Child Law

Court entered order placing custody and guardianship of minor with the biological father of minor's half-sister. Court failed to comply with several aspects of Section 2-28 of Juvenile Court Act, by misconstruing "return home" goal as possibly including home other than respondent mother's home, where minor had been living prior to her removal from home. Court erred in not providing in writing, on form permanency order, why permanency goal was selected and why preceding goals were ruled out, as these are mandatory requirements. (WELCH and CHAPMAN, concurring.)

Ten-year old boy was found guilty of two counts of aggravated battery against his bus monitor, and was adjudicated a delinquent minor and placed in custody of DCFS and sentenced to probation until age 21. Minor was not denied right to counsel because his court-appointed attorney also acted as his GAL, as such representation is not a per se conflict nor actual conflict. Order of adjudication should be amended to reflect one count per one-act, one-crime rule, as State alleged two legal theories based on a closely related series of acts occurring on the same day, and State did not differentiate between the blows the minor inflicted on the bus monitor in the charging instrument. Aggravated battery here was not a forcible felony; language in forcible felony statute demonstrates that legislature intended to exclude battery which did not result in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement. Thus, minor's sentence is void because it exceeded court's authority to sentence up to 5 years probation per Section 5-715 of Juvenile Court Act. (TURNER and POPE, concurring.)

Court found minor's father in default and terminated his parental rights while he was incarcerated in Colorado. Father did not object to court's jurisdiction at the four hearings he attended prior to adjudication, dispositional, termination, and best interest hearings, and thus waived the requirement that he be provided notice of proceedings. Father was served with termination petition and summons, and thus had actual notice of proceedings and had a duty to follow progress of case, but failed to respond or to contact his attorney, thus voluntarily chose not to participate in proceedings. Risk that father was erroneously deprived of his parental rights was minimal when balanced against State's interest in preventing delay in adjudicating parental rights and preserving best interest of minor. (McDADE and LYTTON, concurring.)

One purpose of Juvenile Court Act is to assist parents to correct their parenting flaws while ensuring safety and proper care of children. Problems of cleanliness of home and yard had been corrected by the time DCFS file neglect petition. Court's observation that cleanliness had been recurring problem was speculative and contrary to purpose of the Act. Thus, finding of neglect of seven-year old child reversed and remanded. (Dissent filed.)

Circuit court properly entered finding of nonpaternity of minor based on DNA testing although Respondent and child's mother had signed voluntary acknowledgment of paternity (VAP) and he signed birth certificate as the father. A minor, by and through the GAL, has standing to challenge the paternity of a man who signed a VAP and birth certificate, but was later found not to be the biological father based on DNA test results, as minor was not in privity with either party when they executed VAP.

Court terminated the parental rights of both parents of a four-year old child, whose paternal grandparents then filed petition for adoption. Five days later, foster parents filed, in a separate case, a petition for adoption, and court consolidated the two cases. When a natural parent's parental rights and interests are completely severed by the termination of parental rights, the rights and interests of the natural parent's relatives are also completely severed, and they thus have no rights to the minor, and court properly struck grandparents' response to foster parents' petition for adoption. Even after consolidation, cases continued to have separate identities in the trial court, thus notice of appeal as to ruling in one case must be made within 30 days of entry of judgment in that case, and Rule 304(a) finding was not required.

Limitation period for revocation of consent to a failed adoption within 12 months is absolute. Thus, general consent of adoptive mother, who had adopted child from Ethiopian orphanage, to allow child's adoption by another couple was a surrender of parental rights, and her consent was not timely revoked under section 11 of Adoption Act, which clearly bars any action challenging a consent or surrender after 12 months. Adoptive mother did not reasonably rely on social worker's urging to allow child to be adopted by another family, and persuading her to not seek to regain custody; consent was not taken by that social worker, but by another person at that agency. To set aside consent to adoption, fraud and duress must have been done by the person before whom consent or surrender is acknowledged.

Court was authorized in addressing change of placement motion and determining whether it was in best interest of minor to remove her from foster care of maternal grandparents. Order of change of placement was not void, as it was not ordering a specific placement with a specific foster family. Foster parents, who have the right to be heard by the court, waived issue of adequate notice by participating at the hearing and failing to object to inadequate notice at that time.

Respondent in abuse and neglect proceeding did not supplement record on appeal with recordings of DCFS investigator, and raised ineffective assistance of counsel issue first in appellate court, thus no hearing yet on issue. Court cannot assume that trial court would have ruled the same way as another trial judge did in criminal matter. Remanded for hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claims as to defense counsel's failure to object to investigator's testimony about child's statements or to aggressively cross-examine about interview techniques.