Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff to malicious prosecution and false arrest on arson and trespass charges stemming from plaintiff’s efforts to assist neighbor to get out of burning home. Under plaintiff’s version of facts, defendants had no reasonable grounds, other than plaintiff’s presence outside of burning home, for concluding that plaintiff had committed arson/trespass or that he was anything other than being good neighbor trying to ensure his neighbor’s safety. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could not resolve in defendants’ favor factual dispute as to their claim that plaintiff smelled of gasoline or that they otherwise had reasonable belief that plaintiff had been in burning home when it granted defendants' summary judgment motion. Jury question also existed as to whether defendants acted with malice with respect to plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, where jury could reasonably find that defendants concocted trespass charge where one defendant told plaintiff that trespass charge would most likely be thrown out.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials subjected plaintiff to false arrest and malicious prosecution arising out of attempted murder and firearm charges to which plaintiff was ultimately acquitted, Dist. Ct. did not err in permitting defendants to question plaintiff about his prior use of alias and to elicit testimony about presence of “gangbangers” in apartment defendant had been occupying. Although Dist. Ct. had granted plaintiff’s motion in limine that limited defendants’ references to plaintiff’s criminal background or gang membership, Dist. Ct.’s ruling did not prohibit defendants from presenting evidence of plaintiff’s use of alias during events that led to instant criminal charges. Moreover, instant reference to gang activity did not violate motion in limine ruling since said evidence did not explicitly refer to plaintiff’s own gang membership.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police and other officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants coerced others to testify falsely in trial on arson and burglary charges, where Dist. Ct. found that instant lawsuit was filed beyond applicable two-year limitations period, and that instant malicious prosecution claim was barred because State of Indiana had provided adequate remedy for said claim. Instant lawsuit was timely, since it had been filed within two years of when criminal charges against plaintiff were dismissed. Fact that plaintiff’s conviction had been reversed more that two years prior to filing instant lawsuit did not require different result since defendant was still subject to criminal charges after reversal. Moreover, Indiana does not have applicable malicious prosecution cause of action available to plaintiff where Indiana statute provides immunity to state officers such as defendants. Fact that Indiana gave plaintiff remedy for false imprisonment claim did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in Title VII action alleging that defendant denied plaintiff series of requested promotions, subjected her to sexual harassment based upon co-worker’s showing of video on office computer, and then ultimately terminated her on account of her race. Record showed that plaintiff failed to make timely application for two requested promotions and was properly rejected for two other requested promotions, because decision-makers honestly believed that successful candidates displayed more leadership and interpersonal skills. Moreover, plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of comparable co-worker, who received more favorable treatment, to support her claim that her termination for secretly recording phone conversations of her co-workers over several month period was based on her race. Also, single brief display of male nudity on office computer was insufficient to establish viable sexual harassment claim. With respect to plaintiff’s retaliation claim that went to jury trial, which resulted in verdict in defendant’s favor, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error for violating Rules 51(b)(1) and (2) by failing to give parties opportunity to review final draft of jury instructions, where disputed instruction that told jury that applicable decision-maker was required to have notice of protected conduct constituted accurate statement of law.

Ct. of Appeals imposed $7,500 in Rule 38 sanctions against plaintiff’s former attorney as means to compensate plaintiff for time spent in opposing in instant appeal $70,000 lien that former counsel asserted in underlying action that plaintiff had filed against his former employer. Ct. of Appeals found that counsel’s assertion of said lien was unjustified, where said lien had no mathematical correlation to proposed settlement that plaintiff had rejected, and where counsel’s legal arguments in support of his payment demands were frivolous in light of counsel’s agreement to contingency fee that precluded counsel from asserting any quantum meruit recovery under this record. Fact that plaintiff was unrepresented in appeal did not preclude Rule 38 sanction, such that $7,500 award represented approximately $50 per hour for plaintiff’s time spent in instant appeal. Ct. further noted that it was sending opinion to ARDC for any action against counsel.

In civil proceeding in which govt. sought forfeiture of tractor-trailer and $304,980 in drug-related cash that was found in secret compartment within tractor-trailer, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying motion by defendants (claimed owners of tractor-trailer and cash) to suppress results of police search of tractor-trailer based on claim that defendant-truck driver did not consent to said search. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant gave consent to search tractor-trailer, where record showed that defendant told officer to “go ahead” with requested search and voluntarily unlocked tractor-trailer so that officer could conduct search. While defendant argued that he withdrew his consent prior to officer finding said cash when defendant wrote “UNDER PROTEST” on consent form, defendant’s initial consent gave officer permission to search into any hidden compartments, and defendant’s “protest” was ambiguous where officer held reasonable belief that defendant had signed form without reservations, and where defendant engaged in casual conversation following his signature that was inconsistent with any revocation or limitation of consent.

In action by plaintiff-insured seeking declaration that defendant’s insurance policy covered certain business interruption losses, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment after excluding plaintiff’s expert witness, who provided testimony with respect to plaintiff’s alleged damages arising out of collapse of building that prevented plaintiff from having access to its office space for more than one year. Record showed that expert used acceptable method to calculate said damages, which was set forth in policy, and Dist. Ct.’s determination that expert’s use of only five-month period of time to calculate estimated growth of plaintiff’s profits and to ultimately project plaintiff’s lost profits rendered expert’s analysis unreliable was essentially factual matter that should have been determined by trier of fact, as opposed to issue that could have been resolved in summary judgment proceeding.

Plaintiff failed to state viable section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated his due process rights when defendant, in her capacity as school guidance counselor, criticized plaintiff’s parenting methods and called him “bad father.” Plaintiff essentially asserted defamation action, which, under Paul, 424 US 693, is insufficient to state viable due process violation where, as here, there was no other alleged official action taken by defendant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-govt.’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FTCA action alleging medical malpractice in connection with amputation of plaintiff’s leg, where said motion was based on defendant’s claim that plaintiff’s action was untimely, since it was filed beyond applicable Illinois 4-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions. Fact that plaintiff had filed instant action within six months of Dept. of Veterans Affair’s dismissal of plaintiff's administrative complaint did not require different result. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that Ill. statute of repose was preempted by FTCA’s own procedural scheme, and Ct. further observed that there was no conflict between state and federal law, since record showed that plaintiff had 18 months to file instant action in federal court prior to expiration of statute of repose.