Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-state child welfare officials’ motion for summary judgment on ground that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs-parents’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs’ daughter’s 4th Amendment rights and plaintiffs’ due process rights to make medical decisions on behalf of daughter by coercing them to take daughter to hospital for purposes of testing daughter’s blood for existence of anti-seizure drug that had been prescribed by doctors to treat daughter’s epilepsy. While Dist. Ct. found that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs failed to identify case law that would have put defendants’ case worker on notice that her conduct in procuring consent to draw blood by threats was problematic, Ct. of Appeals found that case law existed to support plaintiffs’ contention that defendants could not use threats to obtain instant consent. Moreover, Ct. found that: (1) plaintiffs could have reasonably believed that case worker used coercion to obtain blood draw, where: (1) case worker told plaintiffs that daughter would become Child in Need of Services (CHINS) that would result in losing their right to make medical decisions on behalf of their daughter if they failed to take daughter to get blood draw; (2) plaintiffs did not understand CHINS proceedings or their rights; and (3) plaintiffs had no real choice but to take daughter to obtain blood draw and had no time to seek legal counsel. Moreover, Ct. noted that: (1) any failure to obtain valid consent meant that search or seizure pursuant to child welfare investigation would be reasonable only if defendant could show existence of either court order, probable cause or exigent circumstances; (2) defendant argued only that it had obtained valid consent; and (3) without showing of valid consent, plaintiffs had created jury question as to whether defendants violated their and their daughter’s rights.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-jail officials and County’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-deceased prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his rights by: (1) maintaining official jail policy, which required that defendants accept all prisoners who could not obtain pre-trial release without regard of ability of jail to accommodate prisoner’s serious medical needs; (2) defendants knew that jail could not accommodate decedent’s medical needs and ignored them; and (3) decedent died two months after he was transferred to different facility. Plaintiff could not proceed against defendant-Sheriff, where plaintiff failed to allege that Sheriff had knowledge of plaintiff’s detention or his medical condition, and where there was no allegation that jail personnel did not promptly respond to plaintiff’s medical incidents throughout his incarceration. Also, plaintiff could not pursue his Monell claim against defendant-County, where: (1) plaintiff failed to allege existence of Sheriff’s Department policy, since courts, and not Sheriff, make pre-trial detention decisions; and (2) Sheriff Department had no option but to detain decedent in its jail and had no policymaking authority over purported policy alleged by plaintiff. Moreover, Ct. noted that decedent always had option to petition court for release based on extraordinary medical grounds.

Dist. Ct. erred in fully granting defendant-prison doctor’s Rule 54(d) motion for costs totaling $4,047.59, where defendant was prevailing party in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant was indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs. Out of the requested amount, defendant sought $2,750 fee for witness who provided medical testimony on behalf of defendant. However, 20 USC section 1821 caps witness fees at $40, and thus defendant was entitled to only $40 as costs for said witness. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that full $2,750 fee was recoverable as expert witness fee under Rule 26, since instant witness was defendant’s own expert, and fees for party’s own expert are generally not recoverable as costs.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing relator’s amended qui tam action, alleging that defendant-County violated False Claims Act (FCA) by misusing federal grant money. Dist. Ct. could properly find with respect to claims of presenting false statements for payment and for use of false statements that relator failed to adequately plead any particular false statement or claim. Dist. Ct. also could properly dismiss plaintiff’s conversion and claim for reverse false claims, where plaintiff had failed to contain sufficient facts indicating that defendant had retained any funds that properly belonged to federal government. Ct. further noted that claims under FCA are subject to heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b) that required plaintiff to provide facts demonstrating “who, what, when, where and how” fraud was perpetrated. Plaintiff’s general allegations that defendant profited from reimbursements of false claims and was reimbursed despite falsity of underlying claim were insufficient under Rule 9(b). Ct. further observed that plaintiff had failed to link any false expense report to any government payment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim, plaintiff’s action, alleging that defendants-holders of plaintiff’s investment accounts breached contract and breached fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff, where defendants honored certain withdrawals made on his investment accounts by plaintiff’s daughter pursuant to power of attorney that plaintiff had granted to her. Terms of power of attorney shielded defendant from liability on breach of contract claim, and although plaintiff asserted that contract required defendant to “supervise and direct investments” with respect to his investment accounts, contract imposed no duty to restrict withdrawals made by plaintiff or his attorney-in-fact. Moreover, same result applied to plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary claim, where plaintiff argued that defendant should not have allowed daughter to make certain withdrawals from his accounts, and where language of power of attorney shielded defendant from liability for daughter’s conduct. Also, defendant had no fiduciary obligation to refuse to carry out transactions authorized by power of attorney.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing plaintiffs’ action, alleging that uConnect infotainment system that was installed in defendants’ 2013-2015 Chrysler cars rendered said vehicles vulnerable to cyber attacks. Record showed that magazine article reported about successful hack via uConnect infotainment system into one of defendant’s vehicles, but no other Chrysler vehicle had been subsequently hacked, and plaintiff’s theory of case was that, although alleged defect never manifested itself after hack that was reported in magazine article, plaintiffs nevertheless suffered “overpayment” injury. Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to bring instant lawsuit, where: (1) defendant filed motion to dismiss after completion of discovery and argued, as factual matter, that plaintiffs lacked standing; and (2) plaintiffs failed to point to any evidence of legally cognizable injury to support their overpayment theory, but rather relied on allegations in complaint and legal argument. Fact that Dist. Ct. had previously denied defendant’s motion to dismiss that made facial challenge to plaintiffs’ lack of standing did not require different result, since facial challenges attack standing only on pleadings. Also, plaintiffs could not rely on expert who quantified loss of value related to information about hack to establish their standing, since plaintiffs failed to provide said evidence to Dist. Ct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants used excessive force by shooting and killing plaintiffs’ decedent during encounter at police station. Record showed that: (1) decedent was placed in rear seat of squad car and was handcuffed behind his back; (2) decedent was able to maneuver himself so that his hands were now in front; (3) decedent stuck both his hands under his shirt and implied that he had gun when he repeatedly stated that he would “do it;” (4) once officers arrived at police station defendant refused to come out of squad car; (5) officers broke out rear windshield of squad car to obtain better view of decedent, who looked like he was holding something to his chin; (6) decedent came out of squad car through rear windshield opening and kept right hand concealed under his shirt; (7) decedent refused officers’ requests to expose his right hand and began to run to exit door where other officers were standing; (8) K-9 dog grabbed hold of decedent, who was now lying prone on ground; and (9) officer shot decedent (who was unarmed) 8 times after officer heard what he thought was gunshot. Ct. of Appeals found that use of deadly force was reasonable, where decedent had intentionally communicated to officers that he was armed and not afraid to “do it,” and where decedent had rushed toward exit door. Moreover, plaintiff had failed to put forth any cases that established violation of decedent’s constitutional rights, and thus defendants-officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff-prisoner’s motion to amend his complaint for third time in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-certain prison officials failed to protect him from assault by another prisoner. Plaintiff’s original complaint, as well as first two amendments asserted that plaintiff had told guards stationed in his housing unit that another inmate had threatened him, and plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed for failure of plaintiff to name correctional officers some two years after lawsuit had been filed. In his proposed third amended complaint, plaintiff changed his theory of the case and alleged that two intake clerks had obscured his report of his PTSD condition, and that said clerks had failed to make other officers aware of his PTSD condition that made him more vulnerable to attacks by other prisoners. Dist. Ct. could properly deny plaintiff’s request to file third-amended complaint, where third-amended complaint failed to allege viable theory of liability, where: (1) plaintiff could not plausibly allege that reasonable officers in intake officers’ position would have known about specific risk to plaintiff by other inmate at time of their purportedly wrongful conduct; and (2) first threat to plaintiff from inmate who assaulted him came after intake clerks’ involvement with plaintiff had ended. Fact that plaintiff was housed in general population while suffering from PTSD is not particular enough risk to support failure-to-protect claim.

Ct. of Appeals denied defendants’ request for costs as prevailing parties on appeal, where defendants made request that costs be assessed against plaintiffs’ next friends, instead of plaintiffs, who were children and actual appellees in instant appeal. Defendants’ request is improper, since Rule 39(a)(3) states that: “if a judgment is reversed, costs are taxed against the appellee.” Accordingly, because of children’s status as appellees, defendants could only seek costs against children and not against their agents, such as their lawyers, guardians ad litem and next friends.

Ct. of Appeals vacated Dist. Ct.’s Rule 54(b) partial final judgment that concerned Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of third-party plaintiff’s action against plaintiff’s employer, where third-party plaintiff sought damages for spoilation of evidence, under circumstances where: (1) plaintiff filed products-liability action against defendants-who had designed and installed winch system that plaintiff claimed had caused his personal injuries when cable within winch system broke; and (2) third-party plaintiff, who was also defendant in products liability action, asserted that employer had lost operative parts of winch system, which, according to third-party plaintiff, had hindered its defense in plaintiff’s products-liability action. Plaintiff’s products-liability action was still pending at time instant Rule 54(b) was entered, and Dist. Ct. dismissed spoilation action, after noting that plaintiff had settled his claim against employer and found that employer’s contribution payments to plaintiff were enough to discharge all of employer’s liabilities related to plaintiff’s injuries. Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct.’s certification of appealability under Rule 54(b) of spoilation claim’s dismissal was improper, since plaintiff’s product-liability action and spoilation action were intertwined, and thus outside bounds of Rule 54(b), especially where spoilation claim depended on whether third-party’s defense in products-liability claim was actually hamstrung by loss of physical evidence. As such, third-party plaintiff must wait until products-liability claims are resolved before appealing dismissal of spoilation claim.