Federal Civil Practice

In section 1983 action in which plaintiff received $25 million judgment based on allegations that defendants-police officer and City violated plaintiff’s due process rights by using coercive tactics to convince witnesses to falsely identify plaintiff as culprit in murder charge, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error in sustaining plaintiff’s Batson objection to peremptory challenge used by defendants against African-American juror, where defendants conceded that they could not show that any biased juror sat on instant jury as result of any Batson error. Additionally, defendant waived any issue regarding Dist. Ct.‘s denial of defendants’ motion for judgment as matter of law based on plaintiff’s failure to introduce into evidence entire transcripts of his original criminal trial, where defendant failed to raise said issue in Dist. Ct. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in allowing plaintiff’s expert to testify on reasonable police practices, where said testimony was not tantamount to legal conclusion, and where expert did not offer opinion on credibility of other witnesses.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing without leave to amend plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-jail officials willfully failed to prevent other inmates from assaulting him, where instant dismissal was based on oral statements made by plaintiff during telephonic “merit-review hearing” that occurred after complaint had been docketed, but before any other filings, except for granting of in forma pauperis petition, had occurred. Dist. Ct. could not dismiss instant case, where Dist. Ct. resolved material factual disputes on oral representations made by plaintiff, under circumstances, where Dist. Ct.’s questions took form of judicial cross-examination designed to elicit admissions from plaintiff. As such, if Dist. Ct. was unclear about any aspect of instant complaint, it should have dismissed it with leave to amend, after giving plaintiff guidance as to areas that needed clarification.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal of insurance company/prospective intervenor, which sought intervention for purpose of undoing settlement that its insured made with plaintiff-class in action alleging violation of Telephone Consumer Protection Act. While insurance company filed timely notice of appeal of order denying its intervention motion, portion of its notice of appeal that challenged propriety of settlement order was untimely as it was filed more than 30 days after entry of said order. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over portion of appeal that challenged intervention order, because Ct. of Appeals could not provide insurance company with any meaningful relief with respect to settlement order, even if intervention order was reversed.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting govt.’s motion for summary judgment in civil forfeiture proceeding, alleging that $100,120 in defendant’s briefcase that DEA agent seized after dog alerted agent to recent presence of drugs was either proceeds of illegal drug transaction or was intended to facilitate such transaction. Defendant’s affidavit, although self-serving, was sufficient to create triable issue as to whether said cash could have been legally obtained by defendant, where defendant claimed that said cash had been generated through life-time of savings in expense-free environment. Moreover, testimony from defendant’s expert witness created triable issue as to whether dog’s training was sufficient to demonstrate that dog’s alert was reliable evidence that subject cash had recently been in contact with illegal drugs.

In product liability action alleging that ladder manufactured by defendant contained defective design that caused plaintiff to incur certain personal injuries, Dist. Ct. erred in allowing jury to examine exemplar ladder, which had been built to exact specifications of ladder used by plaintiff, that defendant’s expert used as demonstrative evidence during his testimony, where said ladder had not been introduced into evidence. Plaintiff objected to jury’s request to examine said ladder during jury deliberations, and as general matter, materials not admitted into evidence should not be sent to jury for use during its deliberations. Moreover, record showed that Dist. Ct. had originally overruled plaintiff’s objections to expert’s use of said ladder during his testimony, where Dist. Ct. noted that it would be used only for demonstrative purposes and would not be admitted into evidence. Instant error was not harmless since both parties had substantial evidence supporting their positions.

Ct. of Appeals denied defendant’s motion to dismiss appeal, even though defendant argued that plaintiff had filed her notice of appeal 113 days after Dist. Ct.’s entry of Rule 77(d) order that was entered day after Dist. Ct. had entered “Memorandum Opinion and Order” that dismissed plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim with prejudice. While defendant argued that Rule 77(d) order, which recited Dist. Ct.’s dismissal order, as well as canceled as moot other scheduled matters, complied with Rule 58’s requirement of filing separate document that reflected Dist. Ct.’s judgment, so as to trigger time frame for filing notice of appeal, Ct. of Appeals found that Rule 77(d) order did not satisfy requirements of Rule 58, where instant Rule 77(d) order was confusing about whether it was meant as a separate judgment, and where Rule 77(d) order was not signed by court clerk. As such, official judgment date was 150 days after Dist. Ct.’s dismissal order, and thus instant notice of appeal was timely.

Ct. of Appeals denied plaintiff-prisoner’s request for free trial transcript for purposes of supporting his appeal from dismissal of his section 1983 action that alleged that defendants-prison officials used excessive force on multiple occasions. While plaintiff argued that he could not afford said transcript, which, he claimed, was required to be filed in his appeal, plaintiff’s status, as prisoner with three strikes against him under 28 USC section 1915(g), precluded him from obtaining free copy of trial transcript where, as here, there was no allegation that plaintiff's appeal concerned situation in which he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiff zero attorney fees after jury awarded plaintiff $100 on one of eight claims against four defendants in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights when carrying out search warrant on plaintiff’s home. Under Farrar, 506 US 103, Dist. Ct. may award zero fees when plaintiff had received only minimal damages, and record established that zero fees was reasonable, even though plaintiff sought $450,000 in attorney fees, where: (1) plaintiff sued four defendants and sought over $100,000 in compensatory damages; (2) instant $100 award represented only .4% of plaintiff’s requested damages against said defendant; and (3) instant $100 award could not be viewed as compensatory since it did not correspond to any itemized property damages sought by plaintiff. Ct. further noted that plaintiff’s victory on just one of eight claims was not significant, and that instant minimal monetary award reflected mere personal victory that had no broader import to public.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in qui tam action alleging that several of defendant’s off-label prescriptions for defendant’s Medicaid patient constituted false claims to U.S. govt. for payment, where said medications were prescribed for purposes not approved by FDA or supported by any pharmaceutical reference books, where basis of ruling was Dist. Ct.’s belief that plaintiff could not establish claim without use of expert to explain Medicaid claim procedures or to interpret certain medical terminology in pharmaceutical reference books. Expert witness was not needed on issue of Medicaid claims procedure since jury could understand that defendant’s writing of improper prescription to Medicaid patient would likely result in claim being filed with Medicaid. Moreover, expert testimony was not necessary to interpret terminology in pharmaceutical reference books where plaintiff’s theory was that there were no medically accepted indication for use of certain drugs to anyone of defendant’s patient’s age. However, on remand, plaintiff may be required to use expert testimony to explain some prescriptions that he claimed constituted false claims, and that he may ultimately not be able to do so since deadline has passed for naming expert witnesses.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiffs on murder charge, where two plaintiffs told police that victim had shot at them, and where prosecutor eventually dismissed said murder charge. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendants had probable cause to believe that plaintiffs had either shot victim or aided actual killer, where third-party witness at murder scene told defendants that: (1) victim had been pursued and confronted by angry people; and (2) he heard multiple gun shots and saw plaintiffs run away from scene. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ argument that jury, as opposed to Dist. Ct., should have made independent assessment of probable cause. Moreover, fact that witness did not see plaintiffs fire gun at victim did not mean that they could not have done so. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to one plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, where prosecutor’s dismissal of instant murder charge as to said plaintiff came about through plaintiff’s plea bargain, which precluded plaintiff from establishing that alleged wrongful prosecution was terminated in manner suggesting plaintiff’s innocence.