Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting petitioner-Dept. of Labor’s petition for enforcement of its subpoenas seeking documents relevant to its investigation of alleged cybersecurity breaches at respondent-company, which provided administrative services for employers who sponsor healthcare and retirement plans. Ct. of Appeals rejected company’s argument that Dept. lacked authority under ERISA to investigate company or cybersecurity incidents generally. Moreover, company failed to argue that subject-matters contained in subpoenas were unclear, and Dist. Ct. found that subject-matters of subpoenas were reasonably relevant to investigation of company’s compliance with ERISA. Also, for purpose of company’s complaints that subpoenas were too burdensome, company failed to provide estimates of numbers of documents at issue in subpoenas, cost of providing said documents, hours required to produce said documents, or how compliance would threaten normal operations of company’s business. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying company’s request for protective order, where company failed to show how disclosure to Dept. would result in information being disclosed to third-party.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-state’s attorney and police investigators violated his First Amendment rights by bringing criminal charges against him in retaliation for his previous unsuccessful campaign for state’s attorney. Dist. Ct. could properly find that applicable two-year limitations period had expired since said period began to run on date plaintiff was indicated and not when he was acquitted of said charges. Also, plaintiff could not seek appeal of Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of his 4th Amendment claim, alleging that he was subjected to pretrial detention without probable cause, where defendant conceded in his brief that under governing law, his claim was not timely, where it occurred more than two years prior to initiation of his lawsuit. Fact that Court in Thompson, 142 S. Ct. 1332, subsequently indicated that litigant needs to only show in 4th Amendment claim that his prosecution ended without conviction did not require different result, where defendant’s concession essentially waived issue on appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds plaintiffs’ action seeking declaratory, monetary and injunctive relief against defendant-former employee, where, among other things, plaintiffs alleged that defendant had violated certain contractual obligations. Relevant contract contained mandatory forum selection clause designating certain California courts as exclusive venues for litigation of disputes arising out of contract. Dist. Ct. could properly find that forum selection clause applied to all three plaintiffs, especially where plaintiffs had sued under clause’s contract. Moreover, all of plaintiffs’ claims arose out of contract, and forum selection clause was mandatory, where it provided that any dispute “will be heard and determined” before certain California courts. Dist. Ct. could also find that application of forum selection clause best served convenience of parties and interests of justice, where California was adequate and available alternative forum, and where California law governed disputes under contract. Also, Dist. Ct. had no duty to consider plaintiff’s preferred forum given mandatory nature of forum selection clause.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing portions of plaintiffs qui tam action under False Claims Act, alleging that defendants-hospital and certain debt collectors submitted false claims to government for collection of “bad debts” that patients owed under circumstances where, according to plaintiffs, said debts were submitted before time they could be considered bad debts that were eligible for reimbursement by government. Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead that defendant-hospital had declined to conduct its own collection efforts so as to establish that hospital failed to comply with applicable regulations. Moreover, with respect to defendants- hospital and two of three debt collectors, plaintiffs failed to provide specific examples of defendants’ submission of bad debts that were not eligible under applicable regulations for reimbursement as bad debts. However, plaintiffs could proceed against defendant-third debt collector, where plaintiffs alleged three examples of debts being submitted for bad debt reimbursement without compliance with relevant regulations. Also, two plaintiffs stated valid retaliation claims against defendants-debt collectors, where there were sufficient allegations to support inference that it was objectively reasonable for plaintiffs to believe that their employers were committing fraud against government, and that their complaints to their employers resulted in their terminations.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-jail personnel’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-inmate’s estate’s section 1983 action, alleging that: (1) defendants were deliberately indifferent to inmate’s heart condition that eventually led to his death; and (2) defendant-correctional officer used excessive force during incident that occurred within jail. When inmate presented himself to jail, he told personnel that he had history of intravenous drug abuse and had congenital heart defect. While plaintiff asserted that various jail personnel were deliberately indifferent to inmate’s medical needs by failing to diagnose his infective endocarditis condition that resulted in his death, plaintiff could not proceed on said claim, where: (1) symptoms that inmate presented to personnel were consistent with other ailments that inmate had reported to personnel; and (2) actions taken by two other defendants were taken after passing of date of last opportunity to save plaintiff’s life. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in granting defendant-correctional officer’s summary judgment motion on excessive force claim, where: (1) plaintiff had claimed that said defendant used excessive force when he purposely moved his legs while inmate was in medical distress and caused inmate to fall and hit his head on floor; and (2) jury could reasonably conclude that said defendant had maliciously allowed inmate to fall, while intending to cause inmate harm.

Dist. Ct. properly dismissed for failure to state viable cause of action plaintiffs (two Illinois Counties seeking to house immigration detainees) action, alleging that 2021 Illinois statute prohibiting State agencies and political subdivisions from contracting with federal government to house immigration detainees was preempted by certain federal statutes, and that it violated doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. Ct. of Appeals found that instant statute was not invalid as matter of either field or conflict preemption, where: (1) no case law supported plaintiffs’ claim that federal governmental had occupied field of detaining and housing noncitizens; (2) State is free to remove its facilities from list of options; and (3) federal government could not require State’s cooperation with respect to housing noncitizens so as to view instant statute as obstacle to federal law. Also, for purposes of intergovernmental immunity doctrine, instant statute does not impose direct regulation on federal government or serve to discriminate against federal government.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated various constitutional rights under circumstances where his convictions on burglary and sexual assault were ultimately vacated after DNA evidence exoneration plaintiff on charged offenses. Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff could not proceed on claim that defendants violated his due process rights when defendants obtained tentative identification of plaintiff from one victim via photo array and then obtained 32 hours later two lineup identifications of plaintiff as culprit from same victim and another victim. While jury could find that said process of obtaining photo identification and then line-up identifications short time later could be unduly suggestive, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, where plaintiff could not point to any controlling authority that established that such procedure was unduly suggestive. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s Brady claim that defendants failed to disclose fact that another victim in uncharged incident had identified her attacker as being heavy smoker, where such fact was neither exculpatory nor useful to plaintiff who also smoked. Ct further rejected plaintiff’s unlawful detention claim, where defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on charged offenses.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-Village’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-convicted sex offender’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant’s Ordinance, which precluded any person, who had been convicted of sexually violent offense, from moving into Village after September 24. 2018 until certain conditions had been met, violated Ex Post Facto Clause. While Dist Ct., in applying existing Seventh Circuit precedent, found that Ordinance operated only prospectively because it only limited convicted sex offender's current, post-Ordinance enactment date's desire to move into Village, Ct. of Appeals, in overruling Seventh Circuit precedent, found that Ordinance was potentially violative of Ex Post Facto Clause because it was retroactive in sense that Ordinance attached new consequences to events (i.e., plaintiff’s conviction on sex offenses) that were completed prior to Ordinance’s enactment. Remand was required for determination as to whether Ordinance was “punitive” for purposes of application of Ex Post Facto Clause.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant-police officer’s interlocutory appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant failed to intervene in another officer’s use of excessive force on plaintiff during plaintiff’s arrest. Dist. Ct. found that there was evidence supporting plaintiff’s claim that defendant had witnessed other officer both slam handcuffed plaintiff on ground and perform leg sweep on plaintiff, and existence of factual dispute as to whether defendant had realistic opportunity to intervene was question for jury, which precluded defendant from seeking instant interlocutory appeal.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-Governor’s motion under Rule 60(b)(5) to vacate Shakman Decree that had been entered in 1972 to preclude Governor and units of local government from conditioning employment decisions on political patronage. Defendant was able to show that 1972 judgment has been satisfied, where: (1) last significant violation of decree occurred nearly 10 years ago with patronage scandal within Dept. of Transportation, and there was no finding of patronage practices harming individual employees or applicants within last seven years; and (2) Governor’s office has instituted or supported several remedial measures in recent years to minimize risk of political patronage in employment practices. Fact that Dist. Ct. believed defendant could do more to implement Governor’s Employment Plan or that there was still risk of unlawful political patronage did not require different result. Ct. of Appeals also observed that continuing to hold defendant to 1972 consent decree would affront principles of federalism and improperly leave Dist. Ct. with playing role at odds with Case or Controversy limitation in Article III of U.S. Constitution. Dist. Ct., though, is available to consider individual claims alleging unlawful patronage.