Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff's section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, when defendant assessed plaintiff forfeiture and penalty totaling $11,190, which represented all unemployment benefits that plaintiff had received during 24-week period, plus 25 percent penalty, after defendant found that plaintiff had failed to report during same 24-week period fact that she had received income from part-time job that would have reduced her weekly unemployment benefit, as she was required to do under Indiana statute. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff received $8,952 during instant 24-week period, when she should have only received $6,123.25 had she properly reported her part-time income; (2) plaintiff made 24 weekly false statements indicating that she had not made any income during same 24-week period; and (3) defendant notified plaintiff that she was required to repay all of her $8,952 in benefits because of her false statements, as required under Indiana statute and tacked on $2,238 penalty, as allowed under Indiana statute. Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause applies only to “punitive” as opposed to “remedial” fines, and record showed that $2,238 penalty, as well as only amount that plaintiff could have received had she been honest, i.e., $6,123, potentially qualified as being covered under Excessive Fines Clause. However, no Excessive Fines Clause violation occurred, where total amount of sanction under Eight Amendment scrutiny is not grossly disproportionate to plaintiff’s 24 separate false statements that attempted to hide her part-time income that would have reduced her weekly unemployment benefit.

Plaintiff-student filed action against defendant-University, alleging that defendant’s closure of campus, cancelation of one-week’s classes and migration of its classes to virtual/remote classes as consequences of COVID-19 pandemic resulted in breach of contract and/or unjust enrichment, where defendant refused to provide partial refunds for in-person tuition and activity fees to account for closure of campus/in-person classes and failure to reschedule canceled classes. Dist. Ct. granted plaintiff’s motion to certify for class action treatment two classes of all students who paid in-person tuition and activity fees. Ct. of Appeals, though, held that Dist. Ct. erred in certifying both classes, after noting that predominance requirement for certification under Rule 23 is only met when common questions represent significant aspect of case, and Dist. Ct. erred by listing one common question for each claim without explaining that question’s relative importance to each claim, whether any individual questions exist or how common questions predominated over individual ones. Ct of Appeals further observed that Dist. Ct. in general failed to apply required rigorous analysis to plaintiff’s claims so as to understand relationship between each claim’s common and individual questions and to determine which issues were common or individual issues and which issues were predominate.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-Sheriff’s and County’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-inmate’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his due process rights by enacting policy that limited inmates to only three books per cell and then conducting search and seizing over 30 books from his cell and then subsequently destroying said books. Instant three-book limit is constitutional, and record showed that three-book policy was contained in prisoner handbook to which plaintiff had received copy. Moreover, plaintiff received oral notice that his and other cells would be searched for excess books some days prior to actual search, and defendants provided inmates options for disposing excess books by allowing them to mail them to others, allowing third-parties to come to jail to pick up excess books on behalf of inmates, and by allowing inmates to donate excess books to other inmates. While plaintiff established that he had protected property right in his excess books, defendants nevertheless provided plaintiff with adequate due process by giving him advance notice of policy, in-person notice of future search and availability of grievance procedure. Fact that plaintiff did not avail himself of any option to comply with policy or did not file grievance did not require different result. Also, plaintiff could not establish any Monell liability, where he provided evidence of only one possible constitutional violation, which failed to establish required pattern of similar constitutional violations that would have given defendant-County notice that its three-book policy violated Constitution.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-jail officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants failed to protect him from another prisoner, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff could not proceed on instant claim because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit. Plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies, where plaintiff received confusing response from jail officials after he filed grievance on instant matter that was so obscure in attempting to inform plaintiff of required appeal procedure, where jail officials had merely referred grievance to different entity, such that no prisoner could make sense as to when he or she could file any required appeal from denial of grievance. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in dismissing plaintiff's failure to promptly afford him medical care claim, where plaintiff had failed to include named defendant-officer in his grievance so as to allow defendants ability to address issue internally on merits.

Ct. of Appeal vacated Dist. Ct.’s order that granted defendants-election officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that state statutory requirements that plaintiff as independent candidate for 13th Congressional District seat in 2016 obtain signatures representing five percent of voters in prior general election and to have notarized nominating petitions in order to obtain spot on ballot were unconstitutional. Record showed that boundaries of District were significantly altered as result of redistricting that occurred in 2020. As such, Ct. of Appeals vacated District Ct.’s order and remanded case with instruction to dismiss lawsuit based on mootness doctrine, where: (1) District’s geographical boundaries had significantly changed due to redistricting; and (2) plaintiff’s as-applied challenge that pertained to alleged burdens in collecting and notarizing signatures concerned geographical characteristics of pre-2020 District, as opposed to current post-2020 District. As result, federal courts could not provide plaintiff was any effectual relief.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting certain aspects of defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 and ADA actions that pertained to four grievances that related to plaintiff’s hearing impairment, an excessive force claim and failure to provide plaintiff with hearing device claim. Basis of Dist. Ct.’s order was belief that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit, and plaintiff’s failure to allege viable remedy with respect to certain claims. With respect to plaintiff’s excessive force claim, dismissal of claim for failure to exhaust remedies was improper, where defendants had failed to clearly inform plaintiff as to when he could appeal any denial of his grievance. However, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s claim that defendants failed to give him prescribed medications, where plaintiff did not file grievance until after he had filed instant lawsuit. With respect to claim concerning defendants’ limited provision of listening device, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing said claim, where, contrary to Dist. Ct.’s belief, plaintiff had actually provided evidence that linked his alleged physical injury to failure to provide listening devise, since plaintiff claimed that failure to provide said device caused him to miss medications for his dental abscess. However, dismissal of claim regarding failure to provide access to special telephone was proper, where said failure was not linked to any physical injury, and where plaintiff sought only compensatory damages for said claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing without prejudice plaintiff’s section 1983 and section 1985 actions, alleging that defendants-her ex-husband, her children’s guardian ad litem and state court judge conspired to violate her and her children’s rights to family association and her right to fair and unbiased trier of fact, when state court judge entered order that modified visitation schedule to require that all of plaintiff’s visitation time with her children be supervised. Record showed that plaintiff had appealed state court judge’s order to appellate court, and that appellate dismissed her appeal after plaintiff had failed to file her opening brief. Plaintiff then filed instant action after dismissal of her appeal. Ct. of Appeals held that Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied to deprive Dist. Ct. of jurisdiction to resolve plaintiff’s claims, since: (1) allegations in federal complaint asserted that state court judgment caused plaintiff’s injuries at issue in instant federal case; and (2) analyzing plaintiff’s allegations of corruption would require federal court to improperly review propriety of final state court judgment, which only U.S. Supreme Court can do. Ct. of Appeals also overruled prior decisions that held that Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply, where plaintiff presents claim that state court judge was corrupt in rendering decision at issue in federal lawsuit. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-government’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action under 18 USC section 925 that sought order directing government to approve plaintiff’s attempted online purchase of handgun, where government’s denial was based on its finding that plaintiff was prohibited from possessing handgun pursuant to 18 USC section 922(g)(4) as either person who had been adjudicated as mental defective or person who had been committed to mental institution. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff had previously been examined by doctor and admitted to inpatient mental health unit under New York State Mental Hygiene Law; (2) doctor’s notes indicated during said stay, plaintiff was experiencing auditory hallucinations, depression and suicidal thoughts with plans to carry them out; and (3) plaintiff was discharged 11 days later with diagnoses of mild depressive disorder, social anxiety disorder, panic disorder and autism spectrum disorder. Ct. of Appeals held that because plaintiff was involuntarily “committed to mental institution” by lawful authority under New York law, section 922(g)(4) prohibited him from possessing handgun.

Ct. of Appeals entered contempt order against respondent under circumstances where: (1) petitioner-National Labor Relations Board (Board) sought and received from Ct. of Appeals order summarily enforcing Board’s order that required, among other things, respondent to re-hire employee, who had been wrongfully terminated, and to remove references to its unlawful termination from employee’s record, post notices of employees’ rights in its stores and file sworn certification with Board attesting to its compliance with said order; (2) respondent failed to satisfy three aspects of Board’s order; (3) Board subsequently filed petition with Court of Appeals, seeking entry of contempt order arising out of respondent’s failure to comply with Board’s order; (4) Ct. of Appeals directed respondent to show cause why Board’s contempt petition should not be granted; and (5) respondent disregarded rule to show cause order. Ct. of Appeals held that contempt order was warranted, where record showed that: (1) respondent failed to comply with Board’s order that Ct. of Appeals had enforced; (2) respondent ‘s violation was significant; and (3) respondent failed to make reasonable and diligent effort to comply with said order. Instant contempt order included requirement that respondent fully comply with enforced order, as well as to pay to Board all of its reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, and to pay $1,000 fine, plus daily fines until respondent fully complies with Board’s order.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated her 4th Amendment rights by arresting her on disorderly conduct charge, under circumstances where defendants encountered plaintiff, who had exposed rifle with bolted bayonet and handgun, while seated in bleachers in public park. While Ct. of Appeals declined to rule on whether officers had probable cause to support their arrest of plaintiff on disorderly conduct charge, it held that officers were entitled to qualified immunity, where plaintiff had failed to identify any legal precedent that found existence of 4th Amendment violation under similar circumstances. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals further found that officers could have reasonably determined that plaintiff’s reported conduct was “otherwise disorderly” for purposes of satisfying Wisconsin disorderly conduct statute, under circumstances, where: (1) it was reported that plaintiff openly carried instant rifle and handgun in crowded park while watching families; and (2) officers had learned prior to her arrest that plaintiff had previously resisted arrest, had threatened police officers and had been subject of mental health proceedings.