Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants violated his 5th and 8th Amendment rights by imposing Behavior Action Plan (BAP) that included placement in segregated cell without any clothes, and at times, without mattress, as well as imposed severe restrictions on ability to read mail or have access to toiletries. While defendants argued that BAP was appropriate in light of plaintiff’s multiple prior attempts at suicide, record contained triable issue as to whether BAP imposed atypical and significant hardship without giving plaintiff opportunity to have notice of BAP or opportunity to be heard on its imposition. Moreover, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish claim that BAP itself denied plaintiff minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief in section 1983 action alleging that Indiana’s marriage-solemnization statute violates 1st Amendment by giving religions who have established clergy opportunity to solemnize marriage ceremonies, but precluded leaders in plaintiff-non profit corporation, which describes itself as humanist group that promotes ethical living without belief in deity, from solemnizing marriages. Under 1st Amendment’s neutrality principles, state cannot make distinction between religious and secular beliefs that hold same place in adherents’ lives, and Ct. rejected state claim that it would allow humanists to solemnize marriages if and only if they falsely declared that they constituted religious group.

In section 1983 and wrongful death actions alleging that defendants-police officials used excessive force when responding to 911 call by shooting decedent, who had been diagnosed as schizophrenic, where decedent, with knife in hand, had lunged at defendant police officer, Dist. Ct. did not err in requiring plaintiff to prove that officer lacked justification to shoot decedent. Fact that defendants did not raise justification affirmative defense did not require different result, where plaintiff was required prove existence of willful and wanton battery. Dist. Ct. also did not err in: (1) admitting evidence of decedent’s alcohol use where said evidence was relevant in jury’s assessment on loss of society claim; and (2) admitting evidence that decedent had knife taped to his leg, even though responding officer was unaware of said knife at time of shooting, since said evidence suggested that decedent was prepared for battle and acted aggressively.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment in instant products liability action alleging that defendant’s muzzle gun that was purchased in 1994 was defective for failing to warn plaintiff, when plaintiff installed 2008 gun conversion kit, that gun could unexpectedly discharge if plaintiff failed to swab barrel of gun between shots. Dist. Ct. could properly find Indiana’s 10-year statute of repose applied to plaintiff’s 1994 purchase of said gun, and that defendant’s installation of conversion kit did not constitute exception to said statute of repose, since conversion kit did not increase existing risk of gun to unexpectedly discharge. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in excluding opinion of plaintiff’s expert, who stated that there was increased risk of unexpected discharge after plaintiff had installed conversion kit, where expert’s opinion lacked evidentiary support, and where expert’s theory was purportedly based only on “common sense.”

Plaintiff-decedent’s estate was entitled to new trial on section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials denied decedent-pre-trial detainee appropriate medical treatment when they rapidly tapered off his psychotropic medication, which resulted in his death, where Dist. Ct. denied plaintiff’s request for jury instruction that described applicable standard of conduct in instant 4th Amendment claim as “objective reasonableness” rather than “deliberative indifference” standard that plaintiff had advocated up until six weeks prior to trial. Plaintiff’s proposed instruction constituted correct statement of law, and Dist. Ct. erred in using deliberate indifference standard under misguided belief that plaintiff had “waived” right to use correct standard because she had failed to promptly notify Dist. Ct. and defendant of applicable standard of conduct. Moreover, plaintiff’s late shift to correct standard of conduct would not have been prejudicial to defendant’s preparation for trial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering order pursuant to Rule 60(a) that required plaintiff to return $124,940 in earnest money to defendant, where defendant had paid said money to plaintiff as part of parties’ agreement, and where plaintiff successfully obtained declaration that said agreement was not binding on parties. Plaintiff acknowledged that if agreement were rescinded it would have to return said earnest money to defendant, and Dist. Ct. could use Rule 60(a) to enter instant order that corrected original final order that had granted plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgment relief but had failed to mention earnest money issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s lawsuit, alleging that defendant-State’s Attorney’s enforcement of state statute that precluded plaintiff from running as candidate for local school board seat due to his prior felony theft conviction essentially violated due process and equal protection clauses because defendant had targeted him on account of his African-American race. Plaintiff’s lawsuit against defendant in his official capacity was barred by 11th Amendment, and defendant was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity with respect to any claim against defendant in his individual capacity. Moreover, underlying state statute prohibiting plaintiff from holding public office due to his felony conviction did not violate equal protection clause, even though plaintiff claimed that statute had disparate impact on African-American men, since plaintiff needed to allege that legislature acted with discriminatory purpose when enacting statute.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss for want of prosecution plaintiff’s personal injury action after plaintiff had failed to comply with certain discovery orders. Record showed clear pattern of delay, where, after series of extensions of time to serve discovery requests, plaintiff failed to comply with court-ordered deadline to serve said responses and failed to appear at either subsequent status hearing or hearing to argue defendant’s motion to dismiss. Moreover, while plaintiff eventually tendered some, but not all of requested discovery responses in conjunction with her motion to reinstate case, Dist. Ct. was not required to grant plaintiff’s motion, where plaintiff’s belated tender of responses was simply too late to warrant reinstatement of her case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging that he was sexually abused in 1950s and 1960s by certain individuals in Catholic church and others, where said lawsuit was filed beyond applicable Ill. statute of limitations/ repose that allowed said lawsuit to be filed up to 12 years after date on which plaintiff obtained age of 18. As such, plaintiff had until reasonable period beyond 1991 to file instant lawsuit, and instant lawsuit was not filed until 2011. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant was estopped from raising statute of limitations/repose defense, even though defendant had offered plaintiff in 2007 some sort of assistance in order “to heal” plaintiff, since said offer occurred after applicable limitations period had expired and did not reflect defendant’s intent to forfeit any statute of repose defense.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by including deliberate falsehoods in their affidavits supporting their request for issuance of search warrant, where: (1) one defendant, who was father-in-law to plaintiff, claimed presence of 50 marijuana plants in plaintiff’s home that plaintiff used to obtain “marijuana oil” for plaintiff’s terminally ill daughter; (2) said defendant failed to reveal his family connection to court; and (3) actual search produced no marijuana plants. Plaintiff did not allege that said defendant was aware that no plants were in plaintiff’s home at time he sought warrant, or that said defendant was not telling truth that he had seen said plants four days prior to seeking warrant, and at time of warrant there was no medical exception to federal law prohibiting possession of marijuana. Moreover, although defendant’s motivation for seeking warrant was suspect, said motivation did not undermine existence of probable cause to search plaintiff’s home.