Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-debt collector’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-debtor’s FDCPA action alleging that defendant’s dunning letter that concerned time-barred debt was misleading. Record showed that said dunning letter did not inform plaintiff that debt was subject to statute of limitations defense, and plaintiff alleged that defendant’s use of offer to “settle” said debt gave her impression that underlying debt was legally enforceable.

Dist Ct. did not err in denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in section 1983 action alleging that defendant subjected plaintiff to false arrest and unreasonable seizure when defendant stopped vehicle in which plaintiff was passenger, and, after issuing warning ticket for alleged traffic offense, spent additional 34 minutes conducting pat-down search of both defendant and driver of vehicle, as well as subjecting vehicle to dog sniff and search of vehicle that produced no drugs. Ct. of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction over much of defendant’s appeal, where denial of summary judgment motion was based on Dist. Ct.’s finding of existence of disputed facts. Moreover, from plaintiff viewpoint, record otherwise established that defendant lacked reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle or probable cause to search plaintiff/vehicle where: (1) plaintiff claimed that defendant did not observe any traffic offense; and (2) justification for search was fact that vehicle contained out-of-state plates and was driving on stretch of highway where much drug trafficking occurs. Fact that driver of vehicle had prior arrest for marijuana cultivation did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison guards’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants and other prison officials were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s risk of suicide, and that they were willful and wanton by failing to provide adequate medical care to protect him from suicide attempt. Although Dist. Ct. found that defendants were not aware of plaintiff’s medical records or of any other sign that plaintiff posed substantial risk of suicide, Dist. Ct. could not make such findings since plaintiff presented evidence that defendants’ failure to act on plaintiff’s requests for mental health treatment in time span leading up to suicide constituted deliberate indifference, especially where defendants were also aware that plaintiff had displayed symptoms of depression prior to suicide attempt. Dist. Ct. did not err in granting summary judgment motion filed by prison medical personnel, where record lacked showing that said defendants had actual knowledge that plaintiff displayed risk of serious harm to himself, and that said defendants deliberately ignored said risk.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-jailers used excessive force against plaintiff-pretrial detainee when they tasered him as they moved him to different cell, Dist. Ct. did not err in using jury instruction that required jury to find that defendants knew that using force presented risk of harm to plaintiff, but recklessly disregarded plaintiff’s safety by failing to take reasonable measures to minimize risk of harm to plaintiff. Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was source of plaintiff’s substantive rights as pre-trial detainee, as opposed to 8th Amendment, and that jury’s use of recklessness standard, which required examination of defendants’ intent, was appropriate. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that jury was required to find existence of defendants’ punishment of plaintiff on basis of wholly objective factors. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s untimely section 1983 complaint alleging false arrest and false imprisonment by two unnamed defendants-police officers, who stopped plaintiff on his bicycle without warrant and arrested him for possession of controlled substance, where seizure of drugs was eventually suppressed, and where charges against plaintiff were dismissed. While Dist. Ct. based dismissal on plaintiff’s failure to identify police officers prior to expiration of limitations period, Dist. Ct. should have equitably tolled any limitations period to allow plaintiff time to learn of identity of said defendants where: (1) Dist. Ct. had not addressed plaintiff’s pending motion to compel defendant to produce names of said officers; (2) plaintiff’s incarceration on unrelated charges made it difficult for him to learn of officers’ identity; and (3) plaintiff otherwise acted with reasonable diligence in obtaining missing information.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-police officers’ 4th Amendment rights by illegally seizing and searching them after resident in home that plaintiffs were searching accused plaintiffs and others of stealing $1,750 while searching said home. Reasonable person in plaintiffs position would not have feared arrest or detention if they had refused defendants’ request to search for said money. Fact that plaintiffs agreed to search only because they had immediate need to use restroom and could not do so until they had been searched did not mean that they were “seized” for purposes of 4th Amendment claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction plaintiff-Illinois grain buyer’s complaint seeking order compelling defendant-Wisconsin farmer to undergo arbitration of underlying claim by plaintiff that defendant had breached several contracts to sell to plaintiff grain that was grown on defendant’s Wisconsin farm. Defendant lacked minimum contacts with Illinois so as to allow plaintiff to sue him in Illinois where: (1) defendant made only one visit to Illinois to attend seed-corn meeting, where he first met plaintiff’s representative; (2) record contained no evidence indicating that defendant had attended seed-corn meeting to find buyer for his grain; (3) all of plaintiff’s subsequent contacts/negotiations with defendant took place in Wisconsin, where all written contracts that contained arbitration clause were executed; and (4) defendant’s contracts with plaintiff were performed entirely in Wisconsin. Fact that defendant contracted with Illinois party was insufficient, by itself, to establish personal jurisdiction over defendant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff-creditor’s motion for summary judgment in action under Fraudulent Transfer Act, where record showed that defendants-debtors transferred all assets of first entity to second entity that was also controlled by defendants some four months after $1.7 million judgment had been entered in favor of plaintiff and against first entity, and where: (1) said transfer was made without first entity receiving any equivalent value in exchange for said transfer; and (2) defendants reasonably should have believed that first entity would incur debts beyond its ability to pay them. Record failed to support defendant’s claim that first entity was adequately funded through alleged injection of $15.1 in net capital. Moreover, record would support finding that owners of first and second entities were personally liable for $1.7 million judgment under alter ego theory, given commingling of personal and business funds and given lack of documentation with respect to allocation of assets.

Dist. Ct. did not err in reducing plaintiff’s request for attorney fees in class action under Telephone Consumer Protection Act, where parties agreed to $6.1.settlement, but where only 1,820 class members actually submitted claims totaling approximately $400,000. While plaintiff’s attorney submitted over $2 million in attorney fees based upon percentage of potential recovery, Dist. Ct. could properly use lodestar method and apply 1.5 risk modifier to calculate fees at $1,147,698.70. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that Dist. Ct. improperly engaged in ex post facto rationalization for fee reduction and further found that Dist. Ct. could properly consider paucity of class recovery as compared to requested fee award, when deciding whether to apply lodestar method, as opposed to percentage method, for purposes of determining fee award.