Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity in action alleging that defendants initiated investigation against plaintiff-prison guards and eventually reassigned them after major jailbreak occurred on their watch, where plaintiffs claimed that defendants took said action in retaliation for plaintiffs’ political support for rival Sheriff’s candidate. Defendants had probable cause to initiate instant investigation given confession by one correctional officer, who identified plaintiffs as having assisted him in allowing prisoners to escape or having advance knowledge of escape. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could not have found existence of material fact with respect to issue as to whether correctional officer’s confession was coerced where state court in criminal proceeding involving correctional officer had found that said confession was voluntary.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s religious rights under Constitution and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, when defendants failed to accommodate his African Hebrew Israelite of Jerusalem religion by allowing him to maintain his dreadlocked hair when receiving visitors and appearing in court. Defendants maintained that plaintiff’s dreadlocks were of such nature that it was impossible to perform effective search of said hair, and prison rules regulating dreadlocks was valid security measure. Moreover, plaintiff failed to present any evidence indicating that prison had no need to regulate hair length, or that said need was insufficient to warrant interference with plaintiff’s religion.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s section 1983 action against defendants-Ill. Dept. of Children and Family Services and others involved in plaintiff’s placement as minor into residential treatment facility, where plaintiff claimed that he was sexually assaulted, at age 8, by another minor at said facility. While plaintiff argued that 20-year limitations period contained in Ill. Childhood Sexual Abuse Act applied, Ct. found that two-year limitation period for general personal injury actions applied to all section 1983 actions alleging personal injuries, including instant claim involving allegations of failure to protect plaintiff from childhood sexual abuse. Moreover, 11th Amendment barred plaintiff’s claim against instant state agency, even though state made only cursory reference to 11th Amendment in its brief.

Ct. of Appeals granted motion by appellants to dismiss instant appeals of settlement of class action alleging that defendant underreported size of its business when participating with appellants in reinsurance pool. Record showed that all but one of parties entered into stipulation to dismiss appeal, which concerned claim by appellants that they did not receive adequate share of class action settlement, that appellants’ settlement in instant appeal did not affect amounts other reinsurance pool members received in class action settlement, and that Ct. of Appeals did not dismiss instant appeal until two months had elapsed for class members to express any opposition to appellants’ settlement. Dissent argued that dismissal of appeal was premature where precise terms of appellants’ settlement were unknown.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing without prejudice plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his civil rights by searching his hotel room and seizing certain items that led to filing of aggravated sexual assault charges against plaintiff that were still pending at time of instant dismissal. While Dist. Ct. indicated that plaintiff could re-file instant action once criminal charges had been resolved, it should have stayed (rather than dismissed) instant action pending resolution of criminal charges since: (1) resolution of instant action during pendency of state prosecution could undermine state criminal charges; and (2) plaintiff’s section 1983 claim may become time-barred by time state prosecution had concluded.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support Dist. Ct.’s finding that defendants-corporation and its CEO made false statements when applying for federal guarantees of 11 property loans, where record showed that employee of corporation was aware that certificates submitted with loan applications contained false statements regarding source of borrowers’ down payments, and that CEO had paid referral fees in contravention to representations made to govt. However, Dist. Ct. erred in assessing treble damages arising out of instant violation of False Claims Act by failing to subtract amount that govt. realized upon sale of repossessed property from money paid by govt. to lenders before tripling resulting net figure.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s claim seeking $34 million plus $2 billion in punitive damages alleging that defendant improperly repossessed plaintiff’s truck and sold it for less than amount plaintiff owed on his truck, after Dist. Ct. found that instant lawsuit satisfied requirements for diversity jurisdiction. While complaint asserted damages exceeding $75,000 jurisdictional minimum, record established to legal certainty that plaintiff could never recover amount in excess of $75,000 given fact that re-sale of truck produced only $13,582 deficiency. Moreover, Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that his lawsuit satisfied jurisdictional requirements of admiralty jurisdiction where plaintiff’s otherwise frivolous claim had no relation to maritime activities. Also, Dist. Ct. could not properly grant defendant’s motion for default judgment on its $13,582 counterclaim where it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim, and where counterclaim had no independent basis for jurisdiction. On remand, Dist Ct. must either dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit without prejudice, or with prejudice (as unrequested sanction due to frivolous nature of claim). Moreover, Dist. Ct. must vacate default judgment in counterclaim and dismiss said claim without prejudice.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim instant section 1983 action alleging that defendants-city officials violated due process clause by failing to reimburse plaintiff for lost pay arising out of suspension that was ultimately overturned by state appellate court. U.S. Constitution does not require states to ensure that their own laws are implemented correctly, and record otherwise showed that State of Illinois offered plaintiff ample process to obtain reversal of suspension. Fact that plaintiff failed to seek lost pay in underlying state-court action did not permit him to seek said remedy in subsequent federal action.

In action by plaintiff-prisoner seeking recovery under 8th Amendment from defendants-prison officials for alleged use of excessive force while escorting plaintiff within prison, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for recruitment of counsel and/or for use of adverse jury instruction due to defendants’ failure to preserve video of incident in question. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff made reasonable attempts to find counsel, it also held that allegations of complaint were sufficiently straightforward, and that plaintiff was sufficiently competent to handle case by himself. Fact that plaintiff was denied certain internal security documents (due to his status as prisoner) as part of his discovery requests did not require different result. Moreover, plaintiff failed to establish any bad-faith on part of defendants so as to warrant giving of adverse jury instruction where record failed to show that any prison official actually viewed subject video and then allowed video to be recorded over for purpose of hiding adverse information.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-police officer’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant terminated him in retaliation for plaintiff protesting fact that others in police dept. allowed individual, whom plaintiff had arrested on traffic violations, to go free only because said individual was politically connected. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s speech was not protected by First Amendment since his sole motive in making protest was to protect himself from civil and criminal liability, and thus did not pertain to matter of public concern, dismissal was not warranted where complaint contained allegations that plaintiff had mixed motive that included desire to bring about change in dept. that extended beyond his own personal interests. Plaintiff also stated similar viable cause of action against Village where allegations in complaint suggested that Chief of Police, who terminated plaintiff, had essentially de facto authority to set hiring and firing policy.