Federal Civil Practice

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of defendant-manufacturer in plaintiff’s negligence and strict products liability action, where plaintiff alleged that microwave oven manufactured by defendant started fire in plaintiff’s home. While plaintiff produced some evidence that microwave caused fire, jury could nevertheless find in favor of defendant where defendant’s witness testified that microwave posed fire hazard only if heavy food had accumulated in unit and was in operation at time of fire, and plaintiff testified that microwave was both clean and off at time of fire. Moreover, record did not support plaintiff’s claim that defendant negligently failed to give him notice of fire hazard, where defendant presented evidence that it was far more successful in contacting owners of microwave about fire hazard than average recall. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in refusing to allow plaintiff to give his interpretation as to origins of fire, where plaintiff was no expert witness.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison guards and prison medical official’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants had failed to protect plaintiff from attack by cellmate and had ignored his requests for treatment of broken tooth that resulted from said attack. Plaintiff failed to show that supervisor of prison guards was subjectively aware prior to attack that cellmate was dangerous to plaintiff, since prior investigation by supervisor indicated that other guards were unaware of problems between plaintiff and cellmate, and that cellmate had no history of violence with other inmates. Moreover, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that medical official was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs, where plaintiff requested only aspirin and otherwise made complaints of pain only two days prior to receiving dental services. Dist. Ct. also did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for recruitment of counsel to assist him in instant case, where Dist. Ct. could properly have found that claim was not complex, and where plaintiff had taken appropriate measures to seek prison records and had made intelligent arguments to support his claims.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding defendants $63,391.45 in costs under 28 USC section 1920 as prevailing parties in litigation that spanned total of 28 years. Defendants did not file untimely request where defendants had previously filed timely Rule 59 motion that was pending at time request for costs had been filed, since relevant time for filing bill of costs did not begin to run until Dist. Ct. had resolved Rule 59 motion. Moreover, defendants were not required to do more than use statutory form of affidavit under 28 USC section 1924 to establish necessity of said costs. Fact that original Dist. Ct. judge failed to act on request for costs for three-year period did not require different result.

In action by plaintiff-shareholder in closely-held corporation alleging that defendant-family member of plaintiff and another shareholder in said corporation fraudulently misrepresented amount of compensation that defendant received from said corporation in his role as CEO and president of said corporation, Dist. Ct. did not err in rejecting plaintiff’s proffered jury instruction regarding amount of information defendant was required to disclose about his compensation, since said instruction was essentially same instruction that Dist. Ct. submitted to jury. Moreover, although jury found that defendant had breached fiduciary duty to plaintiff, jury also found that plaintiff’s claim was filed beyond applicable five-year limitations period and beyond any period allowed by discovery rule, where plaintiff could have timely obtained knowledge about defendant’s compensation through corporate records that disclosed total executive compensation to three corporate officers.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion that essentially sought reversal of Dist. Ct.’s granting of defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in Title VII action alleging race discrimination and retaliation arising out of plaintiff’s employment as teacher. While plaintiff had originally filed Rule 59(e) motion, said motion was filed one day late, such that said motion could only be treated as Rule 60(b) motion. Moreover, because instant Rule 60(b) motion did not toll applicable period for filing any notice of appeal, portion of plaintiff's notice of appeal seeking review of granting of summary judgment motion was untimely, and while portion of notice of appeal seeking review of denial of Rule 60(b) motion was timely, Dist. Ct.’s denial of said motion was proper, where alleged errors contained in said motion pertained only to matters regarding propriety of summary judgment that could have been raised in timely notice of appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-attorney and his law firm’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendants committed legal malpractice in connection with plaintiff’s failed attempt to acquire vacant city lots. While application submitted by defendants on behalf of plaintiff contained many errors, said errors did not prevent plaintiff from obtaining said lots, and plaintiff could have obtained said lots well after application had been submitted. Moreover, where application had to be approved by multiple entities, plaintiff failed to show that it would have been successful in obtaining said lots but for any alleged malpractice associated with drafting of application. Also, plaintiff could not recover $25,000 retainer fee from defendant law firm under unjust enrichment theory, where: (1) law firm never received $25,000 retainer check; and (2) unjust enrichment had no application where parties were subject to specific contract.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of defendants-police officers in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff to false arrest and malicious prosecution on drug possession and solicitation of unlawful act charges, based on defendants’ claim that they saw and heard plaintiff from 300 feet away yell “rocks, rocks” to passing motorist in attempt to sell crack cocaine. While plaintiff denied attempting to sell crack cocaine at time of his arrest, jury could properly credit defendants’ version of incident, and plaintiff otherwise failed to establish impossibility of defendants’ version of incident. Moreover, any inconsistencies with respect to defendants’ testimonies were appropriately resolve by jury. Record also showed that defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff based upon their personal viewing of incident, their claim that they saw plaintiff drop baggie containing crack cocaine at scene of arrest, and their understanding that reference to “rocks” was term for crack cocaine.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his continued civil incarceration under Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA), even though defendant argued that he was denied due process when Illinois trial court admitted into evidence allegations of abuse made against him by two minors in Arizona and Indiana. Said allegations were admitted through testimony of govt. expert, not as proof that said allegations actually occurred, but rather to cast light on information that said expert used to render her expert opinion. Fact that such allegations concerned incidents that occurred prior to original determination that defendant had mental disorder under SDPA did not require different result since trier-of-fact was entitled to know context of original commitment order.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that defendant had failed to establish that class action alleging violation of Illinois Consumer Fraud Act met requisite $5 million statutory threshold under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) so as to support lawsuit’s removal to federal court. While instant lawsuit alleged that defendant had filed 1,100 fraudulent small-claims actions, which concerned compensatory damages and legal fees that totaled no more than $3.5 million, said allegations were insufficient to cap any eventual damages award at less than $5 million amount in controversy threshold, where: (1) plaintiff did not irrevocably commit to obtaining less than $5 million for class members; and (2) defendant alleged that lawsuit actually concerned greater number of small claims actions that had potential for damages greater than $5 million. Thus, remand was required for new determination as to whether amount in controversy reached statutory threshold under CAFA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant’s decision to publicize and maintain internal records regarding three alleged deficiencies found at plaintiff’s nursing home without affording plaintiff prior hearing deprived plaintiff of its rights under Due Process Clause, as well as certain state and federal Medicaid regulations. Plaintiff had no right to hearing before state ALJ under 42 CFR sections 431.151 and 153, since recording of deficiencies in defendant’s compliance history and any public shaming of plaintiff by publication of said deficiencies were not listed as actions that could be remedied in 42 CFR section 488.406. Moreover, plaintiff had no constitutional due process claim to said hearing, where plaintiff failed to establish any protected interest in any defamatory publication, even though plaintiff asserted that existence of deficiencies: (1) precluded plaintiff from obtaining opportunity to correct future deficiencies without financial penalty; and (2) exposed plaintiff to enhanced penalties for future deficiencies.