Federal Civil Practice

In action alleging that defendant breached contract authorizing defendant to use plaintiff's licensed trademarks on certain products that plaintiff had given prior approval, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff's motion for issuance of temporary and preliminary injunctions to prohibit defendant from manufacturing or distributing any products bearing said trademarks where there was evidence that defendant was marketing certain products without plaintiff's prior approval. While defendant argued that language of temporary injunction was too broad where it covered conduct of non-parties, instant injunction complied with Rule 65(d)(2) since non-parties can be bound by injunction where non-parties, with notice of Dist. Ct.'s order, actively aid and abet party in violating prior Dist. Ct. order. Moreover, Ct. noted that while Dist. Ct. extended temporary injunction beyond applicable 28-day period, any said extension became preliminary injunction that was appealable, but remained effective. Moreover, with respect to Dist. Ct.'s grant of plaintiff's subsequent request for "anti-suit" injunction that directed defendant to cease initiating or litigating Greek court action seeking to allow it to continue merchandizing plaintiff's trademarked products, Ct. clarified that defendant could defend itself against any petitions filed by plaintiff in Greek litigation, as long as said defense did not contradict terms of Dist. Ct.'s preliminary injunction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff's pro se Fair Credit Reporting Act claim, which plaintiff (non-lawyer) had purchased from third-party, where Dist. Ct. found that assignment of claim to plaintiff was void as being in violation of Illinois public policy. Under King, 828 N.E.2d 1155, Illinois public policy forbids assignments of legal claims to non-attorneys in order to facilitate non-attorneys ability to litigate said claims without law license. Moreover, record showed that plaintiff had created business that provided legal advice, and that plaintiff had repeatedly purchased claims in order to personally litigate them.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendant, Chicago police officer who was working as security supervisor at plaintiff’s high school, used excessive force in arresting plaintiff-14-year-old student, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to excuse for cause two jurors, who initially indicated that they would give more weight to testimony of police officer over testimony from 14-year-old student. Record showed that both jurors also indicated that they would keep open mind and judge case based on evidence admitted at trial, and neither juror evinced irrational bias that would prevent them from ruling impartially in case. Dist. Ct. also did not err in failing to admit photographs of plaintiff’s arrest allegedly taken from cell-phone of another individual where plaintiff could not authenticate said photographs and where photographs portrayed only small part of incident.

In action alleging that Ill. App. Ct. opinion in plaintiffs' underlying case that challenged propriety of zoning amendment that plaintiffs claimed deprived them of their right to constitutional due process, Dist. Ct. did not err is dismissing said action on Rooker-Feldman Doctrine grounds. Under Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, federal district and circuit courts lack jurisdiction to review decision of state courts, and instant lawsuit was attempt by plaintiffs to have Dist. Ct. review propriety of Ill. App. Ct.'s decision. Fact that plaintiffs contended that instant action was only facial constitutional challenge to new rule of law established by Ill. App. Ct.'s opinion did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff for violating his court-ordered supervision on prior theft charge. Defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff where they were aware of terms of supervision (as well as defendant's conduct that generated supervision order) that prohibited defendant from soliciting funds for charity by using firefighter's boot as collection device, and defendants arrested plaintiff after again observing plaintiff on street using rubber boot to collect money. Defendants were also entitled to qualified immunity where defendants had reasonable belief that defendant had violated terms of supervision given similarity of conduct in using boot to collect money.

In action seeking enforcement of settlement agreement arising out of plaintiff's breach of employment contract claim, Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff right to seek loss of professional fees on grounds that plaintiff had failed to provide estimate of said fees prior to close of discovery. Defendant had adequate notice of said fees where plaintiff gave defendant notice that he was seeking said fees in his initial responses to defendant's Interrogatories and then provided computation for said fees prior to preparation of pretrial order. Ct. further noted that defendant had certain internal records that related to plaintiff's lost professional fees, and that plaintiff had provided explanation for said fees in his deposition. Also, Ct. held that case had been improperly removed to federal court where defendant was resident of same state as Dist. Ct, but that plaintiff waived any objection to said removal by failing to object within applicable 30-day deadline for doing so.

In habeas action by defendant-prisoner challenging prison's revocation of good-time credits under 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) after prison board noted that Dist. Ct. in prior section 1983 action had found that two of defendant's motions for sanctions were "frivolous," Ct. of Appeals certified to Ill. Supreme Ct. question as to whether instant revocation was proper under circumstances where Dist. Ct. in section 1983 action failed to specify that defendant's motions satisfied one of five definitions of frivolousness contained in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) or indicate its intention to invoke said statute.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiffs (persons required to register as sex offenders) alleging that defendant's failure to provide any procedure to correct errors in sex offender registry violated plaintiffs' due process rights. While Dist. Ct. found no violation where defendant had implemented substitute policy, which granted incarcerated individuals means to correct errors in registry, Ct. of Appeals found that substitute policy did not go far enough, and that plaintiffs, who were not incarcerated, were entitled to some process for correcting errors where mistakes on registry implicated liberty interests protected by Due Process Clause.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiffs-civilly committed detainees under Ill. Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, who objected to defendants' policies that: (1) limited various classes of civilly committed detainees from having face-to-face interactions with other civilly committed detainees within facility; and (2) refused to allow plaintiffs ability to contact other civilly committed detainees via facility's internal mail system instead of U.S. mail. Defendants were not required to obtain prior approval by health professionals regarding its policy that limited plaintiffs' ability to associate face-to-face with other civilly committed detainees since defendants' policy was justified as security measure. Ct. also found no impingement of First Amendment rights where plaintiffs had option to communicate with each other via U.S. mail. (Partial dissent filed.)

In action by plaintiff-Holocaust survivors and victims against defendants-Hungarian national bank and national railway seeking under expropriation exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act over $75 billion on allegations that defendants participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during World War II, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants' motion to dismiss after finding that plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to assert expropriation exception to FSIA. Under expropriation exception to FSIA, plaintiffs were required to show that they exhausted their Hungarian remedies or that there was compelling reason for their failure to do so, and that remand was required for plaintiffs to establish any exhaustion of remedies. Plaintiffs also failed to establish that defendant national railway was engaged in any commercial activity in U.S. so as to apply expropriation exception to FSIA. Ct. further found that Dist. Ct.'s denials of instant motions to dismiss were appealable as collateral orders under 28 USC section 1291.