Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants denied plaintiff’s access to courts by confiscating and then destroying his legal papers in retaliation for plaintiff having filed prior lawsuit against individuals in former prison where plaintiff had been housed. Plaintiff failed to present any admissible evidence to dispute sworn statements from defendants denying personal involvement in destruction of plaintiff’s legal papers or explaining that they had removed plaintiff’s legal papers from his room because it was fire hazard. Moreover, plaintiff failed to present any evidence indicating that his legal papers had actually been destroyed, and any temporary confiscation of plaintiff’s legal documents did not constitute deprivation of meaningful access to court in absence of evidence of actual injury.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s action challenging constitutionality of portions of Indiana Unclaimed Property Act that allowed state to retain interest earned by unclaimed bank account when plaintiff, as owner of bank account, attempted to reclaim said bank account. Statute’s provisions, which allowed for confiscation of interest by State after three-year period, is tantamount to unconstitutional confiscation within meaning of takings clause since: (1) plaintiff did not voluntarily relinquish either principal or interest in subject bank account; and (2) State of Indiana could not transfer plaintiff’s private property into public property without compensation merely because it had held said property temporarily as custodian for period of three years.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-City’s and County’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendants’ land use regulations that prohibited plaintiff from running year-round Bible camp on residentially zoned property violated RLUIPA. Plaintiff could not show that defendant-City’s total ban on year-round Bible camp violated RLUIPA’s total exclusion provision, since operative decision-maker was defendant-County that had other properties where Bible camp could be located. Moreover, instant land use regulations did not create substantial burden on plaintiff where: (1) 40% of County’s land parcels could be used for Bible camp; and (2) plaintiff had opportunity to build Bible camp on other properties, but chose not to do so. Fact that plaintiff spent considerable time and money on various applications for rezoning did not constitute substantial burden under RLUIPA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting summary judgment motion filed by defendants-prison nurse practitioner and correctional counselor in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s serious medical condition of hypertension by failing to give him his prescribed medication over three-week period. Record showed that failure to give said medication was, at best, negligent act that was insufficient to establish plaintiff’s section 1983 claim. Moreover, failure to give said medication did not support plaintiff’s claim that he experienced serious medical consequence, where plaintiff’s blood pressure readings taken after instant three-week lapse period were only slightly elevated over normal range.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff to malicious prosecution and false arrest on arson and trespass charges stemming from plaintiff’s efforts to assist neighbor to get out of burning home. Under plaintiff’s version of facts, defendants had no reasonable grounds, other than plaintiff’s presence outside of burning home, for concluding that plaintiff had committed arson/trespass or that he was anything other than being good neighbor trying to ensure his neighbor’s safety. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could not resolve in defendants’ favor factual dispute as to their claim that plaintiff smelled of gasoline or that they otherwise had reasonable belief that plaintiff had been in burning home when it granted defendants' summary judgment motion. Jury question also existed as to whether defendants acted with malice with respect to plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, where jury could reasonably find that defendants concocted trespass charge where one defendant told plaintiff that trespass charge would most likely be thrown out.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials subjected plaintiff to false arrest and malicious prosecution arising out of attempted murder and firearm charges to which plaintiff was ultimately acquitted, Dist. Ct. did not err in permitting defendants to question plaintiff about his prior use of alias and to elicit testimony about presence of “gangbangers” in apartment defendant had been occupying. Although Dist. Ct. had granted plaintiff’s motion in limine that limited defendants’ references to plaintiff’s criminal background or gang membership, Dist. Ct.’s ruling did not prohibit defendants from presenting evidence of plaintiff’s use of alias during events that led to instant criminal charges. Moreover, instant reference to gang activity did not violate motion in limine ruling since said evidence did not explicitly refer to plaintiff’s own gang membership.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police and other officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants coerced others to testify falsely in trial on arson and burglary charges, where Dist. Ct. found that instant lawsuit was filed beyond applicable two-year limitations period, and that instant malicious prosecution claim was barred because State of Indiana had provided adequate remedy for said claim. Instant lawsuit was timely, since it had been filed within two years of when criminal charges against plaintiff were dismissed. Fact that plaintiff’s conviction had been reversed more that two years prior to filing instant lawsuit did not require different result since defendant was still subject to criminal charges after reversal. Moreover, Indiana does not have applicable malicious prosecution cause of action available to plaintiff where Indiana statute provides immunity to state officers such as defendants. Fact that Indiana gave plaintiff remedy for false imprisonment claim did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in Title VII action alleging that defendant denied plaintiff series of requested promotions, subjected her to sexual harassment based upon co-worker’s showing of video on office computer, and then ultimately terminated her on account of her race. Record showed that plaintiff failed to make timely application for two requested promotions and was properly rejected for two other requested promotions, because decision-makers honestly believed that successful candidates displayed more leadership and interpersonal skills. Moreover, plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of comparable co-worker, who received more favorable treatment, to support her claim that her termination for secretly recording phone conversations of her co-workers over several month period was based on her race. Also, single brief display of male nudity on office computer was insufficient to establish viable sexual harassment claim. With respect to plaintiff’s retaliation claim that went to jury trial, which resulted in verdict in defendant’s favor, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error for violating Rules 51(b)(1) and (2) by failing to give parties opportunity to review final draft of jury instructions, where disputed instruction that told jury that applicable decision-maker was required to have notice of protected conduct constituted accurate statement of law.

Ct. of Appeals imposed $7,500 in Rule 38 sanctions against plaintiff’s former attorney as means to compensate plaintiff for time spent in opposing in instant appeal $70,000 lien that former counsel asserted in underlying action that plaintiff had filed against his former employer. Ct. of Appeals found that counsel’s assertion of said lien was unjustified, where said lien had no mathematical correlation to proposed settlement that plaintiff had rejected, and where counsel’s legal arguments in support of his payment demands were frivolous in light of counsel’s agreement to contingency fee that precluded counsel from asserting any quantum meruit recovery under this record. Fact that plaintiff was unrepresented in appeal did not preclude Rule 38 sanction, such that $7,500 award represented approximately $50 per hour for plaintiff’s time spent in instant appeal. Ct. further noted that it was sending opinion to ARDC for any action against counsel.