Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in decertifying class action under circumstances where class of disabled inmates who sought use of prison showers and toilets, but could not do so because said facilities lacked grab bars and other fixtures, had previously been certified. Dist. Ct. held belief that certification was not appropriate because some members of class, although using wheelchairs, might not be disabled within meaning of federal law. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that certification was appropriate, since class certification under Rule 23(c0(4) would only resolve legal issue as to whether said prison facilities require grab bars and other fixtures. As such, once instant legal issue has been resolved, Dist. Ct. can resolve whether each class member would be entitled to any relief. Also, Dist. Ct. failed to explain why application of Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards, which require accessible toilets and showers, could not be applied class-wide.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff-prisoner’s Bivens claims against defendants-federal judges, prosecutor, defendant’s court-appointed counsel and court reporter, alleging that said defendants mishandled his 2014 federal drug crimes trial. Judges and prosecutor were absolutely immune from instant lawsuit, and defendant’s claim against court-reporter for producing transcript with errors did not arise under either Fourth, Fifth or Eighth Amendment for purposes of bringing Bivens claim. Also, plaintiff’s lawsuit against his court-appointed counsel fell outside contours of Bivens action, where said counsel did not act under color of law.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing at pleading stage plaintiff-prisoner’s action, alleging violations of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act, where plaintiff, who was confined to wheelchair and incontinent, defecated on himself on three occasions when he could not use handicapped restroom. Record showed that at times plaintiff attempted to use handicapped restroom, it was occupied by non-disabled inmate, and that each time plaintiff complained to defendants-prison officials about lack of access to restroom, his grievances resulted in prison staff merely saying that they could not reserve restroom time for him or control actions taken by other inmates. Instant complaint was sufficient to allege ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations, where: (1) plaintiff’s confinement to wheelchair and his incontinence rendered him disabled under both statutes; (2) plaintiff plausibly alleged that defendants intentionally denied him prison service or program, i.e., use of handicap-accessible restroom; and (3) plaintiff plausibly alleged that defendants breached their obligation of accommodating his disability by failing to ensure reasonable access to handicapped restroom.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants-police officers’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants had failed to disclose existence of agreement between defendants and non-citizen victim to help victim apply for U visa in exchange for victim’s testimony at plaintiff’s criminal trial. Ct. of Appeals held that finding of qualified immunity was not appropriate at early stage of instant lawsuit, where it was not evident based on allegations in complaint that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and where discovery was necessary to determine whether defendants had informed prosecution about alleged agreement. In such case, Ct. of Appeals held, defendants could not be liable, since ultimate disclosure obligation would have rested on prosecutors and not on defendants.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-insurance company’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-insured’s breach of contract claim arising out of defendant’s failure to defend plaintiff in underlying intellectual-property action, under circumstances where plaintiff had previously prevailed in state-court action under declaratory-judgment statute (735 ILCS 5/2-701(c)) that concerned similar duty to defend plaintiff in same underlying action, and where plaintiff had received certain incidental relief in prior action. Record showed that: (1) prior declaratory action did not allow plaintiff to receive consequential damages or certain fees arising out of defendant’s failure to defend plaintiff in underlying lawsuit; (2) plaintiff subsequently filed in state and federal courts similar breach of contract claims that sought consequential damages arising out of defendant’s failure to defend plaintiff in same underlying action; and (3) state court eventually granted plaintiff’s voluntary motion to dismiss state-court action and expressly reserved plaintiff’s ability to proceed on his federal court breach of contract action. While Dist. Ct. granted defendant’s motion to dismiss on claim and issue preclusion grounds, claim preclusion did not apply, where second state-court action expressly reserved plaintiff’s ability to proceed on instant breach of contract action. Moreover, issue preclusion did not apply, where certain consequential damages and fees sought in instant breach of contract claim could not have been asserted in prior declaratory relief action.

Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) claim against defendant-bank, alleging that defendant had failed to investigate two credit reporting disputes regarding plaintiff’s loan payments. Plaintiff was required to show injury that was something more than statutory violation for purposes of Article III standing, and plaintiff’s alleged injury in form of lower credit score was not traceable to defendant’s alleged failure to investigate, where subject disputes arose from notices that were issued in January of 2012, while plaintiff’s alleged drop in credit score occurred in November of 2011. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly grant defendant’s summary judgment motion with respect to plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of fiduciary claims, where plaintiff’s proffered evidence of his damages was only speculative.

Dist. Ct. did not err in only partially granting plaintiff’s request for $200,000 in attorney’s fees as prevailing party in Fair Labor Standards Act claim, where Dist. Ct. awarded only $70,000 in fees. Dist. Ct. could properly reduce plaintiff’s counsel’s requested billing rate of $450 per hour to $350 per hour and could properly strike time spent by counsel in: (1) litigating counsel’s ability to act as class counsel; (2) time spent generating second motion for summary judgment; and (3) performing paralegal work in calculating damages. Also, Dist. Ct. could reduce lodestar figure to reflect fact that plaintiff’s counsel failed in lawsuit’s primary goal of obtaining judgment on behalf of class and collective. Ct. further noted that additional reduction in fee award was reasonable, where plaintiffs recovered only $60,000 out of $103,500 sought in claimed damages.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction on lack of finality grounds to consider propriety of Dist. Ct.’s order denying company’s motion to quash administrative warrant issued by Dist. Ct. at request of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) seeking to inspect company’s premises after employee of company made telephonic complaint about forklift accident. Record showed that Dist. Ct.’s denial of motion to quash was not final under 28 USC section 1291, where there remained pending in Dist. Ct. OSHA’s motion for contempt against company regarding company’s failure to comply with warrant, as well as OSHA’s motion to toll limitations period. Ct. rejected company’s claim that exception to finality rule applied, where Ct. observed that company had opportunity to raise propriety regarding issuance of warrant in pending contempt proceeding.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-jail probation officers’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-pretrial detainee’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his due process rights by authorizing his continued detention for period of four days after they were either aware or should have been aware that he was not person identified in 2015 arrest warrant that formed basis of his detention. Record showed that plaintiff’s brother had lied to police in 2015 and identified himself by giving them name and birth date of his brother (plaintiff), and 2015 arrest warrant was subsequently issued in plaintiff’s name when his brother failed to report for probation. Plaintiff was subsequently arrested on unrelated offense, but was held on 2015 arrest warrant. On next day, plaintiff’s girlfriend told defendants that they had wrong person in custody, that plaintiff’s brother was actual person subject to warrant, and that plaintiff was on parole in Pennsylvania at time of issuance of 2015 arrest warrant in Wisconsin. While defendants did not release plaintiff until 4 days later, plaintiff failed to show any due process violation, where: (1) defendants took steps to investigate girlfriend’s claim, and (2) plaintiff failed to show that defendants ignored evidence, and defendants otherwise could properly take steps to verify girlfriend’s information. Fact that defendants might have been negligent in delaying confirmation that plaintiff was wrong person in custody was insufficient to establish due process claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to remand its breach of contract action back to state court that had been removed to federal court and then granting defendants’ motion to dismiss instant case based on arbitration clause contained in said contract. Dist. Ct. could properly reject plaintiff’s claim that removal, which occurred months after case had been filed and certain discovery had occurred, was untimely, where: (1) complaint did not specify amount in controversy; (2) instant removal occurred seven days after plaintiff’s counsel emailed defendants' counsel with statement that plaintiff was seeking $250,000 in damages; and (3) said email was first notice that case was removable, and thus removal was timely, since it occurred within 30 days of said notice. Fact that defendants filed in state court motion to dismiss and began discovery prior to removing case did not constitute waiver of any right to remove case. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing case based on arbitration clause, where plaintiff’s claims came within scope of said clause. Moreover, plaintiff’s contention that defendants had fraudulently misrepresented subject-matter of contract did not require different result, where plaintiff never claimed that it was fraudulently induced into agreeing to arbitrate said issue.