Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants retaliated against him by placing him in segregation for protesting his physical assault by two guards. Record showed that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing proper prison grievance regarding said matter prior to filing instant lawsuit. While plaintiff argued that his failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be excused since he feared reprisal for filing any grievance regarding said matter, prison’s internal rules limited defendant’s ability to punish inmates for making false statements to prison staff to statements made outside of grievance process. Accordingly, plaintiff had no objective reason to fear filing of any grievance.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motions for summary judgment by defendants-decedent’s lawyer and decedent’s ex-wife in legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty actions arising out of defendants’ conduct during sale and closing of two condominium units purchased by decedent, where plaintiffs-administrators of decedent’s estate alleged that lawyer failed to title said properties solely in decedent’s name pursuant to decedent's wishes, and that ex-wife (in her capacity as real estate agent for decedent) breached fiduciary duty by receiving commissions on sale of said properties and obtaining title to said properties after death of decedent. Dismissal of legal malpractice claim was appropriate where: (1) magistrate judge had previously barred plaintiffs from offering expert testimony on issue of applicable standard of care; and (2) expert testimony was required where lawyer’s alleged malpractice regarding her communications with decedent would not be readily apparent to lay jury. Similarly, dismissal of breach of fiduciary duty was appropriate where, although there was presumption of fraud arising out of ex-wife’s receipt of commissions and properties, said presumption was rebutted since lawyer could properly testify that decedent actually wanted ex-wife to receive properties after his death. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ claim that presumption of fraud could never be overcome, where ex-wife admitted that she provided no consideration regarding titling of either property.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison dentists and others were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s serious dental problems by ignoring plaintiffs’ request for treatment of 12 cavities, as well as his request for appropriate pain medication. While defendant-dentist addressed two of defendant’s 12 teeth, jury could conclude that treatment provided by dentist was inappropriate where: (1) period of five years elapsed after dentist had diagnosed plaintiff’s dental problems and still not begun treatment on two of plaintiff’s teeth; and (2) dentist proscribed plaintiff pain medication that she knew he could not take. Also, plaintiff could proceed against: (1) prison hygienist, where plaintiff alleged that hygienist discouraged plaintiff from taking aggressive steps to address his dental problems; and (2) prison physician, who was aware of plaintiff’s complaints about his teeth and yet failed to contact dentist or anyone else to determine why plaintiff was not receiving dental treatment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-CTA officials deprived plaintiff of its “occupational liberty” by debarring it from obtaining any additional construction projects for one-year period without giving plaintiff any due process. Plaintiff lacked any property right to support due process claim where plaintiff was to subject to only at-will contract with CTA, and instant complaint, which failed to allege that plaintiff bid for any other public agency work subsequent to instant debarment, did not plausibly allege that instant debarment played any role in plaintiff’s inability to work for public or private entities other than defendant. Ct. further observed that issue remains as to whether corporations such as plaintiff have any occupational liberty interests where corporations by their nature do not have any “occupations.”

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s qui tam action against defendants-University chemistry professors alleging that defendants defrauded U.S. by obtaining federal grant money based on research projects that they had plagiarized. Plaintiff could not maintain instant action since he was not licensed attorney and was not represented by licensed attorney. Moreover, instant lawsuit was frivolous, where plaintiff had failed to allege facts that linked defendants’ alleged fraud to any applications for research grants, and where record otherwise demonstrated that lawsuit was meant to harass defendants, in light of fact that Dist. Ct. had dismissed on similar grounds six other qui tam lawsuits filed by plaintiff against defendants.

Dist. Ct. erred in entering temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of plaintiff that directed defendants-state officials to sign paperwork to pay plaintiff-contractor from State Treasury for past services rendered on design projects for Ill. Dept. of Transportation. Eleventh Amendment prohibited entry of instant TRO where plaintiff essentially requested and received retroactive damages as payment for past services rendered to State, and where instant TRO required either payment of funds from State’s Treasury for said services or specific performance of State’s contract. Moreover, Ct. found that Ex Parte Young exception to instant Eleventh Amendment prohibition did not apply.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction defendant-police officer’s appeal of Dist. Ct. order denying his motion for summary judgment that alleged that he was entitled to qualified immunity in instant section 1983 action asserting that defendant lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff on charges of public intoxication and resisting arrest. Defendant’s argument on appeal depended on key disputed fact regarding whether plaintiff was swaying or walking with unsteady gait at time of his arrest, and as such, Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction where, as here, defendant was contesting whether record contained sufficient evidence to create genuine question of material fact on probable cause issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request under Rehabilitation Act for injunction to require defendants-state officials to restore to 2012 levels payment schedule for programs utilized by developmentally disabled persons, where plaintiffs alleged that said persons bore largest program cuts that threatened their ability to remain in group homes and risked their removal to institutions. Plaintiff’s lawsuit is unripe with respect to claim that program funding threatened their removal from group homes since plaintiffs failed to show that anyone had actually been forced to move to any institution from group home at time of lawsuit. Moreover, plaintiff failed to state viable discrimination claim where, in spite of said cuts, plaintiffs failed to proffer any comparison group of individuals with other disabilities, which received more funding per individual than plaintiff’s group of developmentally disabled individuals.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff-prisoner’s request for certificate of innocence under 28 USC section 2513 based on Ct. of Appeals’ prior decision finding that record failed to show beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of charge of attempting to export defense articles. Determination that govt. failed to prove charge beyond reasonable doubt is not equivalent to conclusion that plaintiff was innocent of instant criminal charge, and in order to issue certificate of innocence, hearing on remand was necessary to determine whether items that plaintiff was attempting to export were actually “defense articles,” and whether defendant knew that said items were “defense articles” and was also aware of need for export license.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in dismissing for want of prosecution plaintiff’s section 1983 retaliation claim after plaintiff had failed to appear for status hearing. Although Dist. Ct. had previously warned plaintiff that failure to appear at said hearing could result in dismissal of case, Dist. Ct. improperly failed to consider lesser sanction where: (1) plaintiff’s failure to appear at status hearing was first-time offense; (2) plaintiff had history of compliance with other Dist. Ct. deadlines; and (3) plaintiff had plausible excuse in his claim that he never received actual notice of said hearing.