Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion that essentially sought reversal of Dist. Ct.’s granting of defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in Title VII action alleging race discrimination and retaliation arising out of plaintiff’s employment as teacher. While plaintiff had originally filed Rule 59(e) motion, said motion was filed one day late, such that said motion could only be treated as Rule 60(b) motion. Moreover, because instant Rule 60(b) motion did not toll applicable period for filing any notice of appeal, portion of plaintiff's notice of appeal seeking review of granting of summary judgment motion was untimely, and while portion of notice of appeal seeking review of denial of Rule 60(b) motion was timely, Dist. Ct.’s denial of said motion was proper, where alleged errors contained in said motion pertained only to matters regarding propriety of summary judgment that could have been raised in timely notice of appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-attorney and his law firm’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendants committed legal malpractice in connection with plaintiff’s failed attempt to acquire vacant city lots. While application submitted by defendants on behalf of plaintiff contained many errors, said errors did not prevent plaintiff from obtaining said lots, and plaintiff could have obtained said lots well after application had been submitted. Moreover, where application had to be approved by multiple entities, plaintiff failed to show that it would have been successful in obtaining said lots but for any alleged malpractice associated with drafting of application. Also, plaintiff could not recover $25,000 retainer fee from defendant law firm under unjust enrichment theory, where: (1) law firm never received $25,000 retainer check; and (2) unjust enrichment had no application where parties were subject to specific contract.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of defendants-police officers in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff to false arrest and malicious prosecution on drug possession and solicitation of unlawful act charges, based on defendants’ claim that they saw and heard plaintiff from 300 feet away yell “rocks, rocks” to passing motorist in attempt to sell crack cocaine. While plaintiff denied attempting to sell crack cocaine at time of his arrest, jury could properly credit defendants’ version of incident, and plaintiff otherwise failed to establish impossibility of defendants’ version of incident. Moreover, any inconsistencies with respect to defendants’ testimonies were appropriately resolve by jury. Record also showed that defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff based upon their personal viewing of incident, their claim that they saw plaintiff drop baggie containing crack cocaine at scene of arrest, and their understanding that reference to “rocks” was term for crack cocaine.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his continued civil incarceration under Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA), even though defendant argued that he was denied due process when Illinois trial court admitted into evidence allegations of abuse made against him by two minors in Arizona and Indiana. Said allegations were admitted through testimony of govt. expert, not as proof that said allegations actually occurred, but rather to cast light on information that said expert used to render her expert opinion. Fact that such allegations concerned incidents that occurred prior to original determination that defendant had mental disorder under SDPA did not require different result since trier-of-fact was entitled to know context of original commitment order.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that defendant had failed to establish that class action alleging violation of Illinois Consumer Fraud Act met requisite $5 million statutory threshold under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) so as to support lawsuit’s removal to federal court. While instant lawsuit alleged that defendant had filed 1,100 fraudulent small-claims actions, which concerned compensatory damages and legal fees that totaled no more than $3.5 million, said allegations were insufficient to cap any eventual damages award at less than $5 million amount in controversy threshold, where: (1) plaintiff did not irrevocably commit to obtaining less than $5 million for class members; and (2) defendant alleged that lawsuit actually concerned greater number of small claims actions that had potential for damages greater than $5 million. Thus, remand was required for new determination as to whether amount in controversy reached statutory threshold under CAFA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant’s decision to publicize and maintain internal records regarding three alleged deficiencies found at plaintiff’s nursing home without affording plaintiff prior hearing deprived plaintiff of its rights under Due Process Clause, as well as certain state and federal Medicaid regulations. Plaintiff had no right to hearing before state ALJ under 42 CFR sections 431.151 and 153, since recording of deficiencies in defendant’s compliance history and any public shaming of plaintiff by publication of said deficiencies were not listed as actions that could be remedied in 42 CFR section 488.406. Moreover, plaintiff had no constitutional due process claim to said hearing, where plaintiff failed to establish any protected interest in any defamatory publication, even though plaintiff asserted that existence of deficiencies: (1) precluded plaintiff from obtaining opportunity to correct future deficiencies without financial penalty; and (2) exposed plaintiff to enhanced penalties for future deficiencies.

Plaintiff-prisoner was entitled to new trial on his section 1983 claim alleging that defendants-jail officials used excessive force while plaintiff was prisoner at county jail. Plaintiff was improperly compelled to wear visible shackles and prison uniform in courtroom, where contrast for jury between plaintiff’s prison garb and defendants’ law enforcement uniforms was highly prejudicial to plaintiff. Moreover, there was nothing in record to indicate that shackles could not have been concealed from jury, and no consideration of security justified plaintiff wearing prison uniform.

Ct. of Appeals denied defendant’s petition for leave to appeal Dist. Ct.’s order certifying class action in lawsuit alleging that defendant violated Telephone Consumer Protection Act by sending to class members unsolicited fax advertisements. Record showed that aggregate statutory damages for class members could range from $5 million to $15 million, and defendant failed to indicate its net worth so as to support any claim that review is required now because certification order would force it to settle merit-less action. Ct. further rejected defendant’s contention that certification was improper because only fax owners had standing to sue under Act, and plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that class members actually owned fax machines.

Tax Court did not err in finding that plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from proceeding on their claim that change in their defined pension plan, which precluded them from obtaining immediate distribution of benefits violated ERISA, Internal Revenue Code, and/or contractual anti-cutback provisions of said plan. Record showed that plaintiffs had participated in prior action, where Ct. of Appeals had ultimately concluded that immediate payment of pension benefits that plaintiffs sought while still working for defendant was not right protected by ERISA because subject plan had not been terminated. Moreover, in order for plaintiff to prevail in instant action, they must first establish that defendant had terminated subject plan, which would directly contradict holding in prior case.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on abstention grounds plaintiff’s lawsuit seeking to enjoin defendant-local election board from enforcing Indiana anti-slating law that had been previously found to be unconstitutional in prior, unrelated lawsuit, where basis for dismissal was fact that local election board, which had seized plaintiff’s election flyers, had pending proceeding regarding plaintiff’s violation of anti-slating statute. Younger abstention did not apply since local election board’s proceeding was not sufficiently akin to criminal prosecution, where there was no possibility of imposition of criminal penalty. Moreover, local election board’s attempt to enforce statute that had previously been found unconstitutional was extraordinary circumstance that would preclude any application of Younger abstention doctrine.