Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals denied plaintiff-prisoner’s request for free trial transcript for purposes of supporting his appeal from dismissal of his section 1983 action that alleged that defendants-prison officials used excessive force on multiple occasions. While plaintiff argued that he could not afford said transcript, which, he claimed, was required to be filed in his appeal, plaintiff’s status, as prisoner with three strikes against him under 28 USC section 1915(g), precluded him from obtaining free copy of trial transcript where, as here, there was no allegation that plaintiff's appeal concerned situation in which he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiff zero attorney fees after jury awarded plaintiff $100 on one of eight claims against four defendants in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights when carrying out search warrant on plaintiff’s home. Under Farrar, 506 US 103, Dist. Ct. may award zero fees when plaintiff had received only minimal damages, and record established that zero fees was reasonable, even though plaintiff sought $450,000 in attorney fees, where: (1) plaintiff sued four defendants and sought over $100,000 in compensatory damages; (2) instant $100 award represented only .4% of plaintiff’s requested damages against said defendant; and (3) instant $100 award could not be viewed as compensatory since it did not correspond to any itemized property damages sought by plaintiff. Ct. further noted that plaintiff’s victory on just one of eight claims was not significant, and that instant minimal monetary award reflected mere personal victory that had no broader import to public.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in qui tam action alleging that several of defendant’s off-label prescriptions for defendant’s Medicaid patient constituted false claims to U.S. govt. for payment, where said medications were prescribed for purposes not approved by FDA or supported by any pharmaceutical reference books, where basis of ruling was Dist. Ct.’s belief that plaintiff could not establish claim without use of expert to explain Medicaid claim procedures or to interpret certain medical terminology in pharmaceutical reference books. Expert witness was not needed on issue of Medicaid claims procedure since jury could understand that defendant’s writing of improper prescription to Medicaid patient would likely result in claim being filed with Medicaid. Moreover, expert testimony was not necessary to interpret terminology in pharmaceutical reference books where plaintiff’s theory was that there were no medically accepted indication for use of certain drugs to anyone of defendant’s patient’s age. However, on remand, plaintiff may be required to use expert testimony to explain some prescriptions that he claimed constituted false claims, and that he may ultimately not be able to do so since deadline has passed for naming expert witnesses.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiffs on murder charge, where two plaintiffs told police that victim had shot at them, and where prosecutor eventually dismissed said murder charge. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendants had probable cause to believe that plaintiffs had either shot victim or aided actual killer, where third-party witness at murder scene told defendants that: (1) victim had been pursued and confronted by angry people; and (2) he heard multiple gun shots and saw plaintiffs run away from scene. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ argument that jury, as opposed to Dist. Ct., should have made independent assessment of probable cause. Moreover, fact that witness did not see plaintiffs fire gun at victim did not mean that they could not have done so. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to one plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, where prosecutor’s dismissal of instant murder charge as to said plaintiff came about through plaintiff’s plea bargain, which precluded plaintiff from establishing that alleged wrongful prosecution was terminated in manner suggesting plaintiff’s innocence.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officials’ motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated her equal protection rights by not enforcing order of protection against her husband and by failing to confiscate her husband’s firearms after his state-law right to possess said firearms had been revoked, which in turn allowed husband to shoot plaintiff before killing himself. Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state valid cause of action, where plaintiff failed to allege intentional discrimination on part of defendants, i.e., that defendants preferred men (but not women) to be left at large so they can injure their domestic partners. Moreover, plaintiff’s theory of case, i.e., that defendant did not give appropriate priority to enforcement of domestic violence laws, could not support instant equal protection claim since: (1) defendant’s lack of enforcement of domestic violence laws established only disparate impact on women; and (2) under Washington, 426 US 229, harm based on disparate impact does not violate equal protection clause and cannot be redressed under section 1983.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiffs in mail fraud, civil RICO and interference with prospective business advantage claims in alleged scheme by defendants to unfairly deprive plaintiffs of opportunity to bid and obtain properties with tax liens at Cook County auctions by packing auction room with bidding agents, where said scheme violated County’s rule permitting only one bidding agent per potential buyer and increased defendants’ odds at obtaining successful bids on said properties. Record showed that County would have barred defendants' use of multiple bidders had it known of defendants’ scheme, and Dist. Ct. properly refused defendants’ proposed jury instruction that defendants’ alleged good faith disagreement about applicable County rule could negate any intent to defraud. Moreover, plaintiffs’ expert could properly estimate profit plaintiffs would have made for all auctions in which plaintiffs participated, based on number of tax liens on which plaintiffs actually bid in one particular auction in order to calculate various “win” percentages for dishonest, as well as honest, bidders.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-news organizations’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s defamation action, even though plaintiff-ex-Chicago Bull basketball player alleged that defendants published false reports that plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy, and that said false reports impaired plaintiff’s ability to earn living through product endorsements and personal appearances. Said reports did not qualify as defamation per se since false report of bankruptcy did not imply that plaintiff lacked competency or integrity to perform current occupations of being goodwill ambassador to Bulls, as well as basketball analyst and celebrity product endorser. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish defamation per quod claim since: (1) any failure of defendants to clarify plaintiff’s bankruptcy status is insufficient to establish reckless disregard for truth element of plaintiff’s claim; and (2) proof of defendants’ actual malice required for instant lawsuit cannot be inferred from defendants’ failure to retract statement once it learned that they were false. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s contention that Uniform Single Publication Act, which provides that claim for defamation is complete upon original publication, did not apply to instant false statements made on Internet.

Dist. Ct. properly denied defendants-prison medical officials’ motion to dismiss (on ground of qualified immunity) instant 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-arrestee’s constitutional rights by failing to monitor and treat his Type I diabetes, which, in turn, led to plaintiff’s death while incarcerated. Instant complaint properly alleged that claim by plaintiff, as pretrial arrestee who had not yet received probable cause hearing on his misdemeanor charge after plaintiff had been arrested without warrant, was covered by 4th Amendment’s “objectively unreasonable” standard as applied to defendants’ conduct. Moreover, Ct. rejected defendants’ contention that 4th Amendment never applies to constitutional claims alleging inadequate provision of medical care by prison personnel, and further found that instant allegations that plaintiff’s relatives informed defendants of plaintiff’s diabetes diagnosis and yet withheld insulin from plaintiff was sufficient to state viable 4th Amendment claim against defendants.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action alleging that defendants’ refusal to refer to plaintiff by his “spiritual” name, i.e., Prince Atum-Ra Uhum Mutawakkil violated Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Defendant’s policy is to only permit inmate use of name that was on his judgment of conviction, and plaintiff failed to show that defendants’ use of his name on his judgment of conviction created substantial burden on plaintiff’s exercise of his religion. Moreover, Ct. noted that plaintiff had failed to seek formal name change in Wisc. civil court.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment by defendants-various DCFS officials in plaintiff's section 1983 action alleging that defendants deprived her of due process by conspiring with individual (hired by DCFS to transcribe DCFS appeal hearing) to alter said transcripts in effort to uphold “indicated finding” against plaintiff in her subsequent appeal to circuit court that concerned question as to whether plaintiff had inflicted mental injuries on her children. Record failed to contain any evidence that defendants met with instant transcriber or had any sort of communication with her regarding said transcripts so as to establish any conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of her due process rights. Moreover, while transcripts produced by instant transcriber contained discrepancies when compared with transcripts generated by independent transcriber, plaintiff failed to show that instant transcriber had “altered” any transcript, especially where certain discrepancies had actually favored plaintiff. Ct. also issued plaintiff rule to show cause why she should not be sanctioned under Rule 38 for filing frivolous appeal where plaintiff merely rehashed arguments that she made to Dist. Ct., which had warned her that her complaint bordered on being frivolous.