Federal Civil Practice

Plaintiff was entitled to new trial in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated plaintiff’s due process rights in violation of Brady by withholding impeachment evidence arising out of prior criminal prosecution of plaintiff on trumped up firearms charge that arose when officer allegedly planted gun on plaintiff during his arrest. Dist. Ct. erred in excluding proposed testimony from other citizens, who claimed that they too were victims of similar misconduct by defendants and other police officers in same Special Operations Section to which defendants and other police officers were members, where: (1) plaintiff asserted that defendants were aware of corruption within SOS in which officers regularly fabricated grounds for drugs and firearms investigations, but withheld said information during plaintiff’s trial; and (2) said proffered evidence was highly probative as to defendants’ involvement in said pattern of misconduct. Moreover, defendants failed to assert that said evidence was unfairly prejudicial, and Dist. Ct.’s concern that admission of said evidence would require time-consuming mini-trials was unwarranted. Dist. Ct. also erred: (1) in refusing to admit guilty-plea testimony of other SOS officers, who had been accused in criminal corruption charges; and (2) in allowing defendants to make indirect references to plaintiff’s extensive arrest record when exploring plaintiff’s use of aliases.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment alleging qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that officers subjected him to false arrest and excessive force when they handcuffed and detained him for 1.5 hours while officers sought to verify validity of plaintiff’s “tan card” license to carry firearm. All three officers were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to false arrest claim where: (1) initial stop to investigate plaintiff’s carrying of loaded firearm was justified; (2) officers could properly investigate whether plaintiff’s tan card was legitimate; (3) officers took immediate measures to verify plaintiff’s license; and (4) there was no evidence that delay in verifying plaintiff’s license was caused by officers. Two officers were also entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff’s excessive force claim where said officers were unaware of plaintiff’s complaints that handcuffs were too tight on his injured hand.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state claim plaintiffs’ RICO action alleging that defendants-pharmacy and drug manufacturer engaged in scheme to defraud insurance companies by filling prescriptions for several generic drugs with dosage form that differed from, and was more expensive than, dosage form prescribed to customers. While instant complaint contained allegations of misconduct by both defendants, plaintiffs failed to sufficiently state “enterprise” element of RICO claim by alleging that both defendants were conducting affairs of RICO enterprise, as opposed to allegations indicating that defendants sought only to advance their own self-interests. Fact that complaint might have contained sufficient allegations to state claim for fraud against either defendant did not require different result since RICO does not penalize parallel, uncoordinated fraud.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for want of jurisdiction, plaintiff’s qui tam lawsuit under False Claims Act alleging that defendant-college knowingly submitted false claims to Dept. of Education in order to receive funding from federal student financial assistance programs, where dismissal was based on belief that plaintiff’s lawsuit was based on allegations, regarding defendant’s alleged improper incentives to its employees for signing up students for enrollment and for financial aid, that had already been publicly disclosed, and that plaintiff was not original source of her allegations. While plaintiff’s lawsuit contained allegations that were similar to allegations in prior lawsuit, plaintiff’s lawsuit could proceed since it suggested that defendant had developed sophisticated and illegal employee evaluation and compensation scheme that was not alleged in prior lawsuit. Moreover, plaintiff qualified as “original source” where her allegations about defendant’s alleged scheme was based on her personal knowledge acquired during her employment at defendant. Fact that plaintiff did not file instant lawsuit until plaintiff’s attorney contacted her did not require different result. Ct. also vacated Dist. Ct.’s imposition of $394,998.33 sanction against plaintiff’s attorneys.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials violated his 8th Amendment rights by imposing frequent prison lockdowns for non-penologically-related purposes that resulted in plaintiff incurring certain physical injuries and emotional distress. Plaintiff sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies by filing prison grievance that challenged prison’s lockdown policy, and plaintiff could cite to certain lockdowns that occurred beyond relevant limitations period, where his claim concerned continuing violation. Moreover, plaintiff set forth more than conclusory allegations regarding frequent lockdowns that occurred over substantial periods of time and provided examples of defendants’ alleged indifference to complaints concerning practice of housing multiple prisoners in small cells during said lockdowns.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s malicious prosecution action alleging that defendants-FBI agents conspired with Indiana state prosecutor to frame plaintiff on bogus bribery charge. Plaintiff’s complaint satisfied relevant pleading requirements, where plaintiff provided sufficient details regarding steps defendants took in doctoring evidence, drafting probable cause affidavit using such doctored evidence and testifying at plaintiff’s trial, to support plaintiff’s allegations that defendants acted with malice by instituting criminal action without probable cause that resulted in plaintiff obtaining not guilty verdict. Fact that plaintiff failed to allege that defendants harbored personal animosity toward plaintiff did not require different result.

In action alleging that benzene in defendant’s paint caused plaintiff to develop acute myeloid leukemia (AML), Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment after finding that opinion from plaintiff’s expert, that benzene at certain exposure level was generally known to cause AML and was substantial factor in development of plaintiff’s disease, was unreliable. Plaintiff’s expert used identical methodology as defendant’s expert, and fact that plaintiff’s expert came up with different conclusion regarding minimum level of benzene exposure that was necessary to cause AML is matter for resolution by jury, as opposed to Dist. Ct. Moreover, fact that plaintiff’s expert did not rule out plaintiff’s weight or smoking history as causes for AML did not render said opinion unreliable since plaintiff was not required under Wisc. law to demonstrate that benzene exposure was sole cause of his disease so long as he showed that benzene either contributed substantially to disease’s development or significantly increased plaintiff’s risk of developing AML.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-bankruptcy debtor’s adversary proceeding alleging that defendant had aided and abetted plaintiff’s employee to breach his fiduciary duty to plaintiff by diverting potential client from plaintiff to defendant, where Dist. Ct. held that plaintiff’s unjust enrichment theory of damages was raised too late in said proceeding. While plaintiff’s damages could not be based on unjust enrichment theory, plaintiff was nevertheless entitled to new damages hearing, where plaintiff could assert restitution theory of damages based on either profits that defendant obtained when employee steered potential client to defendant or on price defendant had been willing to pay plaintiff for employee’s services prior to employee’s breach. Moreover, Bankruptcy Ct. will be free on remand to consider propriety of plaintiff’s punitive damages. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s action against defendant-City alleging that defendant violated section 2511(1)(c)-(d) of Federal Wiretap Act (FWA) when defendant used emails between plaintiffs to initiate misconduct investigation into one plaintiff’s alleged misuse of Law Enforcement Agencies Data System to uncover information about ownership of certain cars. While section 2520 of FWA allows individuals to sue “person or entity” for violations of FWA, section 2511(1)(c)-(d), which formed basis of instant lawsuit, prohibits only “persons” from intentionally disclosing or using communications intercepted in violation of FWA, such that plaintiffs could not sue defendant for said violation since municipalities are not “persons” as contemplated section 2511(1).

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-law firm’s motion for summary judgment on judicial estoppel grounds in plaintiff-Trustee’s claim filed on behalf of bankrupt debtor alleging that defendant committed legal malpractice by failing to advise debtor on consequences of not settling underlying lawsuit by creditor that resulted in $17 million default judgment and by failing to defend debtor in underlying lawsuit. Judicial estoppel doctrine served to protect integrity of courts from appearance of manipulative litigation conduct, and record showed that said creditor convinced Trustee to bring instant malpractice claim as means to fund creditor’s $17 million default judgment. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that it would be inconsistent for Trustee to prevail in instant malpractice claim for benefit of creditor, where malpractice action was premised on theory that creditor should never have obtained underlying default judgment.