Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action third-party plaintiff’s counterclaims alleging contribution arising out of plaintiff’s personal injury claim, as well as claims alleging state and federal antitrust violations, even though third-party plaintiff essentially argued on appeal that Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction over state and federal antitrust counterclaims since said federal claims were “too weak” to invoke federal question jurisdiction under 28 USC section 1331, and that its state claims did not fall within scope of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 USC section 1367(a). Plaintiff’s federal antitrust claims that concerned alleged misuse of market power and alleged conspiracy with another entity were sufficient to invoke subject matter jurisdiction so as to permit Dist. Ct. ability to ultimately dismiss said claims. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly consider and dismiss instant state law counterclaims where they formed part of same case or controversy as federal antitrust counterclaims. Ct. noted, though, that counterplaintiff’s strategy on appeal of arguing lack of jurisdiction with respect to its own counterclaims placed counterplaintiff at risk for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s section 1983 action against defendants-City and its police dept., where plaintiff alleged that police officer subjected plaintiff to false arrest by submitting affidavit that mistakenly named plaintiff as culprit in drug trafficking offense. Defendant-City could not be held liable for actions of police officer on respondeat superior basis in instant section 1983 action, and plaintiff failed to identify any custom or policy that officer was acting upon when drafting affidavit. Moreover, plaintiff could not sue defendants State of Indiana or its state police in their official capacities since they are not “persons” who may be sued under section 1983. Also, plaintiff could not proceed directly against police officer, since Indiana Tort Claims Act provided immunity to said officer, who, according to complaint, was acting within scope of his employment.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in denying plaintiff-prisoner’s motion for recruitment of counsel prior to granting defendants-medical personnel employed by prison’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent with respect to medical treatment of plaintiff’s eye that ultimately resulted in removal of part of said eye. Dist. Ct. should have granted request for recruitment of counsel in light of plaintiff’s vision problems and his 10th grade education, and said error was prejudicial since lawyer could have presented facts to create genuine issue regarding why prison doctor failed to follow eye specialist’s recommendations regarding treatment of eye, or why prison doctor advised series of ineffective treatments that allegedly prolonged plaintiff’s pain.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-Bank’s case seeking to enjoin defendants-customers from arbitrating dispute against bank’s affiliated securities dealer and two of Bank’s employees regarding losses defendants allegedly incurred in setup and oversight of investment account held by plaintiff, but controlled by defendants. Although contract between defendants and affiliated securities dealer contained arbitration clause, plaintiff had standing to file instant lawsuit, even though plaintiff was not named as party in defendants’ lawsuit, since: (1) any arbitration of defendant’s dispute would violate forum selection clause in defendants’ separate contract with plaintiff; and (2) plaintiff would ultimately be responsible for paying any judgment against its employees in defendants’ lawsuit against them. Fact that plaintiff was not named in defendants’ lawsuit did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-professional group organization’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiff-member of said organization, alleging that defendant’s one-year suspension of plaintiff from said group violated Illinois law and group’s own governing documents, where, according to plaintiff, said suspension would severely impact his future income as expert witness. Plaintiff could only proceed with instant case if he could show that membership in defendant’s group affected his important economic interests, and while plaintiff testified that suspension would devastate his potential income, plaintiff failed to present any documentary evidence, such as his own actual income loss or income losses from others who had been suspended from group, to support his claim of significant loss of income arising out of instant suspension.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction plaintiff’s breach of contract action against defendant-Netherlands company, arising out of defendant’s conduct in providing goods and services in Belgium. While personal jurisdiction over defendant exists in Wisconsin only if defendant had consented to bringing lawsuit in Wisconsin, Dist. Ct. could not resolve dispute between parties with respect to issue of defendant’s consent to bring lawsuit in Wisconsin without conducting hearing where: (1) master contract was silent as to whether plaintiff could bring lawsuit in Wisconsin; (2) defendant disputed plaintiff’s claim that parties had orally agreed to allowing plaintiff to bring any lawsuit in Wisconsin; and (3) parties used conflicting commercial forms as to where any lawsuit could be filed.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s breach of contract action against defendant-Chinese limited liability company under international diversity jurisdiction provisions of 28 USC section 1332(a)(2). Defendant’s status as limited liability company meant that company itself did not have its own citizenship, but that defendant’s citizenship for diversity purposes was citizenship of each individual member of said company. As such, Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction because one member of defendant’s company shared same Illinois citizenship as plaintiff.

In action by plaintiff-lawyer alleging that defendant-federal govt. violated FCRA, when it sent him email receipt of his filing fee that contained last four digits of his credit card’s number, as well as his card’s expiration date, Ct. of Appeals found that language in section 1681a(b) of FCRA waived United States sovereign immunity from damages for violation of FCRA. However, plaintiff’s claim lacked merit since FCRA requires that receipt with credit card information actually be printed at point of sale, while record indicated that defendant did not “print” any receipt, but rather sent plaintiff’s receipt to his email account, such that defendant’s conduct was not covered by FCRA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s claim alleging unjust enrichment, fraud and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty arising out of defendants’ efforts at obtaining entity’s interest in partnership for significantly less than fair market value, where plaintiff essentially owed 11 percent of entity selling interest in partnership. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s interest in most of her claims were derivative since any recovery in these actions would go directly to entity as opposed to plaintiff. Moreover, plaintiff failed to adequately plead her fraud claim alleging that defendants withheld from her certain material information about said sale, where plaintiff failed to allege that defendants were under duty to disclose said information to her.