Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-court action alleging that plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for asserting his rights under Ill. Workers’ Compensation Act, where defendant removed case to Dist. Ct. on theory that plaintiff’s lawsuit was really claim under parties’ collective bargaining agreement that was preempted by section 301 of Labor Management Relations Act. Instant retaliation claim should not have been removed since preemption under section 301 did not apply where state court was not required to interpret collective bargaining agreement in order to resolve retaliatory discharge claim. Fact that parties had entered into grievance settlement prior to plaintiff’s departure that was reached under auspices of collective bargaining agreement did not require different result since plaintiff could prevail on his claim without attacking or interpreting said settlement.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs’ request for class action treatment in action under sections 409 and 502 of ERISA alleging that defendant-employer breached its duty to plaintiffs by offering only short-term, underperforming money market investments in one of its investment plans, where defendant described plan as more profitable mix of short and intermediate term investments. While Dist Ct. based denial on its finding that reference in class definition to Hueler Index for purposes of determining whether class members experienced actual damages was improper because use of said Index was disputed by parties as valid measure of damages, use of Hueler Index was not improper since use of Index in class definition did not bind Dist. Ct. to use of said Index when determining damages: and (2) use of Index was valid means to ensure that all class members suffered damages as result of defendant’s conduct. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that class action treatment was inappropriate where thrust of plaintiffs’ claim was that defendant made certain misrepresentations about investment plan.

In action by plaintiff-beneficiary of certain trusts alleging that defendant-law firm committed legal malpractice by failing to disclose terms of certain family trusts and failed to make certain distributions, Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing sanctions on plaintiff for violating terms of protective order that precluded parties from disclosing privileged documents to third parties. Record showed that plaintiff’s counsel disclosed said documents during deposition of plaintiff’s representative, which was also attended by different attorney for plaintiff, who had been retained to represent plaintiff in similar state-court action against defendant. Protective order clearly precluded said disclosure, where order contained directive that parties could not use privileged documents produced by defendant for “any other litigation.” Moreover, instant sanction that immediately closed discovery that was scheduled to close four business days later was reasonable. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for partial summery judgment, where plaintiff conceded that defendant had given her 18-page summary of certain trust assets, which precluded her from establishing that defendant had failed to inform her of her rights under said trusts.

Dist. Ct. erred in failing to grant plaintiff’s motion for new trial in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials lacked probable cause to arrest 14-year-old plaintiff on disorderly conduct charge and used excessive force while plaintiff was in custody, where Dist. Ct. allowed defendants to cross-examine plaintiff on fact that he had been subsequently arrested on under-age drinking charge and on his felony conviction for possession of stolen motor vehicle. Defendants could not use subsequent arrest for underage drinking to establish that plaintiff had been drinking on night of arrest as maintained by defendants. Moreover, cross-examination on plaintiff’s felony conviction deprived plaintiff of fair trial where its probative value on plaintiff’s emotional distress claim was minimal while its prejudice was substantial because it allowed jury to draw impermissible propensity that plaintiff had committed disorderly conduct on night of his arrest.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison and medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by requiring that he wear leg irons on his swollen and possibly cancerous legs when defendants transferred plaintiff outside of prison. Plaintiff could not establish indifference claim with respect to medical defendants, where record showed that defendants consistently monitored condition of plaintiff’s legs, and where plaintiff failed to present any medical evidence to counter opinion of relevant physician that there was no medical reason that plaintiff should avoid use of metal shackles on his ankles. Moreover, non-medical defendants could properly rely on medical defendant’s opinion when denying plaintiff’s request to discontinue use of metal shackles. Fact that plaintiff’s legs became swollen when he was required to walk four blocks did not require different result where plaintiff suffered no other injury.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-employee’s section 1983 action alleging that he was fired from his assistant state’s attorney position in retaliation for providing grand jury and trial testimony regarding alleged wrongdoing committed by state’s attorney in handling cases involving his relatives and political allies. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s testimony was not subject to First Amendment protection under Garcetti, 547 US 410, because it was given pursuant to his official duties, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff presented valid First Amendment claim where providing truthful testimony pursuant to subpoena was not one of plaintiff’s job duties. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that it had legitimate managerial interest in telling plaintiff what to say in court.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-social service officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s section 1983, class-of-one equal protection claim in which plaintiff alleged that defendants initiated aggressive investigation that resulted in merit-less first-degree sexual assault charge against six-year-old plaintiff based on incident in which plaintiff and five-year-old twins were playing “doctor” by touching each other’s bare buttocks. Plaintiff noted that criminal charges were eventually dropped and asserted that political favoritism played role in defendants’ decision to file charges only against plaintiff and not twins, who admitted to same conduct. However, instant complaint also alleged objective rationale for said disparate treatment that defeated any chance of plaintiff obtaining judgment against defendants under equal protection theory, i.e, that sole adult witness to incident had observed plaintiff’s conduct and not conduct of twins.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officers subjected plaintiff to false arrest and excessive force, plaintiff waived any issue regarding propriety of Dist. Ct.’s denial of his motion seeking to exclude from evidence seven of plaintiff’s criminal convictions that were entered within past 10 years, where plaintiff failed to properly develop in Dist. Ct. his contention on appeal that Dist. Ct. had failed under Rule 609 to articulate required probative-prejudice balancing test for each conviction. Fact that defendants addressed said balancing test in their opposition brief before Dist. Ct. did not serve to preserve issue for appellate review.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff-employee in retaliation for publicly accusing defendant of tax fraud, where basis for Dist. Ct. order was its finding that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from establishing in instant lawsuit that defendant committed tax fraud, where Wisc. state court, in parallel conversion action brought by defendant against plaintiff, had previously found that defendant had not engaged in any tax fraud. State court ruling on tax fraud issue was dispositive in instant federal action since absence of tax fraud rendered instant lawsuit without merit, and Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that collateral estoppel did not apply since: (1) according to plaintiff, he did not have full and fair opportunity to litigate tax fraud issue in state court proceeding; and (2) as public policy matter, application of collateral estoppel would deter whistleblowers from bringing meritorious lawsuits.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison guard’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant failed to protect plaintiff from attack by other inmates, under circumstances where plaintiff alleged that defendant was not at her post when certain inmates attacked him at time when said inmates should have been locked in their cells. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s allegations demonstrated that defendant was, at worst, merely negligent, jury could find that defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's safety where: (1) prison rule, which limited number of inmates who could leave their cells, was based on concern for prisoner safety; (2) defendant was actually aware at time of assault that certain cells should have been locked up, but were not locked prior to assault; and (3) defendant’s decision to leave her post for 20 minutes allowed inmates to discover that no one was watching their movements. Dist. Ct. also erred in failing to recruit counsel for plaintiff where plaintiff’s transfer to distant prison severely impacted his ability to obtain relevant documents or otherwise prepare for case.