Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants falsely imprisoned plaintiff beyond his applicable release date. Record showed that Assistant Public Defender prepared agreed order that was signed by sentencing judge that expressly stated that plaintiff would be released without term of mandatory supervised release on May 28, 2010, and plaintiff was released on May 21, 2010. Fact that sentencing judge had entered on same date as agreed order two other orders indicating that release date was earlier than May 28, 2010 did not require different result. Moreover, even without agreed order, plaintiff did not establish any 8th Amendment claim, where defendants were delaying plaintiff’s release based on reasonable belief under Illinois statute that sentencing judge could not impose sentence without also imposing term of mandatory supervised release.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action against defendant-prison guard as sanction for lying (in affidavit and in live testimony) that he had filed written prison grievance regarding subject matter of his section 1982 claim so as to satisfy requirement that he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit. Prison records did not reveal existence of said grievance, although said records contained over 100 other grievances from plaintiff, and plaintiff had previously indicated that he had made only oral complaint about said 1983 claim that defendant had sexually abused him during pat-down search. Ct. further found that plaintiff’s misconduct in committing perjury is sufficient to warrant dismissal of his section 1983 claim and referred matter to U.S. Attorney for consideration of bringing criminal perjury charges against plaintiff. It also issued Rule to Show Cause directing plaintiff to explain why it should not fine him for his misconduct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in instant FELA action, alleging that defendant negligently caused cumulative trauma to plaintiff-employee’s wrists, elbow and shoulder through use of vibrating tools, after determining to exclude opinion of plaintiff’s medical expert witness. Dist. Ct. could properly exclude opinion of plaintiff’s medical expert, where said expert failed to follow reliable methods when finding that plaintiff’s work environment caused his injuries, since expert failed to personally observe plaintiff’s working conditions, obtain written work description, perform scientific tests or investigate several potential non-work-related causes of plaintiff’s health problems. Moreover, although plaintiff argued that defendant had frustrated attempt by plaintiff’s expert to test plaintiff’s work-related tools and had failed to provide expert with written job description, such alleged problems did not excuse expert’s failure to generate admissible opinion, and plaintiff should have otherwise alerted Dist. Ct. to such problems during discovery phase of case.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ lawsuit, alleging that certain loans promulgated by defendants that had yearly interest rates of 139 percent violated various Illinois civil and criminal statutes, where dismissal was based on venue clause contained in loan agreements that called for parties to submit disputes to arbitration conducted by Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe that were to take place on Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservation located in South Dakota. Instant action should not have been dismissed where arbitral mechanism specified in loan agreement was sham/illusory, since Tribe had not set procedures for selection of arbitrators or for conduct of arbitral proceedings. Thus, it would not have been possible for plaintiffs to have ascertained dispute resolution process and rules to which they were agreeing at time of loan agreement. As such, Ct. found that plaintiffs could proceed in federal court where venue clause in loan agreement was substantively and procedurally unconscionable.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on collateral estoppel grounds plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that he was terminated in violation of his due process and freedom of speech rights, where said dismissal was based on prior Appellate Court finding that plaintiff was not eligible for Illinois unemployment insurance benefits because plaintiff had constructively resigned his position by failing to obtain required commercial driver’s license. Section 1900B of Unemployment Insurance Act precluded Dist. Ct. from applying collateral estoppel based on Appellate Court ruling since results of plaintiff’s unemployment insurance claim could not be used as evidence in any other judicial proceeding.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s motion to certify class action in four consolidated consumer protection lawsuits that essentially alleged that defendant used deceptive packaging of its single-serving coffee pods used in Keurig coffeemakers that, according to plaintiffs, misled consumers into believing that pod contained high quality ground coffee beans, rather than instant coffee that pod actually contained. Dist. Ct. failed to recognize potential common question as to all putative class members, i.e., whether defendant’s packaging was likely to mislead reasonable consumer as to contents of pod. Moreover, Dist. Ct.'s concern that each class member’s claim might require individualized inquiry on causation question was not valid reason for denying certification request since: (1) every consumer fraud case involves individualized elements of reliance or causation; and (2) class action would be appropriate in cases where damages for class members could be susceptible to measurement across entire class. Accordingly, plaintiffs were entitled to new consideration of class action issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying Intervenors’ request to view certain documents/exhibits filed under seal in plaintiff's response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, where said documents/exhibits were not relied upon or cited by plaintiff in its response, and where Dist. Ct. indicated that he would not consult said documents when ruling on motion to dismiss. While public has general right to view documents that have been filed in case, said right did not apply, where instant documents played no role in any judicial decision.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were unreasonable in execution of search warrant on plaintiff’s property, where record supported claim that 40 to 50 volunteers from animal-rights groups had assisted defendants in removal of more than 300 animals from plaintiff’s property, and that said individuals had unreasonably damaged plaintiff’s property while conducting search. Ct. rejected defendant-County’s argument that it could not be held responsible for conduct of volunteers, or that it was entitled to immunity against section 1983 action based on immunity granted to it by state statute.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request to remand back to state court plaintiffs’ action alleging that defendants’ cancellation of health insurance policies and replacement of said policies with more costly insurance options violated Illinois law, where said action had been removed to federal court by defendants under Class Action Fairness Act, and where plaintiffs alleged that remand was appropriate under section 1332(d)(4) because two-thirds of potential class members, as well as at least one defendant were citizens of Illinois. Plaintiff had burden of proof to establish eligibility for remand under section 1332(d)(4), and plaintiffs failed in their burden, since they only presented evidence that potential class members were “residents” as opposed to “citizens” of Illinois. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on merits of case, where: (1) plaintiffs conceded that insurance company was entitled to withdraw from Illinois market and cancel existing policies; and (2) plaintiffs could not establish or enforce any HIPAA violation associated with defendants’ actions.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-Mayor’s motion to stay trial on section 1983 action after Dist. Ct. denied Mayor’s claim of qualified immunity with respect to 2 out of 11 plaintiffs. Issue presented in Dist. Ct., i.e., whether plaintiffs' jobs were ones for which political affiliation was permissible criterion, is question of law that makes it proper for interlocutory appeal and eligible for stay of further proceedings in Dist. Ct. pending Mayor’s appeal. Moreover, defendant-City was also entitled to invoke doctrine of “pendent appellate jurisdiction” to seek similar stay of Dist. Ct.’s proceedings against it pending outcome of Mayor’s appeal on qualified immunity question, since outcome of Mayor’s appeal will have direct impact on plaintiff’s case against City, and where City’s liability, if any, derives from Mayor’s liability.