Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs-Native American Tribes’ motion under Rule 60 (b0(5) to relieve them from 1991 final judgment in action in which plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged state statute that prohibited members of Tribes from hunting deer at night on land outside of Tribes' reservations that Tribes had ceded to U.S. govt. in 1800s. Plaintiffs supported motion by arguing that additional deer meat was needed for subsistence and religious purposes due to increased unemployment and health issues facing Tribe members, and record did not support defendant’s claim that: (1) night-time deer hunting ban was necessary measure to protect public safety; or (2) said ban was least restrictive alternative to accomplish public health and safety. Ct. remanded matter to allow defendant opportunity to submit additional evidence to support its claim that night-time deer hunting posed serious safety problem that would justify continuation of 1991 judgment.

Ct. of Appeals assessed $50,000 as Rule 38 sanction arising out of third-party’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of its proposed federal antitrust counterclaims. Ct. found that said appeal was frivolous, since third-party plaintiff’s appellate arguments essentially established violation of Rule 11, where third-party plaintiff argued that: (1) its counterclaims were so weak that they were insufficient to raise federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 29 USC section 1331 so as to allow Dist. Ct. to act on said counterclaims; and (2) its own claims and procedural maneuvers that were asserted/used in Dist. Ct. were baseless. Also, Ct. imposed said sanctions on third-party plaintiff, its owner and its counsel.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked reasonable suspicion to stop plaintiff in his vehicle, when defendants attempted to detain third-party whom defendants believed was subject of felony arrest warrant. Record showed that plaintiff, third-party and others were on front porch of home when defendants approached said group, and when plaintiff and others began to scatter. As such, defendants had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle since they could have reasonably believed that third-party was in said vehicle. Fact that defendants handcuffed plaintiff to secure scene did not transform stop into full-blown arrest, where record suggested that defendants were attempting to protect themselves while apprehending third-party who was suspect in murder case. Moreover, defendants had probable cause to subsequently arrest plaintiff when they later learned that plaintiff was driving stolen vehicle. Also, plaintiff could not proceed on claim that defendants improperly allowed unsworn facts to form basis of arrest report, where record showed that no named defendant played any role in generating said report.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that Wisconsin statute requiring voters to obtain and produce photo ID at polls was unconstitutional and in entering injunction to prohibit enforcement of said statute. Instant statute was similar to Indiana photo ID statute that U.S. Supreme Ct. upheld in Crawford, 553 US 181, and Dist. Ct.’s disagreement with Crawford Ct.’s holding, that goals of prevention of voter impersonation on election day and preservation of public confidence in integrity of elections justified photo ID requirement, was insufficient to support issuance of instant injunction. Ct. also rejected Dist. Ct.’s finding that instant statute violated Voting Rights Act and observed that: (1) it was easier in Wisconsin to obtain photo ID than in Indiana; and (2) any inconvenience in gathering required documents to obtain photo ID did not qualify as substantial burden on right to vote.

Ct. of Appeals reaffirmed its recent order to stay Dist. Ct.’s entry of injunction that prohibited enforcement of Wisc. statute requiring voters to produce photo IDs in order to vote, where defendants-state officials requested issuance of stay for purpose of allowing it to enforce photo ID requirement in this fall’s election. Defendants established strong likelihood of success on merits, where Wisc. statute was similar to Indiana statute that was upheld by U.S. Supreme Ct. in Crawford, 553 US 181. Moreover, Wisc. was entitled to enforcement of its law until statute’s validity has been finally determined. Ct. further rejected plaintiffs’ claim that voters will be unable to obtain photo IDs by time of November election, by observing that said voters already have had more than three years to obtain said IDs from date of statute’s enactment. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in issuing injunction that blocked State of Wisconsin from conducting judicially supervised criminal investigation into question as to whether certain persons violated state’s campaign-finance laws by coordinating fundraising efforts with independent group that was raising and spending money on particular issues. Instant injunction contravened Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits Dist. Ct. from issuing injunction to stay state-court proceeding unless expressly authorized to do so or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to effectuate its judgment. Moreover, Dist. Ct. should not have intervened in state-court matter where: (1) plaintiff in instant case had received relief in state court by obtaining order that stopped investigation as matter of state law; (2) investigation pertained to criminal matter; (3) Dist. Ct. failed to consider principles of federalism, comity and equity prior to issuing injunction; and (4) legal uncertainty as to definition of “coordination” precluded finding that instant investigation was done in bad faith.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction to enjoin defendant-City from enforcing its anti-panhandling ordinance that barred plaintiffs from making oral requests for immediate donations of money in “historic district” of its downtown area. While plaintiffs argued that ordinance violated their First Amendment rights as being improper restriction based on content of their speech, instant ordinance was content-neutral, since requests for money did not express ideas about politics or topics to which govt. sought to suppress expression. Moreover, ordinance was indifferent to reasons for seeking money. Fact that ordinance allowed plaintiffs to make non-verbal requests for money did not make instant ordinance impermissibly content-based. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiffs’ lawsuit challenging defendant’s decision that under Affordable Care Act, it would collect tax in 2014 on individuals who failed to purchase health insurance, but not collect said tax for certain businesses that failed to provide health insurance as fringe benefit. Plaintiffs failed to assert that defendant’s decision had bearing on their own taxes, and plaintiff could not obtain standing by asserting that defendant’s decision would have negative effect on customers using plaintiffs’ services in medical field. Moreover, under Allen, 426 US 26, Ct. rejected standing of plaintiff who attempted to litigate amount of taxes paid by third party.

Dist. Ct. erred in approving proposed settlement in class action under Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act alleging that defendant provided receipts of credit card transactions that contained card’s expiration date, where, as part of settlement, individual class members received $10 coupon to be applied to future purchase at defendant’s store, and where counsel for class action received $1 million in attorneys’ fees. Settlement provided inadequate benefit to class action members, where record showed that agreed upon attorneys’ fees, plus $830,000 worth of coupons and administrative costs totaled $4.1 million, and Dist. Ct. erred in assigning $2.2 in administrative costs as sole benefit of class members when determining fairness of division of settlement proceeds. As such counsel’s fee equated to improper 55 percent contingency fee. Dist. Ct. also erred in: (1) failing to estimate discounted value of coupons to reflect actual use of said coupons by class members, as well as enhanced sales of defendant’s products through use of coupons. Moreover, Dist. Ct. should have used enhanced scrutiny regarding instant settlement where parties used “clear sailing” clause that prevented defendant from contesting amount of attorney fees, and class counsel improperly waited to file fee motion until after deadline for filing objections to settlement.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over instant appeal, where plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal more than 30 days from Dist. Ct.’s entry of Rule 54(b) judgment that dismissed plaintiffs’ state law defamation and false light claims, at time when plaintiffs’ federal section 1983 claim against defendants had remained pending in Dist. Ct. Although Dist. Ct. had granted plaintiffs’ request to file late notice of appeal under Rule 4(a)(5), where Dist. Ct. had mistakenly invited plaintiffs’ counsel to seek Rule 54(b) judgment one week after said judgment had actually been entered, plaintiffs could not rely on said misstatement to support their request to file late notice of appeal, where plaintiffs were actually aware that Rule 54(b) judgment had been entered at time of misstatement, and where plaintiffs otherwise failed to demonstrate “excusable neglect” in failing to file timely notice of appeal. Also, Dist. Ct. had improperly relied on defunct “unique-circumstances” doctrine when granting plaintiffs’ request to file late notice of appeal.