Federal Civil Practice

Plaintiff sued defendant to compel deposition testimonies of two of defendant’s employees (DEA agent and federal prosecutor), where defendant sought said testimonies to establish in underlying lawsuit that one of plaintiff’s doctors failed to disclose that he was under federal investigation in violation of his employment agreement. Defendant, which refused defendant’s request, was subject to its Touhy regulations that governed when it would disclose information or make its employees available for deposition. Dist. Ct., in denying plaintiff’s motion, could properly find that plaintiff had failed to show under applicable arbitrary and capricious standard that defendant unreasonably applied its Touhy regulations, where defendant explained that allowing said depositions would interfere with its law enforcement mission and jeopardize its ability to obtain cooperation in future investigations. Ct. of Appeals further noted that information sought by plaintiff could have been established through other evidence.

Plaintiffs-various State of Illinois employees, lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit, alleging that amendment to Health Care T=Right of Conscience Act, which allowed employers to enforce vaccine mandates in workplace to prevent contraction or transmission of COVID-19, violated their federal and state constitutional protections of free exercise of religion and equal protections of laws, under circumstances, where Dist. Ct. agreed with defendants that amendment did not change existing law and merely clarified existing law. Dist. Ct. also found, though, that plaintiffs could proceed with instant lawsuit because issues of fact remained unresolved on very same issues. In instant interlocutory appeal, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit once Dist. Ct. found that amendment did not change exiting law, since: (1) once Dist. Ct. found that amendment only clarified existing law, plaintiff could not show any harm flowing from enactment of amendment so as to support their standing to bring instant lawsuit; and (2) no harm, therefore, could be remedied by striking instant amendment. Thus, remand was required with directions to Dist. Ct. to dismiss instant lawsuit due to plaintiffs’ lack of standing.

Plaintiff filed instant action under 18 USC section 925A, alleging that federal felon-in-possession statute (18 USC section 922(g)(1)) violated his Second Amendment rights, where record showed that: (1) plaintiff had entered into 1998 guilty plea on felony mail fraud charge; (2) plaintiff had maintained otherwise clean record for 24 years; and (3) plaintiff wished to possess firearm, but section 922(g)(1) prevents him from possessing firearm due to his status as felon. Plaintiff also asserted that: (1) section 922(g)(1) violated Second Amendment because history supports disarming only dangerous persons with prior convictions for violent felonies, and his mail fraud conviction did not qualify as violent felony; and alternatively (2) history required individual assessment of danger that he posed before banning his possession of firearm. In its remand order, Ct. of Appeals noted that Dist. Ct., which dismissed plaintiff complaint, based its dismissal on “means-end” inquiry as set forth in Barr, 919 F.3d 437 and did not evaluate plaintiff’s claim under new standard set forth in Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111, which required Dist. Ct. to examine exclusively Second Amendment text and pertinent history of firearms regulations, when determining whether government satisfied its burden of affirmatively proving that its firearm regulation/statute was part of historical tradition that delineates outer bounds of right to keep and bear arms. Accordingly, Ct. of Appeals directed that Dist. Ct,. examine plaintiff’s claim under new standard. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion for new trial under Rule 59(e), even though: (1) plaintiff alleged in instant lawsuit that he suffered heart attack after taking Androderm that was manufactured by defendant; (2) hours after jury found in favor of defendant, plaintiff’s counsel received discovery documents that had been requested in similar, but separate lawsuit, that included FDA letter requiring defendant to conduct trial to study potential causal link between Androderm and high blood pressure; and (3) plaintiff asserted that defendant withheld said discovery until after completion of instant trial to protect its defense strategy against plaintiff. In order to succeed under Rule 59, plaintiff was required, among other things, to establish that new evidence would have probably produced new result. Moreover,. Ct. of Appeal found that plaintiff failed to establish that FDA letter would have produced new result in instant trial, where: (1) although defendant alleged that plaintiff’s high blood pressure was one of eight potential causes of his heart attack, significance of plaintiff’s blood pressure had already been undercut by plaintiff’s counsel throughout trial; and (2) removal of defendant’s blood pressure argument left seven other alternative factors, including plaintiff’s high cholesterol, smoking, overweight BMI, pre-diabetes, family history of cardiovascular diseases, rested leg syndrome, and sleep apnea as causes for plaintiff’s heart attack.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s False Claims Act action, alleging that defendant made materially false representations during course of certifying to HUD that certain borrowers were sufficiently creditworthy under Direct Endorsement Lender program for HUD to issue federal insurance to lenders issuing federal mortgage loans to said borrowers. While plaintiff, who formerly worked for defendant, alleged that she observed defendant act under “reckless and inappropriate underwriting practices” that resulted in defendant making false certifications to HUD that several loans met HUD’s minimum underwriting guidelines, plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that defendant’s alleged false certificates caused defaults in said loans. This is so, Ct. of Appeals held, where: (1) plaintiff failed to show that defendant had higher-than-average default rate for its federally-insured loans; and (2) plaintiff could not show, with respect to subject loans, that defaults that led to HUD paying money to lenders to account for said defaults, were caused by defendant’s false statements, as opposed to other, unrelated causes for defaults.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-Indian bank’s motion to dismiss instant breach of contract action for lack of jurisdiction under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) , even though plaintiff-U.S. citizen and Illinois resident of Indian origin alleged that defendant retroactively changed terms of his bank account that was established by bank in India. Under FSIA, there is presumption that foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities are immune from lawsuits filed in U.S. courts, and plaintiff failed to establish exception to said presumption for acts committed outside territory of U.S. in connection with commercial activity elsewhere, and where said act caused direct effect in U.S. In this regard, plaintiff failed to show that defendant’s alleged breach of contract, which occurred in India, caused direct effect in U.S., where: (1) plaintiff did not allege that his lawsuit related to any bank account held with U.S.-based branch of defendant’s bank; and (2) plaintiff failed to point to any evidence that U.S. was site of contract’s performance. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s actions had direct effect in U.S., where: (1) defendant operated three branches in U.S.; (2) defendant advertised its accounts to U.S. citizens; and (3) defendant’s actions caused plaintiff’s mental agony and enormous loss of his pension.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing two similar lawsuits against defendants-corporate entity and operator of website that posted advertisements for sale of firearms, even though plaintiffs-legal representatives of two estates asserted that defendants were negligent in causing decedents’ deaths, where decedents were killed by individuals, who had purchased firearms in private sales from other individuals, who had purchased firearms from individuals, who had posted sale of said firearms on defendants’ website. In this regard, plaintiffs maintained that defendants designed website to encourage and assist individuals in circumventing federal and state laws regulating firearms. Dismissals were appropriate, where plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence would state causation claim for negligence that would directly contravene Wisconsin statures that regulate firearm sales, since said regulations pertained to firearm sales made by firearm dealers and not to private sellers of firearms, and since online website was not firearm dealer. Also certain of plaintiffs’ negligence allegations failed to establish viable tort claim, since plaintiffs failed to plead that harm to decedents would have not occurred but for defendants’ alleged negligence. Too, one Dist. Ct. erred in finding that plaintiff established personal jurisdiction over individual defendant, who was resident of Pennsylvania and who played role in design of website, where plaintiff failed to allege that said individual played role in deciding that corporate defendant would solicit business from Wisconsin residents.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-debt-collector’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing plaintiff-debtor’s action under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging that defendant’s second dunning letter violated FDCPA, where it failed to validate plaintiff’s debt (after she had sent letter to defendant seeking said validation) and improperly required that she send second letter seeking said validation. While plaintiff alleged that she became confused and alarmed after receiving second letter, and while Dist. Ct. based dismissal on finding that plaintiff’s confusion and alarm were insufficient injuries to establish requisite standing to bring instant action, Ct. of Appeals held that plaintiff adequately alleged injury-in-fact to support her standing to bring instant lawsuit, where plaintiff asserted that she incurred $3.95 additional postage for sending second request for validation of her debt. As such, plaintiff adequately pleaded concrete harm to underlying interest covered by FDCPA that concerned money damages caused by alleged misleading communications contained in second dunning letter.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action, alleging that defendants violated his due process rights by depriving him of liberty interest in future employment, when: (1) defendants wrongly designated him as “not in good standing” upon his retirement from Illinois State Police, which precluded him from obtaining concealed-carry license due to his status as retired police officer; (2) said designation limited his rights to carry concealed weapon under federal and state law; and (3) if prospective employers learn of his designation, he would be disqualified from future positions in law enforcement and private security. Although plaintiff asserted that his not-in-good-standing designation was not justified, as, according to plaintiff, he was not target of federal criminal investigation either at time he was placed on probation or at time he retired, he still could not prevail on instant due process claim, because he lacked evidence that defendants had actually disclosed his designation to potential employer or had foreclosed plaintiff future job prospects, where plaintiff had not presented evidence that he could not have applied for concealed=carry license as private citizen under Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act. Moreover, plaintiff failed to present evidence that any law enforcement or private-security employer had ever denied, or would deny, him position because of said designated status.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion seeking to prevent U.S. Dept. of Treasury from offsetting from plaintiff’s $1,495,689.50 restitution order $75,000 settlement that plaintiff had obtained from defendant-U.S. government in plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act action. Dist. Ct. could properly find that government could offset plaintiff’s settlement money, even though defendant unsuccessfully argued that: (1) 18 USC section 3664 prohibited use of offset to enforce restitution obligation; (2) instant offset was improper because restitution funds were owed to plaintiff’s victims in his criminal conviction and not to government; (3) offset is only available for delinquent debts, and he was current on his payment plan; and (4) there was no language in restitution order that mandated that settlement funds received by plaintiff be applied to restitution order.