Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction to enjoin defendant-City from enforcing its anti-panhandling ordinance that barred plaintiffs from making oral requests for immediate donations of money in “historic district” of its downtown area. While plaintiffs argued that ordinance violated their First Amendment rights as being improper restriction based on content of their speech, instant ordinance was content-neutral, since requests for money did not express ideas about politics or topics to which govt. sought to suppress expression. Moreover, ordinance was indifferent to reasons for seeking money. Fact that ordinance allowed plaintiffs to make non-verbal requests for money did not make instant ordinance impermissibly content-based. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiffs’ lawsuit challenging defendant’s decision that under Affordable Care Act, it would collect tax in 2014 on individuals who failed to purchase health insurance, but not collect said tax for certain businesses that failed to provide health insurance as fringe benefit. Plaintiffs failed to assert that defendant’s decision had bearing on their own taxes, and plaintiff could not obtain standing by asserting that defendant’s decision would have negative effect on customers using plaintiffs’ services in medical field. Moreover, under Allen, 426 US 26, Ct. rejected standing of plaintiff who attempted to litigate amount of taxes paid by third party.

Dist. Ct. erred in approving proposed settlement in class action under Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act alleging that defendant provided receipts of credit card transactions that contained card’s expiration date, where, as part of settlement, individual class members received $10 coupon to be applied to future purchase at defendant’s store, and where counsel for class action received $1 million in attorneys’ fees. Settlement provided inadequate benefit to class action members, where record showed that agreed upon attorneys’ fees, plus $830,000 worth of coupons and administrative costs totaled $4.1 million, and Dist. Ct. erred in assigning $2.2 in administrative costs as sole benefit of class members when determining fairness of division of settlement proceeds. As such counsel’s fee equated to improper 55 percent contingency fee. Dist. Ct. also erred in: (1) failing to estimate discounted value of coupons to reflect actual use of said coupons by class members, as well as enhanced sales of defendant’s products through use of coupons. Moreover, Dist. Ct. should have used enhanced scrutiny regarding instant settlement where parties used “clear sailing” clause that prevented defendant from contesting amount of attorney fees, and class counsel improperly waited to file fee motion until after deadline for filing objections to settlement.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over instant appeal, where plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal more than 30 days from Dist. Ct.’s entry of Rule 54(b) judgment that dismissed plaintiffs’ state law defamation and false light claims, at time when plaintiffs’ federal section 1983 claim against defendants had remained pending in Dist. Ct. Although Dist. Ct. had granted plaintiffs’ request to file late notice of appeal under Rule 4(a)(5), where Dist. Ct. had mistakenly invited plaintiffs’ counsel to seek Rule 54(b) judgment one week after said judgment had actually been entered, plaintiffs could not rely on said misstatement to support their request to file late notice of appeal, where plaintiffs were actually aware that Rule 54(b) judgment had been entered at time of misstatement, and where plaintiffs otherwise failed to demonstrate “excusable neglect” in failing to file timely notice of appeal. Also, Dist. Ct. had improperly relied on defunct “unique-circumstances” doctrine when granting plaintiffs’ request to file late notice of appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants falsely imprisoned plaintiff beyond his applicable release date. Record showed that Assistant Public Defender prepared agreed order that was signed by sentencing judge that expressly stated that plaintiff would be released without term of mandatory supervised release on May 28, 2010, and plaintiff was released on May 21, 2010. Fact that sentencing judge had entered on same date as agreed order two other orders indicating that release date was earlier than May 28, 2010 did not require different result. Moreover, even without agreed order, plaintiff did not establish any 8th Amendment claim, where defendants were delaying plaintiff’s release based on reasonable belief under Illinois statute that sentencing judge could not impose sentence without also imposing term of mandatory supervised release.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action against defendant-prison guard as sanction for lying (in affidavit and in live testimony) that he had filed written prison grievance regarding subject matter of his section 1982 claim so as to satisfy requirement that he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit. Prison records did not reveal existence of said grievance, although said records contained over 100 other grievances from plaintiff, and plaintiff had previously indicated that he had made only oral complaint about said 1983 claim that defendant had sexually abused him during pat-down search. Ct. further found that plaintiff’s misconduct in committing perjury is sufficient to warrant dismissal of his section 1983 claim and referred matter to U.S. Attorney for consideration of bringing criminal perjury charges against plaintiff. It also issued Rule to Show Cause directing plaintiff to explain why it should not fine him for his misconduct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in instant FELA action, alleging that defendant negligently caused cumulative trauma to plaintiff-employee’s wrists, elbow and shoulder through use of vibrating tools, after determining to exclude opinion of plaintiff’s medical expert witness. Dist. Ct. could properly exclude opinion of plaintiff’s medical expert, where said expert failed to follow reliable methods when finding that plaintiff’s work environment caused his injuries, since expert failed to personally observe plaintiff’s working conditions, obtain written work description, perform scientific tests or investigate several potential non-work-related causes of plaintiff’s health problems. Moreover, although plaintiff argued that defendant had frustrated attempt by plaintiff’s expert to test plaintiff’s work-related tools and had failed to provide expert with written job description, such alleged problems did not excuse expert’s failure to generate admissible opinion, and plaintiff should have otherwise alerted Dist. Ct. to such problems during discovery phase of case.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ lawsuit, alleging that certain loans promulgated by defendants that had yearly interest rates of 139 percent violated various Illinois civil and criminal statutes, where dismissal was based on venue clause contained in loan agreements that called for parties to submit disputes to arbitration conducted by Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe that were to take place on Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservation located in South Dakota. Instant action should not have been dismissed where arbitral mechanism specified in loan agreement was sham/illusory, since Tribe had not set procedures for selection of arbitrators or for conduct of arbitral proceedings. Thus, it would not have been possible for plaintiffs to have ascertained dispute resolution process and rules to which they were agreeing at time of loan agreement. As such, Ct. found that plaintiffs could proceed in federal court where venue clause in loan agreement was substantively and procedurally unconscionable.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on collateral estoppel grounds plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that he was terminated in violation of his due process and freedom of speech rights, where said dismissal was based on prior Appellate Court finding that plaintiff was not eligible for Illinois unemployment insurance benefits because plaintiff had constructively resigned his position by failing to obtain required commercial driver’s license. Section 1900B of Unemployment Insurance Act precluded Dist. Ct. from applying collateral estoppel based on Appellate Court ruling since results of plaintiff’s unemployment insurance claim could not be used as evidence in any other judicial proceeding.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s motion to certify class action in four consolidated consumer protection lawsuits that essentially alleged that defendant used deceptive packaging of its single-serving coffee pods used in Keurig coffeemakers that, according to plaintiffs, misled consumers into believing that pod contained high quality ground coffee beans, rather than instant coffee that pod actually contained. Dist. Ct. failed to recognize potential common question as to all putative class members, i.e., whether defendant’s packaging was likely to mislead reasonable consumer as to contents of pod. Moreover, Dist. Ct.'s concern that each class member’s claim might require individualized inquiry on causation question was not valid reason for denying certification request since: (1) every consumer fraud case involves individualized elements of reliance or causation; and (2) class action would be appropriate in cases where damages for class members could be susceptible to measurement across entire class. Accordingly, plaintiffs were entitled to new consideration of class action issue.