Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction defendant-police officer’s appeal of Dist. Ct. order denying his motion for summary judgment that alleged that he was entitled to qualified immunity in instant section 1983 action asserting that defendant lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff on charges of public intoxication and resisting arrest. Defendant’s argument on appeal depended on key disputed fact regarding whether plaintiff was swaying or walking with unsteady gait at time of his arrest, and as such, Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction where, as here, defendant was contesting whether record contained sufficient evidence to create genuine question of material fact on probable cause issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request under Rehabilitation Act for injunction to require defendants-state officials to restore to 2012 levels payment schedule for programs utilized by developmentally disabled persons, where plaintiffs alleged that said persons bore largest program cuts that threatened their ability to remain in group homes and risked their removal to institutions. Plaintiff’s lawsuit is unripe with respect to claim that program funding threatened their removal from group homes since plaintiffs failed to show that anyone had actually been forced to move to any institution from group home at time of lawsuit. Moreover, plaintiff failed to state viable discrimination claim where, in spite of said cuts, plaintiffs failed to proffer any comparison group of individuals with other disabilities, which received more funding per individual than plaintiff’s group of developmentally disabled individuals.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff-prisoner’s request for certificate of innocence under 28 USC section 2513 based on Ct. of Appeals’ prior decision finding that record failed to show beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of charge of attempting to export defense articles. Determination that govt. failed to prove charge beyond reasonable doubt is not equivalent to conclusion that plaintiff was innocent of instant criminal charge, and in order to issue certificate of innocence, hearing on remand was necessary to determine whether items that plaintiff was attempting to export were actually “defense articles,” and whether defendant knew that said items were “defense articles” and was also aware of need for export license.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in dismissing for want of prosecution plaintiff’s section 1983 retaliation claim after plaintiff had failed to appear for status hearing. Although Dist. Ct. had previously warned plaintiff that failure to appear at said hearing could result in dismissal of case, Dist. Ct. improperly failed to consider lesser sanction where: (1) plaintiff’s failure to appear at status hearing was first-time offense; (2) plaintiff had history of compliance with other Dist. Ct. deadlines; and (3) plaintiff had plausible excuse in his claim that he never received actual notice of said hearing.

Plaintiff was entitled to new trial in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated plaintiff’s due process rights in violation of Brady by withholding impeachment evidence arising out of prior criminal prosecution of plaintiff on trumped up firearms charge that arose when officer allegedly planted gun on plaintiff during his arrest. Dist. Ct. erred in excluding proposed testimony from other citizens, who claimed that they too were victims of similar misconduct by defendants and other police officers in same Special Operations Section to which defendants and other police officers were members, where: (1) plaintiff asserted that defendants were aware of corruption within SOS in which officers regularly fabricated grounds for drugs and firearms investigations, but withheld said information during plaintiff’s trial; and (2) said proffered evidence was highly probative as to defendants’ involvement in said pattern of misconduct. Moreover, defendants failed to assert that said evidence was unfairly prejudicial, and Dist. Ct.’s concern that admission of said evidence would require time-consuming mini-trials was unwarranted. Dist. Ct. also erred: (1) in refusing to admit guilty-plea testimony of other SOS officers, who had been accused in criminal corruption charges; and (2) in allowing defendants to make indirect references to plaintiff’s extensive arrest record when exploring plaintiff’s use of aliases.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment alleging qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that officers subjected him to false arrest and excessive force when they handcuffed and detained him for 1.5 hours while officers sought to verify validity of plaintiff’s “tan card” license to carry firearm. All three officers were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to false arrest claim where: (1) initial stop to investigate plaintiff’s carrying of loaded firearm was justified; (2) officers could properly investigate whether plaintiff’s tan card was legitimate; (3) officers took immediate measures to verify plaintiff’s license; and (4) there was no evidence that delay in verifying plaintiff’s license was caused by officers. Two officers were also entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff’s excessive force claim where said officers were unaware of plaintiff’s complaints that handcuffs were too tight on his injured hand.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state claim plaintiffs’ RICO action alleging that defendants-pharmacy and drug manufacturer engaged in scheme to defraud insurance companies by filling prescriptions for several generic drugs with dosage form that differed from, and was more expensive than, dosage form prescribed to customers. While instant complaint contained allegations of misconduct by both defendants, plaintiffs failed to sufficiently state “enterprise” element of RICO claim by alleging that both defendants were conducting affairs of RICO enterprise, as opposed to allegations indicating that defendants sought only to advance their own self-interests. Fact that complaint might have contained sufficient allegations to state claim for fraud against either defendant did not require different result since RICO does not penalize parallel, uncoordinated fraud.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for want of jurisdiction, plaintiff’s qui tam lawsuit under False Claims Act alleging that defendant-college knowingly submitted false claims to Dept. of Education in order to receive funding from federal student financial assistance programs, where dismissal was based on belief that plaintiff’s lawsuit was based on allegations, regarding defendant’s alleged improper incentives to its employees for signing up students for enrollment and for financial aid, that had already been publicly disclosed, and that plaintiff was not original source of her allegations. While plaintiff’s lawsuit contained allegations that were similar to allegations in prior lawsuit, plaintiff’s lawsuit could proceed since it suggested that defendant had developed sophisticated and illegal employee evaluation and compensation scheme that was not alleged in prior lawsuit. Moreover, plaintiff qualified as “original source” where her allegations about defendant’s alleged scheme was based on her personal knowledge acquired during her employment at defendant. Fact that plaintiff did not file instant lawsuit until plaintiff’s attorney contacted her did not require different result. Ct. also vacated Dist. Ct.’s imposition of $394,998.33 sanction against plaintiff’s attorneys.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials violated his 8th Amendment rights by imposing frequent prison lockdowns for non-penologically-related purposes that resulted in plaintiff incurring certain physical injuries and emotional distress. Plaintiff sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies by filing prison grievance that challenged prison’s lockdown policy, and plaintiff could cite to certain lockdowns that occurred beyond relevant limitations period, where his claim concerned continuing violation. Moreover, plaintiff set forth more than conclusory allegations regarding frequent lockdowns that occurred over substantial periods of time and provided examples of defendants’ alleged indifference to complaints concerning practice of housing multiple prisoners in small cells during said lockdowns.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s malicious prosecution action alleging that defendants-FBI agents conspired with Indiana state prosecutor to frame plaintiff on bogus bribery charge. Plaintiff’s complaint satisfied relevant pleading requirements, where plaintiff provided sufficient details regarding steps defendants took in doctoring evidence, drafting probable cause affidavit using such doctored evidence and testifying at plaintiff’s trial, to support plaintiff’s allegations that defendants acted with malice by instituting criminal action without probable cause that resulted in plaintiff obtaining not guilty verdict. Fact that plaintiff failed to allege that defendants harbored personal animosity toward plaintiff did not require different result.