Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in instant lawsuit by plaintiffs seeking declaration that certain religious statues and related documents properly belonged to plaintiffs (Catholic layman and alleged Papal Knight of the Holy Sepulcher) as opposed to defendants-sisters of Roman Catholic church, where Dist. Ct. refused to take judicial notice of statement from Apostolic Nunciature of the Holy See that one defendant was no longer religious sister. Thrust of Dist. Ct.’s ruling was to allow jury to decide whether said defendant was member of religious order, and secular court may not take sides on issues of religious doctrine. As such, Holy See’s ruling effectively removed issue regarding defendant’s status as sister from case, such that defendant’s status as non-sister must be applied to various aspects of case on remand. Fact that no religious institution was party to case did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action under Computer Fraud and Abuse Act arising out of defendant-former employer’s action in locking plaintiff out of his personal email account held by defendant and in removing several years of plaintiff’s personal correspondence from said account, where basis of motion was plaintiff’s failure to establish all elements of his case, including requirement that he incurred at least $5,000 in damages. Plaintiff failed to provide any evidentiary support for allegations in his complaint, and Dist. Ct. was free to overlook any failure by defendant to comply with requirements set forth in Local Rule 56.1. Ct. also noted that plaintiff could have defended instant summary judgment motion with fact that at time defendant had filed summary judgment motion, it had failed to file timely answer to instant complaint.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by conspiring with fast-food restaurant employees to induce plaintiff to breach peace so as to give defendants pretext to arrest plaintiff. Defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on disorderly conduct charge after obtaining statements from employees of restaurant that plaintiff was verbally abusive with clerk stationed near drive-through window and then grabbed clerk’s wrist as if to pull him through drive-through window. Moreover, plaintiff failed to put forth evidence to support claim that defendants conspired with restaurant employees to set up plaintiff. Also, plaintiff could not establish any 4th Amendment violation against defendant-restaurant since vicarious liability under doctrine of respondeat superior is unavailable against private employers sued under section 1983.

In action alleging that defendants-truck driver and his company were negligent when plaintiff’s motorcycle collided with defendants’ truck, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting oral and written statements from police officer that plaintiff’s husband (who had also filed consortium claim in instant action) told officer that plaintiff had told husband that accident was her fault. Said statements did not violate hearsay rule since plaintiff’s and her husband’s statements qualified as party admissions, and officer’s written statement about husband’s statement to him appeared in crash report, which qualified as public record exception to hearsay rule. Fact that husband was merely repeating plaintiff’s statement did not require different result. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in admitting oral and written statements from officer regarding defendant’s statement to him concerning plaintiff’s admission to defendant that accident was her fault, since defendant’s statement did not qualify as party admission exception to hearsay rule where defendant sought to admit his own out-of-court statement. However, any admission of hearsay evidence was harmless where said evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials arrested her without probable cause on theft of horse charge and arrested her based on nothing more than her status as wife of owner of stables that housed said horse. Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to valid arrest warrant, and while true owner of horse may have lied to arresting officer as to circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s possession of horse and as to plaintiff’s claim that owner owed her husband money for boarding said horse, arresting officer could have credited owner’s statement that plaintiff had taken wrongful possession of said horse. Fact that plaintiff’s husband had lien on horse did not require different result. Moreover, arresting officer could have believed that plaintiff was more than bystander in instant dispute over horse where plaintiff responded to officer’s inquiries about horse and referred to herself and husband jointly when discussing why she would not return horse without payment of boarding fees.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state claim plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Plaintiff adequately alleged that defendants did not provide minimal measures of life necessities in that: (1) he was confined with eight inmates into cell designed for three inmates; (2) he was required to sleep on cell floor near broken windows and cracked toilets; and (3) he was confined in cells that had exposed wiring, sinks without running water, toilets covered in mold and spider webs. Ct. further noted that jail cells must meet minimal standards of habitability.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity in action alleging that defendants initiated investigation against plaintiff-prison guards and eventually reassigned them after major jailbreak occurred on their watch, where plaintiffs claimed that defendants took said action in retaliation for plaintiffs’ political support for rival Sheriff’s candidate. Defendants had probable cause to initiate instant investigation given confession by one correctional officer, who identified plaintiffs as having assisted him in allowing prisoners to escape or having advance knowledge of escape. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could not have found existence of material fact with respect to issue as to whether correctional officer’s confession was coerced where state court in criminal proceeding involving correctional officer had found that said confession was voluntary.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s religious rights under Constitution and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, when defendants failed to accommodate his African Hebrew Israelite of Jerusalem religion by allowing him to maintain his dreadlocked hair when receiving visitors and appearing in court. Defendants maintained that plaintiff’s dreadlocks were of such nature that it was impossible to perform effective search of said hair, and prison rules regulating dreadlocks was valid security measure. Moreover, plaintiff failed to present any evidence indicating that prison had no need to regulate hair length, or that said need was insufficient to warrant interference with plaintiff’s religion.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s section 1983 action against defendants-Ill. Dept. of Children and Family Services and others involved in plaintiff’s placement as minor into residential treatment facility, where plaintiff claimed that he was sexually assaulted, at age 8, by another minor at said facility. While plaintiff argued that 20-year limitations period contained in Ill. Childhood Sexual Abuse Act applied, Ct. found that two-year limitation period for general personal injury actions applied to all section 1983 actions alleging personal injuries, including instant claim involving allegations of failure to protect plaintiff from childhood sexual abuse. Moreover, 11th Amendment barred plaintiff’s claim against instant state agency, even though state made only cursory reference to 11th Amendment in its brief.

Ct. of Appeals granted motion by appellants to dismiss instant appeals of settlement of class action alleging that defendant underreported size of its business when participating with appellants in reinsurance pool. Record showed that all but one of parties entered into stipulation to dismiss appeal, which concerned claim by appellants that they did not receive adequate share of class action settlement, that appellants’ settlement in instant appeal did not affect amounts other reinsurance pool members received in class action settlement, and that Ct. of Appeals did not dismiss instant appeal until two months had elapsed for class members to express any opposition to appellants’ settlement. Dissent argued that dismissal of appeal was premature where precise terms of appellants’ settlement were unknown.