Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing without prejudice plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his civil rights by searching his hotel room and seizing certain items that led to filing of aggravated sexual assault charges against plaintiff that were still pending at time of instant dismissal. While Dist. Ct. indicated that plaintiff could re-file instant action once criminal charges had been resolved, it should have stayed (rather than dismissed) instant action pending resolution of criminal charges since: (1) resolution of instant action during pendency of state prosecution could undermine state criminal charges; and (2) plaintiff’s section 1983 claim may become time-barred by time state prosecution had concluded.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support Dist. Ct.’s finding that defendants-corporation and its CEO made false statements when applying for federal guarantees of 11 property loans, where record showed that employee of corporation was aware that certificates submitted with loan applications contained false statements regarding source of borrowers’ down payments, and that CEO had paid referral fees in contravention to representations made to govt. However, Dist. Ct. erred in assessing treble damages arising out of instant violation of False Claims Act by failing to subtract amount that govt. realized upon sale of repossessed property from money paid by govt. to lenders before tripling resulting net figure.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s claim seeking $34 million plus $2 billion in punitive damages alleging that defendant improperly repossessed plaintiff’s truck and sold it for less than amount plaintiff owed on his truck, after Dist. Ct. found that instant lawsuit satisfied requirements for diversity jurisdiction. While complaint asserted damages exceeding $75,000 jurisdictional minimum, record established to legal certainty that plaintiff could never recover amount in excess of $75,000 given fact that re-sale of truck produced only $13,582 deficiency. Moreover, Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that his lawsuit satisfied jurisdictional requirements of admiralty jurisdiction where plaintiff’s otherwise frivolous claim had no relation to maritime activities. Also, Dist. Ct. could not properly grant defendant’s motion for default judgment on its $13,582 counterclaim where it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim, and where counterclaim had no independent basis for jurisdiction. On remand, Dist Ct. must either dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit without prejudice, or with prejudice (as unrequested sanction due to frivolous nature of claim). Moreover, Dist. Ct. must vacate default judgment in counterclaim and dismiss said claim without prejudice.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim instant section 1983 action alleging that defendants-city officials violated due process clause by failing to reimburse plaintiff for lost pay arising out of suspension that was ultimately overturned by state appellate court. U.S. Constitution does not require states to ensure that their own laws are implemented correctly, and record otherwise showed that State of Illinois offered plaintiff ample process to obtain reversal of suspension. Fact that plaintiff failed to seek lost pay in underlying state-court action did not permit him to seek said remedy in subsequent federal action.

In action by plaintiff-prisoner seeking recovery under 8th Amendment from defendants-prison officials for alleged use of excessive force while escorting plaintiff within prison, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for recruitment of counsel and/or for use of adverse jury instruction due to defendants’ failure to preserve video of incident in question. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff made reasonable attempts to find counsel, it also held that allegations of complaint were sufficiently straightforward, and that plaintiff was sufficiently competent to handle case by himself. Fact that plaintiff was denied certain internal security documents (due to his status as prisoner) as part of his discovery requests did not require different result. Moreover, plaintiff failed to establish any bad-faith on part of defendants so as to warrant giving of adverse jury instruction where record failed to show that any prison official actually viewed subject video and then allowed video to be recorded over for purpose of hiding adverse information.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-police officer’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant terminated him in retaliation for plaintiff protesting fact that others in police dept. allowed individual, whom plaintiff had arrested on traffic violations, to go free only because said individual was politically connected. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff’s speech was not protected by First Amendment since his sole motive in making protest was to protect himself from civil and criminal liability, and thus did not pertain to matter of public concern, dismissal was not warranted where complaint contained allegations that plaintiff had mixed motive that included desire to bring about change in dept. that extended beyond his own personal interests. Plaintiff also stated similar viable cause of action against Village where allegations in complaint suggested that Chief of Police, who terminated plaintiff, had essentially de facto authority to set hiring and firing policy.

Ct. of Appeals denied plaintiff’s petition for mandamus that challenged Dist. Ct.'s order granting defendant’s motion under section 1404(a) to transfer plaintiff’s FTCA action alleging that prison personnel failed to properly diagnose plaintiff’s blood clot in leg, after finding that Dist. of Kansas possessed superior convenience of litigation. While mandamus is appropriate means of challenging Dist. Ct.’s ruling, Dist. Ct. did not commit clear error where: (1) two-thirds of potential witnesses were either in Kansas or California; (2) medical records were located in Kansas; and (3) Dist. of Kansas had lighter case load. Ct. further noted that plaintiff did not argue that technological advances could have neutralized advantages of Kansas forum. Fact that plaintiff and his treating physicians lived in Illinois did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-former FBI agent’s motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity plaintiff’s Bivens action alleging that defendant framed him in obtaining defendant’s kidnapping conviction (that was ultimately overturned) by fabricating evidence, manipulating witnesses, and then suppressing evidence in violation of Brady. Bivens cause of action is available for Brady violation where there is no alternative compensatory remedy, and plaintiff’s complaint contained sufficient facts to state plausible claim for violation of plaintiff’s due process rights under Brady.

On remand, Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing $600,000 sanction on third-party that originally claimed interest in certain oil leases that were eventually returned by third-party to defendant’s receiver, where third-party violated 2010 Dist. Ct. order requiring third-party to obtain agency authorization to operate oil wells on land that was subject to said leases. Record showed that Dist. Ct. granted third-party multiple extensions of time to obtain said authorization, and third-party’s delay generated over $600,000 in additional environmental compliance costs arising out of non-producing oil wells. Third-party also failed to replace $250,000 bond as it had agreed to do.

Dist. Ct. had jurisdiction to act on ADEA action that had originally been filed in state court proceeding, but had been removed to federal court one day after said action had been dismissed by state court for want of prosecution. Plaintiff’s state court action was still “pending” for purposes of removal statute because plaintiff had ability to reinstate said action at time of removal, and parties otherwise acted as if case had been reinstated as of date Dist. Ct. entered its own dismissal order of ADEA action. Result is same even where, as here, Dist. Ct. had not formally reinstated plaintiff’s lawsuit at time of its dismissal. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss ADEA action where plaintiff had previously signed broad release that precluded plaintiff from filing instant action. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that release did not apply where plaintiff alleged that defendant fraudulently induced him to sign release.