Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s request to certify class in lawsuit alleging that defendant falsely told its customers that its shingles met industry standard, where Dist. Ct. based its denial on its observation that proposed class members were required to show that they experienced common damages arising out of their purchase of defendant’s shingles. Dist. Ct. held mistaken belief that commonality of damages was essential for class action treatment, and remand was required where plaintiff’s theories of recovery, i.e., that every purchaser of defendant’s shingles was equally injured by delivery of shingles that did not meet industry standards, or that purchasers whose shingles actually failed were entitled to damages, matched their theory of liability so as to potentially support class action treatment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion for turnover order of defendants’ assets in registration proceeding to enforce California Dist. Ct. order that confirmed plaintiff’s arbitration award that stemmed from plaintiff’s action seeking to recover damages to plaintiff’s home that was built by defendants. While defendants sought set-off of arbitration award that reflected plaintiff’s recovery from other defendants of damages to her home, Ct. of Appeals found that defendants had waived issue by failing to fully litigate said issue in earlier California lawsuit, where said court had denied defendants’ request for set-off, and where defendants had failed to appeal California court’s denial of set-off. Moreover, defendants could not raise issue in instant lawsuit, where Dist. Ct. was simply attempting to enforce judgment by other entities that had already resolved what was owed to plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs-school districts’ lawsuit seeking to require defendant to apply federal funds provided under Patients Protection and Affordable Care Act to rebate certain medical premiums paid by plaintiffs for some outlays on early retirees’ medical care, where plaintiffs’ state-court lawsuit was improperly removed to Dist. Ct. All of plaintiffs’ claims arose under state law and all litigants were citizens of Wisconsin, so as to preclude any invocation of removal jurisdiction. Fact that case raised potential federal issue was insufficient by itself to create federal jurisdiction, and instant lawsuit about ownership following distribution of federal funds was essentially state law matter.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that defendant had valid in pari delicto defense against plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging that defendant conducted fraudulent audits of plaintiff’s financial records in violation of Illinois tort law, where Dist. Ct. had acquired case from 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, which had entered order that directed that matter be transferred to instant Dist. Ct. with directions to remand case to Illinois state court for resolution of lawsuit on merits. Dist. Ct. had no authority to act on merits of case given instant transfer order, even though 2nd Circuit Ct. of Appeals allowed Dist. Ct. to make determination as to whether Illinois court could timely resolve matter, and 2nd Circuit Ct. of Appeals could properly find that Illinois courts would provide more authentic resolution of case that involved purely Illinois law.

Dist. Ct. did not err in staying on abstention grounds two federal causes of action in favor of plaintiff proceeding in related state court action alleging breach of fiduciary duties and breach of partnership agreement, where plaintiff alleged that defendants removed funds from partnership that belonged to plaintiff and placed said funds into accounts controlled by defendants. All three causes of action, which had been filed by plaintiff, were sufficiently parallel, where interests of defendants in all three actions were nearly identical and concerned plaintiff’s claim that defendants either breached partnership agreement or assisted others in said breach. Fact that one defendant in federal action was not included in state court action did not destroy parallel nature of subject lawsuits. Moreover, nine out of ten Colorado River factors supported instant stay of federal action to avoid, among other things, piecemeal litigation.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by entering defendant’s home without permission or warrant and arresting plaintiff after responding to 911 call indicating that plaintiff was potentially involved in domestic dispute, and where 911 caller apologized for making said call and merely requested defendants to obtain her car keys from plaintiff. Ct. rejected defendants’ claim that they could properly enter plaintiff’s home without warrant for purpose of preventing serious injury or to merely ask plaintiff about 911 call, since defendants failed to establish exigent circumstance for doing so where there was no report of physical attack. Moreover, plaintiff could properly establish 1st Amendment claim based on assertion that defendants arrested him in retaliation for calling his attorney during his exchange with defendants, where said attorney repeatedly advised him to inform defendants to leave his home. Plaintiff was also entitled to new trial on his excessive force and willful and wanton battery claims, where Dist. Ct. gave erroneous instruction indicating that lawfulness of defendants’ presence plaintiff’s home was not issue in case, and where defendants’ counsel repeatedly misled jury into thinking that defendants’ presence in plaintiff’s home without warrant was lawful.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated equal protection clause by initially denying plaintiff’s pawn shop license application and then granting said license only after plaintiff agreed not to hire individual with criminal history as manager of plaintiff’s pawn shop. None of plaintiff’s proposed three comparatives were suitable comparatives where: (1) defendant was unaware at time of one comparative’s application that its manager had criminal history; (2) second comparative’s “bad acts” concerned valid self-defense claim not at issue in plaintiff’s application; and (3) third comparative, like plaintiff, also was required to sign memorandum agreeing not to hire individual with criminal history.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s medical needs, where Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in denying two of plaintiff’s requests for recruitment of counsel that were made at start of case and during discovery stage of case. Dist. Ct. failed to focus on plaintiff’s low IQ, functional illiteracy and inexperience in civil litigation when denying his requests for recruitment of counsel, and instead improperly relied on existence of jailhouse lawyer who was assisting plaintiff. Moreover, factual and legal complexity of case required recruitment of counsel, where case involved complex medical terms and concepts about plaintiff’s kidney disease. Also, while Dist. Ct. eventually granted plaintiff’s request for recruitment of counsel to assist him at summary judgment stage of case, initial denials were prejudicial, where plaintiff had failed to present any medical evidence to support his claim, and where plaintiff had failed to depose defendants to determine their knowledge of his kidney disease.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiff $108,350.87 out of requested $426,000 in attorney fees where plaintiff obtained $2,000 verdict in action alleging that defendants-police officers used excessive force when arresting plaintiff, and where Dist. Ct. reached said reduced figure by striking unnecessary time (such as research time spent on drafted motions that were never filed and time spent during day-long mock trial) or improperly documented hours and then reducing resultant lodestar figure by 50% to reflect lack of success on merits of case. Dist. Ct. could properly reduce $400 and $450 per hour fee requests to $385 per hour figure (and $175 per hour figure for less experienced counsel) where such figures were within relevant Chicago market, and where plaintiff’s requested per hour rates were based on contingent fee contracts. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion when eliminating unnecessary hours and in reducing lodestar figure to reflect lack of success, where plaintiff only prevailed on certain claims against defendants, and where instant requested fee dwarfed $2,000 judgment.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that defendant subjected plaintiff to unconstitutional search and arrest on charge of disorderly conduct after defendant received report that individual was driving through town while holding un-holstered gun in view of others. While Dist. Ct. found that defendant did not have sufficient facts to warrant belief that plaintiff had committed disorderly conduct because Wisconsin had implemented right to carry firearms openly, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not clearly established at time of his arrest, where Wisconsin courts had not yet ruled on whether “going armed” was unprotected conduct punishable under disorderly conduct statute. As such, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. Ct. also observed that plaintiff’s reported conduct was sufficient for officer to conclude that plaintiff had criminal intent in holding out what looked to be handgun.