Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-social service officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s section 1983, class-of-one equal protection claim in which plaintiff alleged that defendants initiated aggressive investigation that resulted in merit-less first-degree sexual assault charge against six-year-old plaintiff based on incident in which plaintiff and five-year-old twins were playing “doctor” by touching each other’s bare buttocks. Plaintiff noted that criminal charges were eventually dropped and asserted that political favoritism played role in defendants’ decision to file charges only against plaintiff and not twins, who admitted to same conduct. However, instant complaint also alleged objective rationale for said disparate treatment that defeated any chance of plaintiff obtaining judgment against defendants under equal protection theory, i.e, that sole adult witness to incident had observed plaintiff’s conduct and not conduct of twins.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officers subjected plaintiff to false arrest and excessive force, plaintiff waived any issue regarding propriety of Dist. Ct.’s denial of his motion seeking to exclude from evidence seven of plaintiff’s criminal convictions that were entered within past 10 years, where plaintiff failed to properly develop in Dist. Ct. his contention on appeal that Dist. Ct. had failed under Rule 609 to articulate required probative-prejudice balancing test for each conviction. Fact that defendants addressed said balancing test in their opposition brief before Dist. Ct. did not serve to preserve issue for appellate review.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff-employee in retaliation for publicly accusing defendant of tax fraud, where basis for Dist. Ct. order was its finding that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from establishing in instant lawsuit that defendant committed tax fraud, where Wisc. state court, in parallel conversion action brought by defendant against plaintiff, had previously found that defendant had not engaged in any tax fraud. State court ruling on tax fraud issue was dispositive in instant federal action since absence of tax fraud rendered instant lawsuit without merit, and Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that collateral estoppel did not apply since: (1) according to plaintiff, he did not have full and fair opportunity to litigate tax fraud issue in state court proceeding; and (2) as public policy matter, application of collateral estoppel would deter whistleblowers from bringing meritorious lawsuits.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison guard’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant failed to protect plaintiff from attack by other inmates, under circumstances where plaintiff alleged that defendant was not at her post when certain inmates attacked him at time when said inmates should have been locked in their cells. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s allegations demonstrated that defendant was, at worst, merely negligent, jury could find that defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's safety where: (1) prison rule, which limited number of inmates who could leave their cells, was based on concern for prisoner safety; (2) defendant was actually aware at time of assault that certain cells should have been locked up, but were not locked prior to assault; and (3) defendant’s decision to leave her post for 20 minutes allowed inmates to discover that no one was watching their movements. Dist. Ct. also erred in failing to recruit counsel for plaintiff where plaintiff’s transfer to distant prison severely impacted his ability to obtain relevant documents or otherwise prepare for case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants retaliated against him by placing him in segregation for protesting his physical assault by two guards. Record showed that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing proper prison grievance regarding said matter prior to filing instant lawsuit. While plaintiff argued that his failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be excused since he feared reprisal for filing any grievance regarding said matter, prison’s internal rules limited defendant’s ability to punish inmates for making false statements to prison staff to statements made outside of grievance process. Accordingly, plaintiff had no objective reason to fear filing of any grievance.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motions for summary judgment by defendants-decedent’s lawyer and decedent’s ex-wife in legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty actions arising out of defendants’ conduct during sale and closing of two condominium units purchased by decedent, where plaintiffs-administrators of decedent’s estate alleged that lawyer failed to title said properties solely in decedent’s name pursuant to decedent's wishes, and that ex-wife (in her capacity as real estate agent for decedent) breached fiduciary duty by receiving commissions on sale of said properties and obtaining title to said properties after death of decedent. Dismissal of legal malpractice claim was appropriate where: (1) magistrate judge had previously barred plaintiffs from offering expert testimony on issue of applicable standard of care; and (2) expert testimony was required where lawyer’s alleged malpractice regarding her communications with decedent would not be readily apparent to lay jury. Similarly, dismissal of breach of fiduciary duty was appropriate where, although there was presumption of fraud arising out of ex-wife’s receipt of commissions and properties, said presumption was rebutted since lawyer could properly testify that decedent actually wanted ex-wife to receive properties after his death. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ claim that presumption of fraud could never be overcome, where ex-wife admitted that she provided no consideration regarding titling of either property.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison dentists and others were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s serious dental problems by ignoring plaintiffs’ request for treatment of 12 cavities, as well as his request for appropriate pain medication. While defendant-dentist addressed two of defendant’s 12 teeth, jury could conclude that treatment provided by dentist was inappropriate where: (1) period of five years elapsed after dentist had diagnosed plaintiff’s dental problems and still not begun treatment on two of plaintiff’s teeth; and (2) dentist proscribed plaintiff pain medication that she knew he could not take. Also, plaintiff could proceed against: (1) prison hygienist, where plaintiff alleged that hygienist discouraged plaintiff from taking aggressive steps to address his dental problems; and (2) prison physician, who was aware of plaintiff’s complaints about his teeth and yet failed to contact dentist or anyone else to determine why plaintiff was not receiving dental treatment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-CTA officials deprived plaintiff of its “occupational liberty” by debarring it from obtaining any additional construction projects for one-year period without giving plaintiff any due process. Plaintiff lacked any property right to support due process claim where plaintiff was to subject to only at-will contract with CTA, and instant complaint, which failed to allege that plaintiff bid for any other public agency work subsequent to instant debarment, did not plausibly allege that instant debarment played any role in plaintiff’s inability to work for public or private entities other than defendant. Ct. further observed that issue remains as to whether corporations such as plaintiff have any occupational liberty interests where corporations by their nature do not have any “occupations.”

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s qui tam action against defendants-University chemistry professors alleging that defendants defrauded U.S. by obtaining federal grant money based on research projects that they had plagiarized. Plaintiff could not maintain instant action since he was not licensed attorney and was not represented by licensed attorney. Moreover, instant lawsuit was frivolous, where plaintiff had failed to allege facts that linked defendants’ alleged fraud to any applications for research grants, and where record otherwise demonstrated that lawsuit was meant to harass defendants, in light of fact that Dist. Ct. had dismissed on similar grounds six other qui tam lawsuits filed by plaintiff against defendants.

Dist. Ct. erred in entering temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of plaintiff that directed defendants-state officials to sign paperwork to pay plaintiff-contractor from State Treasury for past services rendered on design projects for Ill. Dept. of Transportation. Eleventh Amendment prohibited entry of instant TRO where plaintiff essentially requested and received retroactive damages as payment for past services rendered to State, and where instant TRO required either payment of funds from State’s Treasury for said services or specific performance of State’s contract. Moreover, Ct. found that Ex Parte Young exception to instant Eleventh Amendment prohibition did not apply.