Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in his section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-police officers violated his 4th Amendment rights by placing him in handcuffs and frisking him for second time during Terry stop, that was based on 911 call that accused plaintiff of police impersonation during incident in which plaintiff activated his clear strobe lights in his Crown Victoria, where plaintiff had claimed that he was merely responding to dispatch from his private employer to assist stranded motorist. Instant initial Terry stop was permissible, where plaintiff’s vehicle and license plate matched caller’s report. Moreover, while one defendant could properly frisk plaintiff during Terry stop, where nature of charged offense provided reasonable suspicion that plaintiff might be carrying weapon, same defendant exceeded permissible scope of Terry stop by placing handcuffs on plaintiff following initial frisk, where original frisk produced no weapon or contraband, and where facts known to said officer did not establish probable cause to arrest plaintiff on charge of police impersonation. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to other defendants-officers, who made decision to formally arrest plaintiff on police impersonation charge (that was eventually dismissed two years later), where said defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff based on their conversations with 911 caller, instant 911 dispatcher and plaintiff himself, where defendants could not confirm existence of plaintiff’s employer. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err denying requests for issuance of preliminary injunction in three separate cases, alleging that imposition of certain COVID-19 vaccination mandates on plaintiffs-certain employees of State of Illinois, Cook County Health and Hospital System, City of Chicago and Chicago and Naperville Fire Departments, violated various constitutional rights and state laws, where plaintiffs’ claims were unlikely to succeed on merits. Certain claims of plaintiff, who were employees of Chicago and Naperville Fire Departments were rendered moot, after Governor Pritzker issued 2022 order that removed said plaintiffs from vaccine mandate. Also plaintiffs’ claim that instant state and local COVID-19 regulations violated their substantive due process rights because said regulations interfered with their rights to bodily autonomy and privacy could not proceed, where plaintiffs failed to show that challenged mandates abridged fundamental right. As such, Dist. Ct. could find under rational basis standard that there was no substantive due process violation, where record showed that vaccine was effective to combat COVID-19, and that defendants relied on reasonably conceivable scientific evidence when promulgating contested mandate. Also, defendant-Governor was entitled to 11th Amendment immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim, where plaintiffs named Governor as defendant in his official capacity, and where said plaintiffs had alleged violation of state law. Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims also failed because plaintiffs had failed to identify what procedural protections they should have been afforded. With respect to plaintiffs’ claim that COVID-19 vaccine mandates violated their right to free exercise of religion and rights under Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act, plaintiffs could not proceed on said claims because plaintiffs never applied for religious exemption that was allowed under said mandates.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support respondent’s denial of petitioner’s (manufacturer of flavored liquids for use in e-cigarette devices) premarket tobacco product application. Applicable standards required respondent to weigh risk of hooking new users into world of tobacco through use of plaintiff’s product against its potential to help existing tobacco users wean themselves from tobacco’s unhealthier forms, and respondent could properly deny plaintiff’s application based on lack of evidence to demonstrate that marketing of plaintiff’s flavored products was appropriate for protection of public health. Ct. also noted that plaintiff had failed to provide bridge between data about other products and its own proposed offering. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that: (1) respondent was required to set forth threshold levels of likelihood that existing users of tobacco products would stop using said products because of plaintiff’s new product; (2) guidance provided by FDA allowed plaintiff to forego product-specific testing in all cases; and (3) defendant based denial on general presumption that e-liquids increase youth tobacco use.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison dentist and medical-services provider’s motions for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s tooth pain by delaying treatment on decayed tooth. Record showed that plaintiff had refused defendant-dentist’s offer to remove tooth and, on second occasion, left appointment to treat tooth to take legal call prior to when treatment could begin. Plaintiff eventually obtained treatment on tooth, but brought instant section 1983 action based on delay in obtaining said treatment. Record did not support claim that dentist had sufficiently culpable mental state, where plaintiff had passed up two opportunities to treat his tooth. Moreover, dentist could not be faulted for not construing plaintiff’s report of tooth pain as urgent, when plaintiff had twice abandoned proffered treatment. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-medical provider’s summary judgment motion, where plaintiff failed to produce evidence establishing systemic and gross deficiencies in care.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion to vacate $1.24 million jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff in his section 1983 action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to risk that two of its off-duty police officers would violate defendant’s policy by using excessive force when confronting plaintiff at local tavern. In order to prevail against defendant in instant Monell action, plaintiff must show that municipal policy or custom caused plaintiff’s injuries, and plaintiff did not establish causation element, where: (1) defendant had policy that prohibited said officers from performing law enforcement function while having alcohol in their blood; (2) police officers, who physically assaulted plaintiff while drinking at tavern, actually violated defendant’s policy, where confrontation with plaintiff was not result of any emergency situation; and (3) defendant’s policy was not moving force of officers’ assault on plaintiff. Moreover, instant causation requirement supports notion that municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for constitutional torts committed by their employees.

Plaintiffs filed defamation action against defendant-newspaper, arising out of article that described state-court judicial proceeding that recounted that several trust beneficiaries successfully removed plaintiff as de facto trustee of $3 million fund. In state-court proceeding, court concluded that plaintiff violated his fiduciary duties, and although it did not determine whether plaintiff had committed criminal act, it ordered him to pay beneficiaries’ litigation expenses because his conduct “amounted to something of bad faith, fraud or deliberate dishonesty.” While plaintiffs asserted that article was defamatory in four areas, Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaint5iff could not proceed in three areas, where article was substantially true and was largely protected by judicial-proceeding privilege in said areas. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly grant defendant’s summary judgment motion with respect to claim that article improperly implicated that plaintiff committed elder abuse, where Ct. of Appeals held that: (1) any implication of elder abuse arising out of plaintiff’s handling of elderly man’s trust was substantially true; and (2) reasonable jury could not conclude that article’s observation about relationship between plaintiff’s conduct and elderly abuse constituted false statement.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction defendant-police officer’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order that denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant used excessive force during plaintiff’s arrest, where Dist. Ct. had rejected defendant’s claim of qualified immunity. Plaintiff claimed that defendant had slammed him down face first and knocked out tooth, while plaintiff was talking to different off-duty officer. Dist. Ct.‘s denial was based on unappealable finding that genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to whether plaintiff had resisted police officer, as well as nature of defendant’s takedown of plaintiff, which precluded summary judgment on issue of qualified immunity. Moreover, while defendant insisted that he used reasonable force, defendant did so only in reliance on his own version of facts. As such, Ct. of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to consider instant interlocutory appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on failure to exhaust administrative remedy grounds plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs when defendants withdrew necessary pain medication for his knee condition. Prison rules required that plaintiff file formal grievance within 10 days of incident, and that he make attempts at informal resolution of grievance prior to filing formal grievance. Moreover, record showed that plaintiff filed formal request after expiration of said 10-day period. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that 10-day period for filing formal grievance should be excused because prison had not responded to his informal grievance, since plaintiff did not need response to his informal grievance attempt prior to filing formal grievance.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding plaintiff $1,889,278.26 in attorney’s fees plus pretrial interest, when evaluating propriety of Bankruptcy Ct. award of $1,944,354,26 in attorney’s fess arising out of plaintiff paying for its own defense in underlying lawsuits filed by female athletes who claimed that Larry Nasser, who was affiliated with plaintiff, had sexually abused them. Prior to calculation of attorney’s fees, plaintiff had prevailed in action alleging that defendant had duty to defend plaintiff in said female athletes’ lawsuits, and instant request by plaintiff for attorney’s fees represented its costs in defending itself in underlying lawsuits. Bankruptcy Ct. and Dist. Ct could properly find that plaintiff was entitled to presumption that plaintiff’s requested fees were reasonable and necessary, where defendant had breached duty to defend plaintiff in said lawsuit, and where plaintiff had paid 70 percent of requested fees. Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that presumption did not apply because plaintiff: (1) did not request write-offs of billed fees and rarely asked questions about fees in invoices that it had received; (2) did not pay fees in full; and (3) had received grant money from other organizations during litigation period, which removed any incentive to drive down legal costs. Also, Bankruptcy Ct. could properly use “total value” approach, as opposed to “task approach,” when determining whether fees were reasonable and necessary.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-City’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-café’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by issuing public health violations and scheduling hearing to revoke plaintiff’s food and drink license in retaliation for plaintiff’s brief posting of sign that encouraged patrons to take off their masks prior to entering café in response to defendant’s issuance of COVID-19 mask mandate. Fact that defendant eventually canceled hearing and dismissed citations did not render plaintiff’s lawsuit moot, where plaintiff experienced concrete injury beyond issuance of citations and cancellation of hearing, since plaintiff was forced to move locations because of defendant’s actions. However, plaintiff could not establish viable Monell First Amendment claim, where plaintiff failed to plead prior pattern of similar misconduct against other businesses resulting from any policy maintained by defendant.