Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals denied second petition seeking permission to appeal order by Dist. Ct. that denied defendant’s challenge to Dist. Ct.‘s modified class certification order. While Dist. Ct.’s modification of original class certification order might have warranted instant appeal, where Dist. Ct.’s modification of definition of class to include employees “who worked as tipped employees earning sub-minimum tip credit wage rate” was over inclusive, and where said modification constituted material change from original class definition, subject matter of defendant’s appeal did not pertain to changed definition of class members. Thus, defendant could only have filed motion to decertify class to address matters contained in instant petition that would not have been subject to appeal under Rule 23(f).

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-CEO’s request to partially lift stay of discovery in action brought by plaintiff alleging that defendant-corporation breached contract to purchase plaintiff’s company, and that defendant-CEO had used his control to strip assets of corporation so as to preclude plaintiff from obtaining any recovery. Record showed that plaintiff and defendant-corporation were parties to pending German arbitration concerning alleged breach of contract, and although plaintiff argued that stay of discovery of its lawsuit against defendants corporation and CEO was appropriate because CEO could obtain materials in discovery that might be useful to corporation in arbitration proceedings, plaintiff’s concern about corporation’s use of discovery materials in arbitration proceedings is not relevant in instant case, and plaintiff otherwise has remedy about said use of discovery materials with arbitration panel. Moreover, plaintiff cannot choose to sue defendant-CEO and then prevent him from defending himself.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on grounds of claim preclusion plaintiff’s ADEA claim, alleging that defendant terminated her from her teaching position on account of her age, where plaintiff had failed to include her ADEA claim in prior unsuccessful state court action, that challenged instant termination on grounds that it was unlawful under Ill. School Code and that defendant had violated plaintiff’s due process rights. All three requirements for claim preclusion defense had been met where there had been final judgment on merits in prior state court action, and where there was identify of parties and adverse act. Moreover, plaintiff could have included ADEA action in prior state court proceeding since, at time plaintiff initiated state court action, her ADEA claim had been pending with EEOC for more than 60 days. Also, defendant was not required to lodge preemptive objection in state court proceeding to plaintiff’s failure to include ADEA action in order to preserve its right to assert claim-preclusion defense in instant case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s putative class action lawsuit under section 1983, challenging on procedural and substantive due process grounds defendant-Village’s collection of $30 booking fee from plaintiff, who had been arrested by Village police, but who had eventually been found “not guilty“ on charged offense. Under Mathews balancing test, instant booking fee did not violate plaintiff’s procedural due process rights since defendant’s interest in offsetting costs of holding plaintiff temporarily outweighed plaintiff’s interests in his $30, where there was exceedingly low likelihood that fee would be imposed erroneously on plaintiff or other arrestees. Moreover, plaintiff had other state remedies available to him to address any risk of false arrest that would provide means for plaintiff’s recovery of booking fee. Also, plaintiff’s claim of substantive due process violation was without merit where: (1) plaintiff’s complaint did not implicate fundamental right; and (2) booking fee had rational basis, where fee served as offset of costs of booking arrestees. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment by defendants-school officials and student dormitory inspectors in plaintiff-student’s section 1983 action, alleging violation of his due process and 4th Amendment rights when defendants expelled plaintiff without initial hearing after dormitory inspector discovered large quantity of marijuana in plaintiff’s dorm room (as part of previously announced inspection of dormitory rooms) in violation of university rules. Plaintiff’s clear violation of university rules and Indiana criminal law required that defendants take immediate action against plaintiff, and university provided hearing 17 days later in which plaintiff had opportunity to offer defense. Moreover, there was no 4th Amendment violation where plaintiff had consented to said inspections as part of his agreement to live in university dormitory. Fact that student inspectors summoned police officer to confirm presence of marijuana in plaintiff’s room, or that officer subsequently obtained warrant to search plaintiff’s room did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants committed willful and wanton misconduct, where plaintiff-prisoner injured his back during prisoner transfer, when driver of police van suddenly slammed on brakes. Dismissal of claim was warranted where plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing prison grievance prior to filing instant lawsuit, as required by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in considering merits plaintiff’s section 1983 claim, after finding that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, where defendant’s summary judgment motion addressing merits of plaintiff’s section 1983 claim was fully briefed.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid cause of action plaintiff-student’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-university violated his substantive and procedural due process rights, when it dismissed him from medical school for alleged unprofessional conduct. Plaintiff failed to establish any protected property interest in his continued education for purposes of establishing due process claim, and plaintiff failed to otherwise allege that defendant had entered into express or implied contract. Fact that instant dismissal may have violated defendant’s internal procedures, as set forth in its disciplinary policy, does not require different result. Plaintiff also failed to state viable equal protection claim, where plaintiff failed to identify similarly-situated student, who had committed similar academic short-comings and who received more favorable treatment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants’ request for attorney fees after granting defendants’ motion to dismiss RICO-class action claim alleging that defendants had improperly taken control of local sanitary district and used said control to divert to themselves permit fees that should have gone to district to finance expansion of its sewage system. Plaintiffs (home owner and home contractor) lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit since scheme’s alleged theft of “Population Equivalents” assigned to homes in plaintiffs’ subdivision by defendants were only measurements of potential wastewater sewage, which, in turn, were not “property” that could be taken or stolen from plaintiffs. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly deny defendants’ claim for attorney fees since they failed to show that plaintiffs’ pre-complaint investigation was inadequate, where plaintiffs’ counsel spent 170 hours conducting factual and legal research prior to filing complaint, and where complaint was not otherwise frivolous.

Ct. of Appeals denied two similar motions to seal terms of settlement agreement in pending appeals, where one motion concerned case filed by minor, in which Dist. Ct. had reduced portion of settlement agreement payable to plaintiff’s law firm pursuant to Local Rule 17.1 of Northern District of Illinois, and other motion concerned settlement agreement whose terms had been highly redacted except for names of parties and nature of lawsuit. Documents that affect disposition of federal litigation are presumptively open to public view, and terms of settlement agreement in minor’s lawsuit needed to be revealed to determine propriety of instant reduction in fees to plaintiff’s counsel. Moreover, defendants in redacted settlement agreement case mooted their request where defendants filed copy of settlement agreement in appendix of their appellate brief.