Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeal by defendant-employer of Dist. Ct.'s order denying defendant's request for arbitration of plaintiff-union's lawsuit alleging that defendant violated terms of collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by laying off certain union members and generating sham asset sale of company as alleged ruse to avoid certain obligations under CBA. While defendant argued that Ct. of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider appeal under section 16(a)(1) of Federal Arbitration Act, record showed that defendant's employees were transportation workers performing occasional interstate projects, such that instant CBA was properly classified as contract for employment of interstate workers under section 1 of FFA, which, in turn precluded defendant from using FFA as basis for appellate jurisdiction of instant appeal.

District Courts erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiffs’ lawsuits seeking declaration that Ill. statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4)(iii), (10)(iii),-1.6(a)(3)(iii)) that prohibits, except for police and other excepted persons, individuals from carrying ready to use/concealed guns is unconstitutional under Second Amendment. Ct. found that Second Amendment’s right of citizens to use arms in defense of home, as recognized in Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), extended to right of self-defense outside of home, and that current Illinois law that allows individuals to be armed in their homes for purposes of self-defense and not allows them to carry guns in public for self-defense purposes is arbitrary since interest in self-defense is as great outside of home as it is inside of home. Ct., though, stayed its mandate for 180 days to allow Ill. Legislature to generate new gun law that contains reasonable limitations on carrying guns in public. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officer and City of Chicago’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-police officer violated plaintiffs’ 4th Amendment rights by arresting plaintiffs on charges of misdemeanor theft and felony property damages without warrant or probable cause. Officer had probable cause to make arrest on instant charges where: (1) neighbor accused plaintiffs of removing valve stem from neighbor’s car tire and keying said car; (2) neighbor and plaintiffs had history of disputes; and (3) neighbor showed officer videotape of neighbor’s car parked in area with limited access to general public where one plaintiff was seen bent down and looking at tire on neighbor’s car and other plaintiff was seen with keys walking past neighbor’s car. Moreover, officer did not violate 4th Amendment with respect to instant warrantless arrests where: (1) one arrest was made in common area outside condominium building where plaintiffs lived; and (2) neither plaintiff registered objection to officer following one plaintiff into condominium to arrest other plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. erred in remanding back to state court plaintiff's action alleging that defendant caused plaintiff to suffer mesothelioma by including asbestos in turbines it supplied to U.S. Navy, where defendant had removed said action via federal officer removal statute under 28 USC section 1442(a)(1). Defendant was entitled to said removal since defendant had colorable government contractor defense with respect to both use of asbestos and failure to warn theories of plaintiff's case where defendant alleged that: (1) defendant worked closely with Navy in supplying said turbines and was acting under color of federal authority; and (2) Navy approved precise turbine specifications that included use of asbestos, was fully aware of all hazards associated with asbestos, and controlled content and placement of any warnings.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment filed by defendants-prison officials and medical personnel in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s constitutional rights by detaining him for nine days after his arrest without formal charges being filed against him and by being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by refusing to give him Oxycontin for his pain (that had been previously given to him by his physician) and substituting other non-narcotic pain medications. Record showed that defendant had probable cause hearing within 24 hours of his arrest and had initial hearing within three days of his arrest. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish constitutional violation where defendants released plaintiff on ninth day pursuant to terms of court order. Also, plaintiff failed to establish viable 8th Amendment violation where plaintiff failed to show that prison doctor’s switch of medication was substantial departure from accepted professional medical standards.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs’ request for class action certification of plaintiffs’ claims that defendant’s washing machines contained defect that caused mold to form in drum of washing machines. While Dist. Ct. found that class certification was improper because actual manufacturer of washing machines made certain design modifications that prevented plaintiffs from establishing common question of fact, Ct. of Appeals held that plaintiffs satisfied common question element where: (1) record indicated that manufacturer made only five design changes that related to, but did not eliminate mold; (2) all of plaintiffs’ claims contained basic question as to whether washing machines permitted mold to accumulate; and (3) Dist. Ct. could create subclasses should record eventually show existence of large differences in mold defects among five differently designed washing machines. Fact that most members of proposed class did not experience mold problems did not require different result.

In action alleging that defendants-U.S. Secretary of Defense (Rumsfeld) and others were personally liable for authorizing use in Iraq of harsh interrogation methods on plaintiffs, who had been accused of being enemy combatants, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-Rumsfeld’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Although plaintiffs were eventually released from custody and were found to be innocent of being enemy combatants by Detainee Status Board, federal law does not establish non-statutory, common law cause of action for damages against persons in military chain of command who either abusively interrogate or mistreat military persons or who fail to prevent improper detention and interrogation. Ct. further found that any lawsuit against Rumsfeld would be improper since: (1) there were no allegations that Rumsfeld personally participated in any alleged wrongful conduct; and (2) any knowledge of subordinates’ misconduct is insufficient to establish liability. (Dissent filed.)

In section 1983 action alleging that certain defendants-police officers violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by falsely arresting him and subjecting him to excessive force during said arrest and by failing to intervene for misconduct committed during arrest by other unnamed officers, Dist Ct. did not deprive plaintiff of fair trial by failing to give plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction that attempted to harmonize language contained in previously tendered personal involvement instruction with failure-to-intervene instruction. While plaintiff’s proposed instruction was consistent with applicable I.P.I. Committee comments, any error was harmless where proposed jury instruction would not have cured underlying error caused by erroneous failure-to-intervene instruction that had been drafted by plaintiff’s counsel which improperly advised jury that plaintiffs must first prove that one or both defendants-arresting officers had participated in false arrest and/or excessive use of force in order to find that said defendants were also liable for any failure to intervene for misconduct committed by other unnamed officers.

Dist Ct. did not err in granting defendants-Human Services caseworkers’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants’ removal of plaintiffs’ disabled son from his home and subsequent placements of son in foster homes due to child abuse allegations deprived plaintiffs of their civil rights. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where defendants were aware of allegations of physical abuse from school reports and reports from son and son’s siblings and were aware that plaintiffs had left son home alone on several occasions. Moreover, reasonable caseworker could rely on probable cause finding made by trial court after seizure to justify continued placement of son into foster homes. Also, although son incurred certain accidental injuries while placed in foster homes, plaintiffs failed to establish violation of son’s right to bodily security where record failed to contain any evidence that defendants had actual knowledge of any risk of harm to son caused by said placement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment after finding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to decedent’s severe mental illness where decedent committed suicide by hanging himself from top of bunk bed in jail cell. While plaintiff asserted that defendants were deliberately indifferent by assigning decedent to cell with bunk bed under circumstances where bunk beds had been used before to assist inmates in committing suicide, Ct. found that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where: (1) decedent did not present imminent risk of suicide at time of incident; and (2) law was unclear at time of incident that defendants had duty to adopt measures designed to thwart actions of inmates who were not actively or imminently suicidal.