Federal Civil Practice

Plaintiff-decedent’s estate was entitled to new trial on section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials denied decedent-pre-trial detainee appropriate medical treatment when they rapidly tapered off his psychotropic medication, which resulted in his death, where Dist. Ct. denied plaintiff’s request for jury instruction that described applicable standard of conduct in instant 4th Amendment claim as “objective reasonableness” rather than “deliberative indifference” standard that plaintiff had advocated up until six weeks prior to trial. Plaintiff’s proposed instruction constituted correct statement of law, and Dist. Ct. erred in using deliberate indifference standard under misguided belief that plaintiff had “waived” right to use correct standard because she had failed to promptly notify Dist. Ct. and defendant of applicable standard of conduct. Moreover, plaintiff’s late shift to correct standard of conduct would not have been prejudicial to defendant’s preparation for trial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering order pursuant to Rule 60(a) that required plaintiff to return $124,940 in earnest money to defendant, where defendant had paid said money to plaintiff as part of parties’ agreement, and where plaintiff successfully obtained declaration that said agreement was not binding on parties. Plaintiff acknowledged that if agreement were rescinded it would have to return said earnest money to defendant, and Dist. Ct. could use Rule 60(a) to enter instant order that corrected original final order that had granted plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgment relief but had failed to mention earnest money issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s lawsuit, alleging that defendant-State’s Attorney’s enforcement of state statute that precluded plaintiff from running as candidate for local school board seat due to his prior felony theft conviction essentially violated due process and equal protection clauses because defendant had targeted him on account of his African-American race. Plaintiff’s lawsuit against defendant in his official capacity was barred by 11th Amendment, and defendant was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity with respect to any claim against defendant in his individual capacity. Moreover, underlying state statute prohibiting plaintiff from holding public office due to his felony conviction did not violate equal protection clause, even though plaintiff claimed that statute had disparate impact on African-American men, since plaintiff needed to allege that legislature acted with discriminatory purpose when enacting statute.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss for want of prosecution plaintiff’s personal injury action after plaintiff had failed to comply with certain discovery orders. Record showed clear pattern of delay, where, after series of extensions of time to serve discovery requests, plaintiff failed to comply with court-ordered deadline to serve said responses and failed to appear at either subsequent status hearing or hearing to argue defendant’s motion to dismiss. Moreover, while plaintiff eventually tendered some, but not all of requested discovery responses in conjunction with her motion to reinstate case, Dist. Ct. was not required to grant plaintiff’s motion, where plaintiff’s belated tender of responses was simply too late to warrant reinstatement of her case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging that he was sexually abused in 1950s and 1960s by certain individuals in Catholic church and others, where said lawsuit was filed beyond applicable Ill. statute of limitations/ repose that allowed said lawsuit to be filed up to 12 years after date on which plaintiff obtained age of 18. As such, plaintiff had until reasonable period beyond 1991 to file instant lawsuit, and instant lawsuit was not filed until 2011. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant was estopped from raising statute of limitations/repose defense, even though defendant had offered plaintiff in 2007 some sort of assistance in order “to heal” plaintiff, since said offer occurred after applicable limitations period had expired and did not reflect defendant’s intent to forfeit any statute of repose defense.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by including deliberate falsehoods in their affidavits supporting their request for issuance of search warrant, where: (1) one defendant, who was father-in-law to plaintiff, claimed presence of 50 marijuana plants in plaintiff’s home that plaintiff used to obtain “marijuana oil” for plaintiff’s terminally ill daughter; (2) said defendant failed to reveal his family connection to court; and (3) actual search produced no marijuana plants. Plaintiff did not allege that said defendant was aware that no plants were in plaintiff’s home at time he sought warrant, or that said defendant was not telling truth that he had seen said plants four days prior to seeking warrant, and at time of warrant there was no medical exception to federal law prohibiting possession of marijuana. Moreover, although defendant’s motivation for seeking warrant was suspect, said motivation did not undermine existence of probable cause to search plaintiff’s home.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s request to certify class in lawsuit alleging that defendant falsely told its customers that its shingles met industry standard, where Dist. Ct. based its denial on its observation that proposed class members were required to show that they experienced common damages arising out of their purchase of defendant’s shingles. Dist. Ct. held mistaken belief that commonality of damages was essential for class action treatment, and remand was required where plaintiff’s theories of recovery, i.e., that every purchaser of defendant’s shingles was equally injured by delivery of shingles that did not meet industry standards, or that purchasers whose shingles actually failed were entitled to damages, matched their theory of liability so as to potentially support class action treatment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion for turnover order of defendants’ assets in registration proceeding to enforce California Dist. Ct. order that confirmed plaintiff’s arbitration award that stemmed from plaintiff’s action seeking to recover damages to plaintiff’s home that was built by defendants. While defendants sought set-off of arbitration award that reflected plaintiff’s recovery from other defendants of damages to her home, Ct. of Appeals found that defendants had waived issue by failing to fully litigate said issue in earlier California lawsuit, where said court had denied defendants’ request for set-off, and where defendants had failed to appeal California court’s denial of set-off. Moreover, defendants could not raise issue in instant lawsuit, where Dist. Ct. was simply attempting to enforce judgment by other entities that had already resolved what was owed to plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs-school districts’ lawsuit seeking to require defendant to apply federal funds provided under Patients Protection and Affordable Care Act to rebate certain medical premiums paid by plaintiffs for some outlays on early retirees’ medical care, where plaintiffs’ state-court lawsuit was improperly removed to Dist. Ct. All of plaintiffs’ claims arose under state law and all litigants were citizens of Wisconsin, so as to preclude any invocation of removal jurisdiction. Fact that case raised potential federal issue was insufficient by itself to create federal jurisdiction, and instant lawsuit about ownership following distribution of federal funds was essentially state law matter.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that defendant had valid in pari delicto defense against plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging that defendant conducted fraudulent audits of plaintiff’s financial records in violation of Illinois tort law, where Dist. Ct. had acquired case from 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, which had entered order that directed that matter be transferred to instant Dist. Ct. with directions to remand case to Illinois state court for resolution of lawsuit on merits. Dist. Ct. had no authority to act on merits of case given instant transfer order, even though 2nd Circuit Ct. of Appeals allowed Dist. Ct. to make determination as to whether Illinois court could timely resolve matter, and 2nd Circuit Ct. of Appeals could properly find that Illinois courts would provide more authentic resolution of case that involved purely Illinois law.