation substantiated only diagnosis of irritable bowel syndrome; and (2) defendants performed series of tests that could not pinpoint source of abdominal pain. Fact that defendants did not order colonoscopy was matter of medical judgment that was not actionable in instant section 1983 action.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-FBI’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action under Freedom of Information Act seeking un-redacted records of FBI investigation that resulted in criminal prosecution of one state police officer, who pleaded guilty to theft charge. While plaintiff sought names of FBI agents involved in investigation, as well as names of state police officers who assisted FBI and names of state police officers who were investigated but charged with any crime, defendant could properly invoke exemption to preclude disclosure of “personnel and medical files” that would constitute unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, since: (1) said disclosure could endanger FBI and state police officers by identifying them to gangsters still involved in criminal activities at issue in investigation; and (2) disclosure of investigated officers who were not charged with any crime would unfairly stigmatize them. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that full disclosure of all officers involved in investigation would enable public to determine whether FBI had adequately staffed investigation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering summary judgment in plaintiffs’ action that defendant-manufacturer sold defective windows that leaked and prematurely rotted in contravention to certain express and implied warranties, and that defendant negligently designed and manufactured said windows, where Dist. Ct. excluded plaintiffs’ expert witnesses and entered summary judgment after finding that plaintiffs could not establish their claims without expert testimony. One expert was excluded because his report contained material factual error, and plaintiffs waived their appellate arguments regarding said exclusion by failing to include them in their response to defendant’s Daubert motion filed in Dist. Ct. Moreover, as to second expert witness, Dist. Ct. applied Daubert factors to exclude said testimony based on finding regarding reliability of expert’s testing methods, and plaintiffs forfeited their appellate arguments regarding said exclusion by failing to include them their Daubert response. Also Dist. Ct. did not err in issuing rule to show cause as to why plaintiffs’ claims should not be dismissed in absence of any expert testimony to support said claims, where: (1) Dist. Ct. gave explicit prior notice of possibility of dismissal due to lack of expert testimony; (2) window distributors’ emails proffered by plaintiffs to establish causation constituted improper hearsay evidence and were otherwise inadmissible as improper expert testimony; and (3) other evidence proffered by plaintiffs failed to establish any negligent design of defendant’s windows.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant’s violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights by improperly responding to her four domestic abuse complaints lodged against another police officer to whom she had dating relationship. Due process clause generally confers no affirmative right to govt. aid, even if such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty or property interests, and defendants’ failure to protect her against private violence does not constitute due process violation. Moreover, plaintiffs’ contention that defendants displayed only tepid response to her complaints was not supported by record, where: (1) officer also alleged that he was victim of violence by plaintiff; (2) defendants repeatedly informed officer that his conduct was unacceptable; and (3) defendants did not do anything to indicate that officer could abuse plaintiff with impunity. Also, DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189, foreclosed plaintiff’s argument that she was entitled to relief under state-created danger doctrine based on claim that defendants failed to properly intervene in her domestic abuse complaints.

Ct. of Appeals entered order in two appeals that struck briefs filed by Appellee/Respondent due to lack of sufficient jurisdictional statements. Appellee’s brief must contain jurisdictional statement that complies with all requirements set forth in FRAP 28(b) and Circuit Rule 28(a), and, if necessary, FRAP 28(A) and Circuit Rule 28(a). Moreover, applicable rules require Appellee to state that Appellant’s jurisdictional statement is both “complete and correct,” while instant jurisdictional statements were deficient because one statement merely indicated that Appellant’s jurisdictional statement was “correct,” while other jurisdictional statement merely stated that Appellant’s jurisdictional statement provided “a complete jurisdictional summary.” Also, if, after review, Appellee finds that Appellant’s jurisdictional statement is wanting on either element, Appellee must supply comprehensive statement that complies with FRAP 28(a) and Circuit Rule 28(a).

In action alleging that defendants-police officials used excessive force when shooting and killing plaintiff’s decedent during traffic stop, Dist. Ct. did not err in quashing defendant’s subpoena issued to Ill. State Police and in excluding evidence that Ill. State Police had failed to test DNA swabs taken from gun that was attributed to defendant at scene of shooting. Only issue for jury’s resolution was whether defendants were justified in shooting decedent, whom defendants claimed had shot at them, and lack of DNA evidence would not tend to prove or disapprove defendants’ justification. Moreover, while DNA evidence likely would have been relevant, neither govt. nor defendant had sought to test swabs taken from gun, and defendant waited several months after discovery deadline to issue instant subpoena.