Criminal Law

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 9/27/17.) Defendant filed motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to 1 count of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle. Defendant's potential sentence was actually 30 years, rather than 60 years as Defendant claimed that his trial counsel erroneously advised him. As the possible 340-year sentence is still significantly longer than Defendant's guilty plea offer of 9 years, and Defendant presents no contemporaneous evidence he reasonably would have risked facing a 30-year sentence at trial rather than accepting 9-year guilty plea. Defendant failed to show deficient performance of trial counsel. Circuit clerk improperly assessed certain fines as fees, and those are vacated. (HARRIS and STEIGMANN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder, armed robbery, home invasion, and residential burglary. State presented evidence showing that officer recovered a knit hat containing a rock at crime scene, and that the hat arrived in sealed condition at lab, and that swabbing and cutting from the hat that lab technicians took was later received and analyzed by ISP forensic scientist; thus, there was not a complete breakdown in chain of custody of that evidence.No ineffective assistance of counsel in counsel's failure to raise foundational challenge to hat's admissibility, as court likely would not have sustained such a challenge. As basis of forensic scientist's opinion was a matter for cross-examination, expert's failure to disclose it on direct examination did not undermine foundation of her testimony. Defense counsel's decision not to request specific verdict forms was likely a strategic decision immune from ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (HOFFMAN and CONNORS, concurring.)

In years prior to trial, Defendant rejected 3 public defenders and decided to represent himself. Just before voir dire, Defendant asked court to reappoint the public defender's office.  Court denied Defendant's request, finding it was a delay tactic. Defendant refused to enter the courtroom for his trial,a nd he was tried in absentia, without counsel, and convicted of murder and concealment of a homicidal death. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request for appointed counsel, as court found that Defendant's request was an attempt to delay trial. Statutory requirement that a defendant who is tried in absentia must be represented by counsel does not apply to in-custody defendants. (NEVILLE and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant entered negotiated plea of guilty to single count of aggravated battery with a firearm, and in exchange for plea was sentenced to 18-year prison term. Court denied Defendant's pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Trial court appointed counsel, who filed amended motion, which court denied. To fulfill her duty to amend Defendant's motion, defense counsel had to attach an affidavit substantiating the new allegations. Under Rule 604(d), facts that do not appear of record must be supported by an affidavit. Hearing on Defendant's motion was inadequate to satisfy Rule 604(d)'s strict-compliance standard.(McLAREN and ZENOFF, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 10/10/17.) Defendant pled guilty to 2 offenses in exchange for agreed- upon prison term and “all mandatory fines, fees, and court costs.” After Court accepted plea agreement, Defendant filed a motion requesting that Court vacate $6,000 in imposed assessments because of his inability to pay, which was denied. On appeal, Defendant abandoned his claim regarding inability to pay, and contended for the first time that he should receive presentencing detention credit against his fines and that some of his fines and fees were erroneously assessed. Defendant could challenge his presentencing detention for the first time on appeal under section 110-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Under this section, Defendant was entitled to $975 in credit for 195 days served. Defendant was barred from directly attacking his fines, because he did not challenge them within 30 days of sentencing. (NEVILLE and PIERCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC) and for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). It is permissible to use a conviction held invalid under the 2013 Illinois Supreme Court decision of People v. Aguilar as a predicate offense under the AHC statute. Defendant's convictions for AHC and UUWF are both based on the same physical act: his unlawful possession of a single firearm on a certain date. Thus, Defendant's conviction for UUWF must be vacated in accordance with one-act, one-crime rule. (SIMON, concurring; HARRIS, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of domestic battery, for whipping 6-year-old child with a belt which children stated was because child had eaten Defendant's biscuit. Defendant raised affirmative defense of reasonable parental discipline.  Court need not expressly consider each factor when determining reasonableness of discipline. Factor of degree of physical injury (2 red welts on upper portion of back of legs) weighed heavily against any finding of reasonableness. It was rational for court to determine that discipline was unreasonable here. (HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)