Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in allowing defendant in instant class action to reimburse itself from $75 million settlement fund that defendant had previously funded for “post settlement claims” from class members that were allowed by terms of settlement to sue defendant. Terms of settlement did not restrict defendant’s ability to settle class members’ claims, and Ct. rejected class counsel’s contention that defendant was required to reimburse settlement for money spent on those claims that could have been defeated by asserting statute of limitations defense or were otherwise without merit. Moreover, while terms of settlement precluded defendant from settling subsequent class actions filed by instant class members, record showed that all of large quantity of claims settled by defendant had been filed by individual claimants.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that defendants-Wisc. Governor and other state officials waived any qualified immunity defense to instant action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s privacy rights by failing to appoint plaintiff as interim Register of Deeds of Marinette County upon learning of existence of plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition and then announcing that plaintiff was not appointed because defendant Governor had learned of said bankruptcy. No waiver occurred, even though defendants did not raise qualified immunity defense while original complaint was in force, since plaintiff’s amended complaint opened door for defendants to raise new and previously unmentioned affirmative defenses. Moreover, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s privacy claims, where defendants merely publicized already published fact that plaintiff had filed bankruptcy petition. Moreover, record showed that plaintiff had signed waiver authorizing disclosure of private information to Wisc. Dep’t of Justice in exchange for being considered for appointment she sought.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiff only $123,000 out of requested $675,000 in attorney fees associated with prosecution of section 1983 action that plaintiff filed against various police officers and City of Chicago arising out of plaintiff’s arrest on assault and battery charges. Record showed that plaintiff did not prevail on 38 out of 39 claims and was awarded only $1 in nominal damages and $3,000 in punitive damages against only one defendant-officer. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly reduce said fee request by 80% based on limited success of lawsuit, where plaintiff’s counsel had failed to keep records that would distinguish between successful and unsuccessful claims. Moreover, Ct. rejected plaintiff’s request to make defendant-City liable for said fees, where City was completely exonerated in said lawsuit, and where City’s only substantive obligation was to indemnify police officer for instant nominal award, which would not otherwise trigger any obligation to pay attorney fees under section 1988. Also, plaintiff was properly required to pay City’s costs to defend itself in instant lawsuit under Rule 54(d)(1), where City had prevailed against plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. erred in certifying class of property owners in instant lawsuit alleging that defendants-owners of oil refinery had allowed benzene and other contaminants to leak into groundwater under class members’ homes. Record was unclear as to whether plaintiffs would be able to identify any common issues where: (1) class members obtained their drinking water from other non-contaminated source; and (2) any reduction in property values of members’ homes might be unrelated to any alleged contamination. Moreover, Dist. Ct. erred in failing to conduct hearing as to whether plaintiffs could have presented common evidence and single methodology to prove both injury and damages prior to ruling on certification motion.

Ct. of Appeals denied second petition seeking permission to appeal order by Dist. Ct. that denied defendant’s challenge to Dist. Ct.‘s modified class certification order. While Dist. Ct.’s modification of original class certification order might have warranted instant appeal, where Dist. Ct.’s modification of definition of class to include employees “who worked as tipped employees earning sub-minimum tip credit wage rate” was over inclusive, and where said modification constituted material change from original class definition, subject matter of defendant’s appeal did not pertain to changed definition of class members. Thus, defendant could only have filed motion to decertify class to address matters contained in instant petition that would not have been subject to appeal under Rule 23(f).

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-CEO’s request to partially lift stay of discovery in action brought by plaintiff alleging that defendant-corporation breached contract to purchase plaintiff’s company, and that defendant-CEO had used his control to strip assets of corporation so as to preclude plaintiff from obtaining any recovery. Record showed that plaintiff and defendant-corporation were parties to pending German arbitration concerning alleged breach of contract, and although plaintiff argued that stay of discovery of its lawsuit against defendants corporation and CEO was appropriate because CEO could obtain materials in discovery that might be useful to corporation in arbitration proceedings, plaintiff’s concern about corporation’s use of discovery materials in arbitration proceedings is not relevant in instant case, and plaintiff otherwise has remedy about said use of discovery materials with arbitration panel. Moreover, plaintiff cannot choose to sue defendant-CEO and then prevent him from defending himself.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on grounds of claim preclusion plaintiff’s ADEA claim, alleging that defendant terminated her from her teaching position on account of her age, where plaintiff had failed to include her ADEA claim in prior unsuccessful state court action, that challenged instant termination on grounds that it was unlawful under Ill. School Code and that defendant had violated plaintiff’s due process rights. All three requirements for claim preclusion defense had been met where there had been final judgment on merits in prior state court action, and where there was identify of parties and adverse act. Moreover, plaintiff could have included ADEA action in prior state court proceeding since, at time plaintiff initiated state court action, her ADEA claim had been pending with EEOC for more than 60 days. Also, defendant was not required to lodge preemptive objection in state court proceeding to plaintiff’s failure to include ADEA action in order to preserve its right to assert claim-preclusion defense in instant case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s putative class action lawsuit under section 1983, challenging on procedural and substantive due process grounds defendant-Village’s collection of $30 booking fee from plaintiff, who had been arrested by Village police, but who had eventually been found “not guilty“ on charged offense. Under Mathews balancing test, instant booking fee did not violate plaintiff’s procedural due process rights since defendant’s interest in offsetting costs of holding plaintiff temporarily outweighed plaintiff’s interests in his $30, where there was exceedingly low likelihood that fee would be imposed erroneously on plaintiff or other arrestees. Moreover, plaintiff had other state remedies available to him to address any risk of false arrest that would provide means for plaintiff’s recovery of booking fee. Also, plaintiff’s claim of substantive due process violation was without merit where: (1) plaintiff’s complaint did not implicate fundamental right; and (2) booking fee had rational basis, where fee served as offset of costs of booking arrestees. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment by defendants-school officials and student dormitory inspectors in plaintiff-student’s section 1983 action, alleging violation of his due process and 4th Amendment rights when defendants expelled plaintiff without initial hearing after dormitory inspector discovered large quantity of marijuana in plaintiff’s dorm room (as part of previously announced inspection of dormitory rooms) in violation of university rules. Plaintiff’s clear violation of university rules and Indiana criminal law required that defendants take immediate action against plaintiff, and university provided hearing 17 days later in which plaintiff had opportunity to offer defense. Moreover, there was no 4th Amendment violation where plaintiff had consented to said inspections as part of his agreement to live in university dormitory. Fact that student inspectors summoned police officer to confirm presence of marijuana in plaintiff’s room, or that officer subsequently obtained warrant to search plaintiff’s room did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants committed willful and wanton misconduct, where plaintiff-prisoner injured his back during prisoner transfer, when driver of police van suddenly slammed on brakes. Dismissal of claim was warranted where plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing prison grievance prior to filing instant lawsuit, as required by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in considering merits plaintiff’s section 1983 claim, after finding that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, where defendant’s summary judgment motion addressing merits of plaintiff’s section 1983 claim was fully briefed.