Federal Civil Practice

In action by plaintiff alleging that defendants-police officers used excessive force when arresting him that caused him to injure his finger, and that defendants further denied him medical attention that caused him to have said finger amputated, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that plaintiff used heroin on day of his arrest where said evidence was relevant on issue as to level of plaintiff’s pain and suffering that arose out of defendant’s alleged conduct. Moreover, said evidence was not unfairly prejudicial where record contained other properly admitted evidence of plaintiff’s drug use. Also, while prosecutor improperly tied defendant’s use of heroin to his actions on day of arrest (since said evidence was admitted only on damages issues), any error did not require reversal where plaintiff’s objection to single comment was sustained, and Dist. Ct. gave sufficient curative instruction.

Ct. of Appeals granted plaintiffs’ motion for injunction seeking to preclude govt. from enforcing mandate under Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to provide contraception and sterilization procedures in self-insured, group health plan provided by secular corporation owned by plaintiffs to its 1,148 employees, where plaintiffs alleged that contraceptive mandate violated teaching of their Catholic faith and violated Religious Freedom Restoration Act. While Dist. Ct. denied plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction, Ct. of Appeals granted instant motion, after finding that: (1) plaintiffs’ use of corporation to provide group health plan did not preclude plaintiffs from asserting violation of RFRA; (2) govt. failed to establish that requiring religious objectors to provide cost-free contraception coverage is least restrictive means of increasing access to contraception; and (3) plaintiffs established both reasonable likelihood of success on merits, as well as irreparable harm if no injunction were entered. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-police officer’s decision to shoot plaintiff after plaintiff discharged firearm in New Year’s Eve celebration violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights where Dist. Ct. found that defendant’s guilty plea to reckless conduct charge arising out of same incident judicially estopped plaintiff from denying that he pointed gun at officer prior to officer shooting plaintiff. Judicial estoppel did not apply where defendants could not show that plaintiff “prevailed” in prior criminal matter by pleading guilty to criminal charge where he received two-year probation term, as well as two-day jail sentence on said charge. Moreover, collateral estoppel did not apply because allegation in charged offense that plaintiff pointed gun at officer was not necessary to establish reckless conduct charge where other allegation that defendant shot firearm in air could have supported said guilty plea. Also, while Illinois courts allow defendants to introduce evidence of guilty plea, plaintiff has opportunity to explain and contradict facts underlying guilty plea.

In action alleging that defendants breached lease for nursing home by failing to pay certain rent and/or fund replacement reserve, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in striking opinion of plaintiff’s expert regarding value of future rent lost to plaintiff as result of instant breach where basis of expert’s opinion did not follow any of three recognized methodologies for making such assessment under Indiana law. Moreover, plaintiff’s motion to submit additional evidence on issue of fair rental value of nursing home that was filed six months after close of discovery was untimely. Dist. Ct. also did not err in considering affidavit of attorney in support of plaintiff’s fee request, even though said attorney indicated in affidavit that his opinion was based on his “belief,” where affidavit, when taken as whole, demonstrated that attorney had personal knowledge of facts presented in affidavit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked exigent circumstances to justify warrantless entry into her apartment and subjected her to unreasonable seizure by taking her to local hospital against her will and then subjected her to excessive force that resulted in fracturing of her wrist on way to hospital. Defendants’ entry into plaintiff’s apartment was reasonable where defendants were aware that plaintiff had recently threatened to commit suicide. Moreover, decision to forcibly take plaintiff to hospital was reasonable based on prior report of suicide threats and observation of plaintiff, who appeared intoxicated and who indicated that she had taken anti-depressants. Also, plaintiff was not subjected to excessive force where plaintiff offered considerable resistance to leaving her apartment, and where defendants used techniques designed to subdue non-compliant individual and prevent escalation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison doctors’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to order MRI to address and diagnose pain in his shoulder. Defendant-physician held belief that plaintiff’s pain stemmed from arthritis, such that MRI would not assist him in diagnosis and treatment of plaintiff. Moreover, plaintiff could only potentially show that physician’s treatment of him was negligent, which is insufficient to establish instant 8th Amendment claim. Plaintiff also failed to show that medical standards called for use of MRI to determine whether diagnosis of arthritis based on x-ray films may be mistaken.

Dist. Ct. erred in sua sponte dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s action alleging that defendants-prison officials improperly used cruel and unusual punishment and infringed on plaintiff’s religious liberty, where dismissal was based on finding that plaintiff’s complaint was too lengthy and unintelligible. Record showed that substantive portion of complaint was only 28 pages and covered seven causes of action. Moreover, fair reading of complaint indicated that allegations were sufficiently clear.

In class action seeking to enforce Fair Labor Standards Act arising out of wages paid to 2,341 technicians hired to install and repair home satellite dishes, Dist. Ct. did not err in entering order that de-certified class after finding that necessity to conduct 2,341 separate damages hearings as part of class action would be impractical. Record showed that each technician was paid on per piece basis, and thus had different experiences with respect to hours worked and overtime paid. Fact that plaintiffs selected 42 individuals as “representatives” of all 2,341 technicians did not cure multiplicity problem where criteria for said selection was not divulged to Dist. Ct., and where record would not support general claim that all 2,341 technicians performed roughly same amount of regular and overtime work.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiffs to false arrest on charges of disorderly conduct, assault and obstruction of justice arising out of incident in which one plaintiff uttered threats to officers attempting to restrain said plaintiff’s dog that ultimately resulted in both plaintiffs being arrested and tasered by defendants. Defendants had probable cause to arrest one plaintiff, who uttered threats of physical violence to animal control officers, on charges of assault and disorderly conduct, and defendants were shielded by qualified immunity with respect to other plaintiff’s arrest on charge of obstruction of justice where reasonable minds could differ as to whether conduct of said plaintiff in yelling at defendants and failing to comply with their order to stop approaching them constituted attempt by said plaintiff to help other plaintiff resist arrest. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting summary judgment with respect to one plaintiff’s excessive force claim where record indicated that one defendant tasered said plaintiff second time after said plaintiff had stopped resisting defendant.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in Title VI, as well as section 1981 and 1983 claims alleging that defendant-police chief refused to add plaintiff to City’s preferred list of companies providing towing services on account of his race. While jury found that race was “a” motivating factor based on evidence that police chief frequently used racial slurs when speaking about plaintiff and other African-Americans, jury could also properly find that defendant would not have added plaintiff’s towing services to list even if race played no role in defendant’s actions where: (1) defendant did not add any towing service, including prospective towing service owned by white individual, during relevant time period; and (2) defendant was aware of report that plaintiff had overcharged his customers. Fact that jury found that race played “a” motivating factor in plaintiff’s non-selection did not automatically entitle plaintiff to some form of relief.