Ct. of Appeals denied defendants’ request for costs as prevailing parties on appeal, where defendants made request that costs be assessed against plaintiffs’ next friends, instead of plaintiffs, who were children and actual appellees in instant appeal. Defendants’ request is improper, since Rule 39(a)(3) states that: “if a judgment is reversed, costs are taxed against the appellee.” Accordingly, because of children’s status as appellees, defendants could only seek costs against children and not against their agents, such as their lawyers, guardians ad litem and next friends.
Ct. of Appeals vacated Dist. Ct.’s Rule 54(b) partial final judgment that concerned Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of third-party plaintiff’s action against plaintiff’s employer, where third-party plaintiff sought damages for spoilation of evidence, under circumstances where: (1) plaintiff filed products-liability action against defendants-who had designed and installed winch system that plaintiff claimed had caused his personal injuries when cable within winch system broke; and (2) third-party plaintiff, who was also defendant in products liability action, asserted that employer had lost operative parts of winch system, which, according to third-party plaintiff, had hindered its defense in plaintiff’s products-liability action. Plaintiff’s products-liability action was still pending at time instant Rule 54(b) was entered, and Dist. Ct. dismissed spoilation action, after noting that plaintiff had settled his claim against employer and found that employer’s contribution payments to plaintiff were enough to discharge all of employer’s liabilities related to plaintiff’s injuries. Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct.’s certification of appealability under Rule 54(b) of spoilation claim’s dismissal was improper, since plaintiff’s product-liability action and spoilation action were intertwined, and thus outside bounds of Rule 54(b), especially where spoilation claim depended on whether third-party’s defense in products-liability claim was actually hamstrung by loss of physical evidence. As such, third-party plaintiff must wait until products-liability claims are resolved before appealing dismissal of spoilation claim.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s personal injury action, arising out of 2004 injections of drug Lupron. Illinois’s two-year limitation period applied to plaintiff’s personal injury claims, and record showed that: (1) plaintiff filed her first complaint on April 20, 2010; and (2) variety of personal, legal and medical records showed that as early as 2004, plaintiff believed that Lupron had caused her negative side effects. As such, limitations period started as of that time.
Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s third-amended complaint, alleging that defendant violated 42 USC section 1981 by assigning contract with plaintiff-company to different company on account of plaintiff owner’s race. Dist. Ct. dismissed original complaint on ground that it was filed by plaintiff’s owner who was not licensed attorney. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, which named plaintiff-company and plaintiff’s owner as plaintiffs, was voluntarily dismissed. Second amended complaint, which named only plaintiff’s owner as plaintiff, was subject of motion to dismiss on ground that plaintiff’s owner was not party to any contract with defendant. Dist. Ct. thereafter granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, but granted plaintiff’s owner ability to file third-amended complaint based on owner’s new allegation that defendant had refused to allow assignment of contract to her. Dist. Ct. also conditioned the filing of the third-amended complaint on plaintiff being able to present proof of her new allegation. Plaintiff’s owner filed third-amended complaint that named different entity as plaintiff but made similar allegations against defendant as first complaint. Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss with prejudice third-amended complaint, where: (1) plaintiff’s owner did not comply with prior Dist. Cut’s order, allowing her to file amended complaint alleging failure to assign contract to plaintiff’s owner; (2) third-amended complaint was filed by plaintiff’s owner who was not licensed attorney; and (3) applicable 4-year limitations period for section 1981 actions had expired.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison medical personnel’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by delaying treatment for his ruptured appendix. With respect to defendant-prison doctor, defendant failed to present evidence that doctor was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, even though plaintiff asserted that he experienced delayed treatment for his ruptured appendix and experienced continued ineffective treatment that concerned giving him pain medication, where: (1) prison doctor modified treatment as plaintiff’s symptoms became worse; (2) plaintiff’s blood and urine tests were essentially normal, and plaintiff did not display symptoms associated with ruptured appendix; (3) doctor’s care was not substantial departure from accepted professional judgment; and (4) there was no evidence that prison doctor ever knew of and disregarded substantial risk of appendicitis. Also, defendants-prison nurses were entitled to summary judgment, where: (1) one nurse acted appropriately with respect to initial belief that plaintiff’s pain was caused by pre-existing hernia; and (2) other nurse diligently cared for plaintiff, checked his vitals and relayed necessary information to prison doctor.
Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying proposed intervenors’ motion to intervene in action by plaintiffs seeking vacatur of “Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds Rule (Rule),” that essentially expanded meaning of “public charge” to disqualify broader set of noncitizens from benefits than earlier policies had done, under circumstances, where: (1) in November of 2020 Dist. Ct. had granted plaintiffs’ relief by vacating said Rule under Administrative Procedure Act; (2) in March of 2021, federal government had dismissed appeals defending instant Rule in courts around country; and (3) in May of 2021, proposed intervenors (various States seeking to defend Rule) filed instant motion to intervene. Dist. Ct. could properly find that instant motion to intervene was untimely, where: (1) proposed intervenors were aware by February of 2021 that federal government was going to abandon defense of instant Rule and to seek to promulgate new rule, and yet waited until May of 2021 to file instant motion to intervene; and (2) by mid-March of 2021, Dist. Ct. could reasonably have determined that it was too late to create entirely new lawsuit through intervention of instant proposed intervenors. Ct. of Appeals also noted that: (1) instant proposed intervention would have exposed original parties to entirely new set of issues; (2) proposed intervenors had other avenues to vindicate their interests; and (3) there were no unusual circumstances to justify instant delay in filing motion to intervene.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-FBI agent and Assistant U.S. Attorney’s (AUSA) motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ Bivens action, alleging that defendants violated their 4th Amendment rights by submitting false and misleading affidavit in support of search warrant that led to seizures of plaintiffs’ properties and assets that ultimately resulted in no criminal charges being filed against plaintiffs. While plaintiffs asserted that AUSA knowingly and recklessly assisted defendant-FBI agent in preparing and filing false affidavit, Ct. of Appeals found that said AUSA was entitled to absolute immunity from instant lawsuit, where plaintiffs failed to allege that AUSA acted outside his prosecutorial role in helping to prepare search warrant application after others had gathered relevant evidence and in presenting application to judge. Also, defendant-FBI agent was entitled to qualified immunity where, even if plaintiffs’ allegation that agent withheld certain facts from judge were true, remainder of affidavit still stated facts sufficient to establish probable cause, or at very least, allowed reasonable agent in defendant’s position to believe that said facts amounted to probable cause. Moreover, alleged omitted facts would not have negated finding of probable cause for instant search.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action, alleging that defendant committed fraud with respect to its operation of volleyball club, where, although statements made by defendant with respect to club’s success and qualifications of defendant’s employees were true, defendant failed to inform public that two entities, i.e. Illinois Department of Children and Family Services and USA Volleyball, issued 1995 reports that accused one of defendant’s coaches that in 1981, 1984 and 1987 said coach had sexual intercourse with at least three under-aged girls he was training. While plaintiff contended that Illinois law required that defendant notify all potential customers of contents of said reports, even though said coach had never been charged with crime arising out of said accusations, Dist. Ct. could properly find that dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint was warranted, where she could not establish any injury to support her fraud claim. This is so, Ct. found, where plaintiff had been aware of said reports, and where plaintiff had never asked any employee of defendant about said reports and received false answer. Moreover, plaintiff was required to show that she was in some manner deceived by any misrepresentation of defendant, and she was unable to show that defendant had ever lied to her.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-state court judge and County Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-pre-trial detainees’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants’ failure to conduct bail hearings within 48 to 68 hours of their arrests violated their 4th Amendment rights. Ct. of Appeals found that 4th Amendment does not require bail hearing within either 48 or 68 hours after plaintiffs’ arrests. Ct. further rejected plaintiffs’ claim that absence of bail hearing within 48 hours unfairly harms innocent citizens, where, after 48 hours, bail-eligible detainees have already had probable cause hearing.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action, alleging that she incurred certain injuries due to non-specific defects in devices manufactured by defendants, where physician surgically implanted two transvaginal polypropylene mesh medical devises, i.e., TVT-Secur device to treat plaintiff’s incontinence and Prosima device to treat her prolapse, and where, according to plaintiff, her injuries resulted from erosion of mesh into her bladder, vagina and adjacent tissues. Under plaintiff’s theory of case, she was required to provide evidence that eliminated abnormal use of devices or any secondary causes of her injuries. As such, with respect to TVT-Secur devise, record failed to contain any evidence eliminating abnormal use or secondary causes for plaintiff’s injuries. Moreover, with respect to Prosima device, plaintiff presented no medical evidence that secondary causes offered by defendants’ experts, such as plaintiff’s vaginal atrophy and pelvic floor dysfunction, were not likely sources of her injuries, or that device did not perform as reasonably expected in light of its intended purpose.
