Federal Civil Practice

Plaintiff-prisoner was entitled to new trial on his section 1983 claim alleging that defendants-jail officials used excessive force while plaintiff was prisoner at county jail. Plaintiff was improperly compelled to wear visible shackles and prison uniform in courtroom, where contrast for jury between plaintiff’s prison garb and defendants’ law enforcement uniforms was highly prejudicial to plaintiff. Moreover, there was nothing in record to indicate that shackles could not have been concealed from jury, and no consideration of security justified plaintiff wearing prison uniform.

Ct. of Appeals denied defendant’s petition for leave to appeal Dist. Ct.’s order certifying class action in lawsuit alleging that defendant violated Telephone Consumer Protection Act by sending to class members unsolicited fax advertisements. Record showed that aggregate statutory damages for class members could range from $5 million to $15 million, and defendant failed to indicate its net worth so as to support any claim that review is required now because certification order would force it to settle merit-less action. Ct. further rejected defendant’s contention that certification was improper because only fax owners had standing to sue under Act, and plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that class members actually owned fax machines.

Tax Court did not err in finding that plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from proceeding on their claim that change in their defined pension plan, which precluded them from obtaining immediate distribution of benefits violated ERISA, Internal Revenue Code, and/or contractual anti-cutback provisions of said plan. Record showed that plaintiffs had participated in prior action, where Ct. of Appeals had ultimately concluded that immediate payment of pension benefits that plaintiffs sought while still working for defendant was not right protected by ERISA because subject plan had not been terminated. Moreover, in order for plaintiff to prevail in instant action, they must first establish that defendant had terminated subject plan, which would directly contradict holding in prior case.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on abstention grounds plaintiff’s lawsuit seeking to enjoin defendant-local election board from enforcing Indiana anti-slating law that had been previously found to be unconstitutional in prior, unrelated lawsuit, where basis for dismissal was fact that local election board, which had seized plaintiff’s election flyers, had pending proceeding regarding plaintiff’s violation of anti-slating statute. Younger abstention did not apply since local election board’s proceeding was not sufficiently akin to criminal prosecution, where there was no possibility of imposition of criminal penalty. Moreover, local election board’s attempt to enforce statute that had previously been found unconstitutional was extraordinary circumstance that would preclude any application of Younger abstention doctrine.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant’s mailing of unsolicited general-purpose credit cards to millions of existing holders of defendant’s limited use credit cards violated Truth in Lending Act (TILA) provisions where terms of general purpose credit card were not presented in tabular format in so-called “Shumer Box” required under section 1637(c) of TILA, and where section 1642 of TILA prohibits mailing of unsolicited, ready-to-use credit cards. No violation of section 1642 occurred, since general purpose credit cards were essentially substitutes for defendant’s limited use credit cards, where accounts of limited use credit cards were closed when customers activated general purpose cards. Moreover, no section 1637(c) violation occurred, where defendant could reasonably have viewed general purpose credit cards as changes to customers’ existing accounts that did not require Shumer Box presentation under regulations existing at time of instant mailing.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing without prejudice plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent with respect to treatment of his epilepsy, where basis for dismissal was plaintiff’s failure to pay $8.40 initial partial filing fee. While Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion is setting initial partial filing fee at $8.40, even though plaintiff’s prison account contained only $.02 at time said fee was established, remand was required because Dist. Ct. had failed to determine whether plaintiff was at fault for not paying said fee.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials and medical personnel's motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s injury to his shoulder. Plaintiff failed to establish cause of action under section 1983 against defendant-corporation that supplied medical personnel to prison since: (1) plaintiff failed to identify corporation’s custom or policy that was responsible for plaintiff’s injury; and (2) respondeat superior liability does not apply to private corporations under section 1983. Moreover, with respect to defendants-individual medical personnel, plaintiff failed to present evidence that any defendant knew both that there was risk of harm to plaintiff caused by delay in treatment of plaintiff’s injury, and that said defendants consciously disregarded said risk. Fact that plaintiff was mistakenly referred to non-specialist, or that other defendants agreed with recommendation not to treat plaintiff’s injury with surgery did not require different result. Moreover, plaintiff could not sue two other medical providers under section 1983, where said providers were not “state actors” due to their infrequent and transitory relationship with penal system.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action against defendants-state and county election officials alleging that defendants’ notification that plaintiff’s voter registration had been temporarily cancelled due to his incarceration pursuant to Indiana statute violated National Voter Registration Act, as well as Help America Vote Act and Civil Rights Act of 1964. Sovereign Immunity barred plaintiff from suing state defendants, and plaintiff failed to state cause of action against county defendants where: (1) plaintiff failed to allege any causal link between county policy and alleged deprivation; and (2) county’s removal of plaintiff from voter registration roll was act based solely on state statute. As such, county defendants were not “persons” for purposes of plaintiff maintaining lawsuit under section 1983.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants falsely arrested plaintiff for obstructing police officer during incident in which defendants entered plaintiff’s home without warrant while attempting to arrest plaintiff’s girlfriend. While defendants alleged that their entry into plaintiff’s home was justified because they smelled burning marijuana, such circumstance did not provide defendants with exigency that permitted them to make warrantless entry, where underlying offense was minor in nature. However, Dist. Ct. should have granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, since case law was unsettled at time of their entry as to whether smell of burning marijuana provided said exigency.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison official and prison nurse’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that said defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s request for treatment for his broken hand, where plaintiff’s grievances against both defendants neither mentioned said defendants by name nor provided information that should have identified them to grievance officer. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting motion for summary judgment filed by remaining defendants-prison officials, since record was disputed as to whether plaintiff had filed timely grievance as to said defendants, and Dist. Ct. could not resolve said factual question without conducting evidentiary hearing.