Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in staying on abstention grounds two federal causes of action in favor of plaintiff proceeding in related state court action alleging breach of fiduciary duties and breach of partnership agreement, where plaintiff alleged that defendants removed funds from partnership that belonged to plaintiff and placed said funds into accounts controlled by defendants. All three causes of action, which had been filed by plaintiff, were sufficiently parallel, where interests of defendants in all three actions were nearly identical and concerned plaintiff’s claim that defendants either breached partnership agreement or assisted others in said breach. Fact that one defendant in federal action was not included in state court action did not destroy parallel nature of subject lawsuits. Moreover, nine out of ten Colorado River factors supported instant stay of federal action to avoid, among other things, piecemeal litigation.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by entering defendant’s home without permission or warrant and arresting plaintiff after responding to 911 call indicating that plaintiff was potentially involved in domestic dispute, and where 911 caller apologized for making said call and merely requested defendants to obtain her car keys from plaintiff. Ct. rejected defendants’ claim that they could properly enter plaintiff’s home without warrant for purpose of preventing serious injury or to merely ask plaintiff about 911 call, since defendants failed to establish exigent circumstance for doing so where there was no report of physical attack. Moreover, plaintiff could properly establish 1st Amendment claim based on assertion that defendants arrested him in retaliation for calling his attorney during his exchange with defendants, where said attorney repeatedly advised him to inform defendants to leave his home. Plaintiff was also entitled to new trial on his excessive force and willful and wanton battery claims, where Dist. Ct. gave erroneous instruction indicating that lawfulness of defendants’ presence plaintiff’s home was not issue in case, and where defendants’ counsel repeatedly misled jury into thinking that defendants’ presence in plaintiff’s home without warrant was lawful.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated equal protection clause by initially denying plaintiff’s pawn shop license application and then granting said license only after plaintiff agreed not to hire individual with criminal history as manager of plaintiff’s pawn shop. None of plaintiff’s proposed three comparatives were suitable comparatives where: (1) defendant was unaware at time of one comparative’s application that its manager had criminal history; (2) second comparative’s “bad acts” concerned valid self-defense claim not at issue in plaintiff’s application; and (3) third comparative, like plaintiff, also was required to sign memorandum agreeing not to hire individual with criminal history.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s medical needs, where Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in denying two of plaintiff’s requests for recruitment of counsel that were made at start of case and during discovery stage of case. Dist. Ct. failed to focus on plaintiff’s low IQ, functional illiteracy and inexperience in civil litigation when denying his requests for recruitment of counsel, and instead improperly relied on existence of jailhouse lawyer who was assisting plaintiff. Moreover, factual and legal complexity of case required recruitment of counsel, where case involved complex medical terms and concepts about plaintiff’s kidney disease. Also, while Dist. Ct. eventually granted plaintiff’s request for recruitment of counsel to assist him at summary judgment stage of case, initial denials were prejudicial, where plaintiff had failed to present any medical evidence to support his claim, and where plaintiff had failed to depose defendants to determine their knowledge of his kidney disease.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiff $108,350.87 out of requested $426,000 in attorney fees where plaintiff obtained $2,000 verdict in action alleging that defendants-police officers used excessive force when arresting plaintiff, and where Dist. Ct. reached said reduced figure by striking unnecessary time (such as research time spent on drafted motions that were never filed and time spent during day-long mock trial) or improperly documented hours and then reducing resultant lodestar figure by 50% to reflect lack of success on merits of case. Dist. Ct. could properly reduce $400 and $450 per hour fee requests to $385 per hour figure (and $175 per hour figure for less experienced counsel) where such figures were within relevant Chicago market, and where plaintiff’s requested per hour rates were based on contingent fee contracts. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion when eliminating unnecessary hours and in reducing lodestar figure to reflect lack of success, where plaintiff only prevailed on certain claims against defendants, and where instant requested fee dwarfed $2,000 judgment.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that defendant subjected plaintiff to unconstitutional search and arrest on charge of disorderly conduct after defendant received report that individual was driving through town while holding un-holstered gun in view of others. While Dist. Ct. found that defendant did not have sufficient facts to warrant belief that plaintiff had committed disorderly conduct because Wisconsin had implemented right to carry firearms openly, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not clearly established at time of his arrest, where Wisconsin courts had not yet ruled on whether “going armed” was unprotected conduct punishable under disorderly conduct statute. As such, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. Ct. also observed that plaintiff’s reported conduct was sufficient for officer to conclude that plaintiff had criminal intent in holding out what looked to be handgun.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants coerced witness into falsely identifying plaintiff as shooter in murder charge (from which plaintiff was eventually found not guilty) by holding said witness against his will until he identified plaintiff as culprit from photo lineup, and that defendants committed Brady violation by failing to inform prosecutor as to how witness identified plaintiff. Plaintiff failed to establish any violation of his due process rights where: (1) plaintiff’s claim pertained only to coerced testimony from witness; and (2) witness who was subject to alleged coercion was only individual who had potential constitutional claim against defendants. Result could have been different if plaintiff’s claim concerned allegation that defendants intentionally manufactured false testimony. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish any Brady violation, where record showed that he was fully aware of any coercion tactics used by defendants prior to his criminal trial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff-employee’s due process rights by terminating him from his seasonal employment without affording him notice or opportunity for hearing. Plaintiff failed to establish that his position as County employee was job that could only be terminated “for cause” so as to establish any due process protection, where: (1) employee handbook indicated that plaintiff was “at will” employee; (2) plaintiff admitted that as seasonal employee he had no guarantee of continued employment. Fact that County ordinance provided that plaintiff could be disciplined for just cause was insufficient to establish property interest in his employment, where ordinance did not set forth promise of continued employment in absence of cause for discharge. Plaintiff’s alternative claim that defendant did not follow its own procedural rules did not constitute due process violation.

Dist. Ct. erred in approving proposed settlement of class action that sought compensation for defendant’s manufacture of casement windows that allowed water to damage windows’ wooden frame, where terms of settlement called for class members to receive cash payments of up to either $750 per structure or $6,000 per structure if class member pursued arbitration of said claim. Lead class counsel, who was son-in-law to one named class representative, operated under conflict of interest and was additionally saddled with financial and ethical issues at time settlement proposal was generated. Record also suggested that said counsel “sold out” class members by agreeing to settlement that actually provided class members with little more than $1 million in damages relief, while providing class counsel with $11 million in fees. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals directed that named class representative, who was father-in-law to lead class counsel, as well as lead class counsel be removed, and that four named class representatives, who were removed by lead class counsel after they had objected to proposed settlement, be reinstated.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on res judicata grounds plaintiff-employee’s action alleging that she was terminated in retaliation for having supported co-worker’s claim of sexual harassment. Record showed that plaintiff had contested her termination in three prior unsuccessful lawsuits, and fact that plaintiff made additional allegations of race and sex discrimination in instant lawsuit did not take case outside contours of res judicata doctrine. Ct. further found that instant lawsuit was filed approximately 10 years after expiration of applicable limitations period.