Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals denied plaintiffs-appellants’ “Motion Requesting Judicial Notice” under Rule 201, where plaintiffs wanted to substitute current Indiana Secretary of State (Diego Morales) for prior Indiana Secretary of State, who was named party in instant case, and where plaintiffs sought judicial notice as to Morales’s position on enforcement of specific campaign finance laws. Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice regarding substitution of Morales as party in case was not necessary as said substitution was governed by Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) and happens automatically. Moreover, plaintiffs could not seek judicial notice with respect to Morales’s position on enforcement of specific campaign finance laws, since likelihood that Morales would enforce said laws was open to debate, and thus was not adjudicative fact that was not subject to reasonable dispute. Also, plaintiffs could not attempt to highlight any gap in evidentiary record via filing of instant motion, since record speaks for itself.

Dist Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s motion for return of forfeited property under Rule 41(g). Record showed that DEA agents seized $146,000 in cash found in plaintiff’s car, which agents deemed to be drug proceeds, and subsequently filed action to administratively forfeit said funds under 21 USC section 881(a)(6), Instead of filing “claim” with DEA to contest forfeiture, plaintiff’s counsel filed petition for remission. After deadline for filing claim had elapsed, DEA issued declaration of forfeiture, which precipitated plaintiff’s motion to return forfeited property. While Dist. Ct. found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s motion, Ct. of Appeals held that Dist. Ct. had jurisdiction to consider said motion under 28 USC section 1355. However, plaintiff’s motion failed on merits, where: (1) Rule 41(g) is not proper vehicle for challenging administrative forfeiture; and (2) counsel’s mistake in filing wrong pleading was not sufficient circumstance that would allow courts to exercise their equitable powers to override instant statutory requirement for filing timely claim. Also, 18 USC section 983(e) , which allows individuals to file motion to set aside declaration of forfeiture only if individual never received notice of government intent to forfeit property, did not apply to plaintiff’s circumstances.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for new trial, where said motion was based on claim that Dist. Ct. erred in excluding from jury, opinion of plaintiff’s expert that defendant’s forklift, from which plaintiff fell, was negligently designed because it failed to include as standard feature door to enclose operating compartment. While Dist. Ct. held that plaintiff’s expert opinion about absence of door was inadmissible because it did not satisfy Rule 702 or satisfy test set forth in Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, Ct. of Appeals found that expert’s opinion was admissible, where: (1) expert had extensive training and experience in failure analysis; and (2) expert’s methodology in visiting accident site and reviewing forklift data was scientifically valid. Fact that expert’s opinion had been rejected in other cases did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. granted plaintiff-Chinese entity’s motion for summary judgment against defendant-U.S. citizen in action seeking enforcement of Chinese court’s entry of default judgment in contract claim filed by plaintiff against defendant. Ct. of Appeals, though, remanded matter back to Dist. Ct. for new determination of its diversity jurisdiction in matter, where record failed to contain competent proof regarding plaintiff’s citizenship and citizenship of one of plaintiff’s partners. Specifically, while employee of plaintiff generated declaration that plaintiff was domiciled in Chinese province, said declaration was insufficient to establish diversity jurisdiction, since partnerships do not have domiciles for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, there was no evidence in record that established citizenship of each of plaintiff’s four Chinese LLC partners. Also, remand was required to provide more detailed evidence to: (1) support plaintiff’s contention that all four of instant Chinese LLCs should be treated as corporations for purposes of obtaining diversity jurisdiction; and (2) clarify whether one LLC could qualify as “foreign state” due to its partial ownership by Chinese state-owned entity.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing lawsuit filed by plaintiff-owner of “drop-in auto sear” device in action seeking declaration that plaintiff was entitled to possess and keep said device that he currently possesses. Record showed that plaintiff purchased said device, which can make firearms fully automatic, at time when he could lawfully purchase and possess said device. However, in 1981 defendant-Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) generated regulation that required owners of said device to register said device, and in 1986 Gun Control Act imposed ban in individuals transferring or possessing instant unregistered device. In instant action, plaintiff sought as remedy either order directing ATF to exempt his device from any registration requirement, or, in alternative, to create amnesty period during which plaintiff and others could register pre-1981 devices. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that neither proposed remedy was possible, and thus, where plaintiff lacked valid claim for compensation and lacked properly stated claim, instant lawsuit must be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state valid claim. Ct. also noted that while it was not making ruling as to whether plaintiff could properly file instant lawsuit under pseudonym (in order to remain anonymous to prevent any future criminal prosecution), plaintiff was still required to comply with Circuit Rule 26.1, which mandates that anonymous litigants reveal true name on disclosure statement and file said statement under seal.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that certain prison guards violated his constitutional rights while responding to his altercation with another prison guard, where basis for ruling was Dist. Ct.’s belief that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit. Applicable rule required that plaintiff submit grievance to Ill. Department of Corrections’ Administrative Board. While record showed that plaintiff’s attorney timely mailed said grievance to Board, Board returned grievance, after noting that only plaintiff himself was permitted to submit his grievance. Ct. of Appeals, in vacating Dist. Ct.’s order, found that applicable rule did not prohibit prisoner from submitting grievance through his attorney. As such, plaintiff had timely complied with applicable rule, where record showed that his attorney timely mailed grievance to Board, and that Board had actually received grievance.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants- City and police officer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that officer violated his 4th Amendment rights by arresting him on DUI charge without probable cause and denying him medical care. Record showed that officer came upon one-car accident scene involving plaintiff, who appeared to officer as being confused, had bouts of slurred speech, had bloodied and glassy eyes, had difficulty in balancing, made certain bizarre statements, and failed multiple field sobriety tests. Moreover, plaintiff, who had incurred seizure prior to accident, stated that he was fine and “no” when asked if he needed medical assistance. Officer then arrested plaintiff and took him to station where he passed Breathalyzer test. Officer then took plaintiff to local hospital for more sensitive testing and then booked plaintiff on DUI charge back at police station. Plaintiff was then released, but not before incurring another seizure at police station. Officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on DUI charge, even though he had passed Breathalyzer test, where, due to plaintiff conduct at accident scene, officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was under influence of alcohol or another intoxicant. Also, plaintiff could not proceed on any failure to provide medical care claim, where plaintiff was unable to show that officer was aware of his initial seizure, since plaintiff responded “no” when asked if he needed medical assistance, and since there was no evidence indicating that officer was otherwise aware that plaintiff had incurred seizure prior to accident or was susceptible to seizures.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-correctional officers’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants unlawfully arrested plaintiff in 2016. Basis of defendants’ motion was their contention that said lawsuit was barred by language contained in 2017 releases in settlements of plaintiff’s prior 2014 section 1983 actions that concerned plaintiff’s claims that different Cook County jail correctional officers had failed to protect him and used excessive force. Dist. Ct. could properly find that language in 2017 settlements of first lawsuits that released Cook County and its employees from “any and all claims,” covered instant lawsuit, even though 2016 arrest at issue in instant lawsuit occurred after events at issue in first lawsuits, but prior to execution of 2017 settlements of first lawsuits. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that his claims against instant defendants were not contemplated at time he signed 2017 settlement agreements, after noting that settlement agreements contained “general release,” which covered all claims, which plaintiff as signing party had actual knowledge or claims that he could have discovered upon reasonable inquiry.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-correctional officers’ motions for summary judgment in plaintiff-deceased inmate’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his diabetic ketoacidosis condition that eventually resulted in inmate’s death. Record showed that: (1) in hours prior to inmate’s death inmate exhibited symptoms of diabetic ketoacidosis; (2) jail nurse denied inmate timely medical care because nurse believed that inmate was faking his condition; (3) nurse assured instant defendants, who were tasked with relocating inmate away from medical unit, that inmate’s vitals were in normal range; and (4) relying on nurse’s judgment, defendants declined to intervene and proceeded to relocate inmate, believing that inmate’s refusal to follow orders was not based on any medically induced incapacity. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because they were entitled to refer to judgment of nurse as medical professional.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his back condition, and that defendants-prison doctor and prison nurse deprived him of due process by prescribing him psychiatric drugs without his permission, where Dist. Ct. based its dismissal on belief that plaintiff’s claims had been misjoined. Ct. of Appeals held that plaintiff had satisfied permissive joinder requirements set forth in Rule 20(a)(2), where: (1) both his claims related to series of events that concerned plaintiff’s back condition, his attempts to receive medical treatment, his appointment with prison nurse, his prescriptions written by prison doctor and his conflicts with correctional officers about taking prescribed psychiatric drugs; and (2) both claims presented common question regarding condition of plaintiff’s back. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in denying defendant’s request for appointment of counsel at PLRA screening stage, where plaintiff claims were not complex, and plaintiff’s pleadings were cogent.