Federal Civil Practice

Ramos v. City of Chicago

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Ramos v. City of Chicago
Civil Court
Section 1983 Action
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 10-3425
Decision Date: 
May 24, 2013
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights in conducting false arrest on residential burglary charge, where plaintiff was ultimately acquitted of said charge. While plaintiff argued that defendants stopped and arrested him without probable cause, record showed that defendants could properly stop plaintiff in his vehicle where: (1) at time of stop defendants had received information that suspect in recent residential burglary was at different residence where defendants observed plaintiff leave in his vehicle; and (2) plaintiff generally matched description of suspect. Moreover, while plaintiff’s height was drastically different than what was told to defendants, so as to provide some doubt that plaintiff was actual suspect, defendants could still arrest plaintiff on traffic charge since plaintiff failed to produce valid license.

Morris v. Nuzzo

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Morris v. Nuzzo
Civil Court
Removal
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 12-3220
Decision Date: 
May 23, 2013
Federal District: 
S.D. Ind., Indianapolis Div.
Holding: 
Vacated and remanded
In action originally filed in Ohio state court, alleging that defendants-insurance company and insurance agent tortiously and in bad faith refused to settle wrongful death claim against insured, that was ultimately removed to Ohio Dist. Ct. and then transferred to Indiana Dist. Ct., Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for remand back to Ohio state court. Forum defendant rule applied so as to preclude removal to federal court where insurance agent was citizen of Ohio, and where Ct. of Appeals rejected Dist. Ct.’s belief that insurance agent had been fraudulently joined as device to preclude instant removal where record showed that agent’s conduct, in allegedly failing to investigate, adjust and settle wrongful death claim, occurred in Ohio. As such, there was reasonable probability that Ohio state court would have applied Ohio law to instant bad-faith claim, that under Ohio law plaintiff stated plausible cause of action against agent, and that agent’s proper presence in lawsuit prevented removal under 28 USC section 1441(b)(2).

Johnson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Johnson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
Civil Court
Standing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 12-3869
Decision Date: 
May 20, 2013
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on grounds of lack of standing plaintiff-plan administrator’s lawsuit seeking order requiring defendant-custodian of funds in said retirement plan to release said funds pursuant to directions from plaintiff. Record showed that defendant supported plaintiff’s request, but could not release said funds because state court had entered prior order precluding defendant from doing so. As such, plaintiff lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit against defendant since plaintiff’s injury was not traceable to actions taken by defendant, but rather was result of independent action taken by third-party, who was not included in instant lawsuit. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant should have released funds in contravention to state court’s order.

Senate Bill 1912

Topic: 
Tort cases and settlement
(Raoul, D-Chicago) amends the Code of Civil Procedure create an enforcement mechanism for cases that settle but the defendant won’t comply with the settlement. It is limited to cases seeking money damages involving personal injury, wrongful death, or tort action. It requires a settling defendant pay all sums due to the plaintiff within 21 days of tender of all applicable documents required under this new Section. The procedure is as follows: (1) Requires a “settling defendant” to tender a release to the plaintiff within 14 days of written confirmation of the settlement. If the law requires court approval of a settlement, the plaintiff must tender to the defendant a copy of the court order approving the settlement. (2) If there is a known third-party right of recovery or subrogation interest, the plaintiff may protect the third-party’s right of recovery or subrogation interest by tendering to the defendant: (a) A signed release of the attorney’s lien. (b) Any of the following: (i) a signed release of a healthcare-provider lien; (ii) a letter from the plaintiff’s attorney agreeing to hold the full amount of the claimed lien in his or her client-fund account pending final resolution of the lien amount; or (iii) an offer that the defendant hold the full amount of the claimed right of recovery pending final resolution of the amount of the right of recovery. (c) Any of the following: (i) documentation of the agreement between the plaintiff and Medicare, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, or the private health insurance company as to the amount of the settlement that will be accepted in satisfaction of right of recovery; (ii) a letter from the plaintiff’s attorney agreeing to hold the full amount of the claimed right to recovery in his or her client-fund account pending final resolution of the amount of the right to recovery; or (iii) an offer that the defendant hold the full amount of the claimed right to recovery pending final resolution of the amount of the right of recovery. (3) If the applicable court finds after a hearing that timely payment has not been made under this Section, judgment must be entered against that defendant for the amount in the executed release, costs incurred in obtaining the judgment, and 9% interest from the date of the plaintiff’s tender. (4) Senate Bill 1912 exempts units of local government, the State of Illinois, and state employees. Parties may agree to some other procedure if they wish. It passed the Senate yesterday and is in the House.
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Dookeran v. County of Cook, Illinois

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Dookeran v. County of Cook, Illinois
Civil Court
Res Judicata
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 11-3197
Decision Date: 
May 3, 2013
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds plaintiff’s Title VII action alleging that defendant’s denial of his application for reappointment to defendant’s medical staff was based on his race and national origin, where instant dismissal was premised on defendant’s failure to include Title VII claim in prior certiorari action that plaintiff had filed in Cook County Circuit Court that also sought appeal from said denial of his application for reappointment to said staff. Both Title VII and certiorari actions satisfied identity of causes of action element of res judicata test where both actions concerned same transaction, and there was no jurisdictional impediment to plaintiff including his Title VII action in his 2006 certiorari action. Fact that prior to Ill. Supreme Ct. decision in Blount, 904 NE2d 1 (2009), several Ill. App. Ct. decisions prohibited plaintiff from bringing Title VII action in circuit court did not require different result. (Dissent filed.)

GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Company, Inc.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Company, Inc.
Civil Court
Removal
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 12-3746
Decision Date: 
May 3, 2013
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Vacated and remanded
Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s objection to removal of citation to discover assets proceeding that had been filed in Illinois circuit court against third-party respondent and defendant, after plaintiff obtained N. Carolina judgment against defendant, and after defendant had transferred its assets to third-party respondent prior to entry of N. Carolina judgment. Instant removal by defendant violated forum-defendant rule under section 1441(b)(2) where third-party respondent had its principal place of business in Illinois, and thus Dist. Ct. should have remanded action back to circuit court. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that forum-rule did not apply since respondent in citation proceeding was not “defendant” for purposes of said rule, and fact that party removing case was not forum-defendant did not require different result. Ct. also rejected defendant’s and respondent’s argument that remand was unnecessary where Dist. Ct. proceeded to final determination of case on merits.

Senate Bill 1514

Topic: 
FOIA and attorney's fees
(Biss, D-Skokie) allows a requestor to prevail for purposes of attorney’s fees if the requestor obtains relief through (1) a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the public body after suit has been filed, unless the public body can demonstrate that its voluntary or unilateral change was not caused by the filing of litigation under this Section; (2) an enforceable written agreement or consent decree; or (3) a judicial order. On third reading in the Senate.
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Senate Bill 1912

Topic: 
Claim for money damages
(Raoul, D-Chicago) makes several changes to the settlement of a claim for money damages. (1) Requires the settling defendant to tender a release within 14 days of the settlement. (2) If court approval of the settlement is required, it requires the plaintiff to timely tender to the settling defendant of a copy of the court order approving the settlement. (3) Requires the plaintiff to tender to settling defendant documentation about a known third-party lienholder or subrogation interest. (4) Requires a settling defendant to pay all sums due to the plaintiff within 21 days of tender of the executed release and lienholder documentation. (4) Awards interest under Section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure for failure to pay within 21 days from plaintiff’s tender of the executed release unless good cause is shown otherwise. (5) Senate Bill 1912 doesn’t apply to actions against the State, State employees, or anyone else who may be indemnified under the State Employee Indemnification Act. It is on third reading in the Senate.
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Smith v. Sangamon County Sheriff’s Dept.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Smith v. Sangamon County Sheriff’s Dept.
Civil Court
Prisoners
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 11-1979
Decision Date: 
April 19, 2013
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-jail officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants’ approach to classifying inmates for cellblock placement, which failed to separate violent from non-violent inmates, constituted violation of plaintiff’s due process rights where plaintiff, as non-violent inmate, was attacked by violent cellmate. Plaintiff failed to present evidence that instant security classification policy, which used multiple factors including prior incarceration history at jail, systematically failed to address obvious risks to inmate safety. Moreover, plaintiff failed to present any evidence that defendants either had notice of particular harm to plaintiff resulting from placement in particular cell or knew that instant classification system exposed plaintiff to any serious risk of harm.

Lees v. Carthage College

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Lees v. Carthage College
Civil Court
Expert Witness
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 11-3061
Decision Date: 
April 16, 2013
Federal District: 
E.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Vacated and remanded
Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-college’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiff-student alleging that defendant was negligent in failing to take certain security measures on its campus and residence halls when plaintiff was sexually assaulted in her residence hall, after Dist. Ct. had excluded proposed testimony from plaintiff’s proposed expert witness. Under Wisc. law, expert testimony is required to establish standard of care, and while Dist. Ct. properly excluded certain aspects of expert’s proposed testimony that had failed to distinguish between acquaintance rape and instant sexual assault that was perpetrated by strangers to plaintiff, certain aspects of expert’s testimony concerning recommended practices published by International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, as well as expert’s testimony regarding non-secure door at plaintiff’s residence hall was admissible and raised genuine dispute for trial.