Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officials’ motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated her equal protection rights by not enforcing order of protection against her husband and by failing to confiscate her husband’s firearms after his state-law right to possess said firearms had been revoked, which in turn allowed husband to shoot plaintiff before killing himself. Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state valid cause of action, where plaintiff failed to allege intentional discrimination on part of defendants, i.e., that defendants preferred men (but not women) to be left at large so they can injure their domestic partners. Moreover, plaintiff’s theory of case, i.e., that defendant did not give appropriate priority to enforcement of domestic violence laws, could not support instant equal protection claim since: (1) defendant’s lack of enforcement of domestic violence laws established only disparate impact on women; and (2) under Washington, 426 US 229, harm based on disparate impact does not violate equal protection clause and cannot be redressed under section 1983.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiffs in mail fraud, civil RICO and interference with prospective business advantage claims in alleged scheme by defendants to unfairly deprive plaintiffs of opportunity to bid and obtain properties with tax liens at Cook County auctions by packing auction room with bidding agents, where said scheme violated County’s rule permitting only one bidding agent per potential buyer and increased defendants’ odds at obtaining successful bids on said properties. Record showed that County would have barred defendants' use of multiple bidders had it known of defendants’ scheme, and Dist. Ct. properly refused defendants’ proposed jury instruction that defendants’ alleged good faith disagreement about applicable County rule could negate any intent to defraud. Moreover, plaintiffs’ expert could properly estimate profit plaintiffs would have made for all auctions in which plaintiffs participated, based on number of tax liens on which plaintiffs actually bid in one particular auction in order to calculate various “win” percentages for dishonest, as well as honest, bidders.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-news organizations’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s defamation action, even though plaintiff-ex-Chicago Bull basketball player alleged that defendants published false reports that plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy, and that said false reports impaired plaintiff’s ability to earn living through product endorsements and personal appearances. Said reports did not qualify as defamation per se since false report of bankruptcy did not imply that plaintiff lacked competency or integrity to perform current occupations of being goodwill ambassador to Bulls, as well as basketball analyst and celebrity product endorser. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish defamation per quod claim since: (1) any failure of defendants to clarify plaintiff’s bankruptcy status is insufficient to establish reckless disregard for truth element of plaintiff’s claim; and (2) proof of defendants’ actual malice required for instant lawsuit cannot be inferred from defendants’ failure to retract statement once it learned that they were false. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s contention that Uniform Single Publication Act, which provides that claim for defamation is complete upon original publication, did not apply to instant false statements made on Internet.

Dist. Ct. properly denied defendants-prison medical officials’ motion to dismiss (on ground of qualified immunity) instant 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-arrestee’s constitutional rights by failing to monitor and treat his Type I diabetes, which, in turn, led to plaintiff’s death while incarcerated. Instant complaint properly alleged that claim by plaintiff, as pretrial arrestee who had not yet received probable cause hearing on his misdemeanor charge after plaintiff had been arrested without warrant, was covered by 4th Amendment’s “objectively unreasonable” standard as applied to defendants’ conduct. Moreover, Ct. rejected defendants’ contention that 4th Amendment never applies to constitutional claims alleging inadequate provision of medical care by prison personnel, and further found that instant allegations that plaintiff’s relatives informed defendants of plaintiff’s diabetes diagnosis and yet withheld insulin from plaintiff was sufficient to state viable 4th Amendment claim against defendants.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action alleging that defendants’ refusal to refer to plaintiff by his “spiritual” name, i.e., Prince Atum-Ra Uhum Mutawakkil violated Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Defendant’s policy is to only permit inmate use of name that was on his judgment of conviction, and plaintiff failed to show that defendants’ use of his name on his judgment of conviction created substantial burden on plaintiff’s exercise of his religion. Moreover, Ct. noted that plaintiff had failed to seek formal name change in Wisc. civil court.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment by defendants-various DCFS officials in plaintiff's section 1983 action alleging that defendants deprived her of due process by conspiring with individual (hired by DCFS to transcribe DCFS appeal hearing) to alter said transcripts in effort to uphold “indicated finding” against plaintiff in her subsequent appeal to circuit court that concerned question as to whether plaintiff had inflicted mental injuries on her children. Record failed to contain any evidence that defendants met with instant transcriber or had any sort of communication with her regarding said transcripts so as to establish any conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of her due process rights. Moreover, while transcripts produced by instant transcriber contained discrepancies when compared with transcripts generated by independent transcriber, plaintiff failed to show that instant transcriber had “altered” any transcript, especially where certain discrepancies had actually favored plaintiff. Ct. also issued plaintiff rule to show cause why she should not be sanctioned under Rule 38 for filing frivolous appeal where plaintiff merely rehashed arguments that she made to Dist. Ct., which had warned her that her complaint bordered on being frivolous.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action under Establishment Clause alleging that defendants wrongfully denied plaintiff’s request to organize atheist group given defendants’ allowance of seven recognized umbrella religious groups of prisoners to meet within prison, where Dist. Ct. believed that only two inmates had expressed any interest in forming atheist group. Record contained triable issue as to whether there was enough interest to form atheist group among 14% of instant prison population, who had indicated “unknown” religious affiliation. However, Dist. Ct. could properly grant summary judgment with respect to: (1) defendant’s rejection of plaintiff’s request to wear “knowledge thought “ ring, where plaintiff had failed to present evidence that failure to wear such ring imposed substantial hardship on his practice of atheism; and (2) plaintiff’s claim that prison library intentionally lost three books that plaintiff had donated on atheism.

Dist. Ct. did not err in approving class counsel's request for attorney fees that represented 27.5% of $200 million settlement of class action claim by class members/defendant’s investors, who alleged that defendant made certain misrepresentations regarding its ability to deliver competitive mobile telephone, even though fee awards typically averaged 10.2% for settlements in $100 to $250 million range. Instant case posed substantial risk of failure for class counsel, and class member who challenged instant award failed to bring to Dist. Ct.’s attention any data showing that instant percentage substantially exceeded norm for large class action settlements. Moreover, Ct. noted that large institutional investors that represented 70% of claims to settlement fund did not raise any objection to fee award. Ct. further dismissed appeal of another challenger to fee award, where said individual had not filed claim to his share of settlement fund, and thus had no standing to challenge fee award.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment by defendant clinical social worker in section 1983 action alleging that several defendants at jail were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s risk of suicide, such that said defendants failed to prevent plaintiff’s suicide at said jail. Social worker noted that plaintiff posed suicide risk three days prior to plaintiff’s suicide and yet failed to inform anyone else of said threat in spite of record reflecting plaintiff’s deteriorating mental state. Moreover, record suggested that had plaintiff provided notice of suicide risk, others could have placed plaintiff in mental hospital or on suicide watch at jail. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in dismissing remaining defendants since there was no evidence indicating that said defendants had any knowledge that plaintiff posed suicide risk, and any alleged failure by defendant-County to discover any deficiencies in its suicide watch policy would not have prevented plaintiff’s suicide.

Appellant (unsecured creditor of debtor company that was also controlled by creditor) lacked standing to appeal Dist. Ct. order that granted motion by another creditor to have debtor turn over stock to be sold to satisfy creditor’s lien, as well as award of attorney fees and costs to third creditor, which also sought portion of proceeds of stock sale to satisfy its lien, since said Dist. Ct. orders applied to debtor, as opposed to appellant. Fact that motion to pierce corporate veil of debtor was granted so as to make appellant responsible for other creditors' liens did not confer standing on appellant in instant appeal since corporate veil cannot be pierced for benefit of corporation or its stockholders. Ct. of Appeals also awarded fees to other creditors, after finding that instant appeal was frivolous.