Criminal Law

(Court opinion corrected 10/20/17). Court denied Respondent’s motion to withdraw his stipulation to adjudication as a sexually violent person, and its order committing him to Illinois Department of Human Services for institutional treatment. No impropriety in court’s acceptance of Respondent’s stipulation. No basis in record upon which to relieve Respondent from his stipulation. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

In consolidated appeal, State appeals from judgments of circuit court granting motions of Defendants to suppress evidence found following a dog sniff of their vehicle. The mission of the traffic stop had been completed, when officer finished written warning, such that the dog sniff unduly prolonged the stop, in violation of 4th amendment. Illinois law did not require driver of vehicle to provide proof of insurance, as her vehicle was properly registered in Minnesota. Officer's unjustified return to vehicle, to ask driver for passenger for proof of insurance, unduly prolonged the traffic stop. There was no probable cause, independent of the dog sniff, to search the vehicle. Evidence was insufficient to provide probable cause to believe that driver and 2 passengers were involved in drug trafficking. (McLAREN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant and codefendant were convicted, after simultaneous but severed bench trials, of robbery and aggravated battery of a senior citizen. Defendant's two convictions were both based on Defendant's single physical act of punching 65-year-old victim, and thus violate the one-act, one-crime principle. Only the robbery conviction will stand, as it is the more serious of the two offenses, as a Class 1 felony. (NEVILLE and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Respondent minor was riding his bicycle when 2 police officers, wishing to speak with him as a potential witness to a homicide, stopped their squad car in his path of travel in middle of street. Officers noticed a bulge in his pocket in the "silhouette" of a firearm. Respondent admitted that he was in possession of fa firearm. Although a seizure did take place, it was reasonable under the circumstances. In context of a suspicionless but reasonable seizure, the later development of a reasonable suspicion that the detainee is armed justifies a patdown of that person. The fact that the court wanted to view the pants the Respondent had been wearing, and the gun, to test credibility of officer's testimony that he could see outline of gun, indicates that court did not have a pre-existing opinion about them. Court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the proof, did not act as advocate, and did not improperly rely on information outside evidentiary process.(HOWSE, concurring; McBRIDE, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and unlawful vehicle invasion. Defendant and another person pulled victim, who was drunk, out of his car, and shot and killed victim. Court properly allowed substantive admissions of witnesses' prior inconsistent statements, as statements, with ASA's description of how statements were memorialized, establish witness' personal knowledge of events. Defense counsel cross-examined witnesses and elicited facts helpful to the defense. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a 2nd-degree murder instruction, as Defendant testified at trial and denied engaging in any fight with the decedent or having any passion toward him on the night of the murder. Thus, Defendant failed to meet his burden to prove evidence of a serious provocation by the decedent. Conviction and sentence of vehicular invasion vacated. By charging that intent of  vehicular invasion was to commit murder, the charging document reflected an affirmative intent not to apportion the accused’s conduct into separate crimes.(HALL and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed violence predicated on mob action, but was acquitted of felony murder. Defendant and an unidentified man shot at each other on the street, resulting in the death of an innocent bystander. It was undisputed that the unidentified man fired the shot that killed the bystander. State failed to prove predicate charge of mob action beyond a reasonable doubt. The "acting together" element  in subsection 25-1(a)(1) of the mob-action statute is intended to apply only to certain types of joint or concerted action:  action pursuant to an agreement or a common criminal purpose. Persons shooting at each other act at cross purposes, not with common purpose or intent required for concerted action. No evidence that Defendant ever agreed to be shot at. (BURKE and McBRIDE, concurring.)