Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant’s mailing of unsolicited general-purpose credit cards to millions of existing holders of defendant’s limited use credit cards violated Truth in Lending Act (TILA) provisions where terms of general purpose credit card were not presented in tabular format in so-called “Shumer Box” required under section 1637(c) of TILA, and where section 1642 of TILA prohibits mailing of unsolicited, ready-to-use credit cards. No violation of section 1642 occurred, since general purpose credit cards were essentially substitutes for defendant’s limited use credit cards, where accounts of limited use credit cards were closed when customers activated general purpose cards. Moreover, no section 1637(c) violation occurred, where defendant could reasonably have viewed general purpose credit cards as changes to customers’ existing accounts that did not require Shumer Box presentation under regulations existing at time of instant mailing.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing without prejudice plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent with respect to treatment of his epilepsy, where basis for dismissal was plaintiff’s failure to pay $8.40 initial partial filing fee. While Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion is setting initial partial filing fee at $8.40, even though plaintiff’s prison account contained only $.02 at time said fee was established, remand was required because Dist. Ct. had failed to determine whether plaintiff was at fault for not paying said fee.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials and medical personnel's motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s injury to his shoulder. Plaintiff failed to establish cause of action under section 1983 against defendant-corporation that supplied medical personnel to prison since: (1) plaintiff failed to identify corporation’s custom or policy that was responsible for plaintiff’s injury; and (2) respondeat superior liability does not apply to private corporations under section 1983. Moreover, with respect to defendants-individual medical personnel, plaintiff failed to present evidence that any defendant knew both that there was risk of harm to plaintiff caused by delay in treatment of plaintiff’s injury, and that said defendants consciously disregarded said risk. Fact that plaintiff was mistakenly referred to non-specialist, or that other defendants agreed with recommendation not to treat plaintiff’s injury with surgery did not require different result. Moreover, plaintiff could not sue two other medical providers under section 1983, where said providers were not “state actors” due to their infrequent and transitory relationship with penal system.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action against defendants-state and county election officials alleging that defendants’ notification that plaintiff’s voter registration had been temporarily cancelled due to his incarceration pursuant to Indiana statute violated National Voter Registration Act, as well as Help America Vote Act and Civil Rights Act of 1964. Sovereign Immunity barred plaintiff from suing state defendants, and plaintiff failed to state cause of action against county defendants where: (1) plaintiff failed to allege any causal link between county policy and alleged deprivation; and (2) county’s removal of plaintiff from voter registration roll was act based solely on state statute. As such, county defendants were not “persons” for purposes of plaintiff maintaining lawsuit under section 1983.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants falsely arrested plaintiff for obstructing police officer during incident in which defendants entered plaintiff’s home without warrant while attempting to arrest plaintiff’s girlfriend. While defendants alleged that their entry into plaintiff’s home was justified because they smelled burning marijuana, such circumstance did not provide defendants with exigency that permitted them to make warrantless entry, where underlying offense was minor in nature. However, Dist. Ct. should have granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, since case law was unsettled at time of their entry as to whether smell of burning marijuana provided said exigency.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison official and prison nurse’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that said defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s request for treatment for his broken hand, where plaintiff’s grievances against both defendants neither mentioned said defendants by name nor provided information that should have identified them to grievance officer. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting motion for summary judgment filed by remaining defendants-prison officials, since record was disputed as to whether plaintiff had filed timely grievance as to said defendants, and Dist. Ct. could not resolve said factual question without conducting evidentiary hearing.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-debt collector’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-debtor’s FDCPA action alleging that defendant’s dunning letter that concerned time-barred debt was misleading. Record showed that said dunning letter did not inform plaintiff that debt was subject to statute of limitations defense, and plaintiff alleged that defendant’s use of offer to “settle” said debt gave her impression that underlying debt was legally enforceable.

Dist Ct. did not err in denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in section 1983 action alleging that defendant subjected plaintiff to false arrest and unreasonable seizure when defendant stopped vehicle in which plaintiff was passenger, and, after issuing warning ticket for alleged traffic offense, spent additional 34 minutes conducting pat-down search of both defendant and driver of vehicle, as well as subjecting vehicle to dog sniff and search of vehicle that produced no drugs. Ct. of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction over much of defendant’s appeal, where denial of summary judgment motion was based on Dist. Ct.’s finding of existence of disputed facts. Moreover, from plaintiff viewpoint, record otherwise established that defendant lacked reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle or probable cause to search plaintiff/vehicle where: (1) plaintiff claimed that defendant did not observe any traffic offense; and (2) justification for search was fact that vehicle contained out-of-state plates and was driving on stretch of highway where much drug trafficking occurs. Fact that driver of vehicle had prior arrest for marijuana cultivation did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison guards’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants and other prison officials were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s risk of suicide, and that they were willful and wanton by failing to provide adequate medical care to protect him from suicide attempt. Although Dist. Ct. found that defendants were not aware of plaintiff’s medical records or of any other sign that plaintiff posed substantial risk of suicide, Dist. Ct. could not make such findings since plaintiff presented evidence that defendants’ failure to act on plaintiff’s requests for mental health treatment in time span leading up to suicide constituted deliberate indifference, especially where defendants were also aware that plaintiff had displayed symptoms of depression prior to suicide attempt. Dist. Ct. did not err in granting summary judgment motion filed by prison medical personnel, where record lacked showing that said defendants had actual knowledge that plaintiff displayed risk of serious harm to himself, and that said defendants deliberately ignored said risk.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-jailers used excessive force against plaintiff-pretrial detainee when they tasered him as they moved him to different cell, Dist. Ct. did not err in using jury instruction that required jury to find that defendants knew that using force presented risk of harm to plaintiff, but recklessly disregarded plaintiff’s safety by failing to take reasonable measures to minimize risk of harm to plaintiff. Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was source of plaintiff’s substantive rights as pre-trial detainee, as opposed to 8th Amendment, and that jury’s use of recklessness standard, which required examination of defendants’ intent, was appropriate. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that jury was required to find existence of defendants’ punishment of plaintiff on basis of wholly objective factors. (Dissent filed.)