Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-professional group organization’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiff-member of said organization, alleging that defendant’s one-year suspension of plaintiff from said group violated Illinois law and group’s own governing documents, where, according to plaintiff, said suspension would severely impact his future income as expert witness. Plaintiff could only proceed with instant case if he could show that membership in defendant’s group affected his important economic interests, and while plaintiff testified that suspension would devastate his potential income, plaintiff failed to present any documentary evidence, such as his own actual income loss or income losses from others who had been suspended from group, to support his claim of significant loss of income arising out of instant suspension.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction plaintiff’s breach of contract action against defendant-Netherlands company, arising out of defendant’s conduct in providing goods and services in Belgium. While personal jurisdiction over defendant exists in Wisconsin only if defendant had consented to bringing lawsuit in Wisconsin, Dist. Ct. could not resolve dispute between parties with respect to issue of defendant’s consent to bring lawsuit in Wisconsin without conducting hearing where: (1) master contract was silent as to whether plaintiff could bring lawsuit in Wisconsin; (2) defendant disputed plaintiff’s claim that parties had orally agreed to allowing plaintiff to bring any lawsuit in Wisconsin; and (3) parties used conflicting commercial forms as to where any lawsuit could be filed.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s breach of contract action against defendant-Chinese limited liability company under international diversity jurisdiction provisions of 28 USC section 1332(a)(2). Defendant’s status as limited liability company meant that company itself did not have its own citizenship, but that defendant’s citizenship for diversity purposes was citizenship of each individual member of said company. As such, Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction because one member of defendant’s company shared same Illinois citizenship as plaintiff.

In action by plaintiff-lawyer alleging that defendant-federal govt. violated FCRA, when it sent him email receipt of his filing fee that contained last four digits of his credit card’s number, as well as his card’s expiration date, Ct. of Appeals found that language in section 1681a(b) of FCRA waived United States sovereign immunity from damages for violation of FCRA. However, plaintiff’s claim lacked merit since FCRA requires that receipt with credit card information actually be printed at point of sale, while record indicated that defendant did not “print” any receipt, but rather sent plaintiff’s receipt to his email account, such that defendant’s conduct was not covered by FCRA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s claim alleging unjust enrichment, fraud and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty arising out of defendants’ efforts at obtaining entity’s interest in partnership for significantly less than fair market value, where plaintiff essentially owed 11 percent of entity selling interest in partnership. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s interest in most of her claims were derivative since any recovery in these actions would go directly to entity as opposed to plaintiff. Moreover, plaintiff failed to adequately plead her fraud claim alleging that defendants withheld from her certain material information about said sale, where plaintiff failed to allege that defendants were under duty to disclose said information to her.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants violated his 5th and 8th Amendment rights by imposing Behavior Action Plan (BAP) that included placement in segregated cell without any clothes, and at times, without mattress, as well as imposed severe restrictions on ability to read mail or have access to toiletries. While defendants argued that BAP was appropriate in light of plaintiff’s multiple prior attempts at suicide, record contained triable issue as to whether BAP imposed atypical and significant hardship without giving plaintiff opportunity to have notice of BAP or opportunity to be heard on its imposition. Moreover, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish claim that BAP itself denied plaintiff minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief in section 1983 action alleging that Indiana’s marriage-solemnization statute violates 1st Amendment by giving religions who have established clergy opportunity to solemnize marriage ceremonies, but precluded leaders in plaintiff-non profit corporation, which describes itself as humanist group that promotes ethical living without belief in deity, from solemnizing marriages. Under 1st Amendment’s neutrality principles, state cannot make distinction between religious and secular beliefs that hold same place in adherents’ lives, and Ct. rejected state claim that it would allow humanists to solemnize marriages if and only if they falsely declared that they constituted religious group.

In section 1983 and wrongful death actions alleging that defendants-police officials used excessive force when responding to 911 call by shooting decedent, who had been diagnosed as schizophrenic, where decedent, with knife in hand, had lunged at defendant police officer, Dist. Ct. did not err in requiring plaintiff to prove that officer lacked justification to shoot decedent. Fact that defendants did not raise justification affirmative defense did not require different result, where plaintiff was required prove existence of willful and wanton battery. Dist. Ct. also did not err in: (1) admitting evidence of decedent’s alcohol use where said evidence was relevant in jury’s assessment on loss of society claim; and (2) admitting evidence that decedent had knife taped to his leg, even though responding officer was unaware of said knife at time of shooting, since said evidence suggested that decedent was prepared for battle and acted aggressively.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment in instant products liability action alleging that defendant’s muzzle gun that was purchased in 1994 was defective for failing to warn plaintiff, when plaintiff installed 2008 gun conversion kit, that gun could unexpectedly discharge if plaintiff failed to swab barrel of gun between shots. Dist. Ct. could properly find Indiana’s 10-year statute of repose applied to plaintiff’s 1994 purchase of said gun, and that defendant’s installation of conversion kit did not constitute exception to said statute of repose, since conversion kit did not increase existing risk of gun to unexpectedly discharge. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in excluding opinion of plaintiff’s expert, who stated that there was increased risk of unexpected discharge after plaintiff had installed conversion kit, where expert’s opinion lacked evidentiary support, and where expert’s theory was purportedly based only on “common sense.”