Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in requiring defendant to bear costs of providing notice to plaintiff’s proposed nationwide class members under circumstances where: (1) plaintiff had initially sought, but was denied proposed certification for nationwide class action in plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging violation of Telephone Consumer Protection Act, but allowed plaintiff to certify class of only Illinois residents; (2) Dist. Ct. based said limitation on U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bristol Myers Squibb Co.,182 U.S. 244; (3) Dist. Ct. then granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff's class of Illinois residents; (3) during pendency of instant case, Ct. of Appeals, in Mussat, 953 F.3d 441, held that Bristol Myers did not apply to case of nationwide class action filed in federal court under federal statute; and (4) instant Dist. Ct. reopened its decision to limit class to Illinois residents, ultimately certified nationwide class and granted summary judgment in favor of nationwide class. While ordinary rule requires plaintiff to initially bear cost of notice to class, especially where liability has yet to be determined, Dist. Ct. could impose said costs on defendant, where: (1) Dist. Ct. had already made defendant liable on merits of case after it had certified class of Illinois residents, but before class certification and necessary notice had been given to non-Illinois residents; and (2) Dist. Ct. could thus place notice costs on defendant once defendant’s liability on merits had been established. Ct. further observed that defendant could seek to recover said notice costs should it prevail on merits of case on appeal.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s (superintendent of juvenile detention center) motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ (juveniles housed in said center) section 1983 action, alleging that defendant’s decision to allow Fox TV to film segment of Empire television series at said center violated their constitutional rights, where said decision resulted in subjecting them to more severe restrictions during said filming than what they would have incurred without filming said segment. Because alleged wrongful conduct pertained to decisions that arose within scope of defendant’s authority as superintendent, defendant was entitled to dismissal of instant lawsuit because he was immune from instant lawsuit under Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 5/1. Ct. further observed that officer suit exception did not apply, where, as here, plaintiffs sought only monetary damages and did not seek to enjoin defendant from any ongoing violations of statutory or constitutional law.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim, plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants’ actions in enforcing against him registration duties for certain sex offenders violated his constitutional rights. Record showed that Illinois passed statute in 2011 that required anyone convicted of felony after July 1, 2011 to register as sex offender if that person had been previously convicted of sex offense or had been previously required to register as sex offender. Plaintiff qualified for coverage under said statute, where he pleaded guilty in 1996 to aggravated criminal sexual abuse, which also required that he resister as sex offender for 10-year period, and where plaintiff was convicted of felony in late 2011. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that 1996 plea deal gave him wholesale exemption from complying with 2011 statute. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him through threats of arrest for failure to register as sex offender because he had lodged prior complaints against defendants, since defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for failure to comply with 2011 statute. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s contention that enforcement of 2011 statute against him constituted 8th Amendment violation as cruel and unusual punishment, since 2011 statute properly applied to him.

Dist. Ct. properly dismissed two counts of plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action against defendants-prison officials, where record showed that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his internal administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit.. However, with respect to third count, where plaintiff alleged that prison guards beat him, record showed that: (1) plaintiff had failed to attach Regional Director’s response to his grievance and had thereafter filed instant lawsuit; and (2) plaintiff subsequently received said response after instant lawsuit had been filed. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies because he should have treated his failure to receive response as non-response and then appealed his grievance to General Counsel, relevant regulations did not cover instant circumstance where response was actually generated but not timely delivered to plaintiff. Ct. of Appeals further found that remand was required for Pavey hearing to determine circumstances surrounding tardy delivery of said response and to determine truth of plaintiff’s claim that prison guard told him that he would not get said response. Ultimately, plaintiff’s claim could proceed if there was determination that any internal appeal was not available to plaintiff, where Bureau of Prisons declined to share its written response with plaintiff.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s finding that defendant committed fraud against plaintiffs, as well as its assessment of compensatory and punitive damages totaling $1.3 million, arising out of defendant’s actions in withdrawing and keeping for itself over $3 million from letters of credit that were meant for plaintiffs. While defendant asserted that it could not be liable for fraud because it was not plaintiffs’ agent or their fiduciary, and thus did not have duty to alert plaintiffs that it had changed instructions about who would control letters of credit, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant’s prior five years of business dealings with plaintiffs created “special relationship,” which supported both existence of duty to disclose to plaintiffs instant change in letters of credit, as well as jury’s verdict

Dist. Ct, did not err in dismissing portion of plaintiff-former prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants improperly revoked his mandatory supervised release without evidence that he violated any term of supervised release and without adequate procedural protections. Plaintiff’s claim is barred by Heck, 512 U.S. 477, since his claim seeking monetary damages would call into question Prison Review Board’s order revoking his mandatory supervised release, where said order had not otherwise been set aside. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in dismissing portion of complaint that alleged that: (1) defendants deliberately or recklessly failed to effect his scheduled release from prison by failing to approve proposed host site by time of his scheduled release from prison; (2) defendants’ inactions forced plaintiff to serve his one-year mandatory supervised release period in prison, because they failed to properly investigate three proposed host sites; and (3) defendants ignored his grievances complaining about their failure to release him to proposed host site. Heck did not apply to this portion of plaintiff’s complaint, where: (1) some of plaintiff’s allegations did not pertain to revocation order because they concerned conduct that occurred after revocation order had been entered; and (2) plaintiff’s allegations did not undermine Board’s finding that plaintiff’s mandatory supervised release should be revoked because he lacked appropriate host site at time of plaintiff’s scheduled release from prison, but that plaintiff could be released upon approval of host site.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action in plaintiffs' class action, alleging that defendant’s acquisition of Ancestry.com (Ancestry) via stock acquisition purchase violated section 30 of Illinois Genetic Information Privacy Act (GIPA); and (2) said stock sale amounted to disclosure of “identity of any person upon whom genetic test is performed or [disclosure] of results of genetic tests in manner that permits identification of subject of test.” Although Ancestry had allegedly paired plaintiffs’ genetic tests with personally identifiable information, Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to allege how instant stock acquisition of Ancestry amounted to any compulsory disclosure, where complaint merely alleged that defendant had received protected information, but failed to plead facts indicating that defendant had compelled Ancestry to disclose any genetic information.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in action alleging that Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (Act) violated their equal protection rights by requiring that they register as sex offenders under said Act only because they have duty to register as sex offender in another jurisdiction. Record showed that plaintiffs were Indiana residents who committed sex offenses either before enactment of said Act or before amendment to said Act that covered their specific offenses. While Dist. Ct. held belief that requiring registration of pre-Act sex offenders who have registration obligations in another jurisdiction was not rationally related to legitimate state interests, Ct. of Appeals held that instant registration requirement for plaintiffs satisfied rational basis review, because State has legitimate interest in seeking to register as many sex offenders as state constitution permits, and because instant requirement is rationally related to advancing that interest.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of Article III standing plaintiff-debtor’s action, alleging that defendant-debt collector violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, when it sent two collections letters, approximately one year apart, about plaintiff’s debt that had been discharged in bankruptcy. Dist Ct. could properly find that plaintiff failed to allege that he had suffered any concrete injury in fact, where he alleged only that he suffered confusion, stress, concern, and fear arising out of receipt of defendant’s collection letters. Plaintiff also failed to allege that defendant took any steps to report plaintiff’s discharged debt to any other agency. Ct. of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s claim that his allegations of intangible damages correlated to common law torts of invasion of privacy and intrusion upon exclusion, and thus were sufficiently concrete injuries for purposes of standing to sue. (Dissent filed.)

Plaintiffs-independent-expenditure political action committee (PAC) and private entity filed action, alleging that Indiana Election Code violated their First Amendment rights to extent that Election Code does not allow independent-expenditure PACs to accept donations from corporations. Defendants-Indiana election officials asserted that Election Code does not prevent such donations, and that plaintiffs therefore lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit seeking to prevent defendants from enforcing Election Code to limit or ban corporate contributions to independent-expenditure PACs. Dist. Ct. found that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that standing issue could not be resolved without determining Code’s meaning and certified following question to Indiana Supreme Ct: “Does the Indiana Election Code--in particular sections 3-9-2-3 to -6-- prohibit or otherwise limit corporate contributions to PACs or other entities that engage in independent campaign-related expenditures?”