Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants- City and police officer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that officer violated his 4th Amendment rights by arresting him on DUI charge without probable cause and denying him medical care. Record showed that officer came upon one-car accident scene involving plaintiff, who appeared to officer as being confused, had bouts of slurred speech, had bloodied and glassy eyes, had difficulty in balancing, made certain bizarre statements, and failed multiple field sobriety tests. Moreover, plaintiff, who had incurred seizure prior to accident, stated that he was fine and “no” when asked if he needed medical assistance. Officer then arrested plaintiff and took him to station where he passed Breathalyzer test. Officer then took plaintiff to local hospital for more sensitive testing and then booked plaintiff on DUI charge back at police station. Plaintiff was then released, but not before incurring another seizure at police station. Officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on DUI charge, even though he had passed Breathalyzer test, where, due to plaintiff conduct at accident scene, officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was under influence of alcohol or another intoxicant. Also, plaintiff could not proceed on any failure to provide medical care claim, where plaintiff was unable to show that officer was aware of his initial seizure, since plaintiff responded “no” when asked if he needed medical assistance, and since there was no evidence indicating that officer was otherwise aware that plaintiff had incurred seizure prior to accident or was susceptible to seizures.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-correctional officers’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants unlawfully arrested plaintiff in 2016. Basis of defendants’ motion was their contention that said lawsuit was barred by language contained in 2017 releases in settlements of plaintiff’s prior 2014 section 1983 actions that concerned plaintiff’s claims that different Cook County jail correctional officers had failed to protect him and used excessive force. Dist. Ct. could properly find that language in 2017 settlements of first lawsuits that released Cook County and its employees from “any and all claims,” covered instant lawsuit, even though 2016 arrest at issue in instant lawsuit occurred after events at issue in first lawsuits, but prior to execution of 2017 settlements of first lawsuits. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that his claims against instant defendants were not contemplated at time he signed 2017 settlement agreements, after noting that settlement agreements contained “general release,” which covered all claims, which plaintiff as signing party had actual knowledge or claims that he could have discovered upon reasonable inquiry.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-correctional officers’ motions for summary judgment in plaintiff-deceased inmate’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his diabetic ketoacidosis condition that eventually resulted in inmate’s death. Record showed that: (1) in hours prior to inmate’s death inmate exhibited symptoms of diabetic ketoacidosis; (2) jail nurse denied inmate timely medical care because nurse believed that inmate was faking his condition; (3) nurse assured instant defendants, who were tasked with relocating inmate away from medical unit, that inmate’s vitals were in normal range; and (4) relying on nurse’s judgment, defendants declined to intervene and proceeded to relocate inmate, believing that inmate’s refusal to follow orders was not based on any medically induced incapacity. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because they were entitled to refer to judgment of nurse as medical professional.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his back condition, and that defendants-prison doctor and prison nurse deprived him of due process by prescribing him psychiatric drugs without his permission, where Dist. Ct. based its dismissal on belief that plaintiff’s claims had been misjoined. Ct. of Appeals held that plaintiff had satisfied permissive joinder requirements set forth in Rule 20(a)(2), where: (1) both his claims related to series of events that concerned plaintiff’s back condition, his attempts to receive medical treatment, his appointment with prison nurse, his prescriptions written by prison doctor and his conflicts with correctional officers about taking prescribed psychiatric drugs; and (2) both claims presented common question regarding condition of plaintiff’s back. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in denying defendant’s request for appointment of counsel at PLRA screening stage, where plaintiff claims were not complex, and plaintiff’s pleadings were cogent.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs=prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that prison’s policy of housing two inmates in single-person cell violated their 8th Amendment rights. While Dist. Ct. based dismissal on belief that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by neglecting to file internal grievance that raised double-cell issue prior to filing instant lawsuit, remand was required because Dist. Ct. failed to consider threshold issue as to whether exhaustion was required, as described in Ross, 578 U.S. 643, where plaintiffs provided some evidence that filing grievance was “dead end,” because other inmates who raised same issue had obtained no response from defendants. Thus, on remand, Dist. Ct. must allow limited discovery to determine whether exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required because no such remedies were “available” to plaintiffs because filing grievance would have been useless act. If so, defendants’ summary judgment motion should be denied. However, if Dist. Ct. finds that administrative remedies were available, then exhaustion requirement would apply to plaintiffs.

Dist Ct. erred in dismissing on merits plaintiff’s action under Illinois Ethics Act, 5 ILCS 430, after finding that defendant-state agency enjoyed 11th Amendment immunity, but not with respect to instant state court action. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff filed certain federal court claims, as well as instant state-court Illinois Ethics Act claim, arising out of his termination from defendant; (2) defendant asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to instant Ethics Act claim; (3) Dist. Ct. found that it had jurisdiction over federal court claims and supplemental jurisdiction over Ethics Act claim. and that defendant was immune under Eleventh Amendment, but that defendant had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity only with respect to state court and not federal court; and (4) Dist. Ct. granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on merits with respect to his Ethics Act claim. Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to defendant from plaintiff’s Ethics Act action in federal court, and Ct. of Appeals, in remanding matter back to Dist. Ct. for entry of order dismissing Ethics Act claim without prejudice, found that when it applies, Eleventh Amendment deprived Dist. Ct. of jurisdiction over claims against immune defendants, and thus lacked power to enter summary judgment on plaintiff's Ethics Act claim.

Dist Ct. did not err in dismissing on timeliness grounds plaintiff-employee’s action, alleging that defendant-employer violated Stored Communications Act (Act) by confronting and disciplining plaintiff after discovering on co-worker’s work computer certain Facebook messages authored by plaintiff that had disparaged plaintiff’s bosses. Relevant limitations period required that plaintiff file instant lawsuit within two years after date upon which plaintiff first discovered or had reasonable opportunity to discover violation of said Act, and appropriate accrual rule required that plaintiff file instant lawsuit within two years when reasonable person would have begun investigation in case. As such, instant lawsuit that was file in March of 2021 was untimely, since: (1) plaintiff was shown by her supervisor screenshots of instant messages in meeting in January of 2019 when supervisor told plaintiff that said messages came from co-worker’s work computer; and (2) said meeting with supervisor was enough to alert reasonable person to investigate supervisor’s knowledge about plaintiff’s Facebook messages, so as to begin applicable limitations period lawsuit untimely. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that her claim accrued at later date, because she was afraid in January of 2019 that she would be terminated if she had investigated violation of Act at that time.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction in their section 1983 action, alleging that Indiana’s statutory scheme that required abortion providers to dispose of fetal remains by either burial or cremation, but allowed women to take custody of said fetal remains and to dispose of them as they pleased violated First Amendment. Ct. of Appeals found that there was no First Amendment violation, where instant statutory scheme did not require women who obtained abortions to violate any religious or secular belief. Moreover, requirement that physicians and other providers tell patrons about their statutory options does not offend First Amendment, where there is no contention that notice required by statute contained false or misleading information. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ claim that statutory scheme violated First Amendment, because it implies that fetus is actual person, which is viewpoint that they do not share.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated Brady by suppressing police report suggesting that someone else committed shootings at issue in plaintiff’s criminal conviction that was eventually vacated. Plaintiff’s allegation in his complaint that prosecutor was aware of said report was judicial admission that precluded plaintiff from establishing civil Brady violation with respect to police defendants. Moreover, even without judicial admission, plaintiff could not show that any defendant acted either intentionally or recklessly, where: (1) two defendants were not aware of said report; (2) one defendant who was aware of said report testified that he only mistakenly failed to bring report to prosecutor’s attention; and (3) plaintiff’s ability to cast doubt on said defendant’s version of facts did not produce evidence that opposite of said defendant’s version of facts is true or that he acted intentionally. Dist. Ct. also did not err in failing to grant plaintiff’s motion to file amended complaint that removed allegation that prosecutor was aware of said report prior to trial, where said motion was not filed until after summary judgment motion was filed. With respect to other reports or identifications, Ct. of Appeals found that either prosecution was aware of said evidence, which precluded plaintiff from obtaining recovery under civil Brady claim, or that defendant and prosecution were aware of said evidence, which also precluded plaintiff from recovery.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant subjected him to false arrest on drug distribution charges by arresting him without probable cause. Record showed that defendant arrested plaintiff pursuant to arrest warrant, and thus plaintiff faced uphill battle to overcome presumption of validity accorded to warrant and information underlying it. Moreover, while plaintiff asserted that Myers lied in his warrant application by stating that confidential informant identified plaintiff from plaintiff’s driver’s license photograph as drug seller, plaintiff could only muster bare allegations that defendant had lied on his warrant application, which was insufficient to overcome presumption that arrest warrant was valid and that his arrest was supported by probable cause. Ct. further noted that without plaintiff's driver’s license in record, it could only guess as to whether reasonable officer in defendant’s position would have found plaintiff’s match to drug seller or whether defendant had made false statements in his warrant application.