Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action under Establishment Clause alleging that defendants wrongfully denied plaintiff’s request to organize atheist group given defendants’ allowance of seven recognized umbrella religious groups of prisoners to meet within prison, where Dist. Ct. believed that only two inmates had expressed any interest in forming atheist group. Record contained triable issue as to whether there was enough interest to form atheist group among 14% of instant prison population, who had indicated “unknown” religious affiliation. However, Dist. Ct. could properly grant summary judgment with respect to: (1) defendant’s rejection of plaintiff’s request to wear “knowledge thought “ ring, where plaintiff had failed to present evidence that failure to wear such ring imposed substantial hardship on his practice of atheism; and (2) plaintiff’s claim that prison library intentionally lost three books that plaintiff had donated on atheism.

Dist. Ct. did not err in approving class counsel's request for attorney fees that represented 27.5% of $200 million settlement of class action claim by class members/defendant’s investors, who alleged that defendant made certain misrepresentations regarding its ability to deliver competitive mobile telephone, even though fee awards typically averaged 10.2% for settlements in $100 to $250 million range. Instant case posed substantial risk of failure for class counsel, and class member who challenged instant award failed to bring to Dist. Ct.’s attention any data showing that instant percentage substantially exceeded norm for large class action settlements. Moreover, Ct. noted that large institutional investors that represented 70% of claims to settlement fund did not raise any objection to fee award. Ct. further dismissed appeal of another challenger to fee award, where said individual had not filed claim to his share of settlement fund, and thus had no standing to challenge fee award.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment by defendant clinical social worker in section 1983 action alleging that several defendants at jail were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s risk of suicide, such that said defendants failed to prevent plaintiff’s suicide at said jail. Social worker noted that plaintiff posed suicide risk three days prior to plaintiff’s suicide and yet failed to inform anyone else of said threat in spite of record reflecting plaintiff’s deteriorating mental state. Moreover, record suggested that had plaintiff provided notice of suicide risk, others could have placed plaintiff in mental hospital or on suicide watch at jail. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in dismissing remaining defendants since there was no evidence indicating that said defendants had any knowledge that plaintiff posed suicide risk, and any alleged failure by defendant-County to discover any deficiencies in its suicide watch policy would not have prevented plaintiff’s suicide.

Appellant (unsecured creditor of debtor company that was also controlled by creditor) lacked standing to appeal Dist. Ct. order that granted motion by another creditor to have debtor turn over stock to be sold to satisfy creditor’s lien, as well as award of attorney fees and costs to third creditor, which also sought portion of proceeds of stock sale to satisfy its lien, since said Dist. Ct. orders applied to debtor, as opposed to appellant. Fact that motion to pierce corporate veil of debtor was granted so as to make appellant responsible for other creditors' liens did not confer standing on appellant in instant appeal since corporate veil cannot be pierced for benefit of corporation or its stockholders. Ct. of Appeals also awarded fees to other creditors, after finding that instant appeal was frivolous.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-court action alleging that plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for asserting his rights under Ill. Workers’ Compensation Act, where defendant removed case to Dist. Ct. on theory that plaintiff’s lawsuit was really claim under parties’ collective bargaining agreement that was preempted by section 301 of Labor Management Relations Act. Instant retaliation claim should not have been removed since preemption under section 301 did not apply where state court was not required to interpret collective bargaining agreement in order to resolve retaliatory discharge claim. Fact that parties had entered into grievance settlement prior to plaintiff’s departure that was reached under auspices of collective bargaining agreement did not require different result since plaintiff could prevail on his claim without attacking or interpreting said settlement.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs’ request for class action treatment in action under sections 409 and 502 of ERISA alleging that defendant-employer breached its duty to plaintiffs by offering only short-term, underperforming money market investments in one of its investment plans, where defendant described plan as more profitable mix of short and intermediate term investments. While Dist Ct. based denial on its finding that reference in class definition to Hueler Index for purposes of determining whether class members experienced actual damages was improper because use of said Index was disputed by parties as valid measure of damages, use of Hueler Index was not improper since use of Index in class definition did not bind Dist. Ct. to use of said Index when determining damages: and (2) use of Index was valid means to ensure that all class members suffered damages as result of defendant’s conduct. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that class action treatment was inappropriate where thrust of plaintiffs’ claim was that defendant made certain misrepresentations about investment plan.

In action by plaintiff-beneficiary of certain trusts alleging that defendant-law firm committed legal malpractice by failing to disclose terms of certain family trusts and failed to make certain distributions, Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing sanctions on plaintiff for violating terms of protective order that precluded parties from disclosing privileged documents to third parties. Record showed that plaintiff’s counsel disclosed said documents during deposition of plaintiff’s representative, which was also attended by different attorney for plaintiff, who had been retained to represent plaintiff in similar state-court action against defendant. Protective order clearly precluded said disclosure, where order contained directive that parties could not use privileged documents produced by defendant for “any other litigation.” Moreover, instant sanction that immediately closed discovery that was scheduled to close four business days later was reasonable. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for partial summery judgment, where plaintiff conceded that defendant had given her 18-page summary of certain trust assets, which precluded her from establishing that defendant had failed to inform her of her rights under said trusts.

Dist. Ct. erred in failing to grant plaintiff’s motion for new trial in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials lacked probable cause to arrest 14-year-old plaintiff on disorderly conduct charge and used excessive force while plaintiff was in custody, where Dist. Ct. allowed defendants to cross-examine plaintiff on fact that he had been subsequently arrested on under-age drinking charge and on his felony conviction for possession of stolen motor vehicle. Defendants could not use subsequent arrest for underage drinking to establish that plaintiff had been drinking on night of arrest as maintained by defendants. Moreover, cross-examination on plaintiff’s felony conviction deprived plaintiff of fair trial where its probative value on plaintiff’s emotional distress claim was minimal while its prejudice was substantial because it allowed jury to draw impermissible propensity that plaintiff had committed disorderly conduct on night of his arrest.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison and medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by requiring that he wear leg irons on his swollen and possibly cancerous legs when defendants transferred plaintiff outside of prison. Plaintiff could not establish indifference claim with respect to medical defendants, where record showed that defendants consistently monitored condition of plaintiff’s legs, and where plaintiff failed to present any medical evidence to counter opinion of relevant physician that there was no medical reason that plaintiff should avoid use of metal shackles on his ankles. Moreover, non-medical defendants could properly rely on medical defendant’s opinion when denying plaintiff’s request to discontinue use of metal shackles. Fact that plaintiff’s legs became swollen when he was required to walk four blocks did not require different result where plaintiff suffered no other injury.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-employee’s section 1983 action alleging that he was fired from his assistant state’s attorney position in retaliation for providing grand jury and trial testimony regarding alleged wrongdoing committed by state’s attorney in handling cases involving his relatives and political allies. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s testimony was not subject to First Amendment protection under Garcetti, 547 US 410, because it was given pursuant to his official duties, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff presented valid First Amendment claim where providing truthful testimony pursuant to subpoena was not one of plaintiff’s job duties. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that it had legitimate managerial interest in telling plaintiff what to say in court.