Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by using torture tactics to extract confession from plaintiff to murder charge and used means to cover up said tactics, where plaintiff had entered into settlement agreement in prior civil action that also sought damages against defendants for using torture tactics to extract confession, in which plaintiff received $3,000 in exchange for broad release that precluded future actions based on incident alleged in said lawsuit. While plaintiff argued that instant action should be allowed to proceed since defendants were guilty of fraudulent concealment of facts demonstrating widespread nature of torture tactics with other criminal suspects that would have altered his decision to settle first lawsuit, Ct. found that: (1) settlement release covered instant lawsuit; (2) plaintiff knew at time of settlement that defendants had been lying about their actions taken against plaintiff; and (3) plaintiff’s counsel in first lawsuit failed to ask during discovery about actions defendants had taken against other suspects. As such, plaintiff could not demonstrate that he reasonably relied on any misstatements made by defendants when executing settlement to support any fraudulent inducement of settlement claim. Fact that other criminal suspects received considerably larger monetary recoveries against instant defendants for similar claims did not require different result. Ct. further noted that, although not raised by defendants, doctrine of res judicata could have been raised to preclude instant lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on Rooker-Feldman doctrine grounds plaintiff’s Rule 22 interpleader action that asked Dist. Ct. to determine ownership of certain stock under circumstances where state court had previously ordered plaintiff to turn over said stock to one defendant in interpleader action, while second defendant in interpleader action also claimed ownership to said stock via purchase agreement with plaintiff. Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply where: (1) second defendant in interpleader action was not party in prior state court action; and (2) instant interpleader action did not attack prior state court judgment, but rather sought determination with respect to priority of claims over said stock. Ct. further observed that on remand, Dist. Ct. may consider whether Wilton-Brillhart abstention doctrine applies where another pending, but stayed state court action involving instant parties has raised similar priority issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1981 action alleging that defendant-Forest Preserve District terminated him on account of his race. Under Jett, section 1981 does not create private cause of action against state actors, and while defendant could bring similar action against instant state actor under section 1983, instant lawsuit was filed beyond applicable two-year period for section 1983 claims. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that result in Jett was superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991.

Ct. of Appeals entered permanent injunction barring enforcement of certain portions of Wisconsin’s campaign finance law, after finding that portions of said law violated plaintiffs’ (interest group and its political action committee (PAC)) First Amendment rights, where statute contained: (1) ban on corporate political expenditures; (2) cap on corporate fundraising for affiliated PAC; (3) lengthy (50 word) regulatory disclaimer as applied to 30-second radio ads; and (4) statutory and regulatory definitions of “political purposes” and “political committee” that were overly vague. It also found unconstitutional certain portions of administrative rules 1.38 and 1.91 that imposed political committee status and other restrictions on groups engaged in issue advocacy, including treatment as express advocacy on all issue advocacy made during 30/60 day pre-election periods, as well as contained improper PAC-like burdens on independent speakers and political groups not engaged in express advocacy as their major purpose.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendants-police officers were entitled to qualified immunity in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s rights under 2nd , 4th and 14th Amendments, when they made warrantless entry into plaintiff’s home and removed her, after defendant had received report from plaintiff’s doctor that plaintiff was suicidal and had obtained Wisconsin section 51.15 statement of emergency detention, since such entry and seizure of plaintiff was justified under exigent circumstances to 4th Amendment’s warrant requirement. Moreover, while defendants’ subsequent seizure of plaintiff’s gun from her home may have violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where: (1) it was reasonable for defendants to have believed that plaintiff’s gun should be seized for safekeeping until it could be determined that plaintiff no longer posed danger to herself; and (2) Wisconsin courts had given broad scope to community caretaking doctrine that arguably supported defendants’ protective sweep of plaintiff’s home and seizure of her gun.

Dist. Ct. lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant-California entity in plaintiff’s trademark infringement action, where defendant’s contacts with Indiana consisted of: (1) fulfilling several Internet orders on allegedly infringing product from Indiana customers; (2) sending at least two allegedly misleading email blasts about said product from list that contained Indiana customers; and (3) maintaining interactive website that was available to Indiana customers. Instant activities attributable to defendant were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over defendant since: (1) said Internet sales were too few in number to demonstrate that defendant had targeted Indiana customers; and (2) defendant’s maintenance of email list or interactive website, without more, was conduct that was unrelated to any alleged trademark infringement.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of defendant-manufacturer in plaintiff’s negligence and strict products liability action, where plaintiff alleged that microwave oven manufactured by defendant started fire in plaintiff’s home. While plaintiff produced some evidence that microwave caused fire, jury could nevertheless find in favor of defendant where defendant’s witness testified that microwave posed fire hazard only if heavy food had accumulated in unit and was in operation at time of fire, and plaintiff testified that microwave was both clean and off at time of fire. Moreover, record did not support plaintiff’s claim that defendant negligently failed to give him notice of fire hazard, where defendant presented evidence that it was far more successful in contacting owners of microwave about fire hazard than average recall. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in refusing to allow plaintiff to give his interpretation as to origins of fire, where plaintiff was no expert witness.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison guards and prison medical official’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants had failed to protect plaintiff from attack by cellmate and had ignored his requests for treatment of broken tooth that resulted from said attack. Plaintiff failed to show that supervisor of prison guards was subjectively aware prior to attack that cellmate was dangerous to plaintiff, since prior investigation by supervisor indicated that other guards were unaware of problems between plaintiff and cellmate, and that cellmate had no history of violence with other inmates. Moreover, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that medical official was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs, where plaintiff requested only aspirin and otherwise made complaints of pain only two days prior to receiving dental services. Dist. Ct. also did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for recruitment of counsel to assist him in instant case, where Dist. Ct. could properly have found that claim was not complex, and where plaintiff had taken appropriate measures to seek prison records and had made intelligent arguments to support his claims.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding defendants $63,391.45 in costs under 28 USC section 1920 as prevailing parties in litigation that spanned total of 28 years. Defendants did not file untimely request where defendants had previously filed timely Rule 59 motion that was pending at time request for costs had been filed, since relevant time for filing bill of costs did not begin to run until Dist. Ct. had resolved Rule 59 motion. Moreover, defendants were not required to do more than use statutory form of affidavit under 28 USC section 1924 to establish necessity of said costs. Fact that original Dist. Ct. judge failed to act on request for costs for three-year period did not require different result.

In action by plaintiff-shareholder in closely-held corporation alleging that defendant-family member of plaintiff and another shareholder in said corporation fraudulently misrepresented amount of compensation that defendant received from said corporation in his role as CEO and president of said corporation, Dist. Ct. did not err in rejecting plaintiff’s proffered jury instruction regarding amount of information defendant was required to disclose about his compensation, since said instruction was essentially same instruction that Dist. Ct. submitted to jury. Moreover, although jury found that defendant had breached fiduciary duty to plaintiff, jury also found that plaintiff’s claim was filed beyond applicable five-year limitations period and beyond any period allowed by discovery rule, where plaintiff could have timely obtained knowledge about defendant’s compensation through corporate records that disclosed total executive compensation to three corporate officers.