Federal Civil Practice

Plaintiffs, in ten separate state-court lawsuits involving several hundred plaintiffs alleging personal injuries caused by prescription medication Depakote, filed with Illinois Supreme Court motion to consolidate all actions in St. Clair County by asserting that all actions concerned common question of fact and asking that said consolidation take place "through trial" and "not solely for pretrial proceedings." Defendant subsequently removed all actions to federal court, asserting that motion to consolidate triggered "mass action" provision of Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Ct. of Appeals, in affirming one Dist. Ct.'s orders denying plaintiff's motion for remand of cases to state court and reversing other Dist. Ct.'s orders granting similar motion, found that plaintiff's motion to consolidate essentially proposed joint trial, and thus removals pursuant to CAFA were proper.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for want of prosecution pro se plaintiff’s Title VII and Whistleblower Protection Act action after plaintiff failed to appear at scheduled hearing. Plaintiff had also failed to appear at prior hearing, and Dist. Ct. had warned plaintiff at that time that continued failure to appear at scheduled hearings would result in dismissal order. While plaintiff claimed that both parties had communicated agreement to continue second hearing by calling Dist. Ct.’s law clerk, record did not support plaintiff’s claim. Moreover, Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that Dist. Ct. was required to impose lesser sanction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials' motion for summary judgment after finding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's 8th Amendment rights by placing him naked and immobilized for five days in cell in hope that plaintiff would pass prison keys that had been previously swallowed by plaintiff. Record showed that defendants were concerned that plaintiff posed security threat to prison if he acquired prison keys after they had passed through his body, and prison doctors estimated that said keys would pass within five days. Moreover, record otherwise showed that defendants were not indifferent to plaintiff's health or safety since they closely watched plaintiff during said five-day period.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction in class action that challenged Indiana's $1,000 annual limit for dental services covered by Medicaid, after finding that defendant was required to cover all medically necessary dental services irrespective of instant monetary cap. Plaintiff possessed private right of action to challenge instant cap and further demonstrated likelihood of success where: (1) State was required to provide Medicaid coverage for medically necessary treatments in those service areas, such as dental care, that State opted to provide coverage; and (2) instant $1,000 cap could not be viewed as valid "utilization control procedure" where cap was not based on degree or consideration of medical necessity, and where said cap completely excluded from services certain medically necessary dental services. Record further showed that plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if injunction were not granted.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on 11th Amendment grounds plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action alleging that defendants-State of Illinois and State agency violated plaintiff's 8th Amendment rights by operating prison cell that had become infested with mice and cockroaches. Plaintiff could not sue defendants since Congress did not abrogate state's sovereign immunity under section 1983. Moreover, neither State nor its agencies are suable "persons" within meaning of section 1983. Ct. further observed that plaintiff could have avoided instant constitutional and/or statutory bar by naming individual prison officials as defendants.

In action under terrorism exception of Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, Dist. Ct. erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction over intentional infliction of emotional distress claims made by family members of U.S. citizen, who incurred personal injuries by terrorists while as passenger in car with family members along highway in Israel. Although said family members were not U.S. citizens and could not bring private cause of action under section 1605A(c) of FSIA, said family members could bring action under pass-through provisions contained in section 1605A(a) of FSIA since: (1) family member who was victim of terrorist attack was also U.S. citizen; and (2) said family members could assert intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under Israeli law.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs-prisoners' motion for class certification in action alleging that defendants-officials in charge of jail violated plaintiffs-prisoners' 8th amendment rights by reducing medical pill distribution from three to two times daily. Plaintiff failed to satisfy typicality requirement for class certification since claims of inadequate medical care require individual determinations revolving around individual medical histories. Moreover, Dist. Ct.'s denial of plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief was proper where plaintiff failed to present evidence that alleged inadequacies of prison facility were ongoing at time of injunction request.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff's action alleging that Article 9 of Ill. Election Code, which contained certain disclosure requirements for campaign contributions and expenditures for "political committees" on behalf of or in opposition to any political candidate or ballot question, violated plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. While plaintiff argued that Article 9 had chilling effect on its members who require assurances that their identities remain anonymous, state's interest in providing electorate with information as to source of political campaign money was sufficiently important to support instant disclosure requirements. Ct. also rejected plaintiff's contention that Article 9's definitions of "electioneering communications," "political committee," "contribution," "expenditure" and "independent expenditure" were facially vague and overbroad. (Partial dissent filed.)

Ct. of Appeals denied defendant’s motion to stay mandate pending disposition of its petition for writ of certiorari to U.S. Supreme Ct. after finding that there was no reasonable probability that four Justices would vote to grant said writ or that five Justices would vote to reverse instant judgment. Underlying case concerned question as to whether plaintiff stated viable cause of action under Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 USC sections 2721-25, arising out of defendant’s disclosure of plaintiff’s personal information on parking ticket issued to defendant, and Ct. of Appeals doubted that defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari would be granted where: (1) one of defendant’s main arguments was never raised in Ct. of Appeals; and (2) effect of underlying judgment was merely return of case to Dist. Ct. for hearing on merits of complaint.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-police officer's motion for qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that defendant made knowingly false or misleading statements in affidavit supporting issuance of no-knock search warrant of plaintiff's home. Qualified immunity was not appropriate where plaintiff produced sworn testimony from individual (who was defendant's source for warrant application) which was contrary to statements made by defendant in his affidavit. Moreover, if individual's testimony is believed, said evidence would establish that defendant made false or misleading statements in affidavit and preclude any finding that probable cause existed for issuance of no-knock warrant.