Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants coerced witness into falsely identifying plaintiff as shooter in murder charge (from which plaintiff was eventually found not guilty) by holding said witness against his will until he identified plaintiff as culprit from photo lineup, and that defendants committed Brady violation by failing to inform prosecutor as to how witness identified plaintiff. Plaintiff failed to establish any violation of his due process rights where: (1) plaintiff’s claim pertained only to coerced testimony from witness; and (2) witness who was subject to alleged coercion was only individual who had potential constitutional claim against defendants. Result could have been different if plaintiff’s claim concerned allegation that defendants intentionally manufactured false testimony. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish any Brady violation, where record showed that he was fully aware of any coercion tactics used by defendants prior to his criminal trial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff-employee’s due process rights by terminating him from his seasonal employment without affording him notice or opportunity for hearing. Plaintiff failed to establish that his position as County employee was job that could only be terminated “for cause” so as to establish any due process protection, where: (1) employee handbook indicated that plaintiff was “at will” employee; (2) plaintiff admitted that as seasonal employee he had no guarantee of continued employment. Fact that County ordinance provided that plaintiff could be disciplined for just cause was insufficient to establish property interest in his employment, where ordinance did not set forth promise of continued employment in absence of cause for discharge. Plaintiff’s alternative claim that defendant did not follow its own procedural rules did not constitute due process violation.

Dist. Ct. erred in approving proposed settlement of class action that sought compensation for defendant’s manufacture of casement windows that allowed water to damage windows’ wooden frame, where terms of settlement called for class members to receive cash payments of up to either $750 per structure or $6,000 per structure if class member pursued arbitration of said claim. Lead class counsel, who was son-in-law to one named class representative, operated under conflict of interest and was additionally saddled with financial and ethical issues at time settlement proposal was generated. Record also suggested that said counsel “sold out” class members by agreeing to settlement that actually provided class members with little more than $1 million in damages relief, while providing class counsel with $11 million in fees. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals directed that named class representative, who was father-in-law to lead class counsel, as well as lead class counsel be removed, and that four named class representatives, who were removed by lead class counsel after they had objected to proposed settlement, be reinstated.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on res judicata grounds plaintiff-employee’s action alleging that she was terminated in retaliation for having supported co-worker’s claim of sexual harassment. Record showed that plaintiff had contested her termination in three prior unsuccessful lawsuits, and fact that plaintiff made additional allegations of race and sex discrimination in instant lawsuit did not take case outside contours of res judicata doctrine. Ct. further found that instant lawsuit was filed approximately 10 years after expiration of applicable limitations period.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by using torture tactics to extract confession from plaintiff to murder charge and used means to cover up said tactics, where plaintiff had entered into settlement agreement in prior civil action that also sought damages against defendants for using torture tactics to extract confession, in which plaintiff received $3,000 in exchange for broad release that precluded future actions based on incident alleged in said lawsuit. While plaintiff argued that instant action should be allowed to proceed since defendants were guilty of fraudulent concealment of facts demonstrating widespread nature of torture tactics with other criminal suspects that would have altered his decision to settle first lawsuit, Ct. found that: (1) settlement release covered instant lawsuit; (2) plaintiff knew at time of settlement that defendants had been lying about their actions taken against plaintiff; and (3) plaintiff’s counsel in first lawsuit failed to ask during discovery about actions defendants had taken against other suspects. As such, plaintiff could not demonstrate that he reasonably relied on any misstatements made by defendants when executing settlement to support any fraudulent inducement of settlement claim. Fact that other criminal suspects received considerably larger monetary recoveries against instant defendants for similar claims did not require different result. Ct. further noted that, although not raised by defendants, doctrine of res judicata could have been raised to preclude instant lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on Rooker-Feldman doctrine grounds plaintiff’s Rule 22 interpleader action that asked Dist. Ct. to determine ownership of certain stock under circumstances where state court had previously ordered plaintiff to turn over said stock to one defendant in interpleader action, while second defendant in interpleader action also claimed ownership to said stock via purchase agreement with plaintiff. Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply where: (1) second defendant in interpleader action was not party in prior state court action; and (2) instant interpleader action did not attack prior state court judgment, but rather sought determination with respect to priority of claims over said stock. Ct. further observed that on remand, Dist. Ct. may consider whether Wilton-Brillhart abstention doctrine applies where another pending, but stayed state court action involving instant parties has raised similar priority issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1981 action alleging that defendant-Forest Preserve District terminated him on account of his race. Under Jett, section 1981 does not create private cause of action against state actors, and while defendant could bring similar action against instant state actor under section 1983, instant lawsuit was filed beyond applicable two-year period for section 1983 claims. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that result in Jett was superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991.

Ct. of Appeals entered permanent injunction barring enforcement of certain portions of Wisconsin’s campaign finance law, after finding that portions of said law violated plaintiffs’ (interest group and its political action committee (PAC)) First Amendment rights, where statute contained: (1) ban on corporate political expenditures; (2) cap on corporate fundraising for affiliated PAC; (3) lengthy (50 word) regulatory disclaimer as applied to 30-second radio ads; and (4) statutory and regulatory definitions of “political purposes” and “political committee” that were overly vague. It also found unconstitutional certain portions of administrative rules 1.38 and 1.91 that imposed political committee status and other restrictions on groups engaged in issue advocacy, including treatment as express advocacy on all issue advocacy made during 30/60 day pre-election periods, as well as contained improper PAC-like burdens on independent speakers and political groups not engaged in express advocacy as their major purpose.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendants-police officers were entitled to qualified immunity in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s rights under 2nd , 4th and 14th Amendments, when they made warrantless entry into plaintiff’s home and removed her, after defendant had received report from plaintiff’s doctor that plaintiff was suicidal and had obtained Wisconsin section 51.15 statement of emergency detention, since such entry and seizure of plaintiff was justified under exigent circumstances to 4th Amendment’s warrant requirement. Moreover, while defendants’ subsequent seizure of plaintiff’s gun from her home may have violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where: (1) it was reasonable for defendants to have believed that plaintiff’s gun should be seized for safekeeping until it could be determined that plaintiff no longer posed danger to herself; and (2) Wisconsin courts had given broad scope to community caretaking doctrine that arguably supported defendants’ protective sweep of plaintiff’s home and seizure of her gun.

Dist. Ct. lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant-California entity in plaintiff’s trademark infringement action, where defendant’s contacts with Indiana consisted of: (1) fulfilling several Internet orders on allegedly infringing product from Indiana customers; (2) sending at least two allegedly misleading email blasts about said product from list that contained Indiana customers; and (3) maintaining interactive website that was available to Indiana customers. Instant activities attributable to defendant were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over defendant since: (1) said Internet sales were too few in number to demonstrate that defendant had targeted Indiana customers; and (2) defendant’s maintenance of email list or interactive website, without more, was conduct that was unrelated to any alleged trademark infringement.