Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in certifying for class action treatment two classes of employees who asserted that some of defendant's superintendents at 262 construction sites committed racial discrimination by failing to award African-American workers overtime assignments and by either racially harassing or tolerating co-worker racial harassment of said class members at work sites. None of twelve named plaintiffs could represent either class since none of named plaintiffs were employed by defendant during entire time span identified in either proposed class. Moreover, plaintiffs' proposed classes lacked common question required for class certification under Walmart, 131 S.Ct. 2511, since supervisors at each work site had independent discretion with respect to work assignments and with respect to imposition of discipline regarding complaints of racial harassment. Fact that defendant had company-wide policy prohibiting race discrimination did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-Village’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging that defendant’s practice of printing personal information such as his name, address, driver’s license number, date of birth, sex, height and weight on printed parking ticket that was placed on plaintiff’s vehicle violated anti-disclosure provisions of Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA). Instant parking ticket and placement on plaintiff’s vehicle constituted regulated disclosure under DPPA, and plaintiff stated viable cause of action where record failed to indicate how instant disclosed information played any role in effectuating Village’s law enforcement. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff must show that someone actually viewed parking ticket on his vehicle to state claim under DPPA. (Dissent filed.)

Ct. of Appeals denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs-class representatives’ appeal of Dist. Ct. order decertifying class action lawsuit seeking to enforce certain rights under Fair Labor Standards Act even though defendants had argued that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue appeal since they had settled their individual claims against defendants. Plaintiffs had standing to pursue instant appeal since provision in settlement agreements noted that plaintiffs were seeking incentive reward for their services as class representatives, and prospect of such awards gave plaintiffs tangible financial stake in getting denial of class certification revoked.

In action to determine prepayment penalty in loan agreement between parties, Dist. Ct. did not err in setting said penalty based on plaintiffs' interpretation of penalty provision language in loan agreement, even though Ct. of Appeals in prior appeal found that plaintiffs' interpretation was unreasonable, since Dist. Ct. took extrinsic evidence on remand to determine parties' intent. Moreover, fact that defendant's interpretation of penalty provision was also plausible was insufficient to overturn Dist. Ct. judgment. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly consider third-party testimony that defendant's lead negotiator had similar understanding of penalty provision as plaintiffs' lead negotiator where such testimony was offered only as evidence of parties' intent at time of loan closing.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-prisoner's free speech rights when they seized copy of Black Panther's "Ten-Point" program that was located in his cell. Seizure was justified where said program, which advocated for, among other things, freedom for all black men in state or federal prison, could be viewed by defendants as incitement to violence by black prisoners and as mechanism to recruit prison gang members. Remand, though, was required as to plaintiff's due process claim alleging that defendants failed to give him proper notice that he could not possess copy of "Ten-Point" program and then placed him in 90-day segregation, since Dist. Ct. failed to make finding as to whether said placement constituted deprivation of liberty.

Dist. Ct. erred in giving jury instruction regarding issue of defendants-police officers' liability in instant damages-only trial in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights when defendants seized her during search of plaintiff's apartment under circumstances where defendants and others searched wrong home. Defendants conceded that liability instruction was improper, and said instruction, along with defendants' attempts to present evidence that others were responsible for plaintiff's damages, had likely effect of confusing jury, which awarded plaintiff only one dollar in damages, by converting instant damages-only trial into one about liability.

In action seeking recovery for personal injuries incurred by plaintiff when industrial grease propelled out of large spindle mechanism and hit plaintiff in chest, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion under Daubert to bar plaintiff's expert from offering opinion as to cause of accident. Record showed that plaintiff's expert applied reliable science and mathematical models to known facts and data, so as to allow jury to find that accident was caused by design defect in said mechanism. Plaintiff's expert could also properly testify that reasonable designer would have considered danger of powerful spring within said mechanism, and that alterative design could have significantly reduced said danger. Fact that defendant disagreed with theory of plaintiff's expert as to causation of accident did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. lacked diversity jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs-insurance companies' action seeking declaration that plaintiffs owed no duty to defend insured in underlying state-court class action lawsuit alleging violations of federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act. Record showed that insured had previously transferred its interests in insurance policies to defendants-class members, with none of said members having individual claim worth more than $75,000 jurisdictional minimum to support instant diversity action. General rule is that claims of multiple litigants cannot be aggregated to reach $75,000 jurisdictional minimum, and said rule applies both to multiple plaintiffs seeking to combine their claims against single defendant, and to those claims brought by single plaintiff against multiple defendants. Ct. rejected plaintiffs' claim that amount in controversy jurisdictional amount was met since defendants held common and undivided interest in single right to proceeds from policies after Ct. noted that claims of class members arose from separate transactions.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-govt.'s motion for summary judgment in FTCA action alleging that govt. negligently destroyed plaintiff's blood and saliva specimens that had been seized by special agent of Food and Drug Administration. Plaintiff's lawsuit was covered by exception to FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in section 2680(c), which included in exception "any claim arising with respect of the detention of ...property by" law enforcement officers, where record showed that special agent seized specimens for criminal investigation. Fact that govt. did not initially assert sovereign immunity as defense when plaintiff presented its administrative claim did not constitute waiver of defense since executive branch cannot waive sovereign immunity.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officers subjected plaintiffs-two teenage boys to false arrest on drug conspiracy charges and subjected them to illegal search, plaintiffs were not entitled to new trial based on defense counsel’s improper speaking objection during plaintiff’s counsel’s rebuttal argument, even though said objection improperly suggested that plaintiffs were drug dealers. Plaintiffs failed to establish any prejudice after Dist. Ct. instructed jurors to disregard statements made by defense counsel. Ct. also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that defense counsel improperly asked plaintiffs about actions of third-party (who had also been arrested at scene and had pleaded guilty to instant charges) since said questions were responsive to plaintiff’s counsel’s questions. Moreover, jury, in finding in favor of defendants, could properly believe defendants’ testimonies that plaintiffs were arrested after defendants observed plaintiffs assist third-party make two drug deals.