Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s untimely section 1983 complaint alleging false arrest and false imprisonment by two unnamed defendants-police officers, who stopped plaintiff on his bicycle without warrant and arrested him for possession of controlled substance, where seizure of drugs was eventually suppressed, and where charges against plaintiff were dismissed. While Dist. Ct. based dismissal on plaintiff’s failure to identify police officers prior to expiration of limitations period, Dist. Ct. should have equitably tolled any limitations period to allow plaintiff time to learn of identity of said defendants where: (1) Dist. Ct. had not addressed plaintiff’s pending motion to compel defendant to produce names of said officers; (2) plaintiff’s incarceration on unrelated charges made it difficult for him to learn of officers’ identity; and (3) plaintiff otherwise acted with reasonable diligence in obtaining missing information.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-police officers’ 4th Amendment rights by illegally seizing and searching them after resident in home that plaintiffs were searching accused plaintiffs and others of stealing $1,750 while searching said home. Reasonable person in plaintiffs position would not have feared arrest or detention if they had refused defendants’ request to search for said money. Fact that plaintiffs agreed to search only because they had immediate need to use restroom and could not do so until they had been searched did not mean that they were “seized” for purposes of 4th Amendment claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction plaintiff-Illinois grain buyer’s complaint seeking order compelling defendant-Wisconsin farmer to undergo arbitration of underlying claim by plaintiff that defendant had breached several contracts to sell to plaintiff grain that was grown on defendant’s Wisconsin farm. Defendant lacked minimum contacts with Illinois so as to allow plaintiff to sue him in Illinois where: (1) defendant made only one visit to Illinois to attend seed-corn meeting, where he first met plaintiff’s representative; (2) record contained no evidence indicating that defendant had attended seed-corn meeting to find buyer for his grain; (3) all of plaintiff’s subsequent contacts/negotiations with defendant took place in Wisconsin, where all written contracts that contained arbitration clause were executed; and (4) defendant’s contracts with plaintiff were performed entirely in Wisconsin. Fact that defendant contracted with Illinois party was insufficient, by itself, to establish personal jurisdiction over defendant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff-creditor’s motion for summary judgment in action under Fraudulent Transfer Act, where record showed that defendants-debtors transferred all assets of first entity to second entity that was also controlled by defendants some four months after $1.7 million judgment had been entered in favor of plaintiff and against first entity, and where: (1) said transfer was made without first entity receiving any equivalent value in exchange for said transfer; and (2) defendants reasonably should have believed that first entity would incur debts beyond its ability to pay them. Record failed to support defendant’s claim that first entity was adequately funded through alleged injection of $15.1 in net capital. Moreover, record would support finding that owners of first and second entities were personally liable for $1.7 million judgment under alter ego theory, given commingling of personal and business funds and given lack of documentation with respect to allocation of assets.

Dist. Ct. did not err in reducing plaintiff’s request for attorney fees in class action under Telephone Consumer Protection Act, where parties agreed to $6.1.settlement, but where only 1,820 class members actually submitted claims totaling approximately $400,000. While plaintiff’s attorney submitted over $2 million in attorney fees based upon percentage of potential recovery, Dist. Ct. could properly use lodestar method and apply 1.5 risk modifier to calculate fees at $1,147,698.70. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that Dist. Ct. improperly engaged in ex post facto rationalization for fee reduction and further found that Dist. Ct. could properly consider paucity of class recovery as compared to requested fee award, when deciding whether to apply lodestar method, as opposed to percentage method, for purposes of determining fee award.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion by certain attorneys in instant class action fee dispute to find that disputing attorney was bound by written agreement that had memorialized prior oral agreement by all class action attorneys to split fee award according to agreed-upon percentages, even though disputing attorney had failed to sign written agreement. Record showed that after all attorneys had orally agreed to percentage split of fees, disputing attorney suggested only two changes to text of proposed written agreement that were subsequently incorporated into said agreement. As such, Dist. Ct. could reasonably construe disputing attorney’s subsequent two-week silence before agreement was tendered to all attorneys for their signatures as assent to be bound by said agreement, and that disputing attorney's subsequent objection to signing agreement was motivated only by “buyer’s remorse” over actual fee split.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's 4th Amendment rights by using excessive force by shooting him when attempting to execute arrest warrant issued for him. Record showed that defendant had pleaded guilty to Indiana charge of resisting law enforcement officer that stemmed from instant shooting incident, and under Heck, 512 US 477, defendant was precluded from bringing instant 1983 action under theory that he did not attempt to draw his weapon until after shots were fired at him, since said theory was inconsistent with his guilty plea to resisting arrest charge and otherwise implied invalidity of his state court conviction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant police officer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by using excessive force to cause plaintiff’s car to stop, when he intentionally collided with plaintiff’s car during high speed car chase and caused plaintiff’s death when plaintiff’s car crashed after said collision. Expert testimony established that no reasonable jury could conclude that defendant’s police car had actually collided with plaintiff’s vehicle.