Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying Intervenors’ request to view certain documents/exhibits filed under seal in plaintiff's response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, where said documents/exhibits were not relied upon or cited by plaintiff in its response, and where Dist. Ct. indicated that he would not consult said documents when ruling on motion to dismiss. While public has general right to view documents that have been filed in case, said right did not apply, where instant documents played no role in any judicial decision.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were unreasonable in execution of search warrant on plaintiff’s property, where record supported claim that 40 to 50 volunteers from animal-rights groups had assisted defendants in removal of more than 300 animals from plaintiff’s property, and that said individuals had unreasonably damaged plaintiff’s property while conducting search. Ct. rejected defendant-County’s argument that it could not be held responsible for conduct of volunteers, or that it was entitled to immunity against section 1983 action based on immunity granted to it by state statute.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request to remand back to state court plaintiffs’ action alleging that defendants’ cancellation of health insurance policies and replacement of said policies with more costly insurance options violated Illinois law, where said action had been removed to federal court by defendants under Class Action Fairness Act, and where plaintiffs alleged that remand was appropriate under section 1332(d)(4) because two-thirds of potential class members, as well as at least one defendant were citizens of Illinois. Plaintiff had burden of proof to establish eligibility for remand under section 1332(d)(4), and plaintiffs failed in their burden, since they only presented evidence that potential class members were “residents” as opposed to “citizens” of Illinois. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on merits of case, where: (1) plaintiffs conceded that insurance company was entitled to withdraw from Illinois market and cancel existing policies; and (2) plaintiffs could not establish or enforce any HIPAA violation associated with defendants’ actions.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-Mayor’s motion to stay trial on section 1983 action after Dist. Ct. denied Mayor’s claim of qualified immunity with respect to 2 out of 11 plaintiffs. Issue presented in Dist. Ct., i.e., whether plaintiffs' jobs were ones for which political affiliation was permissible criterion, is question of law that makes it proper for interlocutory appeal and eligible for stay of further proceedings in Dist. Ct. pending Mayor’s appeal. Moreover, defendant-City was also entitled to invoke doctrine of “pendent appellate jurisdiction” to seek similar stay of Dist. Ct.’s proceedings against it pending outcome of Mayor’s appeal on qualified immunity question, since outcome of Mayor’s appeal will have direct impact on plaintiff’s case against City, and where City’s liability, if any, derives from Mayor’s liability.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s substantive due process rights by rendering plaintiff more vulnerable to blow to face by third-party under circumstances where plaintiff obeyed defendant’s order to lie down on ground during incident involving alleged assault of plaintiff by three individuals, and where defendant failed to intervene when one individual disobeyed defendant’s order and hit plaintiff in face. Plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant had deliberate intent to harm plaintiff by allowing individual to hit him, and that plaintiff presented at most evidence of negligent conduct on part of defendant. Ct. further found that defendant’s efforts to safely stop all participants in incident were reasonable.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding after bench trial that plaintiff failed to establish necessary causal connection between adverse act and plaintiff’s protected speech in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that his suspension and severe verbal counseling violated his First Amendment rights because they were imposed due to fact that he had previously spoken out on behalf of his fellow union members concerning their complaints about forced overtime. While plaintiff’s protests constituted protected speech because they were made in his role as union vice-president, plaintiff failed to show that his suspension was related to said protests since record showed that suspension was based upon unrelated incident involving plaintiff’s use of Dept. memo book. Moreover, verbal counseling was related to separate incident in which plaintiff was deemed to be insubordinate to his supervisor.

Plaintiff-decedent’s estate was entitled to new trial in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison officials denied decedent-pre-trial detainee appropriate medical treatment when defendants rapidly tapered off his psychotropic medication, which resulted in his death, where Dist. Ct. denied plaintiff’s request for jury instruction that described applicable standard of conduct in instant 4th Amendment claim as “objective reasonableness” rather than “deliberate indifference” standard that plaintiff had advocated up until six weeks prior to trial. Plaintiff’s proposed instruction constituted correct statement of law, and Dist. Ct. erred in using deliberative indifference standard under misguided belief that plaintiff had “waived” right to use correct standard because she had failed to promptly notify Dist. Ct. and defendant of applicable standard of conduct. Moreover, plaintiff’s late shift to correct standard of conduct would not have been prejudicial to defendant’s preparation for trial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding attorney fees and costs to plaintiff-mortgage lender, where defendant had no objective basis for removing instant state-court foreclosure action, where said removal occurred four years after filing of state-court action and just prior to hearing on summary judgment motion, and where defendant’s rationale for said removal, i.e., that federal jurisdiction existed under 28 USC section 1349 because Freddie Mac was real party in interest, was wholly without merit given that: (1) defendant’s notice of removal conceded that Freddie Mac neither owned nor held applicable note and mortgage; and (2) jurisdiction under section 1349 can only be invoked where Freddie Mac was named party, and Freddie Mac was not named party in instant foreclosure action. Ct. of Appeals also directed attorney for defendant to respond to rule to show cause as to why she should not be further sanctioned for filing frivolous appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to support their demand that plaintiff submit to breathalyzer test or to arrest him on charge of possessing open container of alcohol in vehicle after said test revealed no alcohol on his breath. Defendants had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant had been drinking while driving his car where three credible witnesses told them that they saw defendant drink from what looked to be vodka bottle while driving his car, and where defendants observed what looked to be bottle containing alcohol in front seat of defendant's car. Fact that defendant passed field sobriety test did not require different result, and case law was conflicting at time of instant breathalyzer test as to whether defendants needed search warrant to conduct said test. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim on open-container charge where: (1) bottle in front seat of plaintiff’s car looked like opened liquor bottle that contained clear liquid; and (2) defendants did not know that said bottle did not contain alcohol until one month after issuance of citation.

In section 1983 and state law actions alleging that defendants-prison officials and private medical providers failed to provide plaintiff-pretrial detainee with adequate medical treatment that resulted in plaintiff’s death from diabetic ketoacidosis, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ state law medical malpractice claim where plaintiff failed to submit affidavit from medical professional that was required under section 2-622 of Ill. Code of Civil Procedure. Ct rejected plaintiff’s claim that said affidavit was not required in instant federal proceeding based on diversity jurisdiction. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in making said dismissal with prejudice since: (1) dismissals under section 2-622 are normally without prejudice to allow plaintiff to amend her compliant by supplying requisite affidavit; and (2) Dist. Ct. did not make specific finding that failure to include affidavit was done in bad faith or that defendants would be prejudiced by allowing said amendment. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s section 1983 action where plaintiff failed to present evidence of series of similar incidents involving diabetic ketoacidosis to support her claim that defendants’ lack of policies regarding appropriate treatment of diabetic prisoners who refuse insulin and/or blood sugar tests constituted deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical condition.