Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid cause of action plaintiff-student’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-university violated his substantive and procedural due process rights, when it dismissed him from medical school for alleged unprofessional conduct. Plaintiff failed to establish any protected property interest in his continued education for purposes of establishing due process claim, and plaintiff failed to otherwise allege that defendant had entered into express or implied contract. Fact that instant dismissal may have violated defendant’s internal procedures, as set forth in its disciplinary policy, does not require different result. Plaintiff also failed to state viable equal protection claim, where plaintiff failed to identify similarly-situated student, who had committed similar academic short-comings and who received more favorable treatment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants’ request for attorney fees after granting defendants’ motion to dismiss RICO-class action claim alleging that defendants had improperly taken control of local sanitary district and used said control to divert to themselves permit fees that should have gone to district to finance expansion of its sewage system. Plaintiffs (home owner and home contractor) lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit since scheme’s alleged theft of “Population Equivalents” assigned to homes in plaintiffs’ subdivision by defendants were only measurements of potential wastewater sewage, which, in turn, were not “property” that could be taken or stolen from plaintiffs. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly deny defendants’ claim for attorney fees since they failed to show that plaintiffs’ pre-complaint investigation was inadequate, where plaintiffs’ counsel spent 170 hours conducting factual and legal research prior to filing complaint, and where complaint was not otherwise frivolous.

Ct. of Appeals denied two similar motions to seal terms of settlement agreement in pending appeals, where one motion concerned case filed by minor, in which Dist. Ct. had reduced portion of settlement agreement payable to plaintiff’s law firm pursuant to Local Rule 17.1 of Northern District of Illinois, and other motion concerned settlement agreement whose terms had been highly redacted except for names of parties and nature of lawsuit. Documents that affect disposition of federal litigation are presumptively open to public view, and terms of settlement agreement in minor’s lawsuit needed to be revealed to determine propriety of instant reduction in fees to plaintiff’s counsel. Moreover, defendants in redacted settlement agreement case mooted their request where defendants filed copy of settlement agreement in appendix of their appellate brief.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials used excessive force while subduing plaintiff-prisoner in his cell, Dist. Ct. erred in removing plaintiff from courtroom and sending him back to prison at close of evidence and prior to giving plaintiff opportunity to seek jury poll following jury’s verdict in defendants’ favor. Civil litigant has right under Rule 48(c) to poll jury following adverse jury verdict, and failure to conduct properly requested jury poll is serious error that ordinarily requires reversal. Moreover, reversal of jury’s verdict is required here, where: (1) reason for plaintiff’s immediate removal from courtroom at close of evidence was not readily apparent; (2) Dist. Ct.’s action precluded plaintiff from having any input on jury question posed to Dist. Ct. regarding existence of prison video; and (3) jury’s foreperson gave post-verdict ambiguous statement regarding defendants’ actions in case that would have generated request for jury poll, especially where jury had initially reported that it was deadlocked in matter. Ct. rejected defendants’ claim that plaintiff should have requested jury poll prior to jury announcing its verdict.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal of Dist. Ct. order that remanded matter back to Bankruptcy Ct. for new hearing as to whether defects in roof of building arose after Bankruptcy Ct. had approved debtor’s assumption and sale of lease of said building to tenant, where landlord sought to hold tenant responsible for repair of said leaks, and where tenant had moved Bankruptcy Ct. to reopen bankruptcy proceeding to block landlord from seeking said repair under argument that leaks were present prior to Bankruptcy Ct.’s approval of debtor’s assumption and sale of lease to tenant. Dist. Ct.’s remand order was not “final decision” for purposes of providing Ct. of Appeals with jurisdiction under 28 USC sections 158 or 1291 to consider appeal, since remand order contemplated new findings of fact and new decision by Bankruptcy Ct., which had originally denied tenant’s request to block landlord’s claim for repairs to roof. Ct. of Appeals rejected landlord’s argument that it had jurisdiction to consider appeal under 28 USC section 1292, after finding that remand order did not qualify as modification of injunction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to stop plaintiff for traffic offense and to subsequently arrest him on driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge. Police had probable cause to stop defendant, where officer’s radar gun indicated that plaintiff had been speeding, and where plaintiff presented no evidence indicating that radar gun was inaccurate. Thus, plaintiff could have been properly arrested on speeding charge without regard to propriety of DWI charge. Moreover, officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on DWI charge, where defendant’s blood alcohol reading was over legal limit. Fact that plaintiff claimed that he had only one beer on night of arrest did not preclude issuance of summary judgment.

Plaintiff waived any argument that Dist. Ct. erred in denying his challenge to one juror who sat on jury in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-officer used excessive force in arresting plaintiff during homicide investigation. Record showed that, after plaintiff’s challenge to said juror was denied, plaintiff turned down Dist. Ct.’s subsequent offer to empanel new jury before proceeding with trial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for want of prosecution plaintiff’s section 1983 action, where plaintiff failed to serve any defendant within 15 months after filing said action. Record showed that nothing had occurred with lawsuit in first 13 months, although plaintiff had explained that defendant-university had stymied his efforts to serve appropriate defendants by failing to provide names and addresses of its employees, and defendant did nothing in following two months to serve any defendants, including governmental defendants. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in treating plaintiff’s motion to reconsider dismissal under Rule 59(e) as motion to vacate dismissal order under Rule 60(b), where plaintiff’s motion was filed one day after applicable 28-day deadline for filing Rule 59(e) motions. Also, Rule 6(d) did not provide plaintiff with three-day extension of time for filing Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider, even though plaintiff had received notice of dismissal by mail.

Dist. Ct. did not err in conditioning grant of plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice its breach of contract action by requiring plaintiff to pay defendants $11,000 out of requested $56,000 in legal fees associated with defendants’ claim that plaintiff lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, after Dist. Ct. had found that instant parties were not completely diverse. While defendants argued that they were entitled to remaining portion of requested legal fees that arose out of other claims in their motion to dismiss, which included claim that one defendant had not been properly served with lawsuit, Dist. Ct. could properly find that $45,000 fee was excessive for said legal work, and defendants could not have otherwise prevailed on lack of service issue, where they had waived it by failing to include it in their responsive pleading to complaint.