Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct.’s entry of order dismissing without prejudice petitioner-prisoner’s habeas petition due to petitioner’s failure to exhaust his state-court remedies constituted final and appealable judgment and overruled two cases, Garcia, 792 F.ed 732 and Moore, 368 F.3d 754 that held to contrary. Also, instant appeal was not moot, even though petitioner had been released from prison, where petitioner remained on parole, and petitioner’s claim that he was wrongfully denied good-time credits, if successful, could affect time spent on parole. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing petitioner’s habeas petition, where record showed that petitioner could have pursued his good-time credit restoration claim in state court.
Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to pursue their claims, alleging that defendant-Governor issued series of COVID-19-related executive orders that required Illinois citizens to shelter in place at their residences, compelled non-essential businesses to temporarily cease or reduce their operations and prohibited gatherings of more than 10 people, which, according to plaintiffs, violated their First Amendment rights, as well as their due process and equal protection rights and violated 5th Amendment Takings Clause. Plaintiffs failed to allege type of concrete and particularized injuries required to establish standing, where plaintiffs only made vague allegations such as being subjected to “severe restrictions on their religious liberty,” as well as restrictions on their right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assembly that did not contain any allegation that was specific to particular plaintiff or that described concrete harm. Moreover, while business plaintiffs had standing to pursue Takings Clause claim, where said plaintiffs alleged financial harm arising out of defendant’s executive orders, said plaintiffs failed to allege viable Takings Clause claim, where plaintiffs failed to allege specific facts that showed that defendant’s orders deprived them of all or significant part of their economically beneficial use of their properties.
Dist. Ct. erred in denying class member’s objection to attorney fee award of 25 percent of class action’s $45 million settlement in instant security fraud case. While Dist. Ct. found that proposed 25 percent attorney fee for class counsel was reasonable based on contingent nature of litigation and successful result for class, remand was required for new determination of fee award, where, although class counsel was deserving of multi-million dollar fee, Dist. Ct: (1) did not consider existence of ex ante fee agreement between class counsel and third-party that concerned similar litigation, since said agreement could serve as useful guidepost for determining market rate with respect to instant lawsuit; (2) did not properly consider lower risk of nonpayment, where prior litigation concerning defendant on similar issues had resulted in substantial settlements; and (3) did not give sufficient weight to fact that instant settlement took place at early stage of case so as to warrant reduction in proposed fee.
Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioning intervenor’s motion to intervene in plaintiff’s civil rights case, under circumstances where: (1) plaintiff alleged that his civil rights were violated when he was detained overnight on out-of-county warrant for another person who had same name and was not permitted to post bail; and (2) petitioning intervenor filed intervention motion on same day that plaintiff had stipulated to dismissal of his case without prejudice and with leave to reinstate case. Dist. Ct. could properly find that motion to intervene was untimely, since: (1) plaintiff had brought case as individual claim and had never alleged case as class action; (2) Dist. Ct. had previously rejected plaintiff’s attempt to bring class action arising out of police treatment of similarly-situated individuals; and (3) petitioning intervenor could not have otherwise relied on plaintiff to protect his interests in instant case so as to excuse instant delay in filing intervention motion, where plaintiff had not brought his case as class action.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ (County investigator and County) motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-investigator violated her due process rights by withholding exculpatory evidence, fabricating inculpatory evidence and testifying falsely at her trial on arson charges. Record showed that: (1) investigator was investigating source of fire at plaintiff’s home, and after initially finding that fire was caused by electrical problem, eventually found that plaintiff had caused fire after listening to recording generated by third-party that indicated that plaintiff had caused fire; and (2) after plaintiff was found guilty of said arson charges, said charges were eventually dismissed, where record suggested that third-party had generated said recording for purposes of extorting plaintiff. With respect to plaintiff’s claim that investigator either withheld different telephone recording generated by plaintiff, investigator testified that although he attempted to record said phone call, he was unsuccessful in doing so. As such, there was no Brady violation, where: (1) plaintiff could not establish that said recording ever existed; and (2) plaintiff failed to show that said recording was material. Plaintiff also failed to establish that investigator fabricated any evidence, where: (1) investigator’s failure to include all details of recording in his written summary did not constitute fabricated evidence given summary nature of said report; and (2) plaintiff failed to show how investigation report was otherwise inconsistent or misleading. Moreover, plaintiff could not proceed on her claim that investigator gave false testimony at trial, where investigator enjoyed absolute immunity from liability based on his trail testimony.
Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that he was sexually assaulted by prison guard, where said dismissal was imposed as sanction for plaintiff’s attempt to avoid finding that he had failed to exhaust his prison administrative remedies, under circumstances where plaintiff submitted document that contained forged signature and check mark on grievance form that did not appear in original form. Record amply supported finding that plaintiff knowingly submitted fraudulent grievance form, where alterations all appeared to be hand-written, and dismissal of instant action was reasonable sanction given severity of plaintiff’s conduct. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing 2-year ban on plaintiff filing any civil actions or in dismissing plaintiff’s other pending civil actions, given plaintiff’s prior history of litigation misconduct, which included prior filing ban in different court.
Dist. Ct. erred in failing to grant defendants-Indiana state officials’ motion to dismiss on abstention grounds, plaintiffs’ (ten minors who are or were subject to Indiana CHINS proceedings) action, alleging that defendants violated their due process rights and requesting issuance of injunction with respect to how state investigates child welfare matters prior to CHINS proceedings, when state may or must initiate CHINS proceedings, and what relief state may or must pursue in CHINS court. Dismissal on abstention grounds was required, where record showed that relief sought by plaintiffs currently in CHINS system could be provided in CHINS proceedings, and plaintiffs failed to identify what relief options are open to federal court, but closed to CHINS court. Moreover, it is improper for federal courts to issue injunction requiring state officials to comply with state law.
Dist. Ct. did not err in certifying for class action treatment under Rule 23 plaintiffs-prisoners’ section 1983 action against defendants-22 prison supervisors in various prison facilities, alleging that defendants generated plan in violation of 8th Amendment to conduct prison-wide shakedowns of prisoners, where plaintiffs asserted that planning and executing of plan was designed to inflict pain and humiliation on inmates. Both parties agreed that shakedowns occurred and were executed according to uniform plan under defendants' supervision, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiffs satisfied commonality factor for purposes of class action certification, where plaintiffs alleged that defendants acted pursuant to common policy and implemented same or similar procedures at each prison facility. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly determine that common issues of liability established predominance factor for purposes of class action certification. Ct. rejected defendants’ contention that cases against supervisors are poorly suited for class-wide resolution, where instant case is premised on constitutionality of procedures that were part of plan designed and implemented by defendants.
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s Rule 27 petition seeking to depose member of parent entity of LLC under circumstances where plaintiff wanted to bring federal diversity claim against LLC, and where plaintiff sought to have member identify members of LLC for purpose of obtaining information about their citizenship so as to allow plaintiff to bring federal action. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff could not use Rule 27 to obtain said information, since: (1) Rule 27 requires showing at outset that plaintiff’s case would be cognizable in federal court, and plaintiff could not do so absence knowledge of citizenship of LLC members; and (2) plaintiff failed to show that deposition to elicit member’s testimony was necessary to prevent member’s testimony from being lost. Ct. further noted that purpose of Rule 27 is to perpetuate testimony, and plaintiff could not use Rule 27 to obtain jurisdictional discovery.
Ct. of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s petition for review of Board’s removal order, where petitioner failed to either pay docketing fee or file timely motion to proceed in forma pauperis that contained required affidavit pursuant to Rule 24(b). Record showed that: (1) petitioner’s appellate counsel failed to comply with series of Ct. of Appeal’s orders requiring counsel to pay docketing fee or file motion to proceed in forma pauperis; (2) counsel gave excuse as to his noncompliance by stating that his smart-phone failed to give him notifications of said orders, as well as need to file additional pleading in support of his motion for stay of removal order; (3) Ct. of Appeals rejected counsel’s excuse of smart-phone failure; (4) Ct. of Appeals denied motion for stay due to counsel’s lack of filing supplemental pleading, dismissed petition for review for failure to pay docketing fee or file compliant motion to proceed in forma pauperis and sanctioned appellate counsel $1,000 to due his failure to properly attend to needs of his client. Ct. of Appeals also observed that it had issued 24 rules to show cause against appellate counsel in 12 cases and issued another rule to show in this case that asked why appellate counsel should not be suspended or removed from bar pursuant to Rule 46(b) due to his pattern of non-compliance with court directives.
