Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated battery of a peace officer. Evidence overwhelmingly supports trial court’s finding that Defendant was aware that the victim was a police officer engaged in his duties when Defendant struck him across the head and on the back with a baseball bat. Three witnesses testified that officer was in full police uniform, and that officer stood face-to-face with Defendant when he first approached him. Officer’s testimony, including of his 3-day hospitalization and extensive physical therapy, established that his injuries reached threshold of great bodily harm. (NEVILLE and MASON, concurring.)
Defendant pled guilty to being an armed habitual criminal. Court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Court properly denied Defendant’s pro se motion for DNA testing of sawed-off shotgun which victim originally stated (but later recanted) that she had asked acquaintance to hit her with to make it appear that Defendant had battered her. Any result of proposed testing would not have potential to produce evidence that would raise a reasonable probability that Defendant would have been acquitted had he proceeded to trial. (O'BRIEN and SCHMIDT, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on ground that prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence that could have been used to impeach govt. witness at defendant’s trial. While said evidence from witness’ cellmate, who opined that witness lied “a lot of times” and demonstrated lack of remorse over death of victim, conflicted with witness’ testimony, such that said evidence should have been turned over to defendant, state court’s conclusion that said impeachment evidence would not have changed outcome of defendant’s trial was not so unreasonable so as to warrant new trial, where: (1) other witnesses provided sufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt on charged offense; (2) record contained other impeachment evidence pertaining to said witness; and (3) withheld evidence also contained inculpatory evidence that would have been harmful to defendant.
Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on wire fraud and money laundering charges stemming from scheme in which one defendant, as employee of city’s Land Bank, steered at below market prices purchases of abandoned properties in Land Bank to certain non-profit organizations which, in turn, sold said properties at market prices and then split proceeds of said sales with defendants and gave kickbacks for steering properties through Land Bank. While defendant-Land Bank employee argued that his specific intent to commit fraud was not established,since he did not get paid for something that he would not have normally done while performing services for Land Bank, defendant admitted that he had intended to earn money from Land Bank sales. Also, his mistake in believing that his actions were not illegal was not defense to honest services fraud. Too, record contained evidence of straightforward quid pro quo scheme in which defendant-Land Bank employee intended to deprive city of his honest services by accepting kickbacks from third-parties who relied on him to facilitate sales of valuable properties at low cost. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in failing to give jury defendants’ proffered “good-faith” instruction, since charged offenses already required jury to find existence of bad faith. Finally, Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing sentencing enhancement under section 2C1.1(b)(3) of USSG due to defendant’s sensitive position at Land Bank where Land Bank employee exercised discretion and influence in transferring Land Bank properties.
(Modified upon denial of rehearing 11/1/17.) Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of escape for her failure to report to county jail immediately after her discharge from a halfway house as ordered as a bond condition. As State could not establish that Defendant was in custody, a requirement inherent in the offense of escape, it could not prove she was guilty of escape beyond a reasonable doubt. (HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, concurring.)
Record supported jury’s guilty verdict on Medicaid fraud charges arising out of defendant’s submission of invoices for medical transportation services that did not occur at all or for services during transportation of patients that did not occur, where govt. presented witnesses who stated that certain services did not occur during their transportation by defendant's company or that they did not use said company's services at times asserted in invoices. Fact that defendant claimed that there was no direct evidence that as owner of said transportation company, she personally submitted fraudulent invoices did not require different result, where other circumstantial evidence indicated that defendant either used identities of third-parties when submitting said invoices or directed/trained others to do so on behalf of her company. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that instant indictment, which used only initials to identify third-parties whose names were used when submitting fraudulent invoices, provided defendant with inadequate notice of charged offenses, since record showed that defendant was aware of actual identity of said third-parties at time of trial.
In prosecution on bankruptcy fraud charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in rejecting defendant’s proposed theory-of-defense instruction under circumstances where defendant was charged with failure to report in certain bankruptcy pleadings that he had interest in real estate and in proceeds of life insurance policies. While last sentence of proposed instruction that informed jury that it must acquit defendant if it found that his omissions were not made with intent to deceive was accurate statement of law, said sentence did not add any new information beyond Dist. Ct.’s other instructions to jury. Moreover, remaining portion of proposed instruction that informed jury that defendant's omissions were part of his continued failure to abide by particulars demanded in bankruptcy filings, which was inconsistent with intent to deceive, was misstatement of law, and thus was properly rejected.
Defendant was convicted of 4 counts of 1st degree murder. Defendant contended that court erred in denying his motion for mistrial because reversible error occurred when judge fell asleep during jury trial. A judge falling asleep for a portion of a trial is not per se reversible error. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for mistrial because Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced. Neither party asked judge for any evidentiary rulings during the time judge was sleeping, and evidence of Defendant's guilt was overwhelming. (HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring; O'BRIEN, dissenting.)
(Modified upon denial of petition for rehearing 10/27/17.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of burglary of an Arby's, and was sentenced to 21 years. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request for continuance on basis that defense witness, who Defendant said was not available to testify, was not expected to offer any information as to application on Defendant's cell phone. Court did not abuse its discretion in giving accomplice-witness jury instruction, as answer of Defendant's girlfriend, as to whether she was the lookout, was evasive. (LYTTON and SCHMIDT, concurring.)
In prosecution on charge of unlawful possession of firearm, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress gun that was found on floor of back seat of car in which defendant was passenger, where police approached car and observed defendant attempting to hide something after they had observed said car stopped in road within 15 feet of crosswalk in violation of Wisc. statute. Defendant conceded that car was stopped 7 to 8 feet from crosswalk, and Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that police had probable caused to issue ticket that would allow them to briefly seize car and its occupants. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that police could not approach said car, because statute would allow car to be in instant prohibited zone to receive or discharge cargo or passengers, since: (1) all four doors of car were shut and no one was standing nearby, such that exemption did not apply; (2) police, who had probable cause to issue ticket, could approach car (and observe defendant’s actions) before resolving any statutory exemption; and (3) police could issue instant ticket and then leave to judicial process issue as to whether exemption applies. Also, under Wren, 517 U.S. 806, police can stop and arrest individuals, where there is probable cause to believe that said individuals violated parking statutes. (Dissent filed.)
