Federal Civil Practice

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of defendants-police officers in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff to false arrest and malicious prosecution arising out of plaintiff’s arrest in felony drug possession charge after defendant-officer had observed plaintiff making three drug sales in neighboring vacant lot where others facilitated said sales. Plaintiff’s testimony, that defendant-officer had fabricated circumstances of plaintiff's arrest in officer's quest to join drug squad, contained many inconsistencies, and plaintiff’s counsel’s questions about existence of gangs in neighborhood supported defendants’ claim that drug dealing was occurring at time of plaintiff’s arrest. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error in excluding plaintiff’s proffered pictures of arrest scene, where certain excluded photographs actually supported officer’s testimony that he had witnessed drug sales. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request to impeach officer with unrelated accusations that officer had miscounted drug evidence and used abusive language in unrelated incidents, where officer was not reprimanded for either incident.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officers’ forceful entry into plaintiff’s apartment to enforce search warrant violated her 4th Amendment rights under circumstances where defendants were searching wrong address. Search resulting from innocent mistake is not unreasonable, and record showed that defendants realized mistake contemporaneously with ramming plaintiff’s door and left immediately to go to correct address at nearby apartment. Fact that defendants had looked into plaintiff’s apartment upon realizing mistake did not constitute search of said address.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ motion to direct defendants to allow any Illinois resident with FOID card to carry concealed gun outside of home until new Illinois concealed-carry law is fully implemented as remedy in response to state’s 270-day delay between date of enactment of concealed-carry law and issuance of first permits to carry guns under new law. While provisions of former law that bars concealed-carry will continue until permits under new law can be issued, plaintiffs’ proposed remedy is unreasonable, and their argument that defendants were dilatory in implementing new concealed-carry law by enacting conditions that take time to satisfy before permits can be issued must be addressed in separate lawsuit that challenges requirements contained in new law. Ct. further noted that plaintiff’s proposed relief is inconsistent with underlying opinion, which fixed no timetable for implementation of new concealed-carry law.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable claim plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution arising out of his arrest on charges of trespass and resisting law enforcement officer. Plaintiff’s false arrest claim was untimely, since it was filed more than two years after defendant’s arraignment, as opposed to date charges were subsequently dropped, as advocated by plaintiff. Moreover, plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, which alleged that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest and charge him, was mere restatement of his false arrest charge in effort to circumvent statute of limitations issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting on grounds of qualified immunity defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants’ imposition of 182-day segregation term as sanction for prison forgery charge against plaintiff that was later overturned by Ill. Administrative Review Bd. violated plaintiff’s liberty interests under 14th Amendment. Instant 182-day confinement, that allowed plaintiff to have weekly shower and recreational yard visits, was insufficient to establish 14th Amendment violation as “atypical and significant hardship.” Moreover, plaintiff failed to identify any case law in existence at time of confinement that established that instant confinement implicated any liberty interest.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action, plaintiff’s complaint, alleging violation of Ill. Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, as well as common law fraud, arising out of defendant-lender’s purchase of hazard insurance to cover plaintiff's home after plaintiff’s hazard insurance had lapsed, where plaintiff asserted that defendant had failed to disclose that it was receiving “kickback” from insurance company from which it purchased said insurance. Mortgage agreement required that plaintiff maintain hazard insurance throughout lifetime of loan and expressly provided that defendant could purchase said insurance and pass on costs to plaintiff that included compensation to it and its insurance affiliate, where as here, plaintiff allowed her insurance to lapse. Record also showed that defendant had warned plaintiff of increased premium due to her failure to keep her insurance policy current and provided plaintiff opportunity to obtain her own insurance even after it had purchased more expensive policy.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants denied plaintiff’s access to courts by confiscating and then destroying his legal papers in retaliation for plaintiff having filed prior lawsuit against individuals in former prison where plaintiff had been housed. Plaintiff failed to present any admissible evidence to dispute sworn statements from defendants denying personal involvement in destruction of plaintiff’s legal papers or explaining that they had removed plaintiff’s legal papers from his room because it was fire hazard. Moreover, plaintiff failed to present any evidence indicating that his legal papers had actually been destroyed, and any temporary confiscation of plaintiff’s legal documents did not constitute deprivation of meaningful access to court in absence of evidence of actual injury.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s action challenging constitutionality of portions of Indiana Unclaimed Property Act that allowed state to retain interest earned by unclaimed bank account when plaintiff, as owner of bank account, attempted to reclaim said bank account. Statute’s provisions, which allowed for confiscation of interest by State after three-year period, is tantamount to unconstitutional confiscation within meaning of takings clause since: (1) plaintiff did not voluntarily relinquish either principal or interest in subject bank account; and (2) State of Indiana could not transfer plaintiff’s private property into public property without compensation merely because it had held said property temporarily as custodian for period of three years.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-City’s and County’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendants’ land use regulations that prohibited plaintiff from running year-round Bible camp on residentially zoned property violated RLUIPA. Plaintiff could not show that defendant-City’s total ban on year-round Bible camp violated RLUIPA’s total exclusion provision, since operative decision-maker was defendant-County that had other properties where Bible camp could be located. Moreover, instant land use regulations did not create substantial burden on plaintiff where: (1) 40% of County’s land parcels could be used for Bible camp; and (2) plaintiff had opportunity to build Bible camp on other properties, but chose not to do so. Fact that plaintiff spent considerable time and money on various applications for rezoning did not constitute substantial burden under RLUIPA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting summary judgment motion filed by defendants-prison nurse practitioner and correctional counselor in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s serious medical condition of hypertension by failing to give him his prescribed medication over three-week period. Record showed that failure to give said medication was, at best, negligent act that was insufficient to establish plaintiff’s section 1983 claim. Moreover, failure to give said medication did not support plaintiff’s claim that he experienced serious medical consequence, where plaintiff’s blood pressure readings taken after instant three-week lapse period were only slightly elevated over normal range.