Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-FBI agent and Assistant U.S. Attorney’s (AUSA) motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ Bivens action, alleging that defendants violated their 4th Amendment rights by submitting false and misleading affidavit in support of search warrant that led to seizures of plaintiffs’ properties and assets that ultimately resulted in no criminal charges being filed against plaintiffs. While plaintiffs asserted that AUSA knowingly and recklessly assisted defendant-FBI agent in preparing and filing false affidavit, Ct. of Appeals found that said AUSA was entitled to absolute immunity from instant lawsuit, where plaintiffs failed to allege that AUSA acted outside his prosecutorial role in helping to prepare search warrant application after others had gathered relevant evidence and in presenting application to judge. Also, defendant-FBI agent was entitled to qualified immunity where, even if plaintiffs’ allegation that agent withheld certain facts from judge were true, remainder of affidavit still stated facts sufficient to establish probable cause, or at very least, allowed reasonable agent in defendant’s position to believe that said facts amounted to probable cause. Moreover, alleged  omitted facts would not have negated finding of probable cause for instant search.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action, alleging that defendant committed fraud with respect to its operation of volleyball club, where, although statements made by defendant with respect to club’s success and qualifications of defendant’s employees were true, defendant failed to inform public that two entities, i.e. Illinois Department of Children and Family Services and USA Volleyball, issued 1995 reports that accused one of defendant’s coaches that in 1981, 1984 and 1987 said coach had sexual intercourse with at least three under-aged girls he was training. While plaintiff contended that Illinois law required that defendant notify all potential customers of contents of said reports, even though said coach had never been charged with crime arising out of said accusations, Dist. Ct. could properly find that dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint was warranted, where she could not establish any injury to support her fraud claim. This is so, Ct. found, where plaintiff had been aware of said reports, and where plaintiff had never asked any employee of defendant about said reports and received false answer. Moreover, plaintiff was required to show that she was in some manner deceived by any misrepresentation of defendant, and she was unable to show that defendant had ever lied to her.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-state court judge and County Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-pre-trial detainees’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants’ failure to conduct bail hearings within 48 to 68 hours of their arrests violated their 4th Amendment rights. Ct. of Appeals found that 4th Amendment does not require bail hearing within either 48 or 68 hours after plaintiffs’ arrests. Ct. further rejected plaintiffs’ claim that absence of bail hearing within 48 hours unfairly harms innocent citizens, where, after 48 hours, bail-eligible detainees have already had probable cause hearing.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action, alleging that she incurred certain injuries due to non-specific defects in devices manufactured by defendants, where physician surgically implanted two transvaginal polypropylene mesh medical devises, i.e., TVT-Secur device to treat plaintiff’s incontinence and Prosima device to treat her prolapse, and where, according to plaintiff, her injuries resulted from erosion of mesh into her bladder, vagina and adjacent tissues. Under plaintiff’s theory of case, she was required to provide evidence that eliminated abnormal use of devices or any secondary causes of her injuries. As such, with respect to TVT-Secur devise, record failed to contain any evidence eliminating abnormal use or secondary causes for plaintiff’s injuries. Moreover, with respect to Prosima device, plaintiff presented no medical evidence that secondary causes offered by defendants’ experts, such as plaintiff’s vaginal atrophy and pelvic floor dysfunction, were not likely sources of her injuries, or that device did not perform as reasonably expected in light of its intended purpose.

Dist. Ct. did not err in remanding instant case, alleging violation of Illinois Home Care Act, arising out of COVID-19 death of nursing home resident, even though defendant-nursing home removed instant case to federal court by arguing that case necessarily rested on federal law for purposes of removal under 28 USC section 1441(a), and that it was acting as federal officer for purposes of 28 USC section 1442(a)(1). Mere fact that defendant was subject to orders issued by Centers for Disease Control after pandemic began did not turn defendant, as private entity, into public actor, and Ct. of Appeals noted that plaintiff’s complaint under state law was not arguably preempted by any federal law. Moreover, plaintiff’s lawsuit, which alleged that defendant allowed members of its staff to work while ill and failed to isolate residents who had contracted COVID-19 had nothing to do with any federal statute, for purposes of section 1441. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act preempted all claims under state law related to COVID-19.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-school administrators’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-students’ action, alleging that defendants’ actions in barring plaintiffs from wearing T-shirts bearing images of firearms violated their First Amendment rights. Dist. Ct. found that defendants’ actions were viewpoint neutral and reasonable under standard applicable for speech restrictions in nonpublic forum. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that Dist. Ct. should have used standard set forth in Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, which held that restrictions on student speech are constitutionally permissible if school officials reasonably forecast that speech would materially and substantially disrupt work and discipline of school or invade rights of others. Since standard under Tinker is stricter than test for speech restrictions in nonpublic forums remand was required for new consideration under Tinker test.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff-prisoner’s appeal of Magistrate Judge’s order that only partially granted plaintiff’s motion to unseal certain documents related to government’s application for wiretap warrant. Record showed that plaintiff never sought review of Magistrate Judge’s order with Dist. Ct., and neither plaintiff nor government used direct-appeal procedure under 28 USC section 636(c) by giving consent to entry of final decision by Magistrate Judge.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-University’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs-students’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendant breached contract by failing to remit entire students’ Mandatory Fee during period of time that University shifted to remote learning from in-person instruction during COVID-10 pandemic, even though plaintiffs asserted that failure to remit entire Mandatory Fee, which was used to cover cost of on-campus facilities and programs, violated both Takings Clause of 5th Amendment and Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs could not obtain any monetary award against University, since states and their agencies are not “persons” for purposes of section 1983. Fact that plaintiffs added two individual defendants (University President and Chairperson of its Board) did not require different result, since neither individual was responsible for repayment of Mandatory Fee. Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegations of violation of state-law contract is action lying under state law, and alleged breach of state-law contract does not violate U.S. Constitution.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint, alleging that Indiana Supreme Court decision in Gunderson v. State of Indiana, which held that State of Indiana had exclusive title to Lake Michigan and its shores up to high-water mark, constituted improper judicial taking of their property without compensation, where plaintiffs asserted that property-line should have been set at ordinary low-water mark. Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to pursue instant claim, where, although plaintiff had established personal injury in fact, they failed to show that defendants-state officials either caused their injuries or had ability to redress them, where establishment of relevant property-line arose out of judicial opinion. Ct. further observed that even if plaintiffs had established standing, instant complaint could have been dismissed for failure to state viable judicial taking claim, where plaintiffs failed to allege that low-water mark had been established as relevant property-line prior to Gunderson decision.

Record showed that: (1) Dist. Ct. had denied plaintiff’s motion to add two defendants to plaintiffs’ fraud and breach of contract claim; (2) plaintiffs’ lawsuit resulted in $905,000 judgment in plaintiffs’ favor, although defendants’ motion for new trial remained pending; (3) instead of waiting for lawsuit to become final and to appeal Dist. Ct.’s denial of their request to add two defendants, plaintiffs filed second similar lawsuit against said defendants; and (4) second lawsuit was assigned to different Dist. Ct. judge, who ultimately dismissed second lawsuit on claim preclusion grounds. In plaintiffs’ appeal of dismissal of second lawsuit. Ct. of Appeals, in noting Local Rule 40.4, which permits district court judges to consolidate related cases before single judge, found that: (1) plaintiffs should not be permitted to shop judges by filing second lawsuit; (2) defendants in second lawsuit should have asked for transfer to first lawsuit or stay action in second lawsuit until result in first lawsuit had become final; and (3) second Dist. Ct. judge should have taken steps to see that both lawsuits be handled by one judge. Ct of Appeals, in directing that second lawsuit be remanded for purposes of transferring second lawsuit to Dist. Ct. judge in first lawsuit, observed that second lawsuit was unnecessary, regardless of whether plaintiffs actually prevailed in first lawsuit, where, if plaintiffs did prevail in first lawsuit, they had opportunity to proceed against defendants in second lawsuit in any collection proceeding stemming from first lawsuit.