Child Law

In re Veronica C., a Minor

In re Veronica C., a Minor
Illinois Supreme Court
Civil Court
Standing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 108953
Decision Date: 
Thursday, September 23, 2010
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Kane Co.
Holding: 
Appellate court affirmed.
Justice: 
KARMEIER
Twelve-year-old student was found guilty of battery upon classmate, and was placed on probation for one year. At hearing at which time probation order was entered, the State objected to court supervision, and the court stated that it could not order court supervision because of the State's objection. Minor has no standing to challenge "consent" requirement of Section 5-615 because it was not the State's objection that deprived respondent of the chance to have court supervision, as it was not allowed because a finding of guilt had already been entered; thus, State's objection was irrelevant. Minor was thus not adversely affected by operation of the statutory provision.(FITZGERALD, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and BURKE, concurring.)

In re Marriage of Akula

In re Marriage of Akula
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Child Custody
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 1-10-1084
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 3rd Div.
Holding: 
Certified question answered; remanded.
Justice: 
STEELE
Parties were married in Illinois, and Illinois court entered judgment of dissolution of marriage awarding mother sole custody of their minor son. Mother and son, then father, moved to India, and India family court entered ex parte interim order restraining anyone from disturbing the custody of the child, who remained in school in India. The India family court determined that the parties are "now ordinarily residing" in India. This finding necessarily implied that the parties did not presently reside in Illinois; thus, India court acted in substantial conformity with jurisdictional requirements of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Drafters of UCCJEA did not intend that "residence" be equated with "domicile". Thus, Illinois court did not have exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over child custody. (MURPHY and QUINN, concurring.)

In re Austin M.

In re Austin M.
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Juvenile Law
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 4-08-0435
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
Ford Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
MYERSCOUGH
Respondent, age 16 at time of incident, was adjudicated a delinquent based on misdemeanor criminal sexual abuse, and sentenced to 24 months probation. Respondent was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his attorney agreed to give up his ability to cross-examine the witnesses in exchange for the State giving up the ability to have live testimony, as this is a matter of trial strategy; live testimony tends to be more persuasive than videotape. Respondent was not denied right to counsel when his attorney acted as both GAL and defense counsel; this "hybrid representation" was neither per se or actual conflict. In Illinois, counsel for juvenile respondents are encouraged to protect the legal rights of minors and the best interests of the minors and society. (McCULLOUGH, concurring; APPLETON, dissenting.)

In re Shatavia S.

In re Shatavia S.
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Juvenile Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 5-08-0560
Decision Date: 
Friday, August 20, 2010
District: 
5th Dist.
Division/County: 
Madison Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
STEWART
(Motion to publish granted 8/20/10.) Minor was placed on court supervision after being charged with criminal damage to property and resisting a peace officer, and was ordered to pay $659 in restitution; State alleged that minor threw rocks at a vehicle and that she pulled away from a police officer. Minor appealed, arguing no factual or evidentiary basis that minor caused the $266 damage to the victim's windshield. Court within its discretion in ordering restitution, as minor's testimony that she did not throw rocks at car conflicted with her earlier admission that she threw a rock at vehicle, and as State presented affidavit of victim and car repair estimates. Court has authority to consider appeal of conditions of minor's court supervision per Supreme Court Rule 604(b). (GOLDENHERSH and WEXSTTEN, concurring.)

In re Anaya J.G., a Minor

In re Anaya J.G., a Minor
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Termination of Parental Rights
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 1-10-0132
Decision Date: 
Friday, July 30, 2010
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 5th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
LAVIN
Notice provisions of Indian Child Welfare Act were not applicable to termination of parental rights hearing where there was some evidence that minor's maternal grandmother may have been affiliated with the Cherokee tribe. Minor's biological mother and father are not members of an Indian tribe, and made only bare assertions that grandmother was of Cherokee descent; thus, there was insufficient evidence that minor was a member of an Indian tribe. Best interest determination is supported by manifest weight of evidence; even though cultural differences between minor and foster parents, a nurturing and positive environment was provided, and biological mother was inconsistent in her participation and contact with minor. (TOOMIN and HOWSE, concurring.)

In re Haley D., a Minor

In re Haley D., a Minor
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Termination of Parental Rights
Service
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 2-10-0044
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
DuPage Co.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
McLAREN
State filed petition alleging that minor was neglected; natural father received abode service of summons; court found minor neglected and made her a ward of court. Over father's objection, court changed permanency goal from return home to substitute care pending termination of parental rights. Four months later, State filed petition for termination of parental rights, but contrary to service requirements of Rule 11, natural father was not served with petition nor with notice of filing of or of hearing on petition, and his parental rights were terminated by default. Court erred in denying father's petition to vacate default judgment. Lack of notice of filing of petition for TPR did not deprive court of jurisdiction over father, but it did violate his due process rights. (HUTCHINSON, concurring; ZENOFF, dissenting.)

Marshall Joint School Dist. No. 2 v. C.D.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Marshall Joint School Dist. No. 2 v. C.D.
Civil Court
School Law
Citation
Case Number: 
Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499 Cons.
Decision Date: 
August 2, 2010
Federal District: 
W.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded
Dist. Ct. erred in affirming ALJ's decision that found that defendant-student was still eligible for special education under Individuals with Disability Education Act based on testimony from student's physician. ALJ applied wrong legal standard by determining in abstract whether student's physical disability could adversely affect his educational performance in gym class, rather than determining whether said disability actually did adversely affect said performance. Moreover, opinion of student's physician did not support ALJ holding where physician did not test or observe student in classroom setting and had no training in special education. Additionally, evidence supported educational team's finding that student was no longer in need of special education services where student was already placed in regular gym class with his peers and was performing gym activities with certain modifications.

In re T.W., a Minor

In re T.W., a Minor
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Juvenile Sex Offenders
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 1-09-0197
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 5th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HOWSE
(Court opinion corrected 7/9/10.) Respondent minor was adjudicated a delinquent upon conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse and aggravated criminal sexual assault upon 6-year old child in men's locker room at YMCA swimming pool area. No ineffective assistance of counsel by his attorney, from Evanston Community Defender's Officer, failing to recuse himself because that office could not pay for a DNA expert; defense counsel subjected State's expert to thorough cross-examination, including testimony that State's expert could not tell how seminal stain got onto child's swimsuit; and overwhelming nature of DNA evidence and victim's unrebutted testimony such that reasonable probability does not exist that any mistakes in strategy or tactics by counsel would have resulted in different outcome. (FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring.)

Senate Bill 3386

Topic: 
Guardianship of minors
(Wilhelmi, D-Joliet; C. Gordon, D-Coal City) was signed into law on Tuesday with an effective date of January 1, 2011. It makes four changes to make it relevant to today’s society, which are as follows: • It gives the court jurisdiction to proceed on a petition for guardianship if the parent or parents have “voluntarily relinquished physical custody of the minor.” This language is borrowed from the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, and it complies with the superior rights of parents as required by the courts. Because the courts have repeatedly interpreted this language, it provides plenty of guidance on what this means. • It expands the requirements for a parent or parents to consent to a guardianship. It will require that the parent or parents must execute a written document that is dated and notarized or personally appear in open court and consent to the petition. • It provides a procedure for terminating a guardianship that is completely absent in the current statute. The court must terminate the guardianship if the parent establishes (by a preponderance of the evidence) that a material change in the circumstances of the minor or the parent has occurred since the guardianship was started unless the guardian establishes (by clear and convincing evidence) that the termination of the guardianship is not in the minor’s best interests. It then provides a list of criteria to help guide the court in making this decision, such as the ability of the parent to provide a safe, nurturing environment for the minor. This language complies with current case law. • It repeals the archaic fitness language because termination of parental rights is not a goal of guardianship petitions in the probate act—guardianships are not designed to be permanent.
View Full Text of Legislation