Federal Civil Practice

In action alleging that benzene in defendant’s paint caused plaintiff to develop acute myeloid leukemia (AML), Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment after finding that opinion from plaintiff’s expert, that benzene at certain exposure level was generally known to cause AML and was substantial factor in development of plaintiff’s disease, was unreliable. Plaintiff’s expert used identical methodology as defendant’s expert, and fact that plaintiff’s expert came up with different conclusion regarding minimum level of benzene exposure that was necessary to cause AML is matter for resolution by jury, as opposed to Dist. Ct. Moreover, fact that plaintiff’s expert did not rule out plaintiff’s weight or smoking history as causes for AML did not render said opinion unreliable since plaintiff was not required under Wisc. law to demonstrate that benzene exposure was sole cause of his disease so long as he showed that benzene either contributed substantially to disease’s development or significantly increased plaintiff’s risk of developing AML.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-bankruptcy debtor’s adversary proceeding alleging that defendant had aided and abetted plaintiff’s employee to breach his fiduciary duty to plaintiff by diverting potential client from plaintiff to defendant, where Dist. Ct. held that plaintiff’s unjust enrichment theory of damages was raised too late in said proceeding. While plaintiff’s damages could not be based on unjust enrichment theory, plaintiff was nevertheless entitled to new damages hearing, where plaintiff could assert restitution theory of damages based on either profits that defendant obtained when employee steered potential client to defendant or on price defendant had been willing to pay plaintiff for employee’s services prior to employee’s breach. Moreover, Bankruptcy Ct. will be free on remand to consider propriety of plaintiff’s punitive damages. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s action against defendant-City alleging that defendant violated section 2511(1)(c)-(d) of Federal Wiretap Act (FWA) when defendant used emails between plaintiffs to initiate misconduct investigation into one plaintiff’s alleged misuse of Law Enforcement Agencies Data System to uncover information about ownership of certain cars. While section 2520 of FWA allows individuals to sue “person or entity” for violations of FWA, section 2511(1)(c)-(d), which formed basis of instant lawsuit, prohibits only “persons” from intentionally disclosing or using communications intercepted in violation of FWA, such that plaintiffs could not sue defendant for said violation since municipalities are not “persons” as contemplated section 2511(1).

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-law firm’s motion for summary judgment on judicial estoppel grounds in plaintiff-Trustee’s claim filed on behalf of bankrupt debtor alleging that defendant committed legal malpractice by failing to advise debtor on consequences of not settling underlying lawsuit by creditor that resulted in $17 million default judgment and by failing to defend debtor in underlying lawsuit. Judicial estoppel doctrine served to protect integrity of courts from appearance of manipulative litigation conduct, and record showed that said creditor convinced Trustee to bring instant malpractice claim as means to fund creditor’s $17 million default judgment. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that it would be inconsistent for Trustee to prevail in instant malpractice claim for benefit of creditor, where malpractice action was premised on theory that creditor should never have obtained underlying default judgment.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-City and Mayor’s motion for summary judgment in instant class-of-one action alleging that Mayor denied plaintiff-Mayor’s next-door neighbor’s equal protection rights by subjecting plaintiff to verbal harassment and seeking to improperly block other city officials from issuing building permits to allow plaintiff to improve his property. Dist. Ct. improperly believed that plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence of similarly-situated individual, who received more favorable treatment, was fatal to plaintiff’s case, where, as here, record contained clear showing of animosity on part of Mayor that had no rational basis.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment alleging that he was entitled to qualified immunity in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant used excessive force during struggle with plaintiff over memory chip defendant wanted to seize as evidence from plaintiff’s surveillance camera. While plaintiff alleged that defendant had unnecessarily tackled him as he was attempting to retrieve memory chip, plaintiff failed to identify any case law that established at time of incident that he had right to be free from type of force used by defendant, or that defendant’s use of force was “plainly excessive” as objective matter.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s motion to set aside on grounds of fraudulent inducement covenant contained in settlement agreement not to execute judgment in plaintiff’s favor in exchange for defendant’s assignment of right to sue third-party in insurance claim dispute, where settlement contained integration clause. Under Indiana law, Dist. Ct. improperly believed that mere existence of integration clause required plaintiff to show fraudulent inducement with respect to integration clause, rather than fraudulent inducement with respect to agreement as whole, before plaintiff could use parol evidence to vary terms of settlement agreement. On remand, Dist. Ct. must consider evidence as to whether parties actually intended integration clause to prohibit Dist. Ct. from doing anything other than to enforce covenant as written.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials subjected plaintiff-prisoner to improper public strip searches, Dist. Ct. committed plain error in submitting instruction that merely asked jury to determine whether defendants had valid penologic reason for conducting instant searches since said instruction did not require jury to determine whether manner in which searches were conducted were constitutional. Ct. also erred in giving instruction in plaintiff's retaliation claim that required plaintiff to prove that grievances filed by him were sole cause of defendants’ decision to conduct instant searches.

Dist. Ct. erred in instant civil forfeiture proceeding in striking claimant’s claim to $196,969 that had been seized from defendant’s home under circumstances where govt. had suspected that claimant was drug dealer, where Dist. Ct.’s order was based on claimant’s failure to fully comply with requirements set forth under 18 USC section 983(a)(3) and Supplemental Rule G(2) regarding how he had obtained possession of said cash. Claimant’s claim was verified, and govt. could not demand at initial stage of proceeding that claimant prove, beyond allegations made in claim itself, that he had standing to assert instant claim. On remand, Dist. Ct. is free to find that instant claim is frivolous if claimant persists in his contention that his mere occupancy of his home signifies rights of ownership of everything in his residence.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying claimant’s request to stay instant civil forfeiture proceeding that govt. had filed with respect of cash seized from claimants’ apartment that govt. had believed was related to drug activity. Stay should have been entered where claimants asserted that forfeiture proceeding would undermine their right not to incriminate themselves in pending criminal charges in which instant seizure had been successfully challenged. Moreover, Dist. Ct.’s issuance of protective order precluding govt. from disclosing claimants’ answers to interrogatories regarding ownership of seized cash was not suitable alternative to stay request. Dist. Ct. also erred in striking claimants’ claim, after noting that claimants had refused to answer certain interrogatories regarding source of seized cash, where Dist. Ct. improperly believed that claimants’ refusal to answer all interrogatories precluded them from establishing standing to pursue their claim.