Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-City and Mayor’s motion for summary judgment in instant class-of-one action alleging that Mayor denied plaintiff-Mayor’s next-door neighbor’s equal protection rights by subjecting plaintiff to verbal harassment and seeking to improperly block other city officials from issuing building permits to allow plaintiff to improve his property. Dist. Ct. improperly believed that plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence of similarly-situated individual, who received more favorable treatment, was fatal to plaintiff’s case, where, as here, record contained clear showing of animosity on part of Mayor that had no rational basis.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment alleging that he was entitled to qualified immunity in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant used excessive force during struggle with plaintiff over memory chip defendant wanted to seize as evidence from plaintiff’s surveillance camera. While plaintiff alleged that defendant had unnecessarily tackled him as he was attempting to retrieve memory chip, plaintiff failed to identify any case law that established at time of incident that he had right to be free from type of force used by defendant, or that defendant’s use of force was “plainly excessive” as objective matter.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s motion to set aside on grounds of fraudulent inducement covenant contained in settlement agreement not to execute judgment in plaintiff’s favor in exchange for defendant’s assignment of right to sue third-party in insurance claim dispute, where settlement contained integration clause. Under Indiana law, Dist. Ct. improperly believed that mere existence of integration clause required plaintiff to show fraudulent inducement with respect to integration clause, rather than fraudulent inducement with respect to agreement as whole, before plaintiff could use parol evidence to vary terms of settlement agreement. On remand, Dist. Ct. must consider evidence as to whether parties actually intended integration clause to prohibit Dist. Ct. from doing anything other than to enforce covenant as written.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials subjected plaintiff-prisoner to improper public strip searches, Dist. Ct. committed plain error in submitting instruction that merely asked jury to determine whether defendants had valid penologic reason for conducting instant searches since said instruction did not require jury to determine whether manner in which searches were conducted were constitutional. Ct. also erred in giving instruction in plaintiff's retaliation claim that required plaintiff to prove that grievances filed by him were sole cause of defendants’ decision to conduct instant searches.

Dist. Ct. erred in instant civil forfeiture proceeding in striking claimant’s claim to $196,969 that had been seized from defendant’s home under circumstances where govt. had suspected that claimant was drug dealer, where Dist. Ct.’s order was based on claimant’s failure to fully comply with requirements set forth under 18 USC section 983(a)(3) and Supplemental Rule G(2) regarding how he had obtained possession of said cash. Claimant’s claim was verified, and govt. could not demand at initial stage of proceeding that claimant prove, beyond allegations made in claim itself, that he had standing to assert instant claim. On remand, Dist. Ct. is free to find that instant claim is frivolous if claimant persists in his contention that his mere occupancy of his home signifies rights of ownership of everything in his residence.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying claimant’s request to stay instant civil forfeiture proceeding that govt. had filed with respect of cash seized from claimants’ apartment that govt. had believed was related to drug activity. Stay should have been entered where claimants asserted that forfeiture proceeding would undermine their right not to incriminate themselves in pending criminal charges in which instant seizure had been successfully challenged. Moreover, Dist. Ct.’s issuance of protective order precluding govt. from disclosing claimants’ answers to interrogatories regarding ownership of seized cash was not suitable alternative to stay request. Dist. Ct. also erred in striking claimants’ claim, after noting that claimants had refused to answer certain interrogatories regarding source of seized cash, where Dist. Ct. improperly believed that claimants’ refusal to answer all interrogatories precluded them from establishing standing to pursue their claim.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s employment-discrimination case as sanction for her failure to appear at scheduled status hearing. While plaintiff was warned in prior order that had granted her motion to proceed in forma pauperis that her failure to appear at said hearing could result in lawsuit’s dismissal, instant failure to appear was sole misstep committed by plaintiff, and Dist. Ct. had failed to consider possibility of lesser sanction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion to quash attorney lien on proceeds generated from plaintiff’s $1.3 million settlement of lawsuit in which counsel represented plaintiff at one time, under circumstances where counsel had withdrawn as counsel prior to plaintiff obtaining said settlement on her own behalf. No valid attorney lien existed where terms of retainer agreement called for payment of fees on all funds “secured by [counsel],” and record showed that, during his representation of plaintiff, counsel merely obtained $375,000 offer to settle case that was ultimately rejected by plaintiff. Ct. further issued rule to show cause that required counsel to explain why he should not be sanctioned where counsel asserted $70,000 lien on $375,000 rejected offer, where lien was significantly greater than ten percent figure for his fee contained in retainer agreement.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action alleging that defendants used excessive force when subduing him after plaintiff ignored directive from prison guard, where Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request for recruitment of counsel to assist him in his claim. Dist. Ct. used wrong legal standard under Gil, 381 F3d 649, which focused on plaintiff’s competency to try case by himself, rather than plaintiff’s ability to gather evidence and prepare for case, when denying defendant’s motion for recruitment of counsel. Moreover, absence of counsel prejudiced plaintiff where defendants erroneously claimed in summary judgment motion that: (1) plaintiff’s sworn statement in his response to summary judgment motion constituted improper “self-serving” evidence; and (2) plaintiff’s claim was precluded under Heck where plaintiff had been found guilty of disobeying guard. Ct. further noted that counsel was necessary because plaintiff’s recent transfer to different prison hampered his ability to gather supporting evidence.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-jail officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants denied plaintiff-prisoner due process by failing to provide him with notice or hearing prior to placing him on suicide watch and failing to properly address his allergic reaction to wearing special gown given to prisoners on suicide watch. Record showed that plaintiff's placement on suicide watch over period of five days was too short of time frame to trigger due process protection, and that, although plaintiff faced more restrictions than those in general prison population, said restrictions, which pertained to type of eating utensils and type of blanket, were not overly harsh. Moreover, defendant-officer’s prompt call nurse to check out plaintiff’s alleged rash precluded any liability on plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim, and defendant could otherwise rely on nurse’s diagnosis that she did not observe any rash that would require different garment.