Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion by certain attorneys in instant class action fee dispute to find that disputing attorney was bound by written agreement that had memorialized prior oral agreement by all class action attorneys to split fee award according to agreed-upon percentages, even though disputing attorney had failed to sign written agreement. Record showed that after all attorneys had orally agreed to percentage split of fees, disputing attorney suggested only two changes to text of proposed written agreement that were subsequently incorporated into said agreement. As such, Dist. Ct. could reasonably construe disputing attorney’s subsequent two-week silence before agreement was tendered to all attorneys for their signatures as assent to be bound by said agreement, and that disputing attorney's subsequent objection to signing agreement was motivated only by “buyer’s remorse” over actual fee split.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's 4th Amendment rights by using excessive force by shooting him when attempting to execute arrest warrant issued for him. Record showed that defendant had pleaded guilty to Indiana charge of resisting law enforcement officer that stemmed from instant shooting incident, and under Heck, 512 US 477, defendant was precluded from bringing instant 1983 action under theory that he did not attempt to draw his weapon until after shots were fired at him, since said theory was inconsistent with his guilty plea to resisting arrest charge and otherwise implied invalidity of his state court conviction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant police officer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by using excessive force to cause plaintiff’s car to stop, when he intentionally collided with plaintiff’s car during high speed car chase and caused plaintiff’s death when plaintiff’s car crashed after said collision. Expert testimony established that no reasonable jury could conclude that defendant’s police car had actually collided with plaintiff’s vehicle.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering $413 million default judgment against defendants as sanction for various discovery infractions in RICO action by plaintiffs alleging that defendants-controlling shareholders in corporation caused corporation to pay out millions of dollars to defendants for services never performed. Entry of default judgment was not abuse of discretion, where record supported Dist. Ct. finding that: (1) defendants made at best minimal efforts to produce certain bank records/computer hard drive that had been subject to prior production orders; and (2) defendants failed to make one defendant available for his deposition. Fact that Magistrate Judge had imposed lesser sanction did not require different result. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in using four-year-old offer to purchase total shares of subject corporation when calculating damages, where defendant had withheld certain documents that could have provided more accurate calculation of corporation’s worth.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff on charge of disorderly conduct, arising out of dispute between plaintiff-deer hunter and defendant game warden outside of deer registration post. Dist. Ct. could not make credibility determination when finding that arguable probable cause existed based on its finding that plaintiff suddenly shouted at defendant and brushed up against him, since plaintiff stated that he spoke to defendant in non-confrontational way and accidentally brushed up against him. Moreover, plaintiff’s allegation that he was merely attempting to disengage from defendant supported his claim that defendant lacked probable cause to arrest him on disorderly conduct charge.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s motion seeking preliminary injunction on enforcement of defendant’s policy requiring small groups to obtain permit to gather on public property managed by defendant. Record showed likelihood of plaintiff prevailing on his claim that said policy violated his First Amendment rights where: (1) permit requirement for small groups was not narrowly tailored as least restrictive means to further govt. interest since defendant allowed larger, non-protesting groups to gather without need for permit; (2) defendant’s insistence that smaller groups obtain permit where they had invited public to attend gathering was likely too restrictive when invitation did not produce larger crowd; and (3) requirement of permit gave defendant’s employees too much unbridled discretion in determining whether permit would be issued. Fact that defendant had never denied permit application did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. erred in directing defendant to produce 13 of its employees located in Germany for depositions to take place in New York City as sanction for various discovery abuses. Dist. Ct. could not use instant sanction to require defendant’s U.S. citizen employees in Germany to appear before Dist. Ct. to take deposition, where said citizens could have been deposed in Amsterdam, where parties had originally agreed to take their depositions. Moreover, defendant’s foreign-born employees in Germany could not otherwise be forced to come to U.S. to be deposed. Ct. further observed that defendant’s employees should not be punished for “sins” of defendant by requiring that they come to inconvenient place to take deposition, rather than convenient place where parties had agreed to take their depositions. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in denying motion to dismiss by one defendant-prosecutor, where said defendant asserted that he was entitled to absolute immunity in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that said defendant and another prosecutor deprived plaintiff of liberty under due process clause and committed tort of malicious prosecution by coercing witnesses to provide testimony that defendants and said witnesses knew to be false, which resulted in plaintiff’s wrongful conviction on two murder charges and his imprisonment for 17 years until his acquittal on retrial. Said defendant was entitled to absolute immunity, where his alleged procurement of false testimony took place in midst of plaintiff’s second trial, and thus said defendant was acting in his prosecutorial, as opposed to investigative role. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in finding that other defendant-prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity, where complaint indicated that said defendant was acting in his investigative role when he allegedly fabricated evidence prior to plaintiff’s prosecution, and then introduced fabricated evidence at plaintiff’s first trial. (Partial dissent filed.)