Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals denied plaintiff’s petition for mandamus that challenged Dist. Ct.'s order granting defendant’s motion under section 1404(a) to transfer plaintiff’s FTCA action alleging that prison personnel failed to properly diagnose plaintiff’s blood clot in leg, after finding that Dist. of Kansas possessed superior convenience of litigation. While mandamus is appropriate means of challenging Dist. Ct.’s ruling, Dist. Ct. did not commit clear error where: (1) two-thirds of potential witnesses were either in Kansas or California; (2) medical records were located in Kansas; and (3) Dist. of Kansas had lighter case load. Ct. further noted that plaintiff did not argue that technological advances could have neutralized advantages of Kansas forum. Fact that plaintiff and his treating physicians lived in Illinois did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-former FBI agent’s motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity plaintiff’s Bivens action alleging that defendant framed him in obtaining defendant’s kidnapping conviction (that was ultimately overturned) by fabricating evidence, manipulating witnesses, and then suppressing evidence in violation of Brady. Bivens cause of action is available for Brady violation where there is no alternative compensatory remedy, and plaintiff’s complaint contained sufficient facts to state plausible claim for violation of plaintiff’s due process rights under Brady.

On remand, Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing $600,000 sanction on third-party that originally claimed interest in certain oil leases that were eventually returned by third-party to defendant’s receiver, where third-party violated 2010 Dist. Ct. order requiring third-party to obtain agency authorization to operate oil wells on land that was subject to said leases. Record showed that Dist. Ct. granted third-party multiple extensions of time to obtain said authorization, and third-party’s delay generated over $600,000 in additional environmental compliance costs arising out of non-producing oil wells. Third-party also failed to replace $250,000 bond as it had agreed to do.

Dist. Ct. had jurisdiction to act on ADEA action that had originally been filed in state court proceeding, but had been removed to federal court one day after said action had been dismissed by state court for want of prosecution. Plaintiff’s state court action was still “pending” for purposes of removal statute because plaintiff had ability to reinstate said action at time of removal, and parties otherwise acted as if case had been reinstated as of date Dist. Ct. entered its own dismissal order of ADEA action. Result is same even where, as here, Dist. Ct. had not formally reinstated plaintiff’s lawsuit at time of its dismissal. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss ADEA action where plaintiff had previously signed broad release that precluded plaintiff from filing instant action. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that release did not apply where plaintiff alleged that defendant fraudulently induced him to sign release.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment by defendants-certain health professionals employed by or under contract to prison in section 1983 action alleging that said defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s scoliosis condition in his spine by failing to assign him lower bunk, medical mattress, back brace or orthopedic shoes. Record showed that plaintiff had no medical need for any of these devices, and that his medical condition was not serious enough to warrant them. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting motion for judgment with respect to defendant-nurse, who refused plaintiff’s request to stay overnight in prison’s Health Care Unit due to back pain, and instead wheeled plaintiff back to his cell and told him to climb into his upper bunk bed on his own even though plaintiff indicated that he could not do so and wound up injuring himself while trying to climb into upper bunk bed.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed as moot appeal by plaintiffs-employee and employee’s union of Dist. Ct.’s order granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant’s termination of employee violated her due process rights where employee signed complete settlement and release of her claim prior to oral argument. While terms of agreement allowed for appeal to continue as “declaratory judgment action only,” employee could not continue to prosecute the appeal where she no longer had personal stake in lawsuit. Moreover, union lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit in its own right since complaint did not allege any injury to union, and although union initially had associational standing to bring instant lawsuit and file appeal, employee’s settlement rendered union’s appeal moot where employee had no personal stake in lawsuit and union did not have any other union member who had any similar redressable claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid cause of action plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that she was deprived of protected liberty interest without due process when defendants-DCFS officials issued protection plan that essentially closed plaintiff’s day-care (during investigation of complaint that plaintiff had failed to supervise children for period of time) without providing plaintiff with hearing prior to establishing terms of plan. Due process does not require said hearing where plaintiff’s participation in protection plan was voluntary, and where plaintiff could opt out of plan at any time. Moreover, plaintiff was not entitled to subsequent hearing once plan was implemented where plaintiff had voluntarily agreed to stop operating day-care. Fact that ALJ ultimately expunged any DCFE “indicated finding” against plaintiff, or that defendants took 60 days beyond established limit to complete its investigation of complaint did not require different result.

Ct. of Appeals denied defendants' petition for rehearing en banc that sought reversal of original panel decision that found that Illinois statute prohibiting most individuals from carrying concealed guns was unconstitutional. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in directing defendant-Dept. of Justice to turn over 440 internal memorandums and emails from legal staff representing EPA and Corps of Engineers generated during CERCLA lawsuit seeking environmental cleanup costs from plaintiffs and other entities after plaintiff sought said documents pursuant to FOIA, and after Dist. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that said documents/emails were protected by attorney work product privilege. Although plaintiff sought said documents to determine whether said federal agencies colluded so as to understate any contribution by said agencies to pollution of Superfund site, work product privilege applied where U.S., as opposed to said agencies, was real party in CERCLA action, and information in nature of attorney work product exchanged among Dep’t.’s lawyers is not information exchanged among adverse parties, and thus was privileged from disclosure to plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant improperly failed to award plaintiff $20 million in additional disaster relief under Stafford Act. While plaintiff alleged that additional award was warranted because defendant was required to cover replacement cost of damaged hospital equipment, as opposed to cost of said equipment less depreciation, defendant could properly determine that depreciated cost is appropriate measure of loss in absence of any statute requiring defendant to award relief based on replacement cost. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that replacement cost was required since: (1) medical regulators required that plaintiff replace damaged equipment with new equipment; and (2) one of defendant’s employees promised reimbursement for cost of new equipment.