Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-jail officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants’ approach to classifying inmates for cellblock placement, which failed to separate violent from non-violent inmates, constituted violation of plaintiff’s due process rights where plaintiff, as non-violent inmate, was attacked by violent cellmate. Plaintiff failed to present evidence that instant security classification policy, which used multiple factors including prior incarceration history at jail, systematically failed to address obvious risks to inmate safety. Moreover, plaintiff failed to present any evidence that defendants either had notice of particular harm to plaintiff resulting from placement in particular cell or knew that instant classification system exposed plaintiff to any serious risk of harm.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-college’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiff-student alleging that defendant was negligent in failing to take certain security measures on its campus and residence halls when plaintiff was sexually assaulted in her residence hall, after Dist. Ct. had excluded proposed testimony from plaintiff’s proposed expert witness. Under Wisc. law, expert testimony is required to establish standard of care, and while Dist. Ct. properly excluded certain aspects of expert’s proposed testimony that had failed to distinguish between acquaintance rape and instant sexual assault that was perpetrated by strangers to plaintiff, certain aspects of expert’s testimony concerning recommended practices published by International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, as well as expert’s testimony regarding non-secure door at plaintiff’s residence hall was admissible and raised genuine dispute for trial.

Dist. Ct. erred in instant lawsuit by plaintiffs seeking declaration that certain religious statues and related documents properly belonged to plaintiffs (Catholic layman and alleged Papal Knight of the Holy Sepulcher) as opposed to defendants-sisters of Roman Catholic church, where Dist. Ct. refused to take judicial notice of statement from Apostolic Nunciature of the Holy See that one defendant was no longer religious sister. Thrust of Dist. Ct.’s ruling was to allow jury to decide whether said defendant was member of religious order, and secular court may not take sides on issues of religious doctrine. As such, Holy See’s ruling effectively removed issue regarding defendant’s status as sister from case, such that defendant’s status as non-sister must be applied to various aspects of case on remand. Fact that no religious institution was party to case did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action under Computer Fraud and Abuse Act arising out of defendant-former employer’s action in locking plaintiff out of his personal email account held by defendant and in removing several years of plaintiff’s personal correspondence from said account, where basis of motion was plaintiff’s failure to establish all elements of his case, including requirement that he incurred at least $5,000 in damages. Plaintiff failed to provide any evidentiary support for allegations in his complaint, and Dist. Ct. was free to overlook any failure by defendant to comply with requirements set forth in Local Rule 56.1. Ct. also noted that plaintiff could have defended instant summary judgment motion with fact that at time defendant had filed summary judgment motion, it had failed to file timely answer to instant complaint.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by conspiring with fast-food restaurant employees to induce plaintiff to breach peace so as to give defendants pretext to arrest plaintiff. Defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on disorderly conduct charge after obtaining statements from employees of restaurant that plaintiff was verbally abusive with clerk stationed near drive-through window and then grabbed clerk’s wrist as if to pull him through drive-through window. Moreover, plaintiff failed to put forth evidence to support claim that defendants conspired with restaurant employees to set up plaintiff. Also, plaintiff could not establish any 4th Amendment violation against defendant-restaurant since vicarious liability under doctrine of respondeat superior is unavailable against private employers sued under section 1983.

In action alleging that defendants-truck driver and his company were negligent when plaintiff’s motorcycle collided with defendants’ truck, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting oral and written statements from police officer that plaintiff’s husband (who had also filed consortium claim in instant action) told officer that plaintiff had told husband that accident was her fault. Said statements did not violate hearsay rule since plaintiff’s and her husband’s statements qualified as party admissions, and officer’s written statement about husband’s statement to him appeared in crash report, which qualified as public record exception to hearsay rule. Fact that husband was merely repeating plaintiff’s statement did not require different result. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in admitting oral and written statements from officer regarding defendant’s statement to him concerning plaintiff’s admission to defendant that accident was her fault, since defendant’s statement did not qualify as party admission exception to hearsay rule where defendant sought to admit his own out-of-court statement. However, any admission of hearsay evidence was harmless where said evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials arrested her without probable cause on theft of horse charge and arrested her based on nothing more than her status as wife of owner of stables that housed said horse. Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to valid arrest warrant, and while true owner of horse may have lied to arresting officer as to circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s possession of horse and as to plaintiff’s claim that owner owed her husband money for boarding said horse, arresting officer could have credited owner’s statement that plaintiff had taken wrongful possession of said horse. Fact that plaintiff’s husband had lien on horse did not require different result. Moreover, arresting officer could have believed that plaintiff was more than bystander in instant dispute over horse where plaintiff responded to officer’s inquiries about horse and referred to herself and husband jointly when discussing why she would not return horse without payment of boarding fees.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state claim plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Plaintiff adequately alleged that defendants did not provide minimal measures of life necessities in that: (1) he was confined with eight inmates into cell designed for three inmates; (2) he was required to sleep on cell floor near broken windows and cracked toilets; and (3) he was confined in cells that had exposed wiring, sinks without running water, toilets covered in mold and spider webs. Ct. further noted that jail cells must meet minimal standards of habitability.