Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting defendant’s post-arrest inculpatory statements in two separate trials on drug charges that involved large scale marijuana and methamphetamine transactions, even though defendant argued that he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant implicitly waived his Miranda rights, where, although defendant did not explicitly acknowledge meaning of Miranda rights: (1) defendant was intelligent individual who understood English; (2) Dist. Ct. found agent credible in his claim that he read said rights to defendant, and that defendant appeared to understand them; (3) defendant was familiar with criminal system; and (4) agents received defendant’s consent for protective sweep of his property prior to giving Miranda rights and questioning him. Also, Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in admitting out-of-court statements of confidential informant with respect to conversations he had with defendant and others, since: (1) informant’s conversations with defendant were admissible to give context to defendant’s statements; and (2) out-of-court statements of two other individuals were admissible under co-conspirator exception to hearsay rule (Rule 801(d)(2)(E)), where Dist. Ct. could find that conspiracy among said individuals and defendant existed based on informant’s testimony and information contained in recorded conversations.

In prosecution on charges of mail fraud and making false claims to IRS arising out of defendant’s submission of tax returns containing false statements that resulted in defendant’s receipt of two $300,000 refund checks, defendant was entitled to new trial where Dist. Ct. deprived him of his due process rights to fair trial by: (1) making inflammatory remarks during pro se defendant’s cross-examination of first govt. witness, where said remarks, which suggested to jury that defendant was acting in nonsensical manner by advancing his sovereign citizen views, conveyed bias about defendant’s guilt or honesty; (2) threatening to “kick out” defendant from trial because of his views, which impacted defendant’s credibility in eyes of jury; (3) giving non-pattern jury instruction that conveyed to jury that defendant was guilty of both charged offenses through his receipt of checks and money; and (4) comparing instant charged offenses to violent attack on individual. Fact that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s guilt on both charges was immaterial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition, challenging his conviction on charge of murdering his step-mother, where said petition alleged that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to testimony of second detective, who surreptitiously eavesdropped on 17-year old defendant making inculpatory statement to his mother during statutorily allowed conversation with his mother prior to making any waiver of his constitutional rights. Trial counsel did make objection to first detective testifying to said conversation, which was overruled by trial court, and, although trial counsel should have made second objection to preserve issue, any error was harmless given strength of evidence against defendant. Ct. also rejected on grounds of trial strategy defendant’s claims that his trial counsel were ineffective for: (1) failing to impeach witness who gave unexpected testimony regarding alleged threat that defendant made toward victim; (2) failing to object to jury’s inquiry about specific crimes for which defendant was on parole; (3) questioning witness about defendant’s criminal history and his poor relationships with his family; and (4) failure to interview witness about victim’s claims of spousal abuse. Fact that trial counsel admitted to making mistakes during trial only showed that their trial strategy did not work out as well as planned and not that counsel were incompetent.

Dist. Ct. in three separate proceedings in which defendant was charged with drug trafficking offenses did not err in imposing two-level enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(12) of USSG, after finding that defendant had maintained his home for purpose of manufacturing or distributing controlled substances. Dist. Ct., in ultimately sentencing defendant to concurrent 87-month terms of incarceration, could properly find that instant seven, significant drug transactions in defendant’s home within two-month period were sufficient to constitute primary or principal use of premises for purposes of imposing instant enhancement. Moreover, Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that Dist. Ct. was required to apply simple balancing test that compared frequency of unlawful activity at residence with frequency of lawful use.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying without conducting evidentiary hearing defendant’s habeas petition challenging his sex trafficking convictions on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective in recommending that defendant not accept govt. offer that included term of imprisonment of 15 years in exchange for guilty plea, where defendant rejected plea offer and took case to trial and received 50-year sentence. Factual question remained as to whether govt. ever made plea offer, where defendant supported his contention that plea offer was made by attaching affidavits from his mother and grandmother, who claimed that defendant discussed plea offer with them prior to trial. Moreover, defendant sufficiently alleged that, with competent advice, he would have accepted plea deal. Also, remand was required to resolve factual question as to whether counsel told defendant that he would be better served by proceeding to trial.