Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-jail personnel’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-inmate’s estate’s section 1983 action, alleging that: (1) defendants were deliberately indifferent to inmate’s heart condition that eventually led to his death; and (2) defendant-correctional officer used excessive force during incident that occurred within jail. When inmate presented himself to jail, he told personnel that he had history of intravenous drug abuse and had congenital heart defect. While plaintiff asserted that various jail personnel were deliberately indifferent to inmate’s medical needs by failing to diagnose his infective endocarditis condition that resulted in his death, plaintiff could not proceed on said claim, where: (1) symptoms that inmate presented to personnel were consistent with other ailments that inmate had reported to personnel; and (2) actions taken by two other defendants were taken after passing of date of last opportunity to save plaintiff’s life. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in granting defendant-correctional officer’s summary judgment motion on excessive force claim, where: (1) plaintiff had claimed that said defendant used excessive force when he purposely moved his legs while inmate was in medical distress and caused inmate to fall and hit his head on floor; and (2) jury could reasonably conclude that said defendant had maliciously allowed inmate to fall, while intending to cause inmate harm.

Dist. Ct. properly dismissed for failure to state viable cause of action plaintiffs (two Illinois Counties seeking to house immigration detainees) action, alleging that 2021 Illinois statute prohibiting State agencies and political subdivisions from contracting with federal government to house immigration detainees was preempted by certain federal statutes, and that it violated doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. Ct. of Appeals found that instant statute was not invalid as matter of either field or conflict preemption, where: (1) no case law supported plaintiffs’ claim that federal governmental had occupied field of detaining and housing noncitizens; (2) State is free to remove its facilities from list of options; and (3) federal government could not require State’s cooperation with respect to housing noncitizens so as to view instant statute as obstacle to federal law. Also, for purposes of intergovernmental immunity doctrine, instant statute does not impose direct regulation on federal government or serve to discriminate against federal government.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated various constitutional rights under circumstances where his convictions on burglary and sexual assault were ultimately vacated after DNA evidence exoneration plaintiff on charged offenses. Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff could not proceed on claim that defendants violated his due process rights when defendants obtained tentative identification of plaintiff from one victim via photo array and then obtained 32 hours later two lineup identifications of plaintiff as culprit from same victim and another victim. While jury could find that said process of obtaining photo identification and then line-up identifications short time later could be unduly suggestive, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, where plaintiff could not point to any controlling authority that established that such procedure was unduly suggestive. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s Brady claim that defendants failed to disclose fact that another victim in uncharged incident had identified her attacker as being heavy smoker, where such fact was neither exculpatory nor useful to plaintiff who also smoked. Ct further rejected plaintiff’s unlawful detention claim, where defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on charged offenses.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-Village’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-convicted sex offender’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant’s Ordinance, which precluded any person, who had been convicted of sexually violent offense, from moving into Village after September 24. 2018 until certain conditions had been met, violated Ex Post Facto Clause. While Dist Ct., in applying existing Seventh Circuit precedent, found that Ordinance operated only prospectively because it only limited convicted sex offender's current, post-Ordinance enactment date's desire to move into Village, Ct. of Appeals, in overruling Seventh Circuit precedent, found that Ordinance was potentially violative of Ex Post Facto Clause because it was retroactive in sense that Ordinance attached new consequences to events (i.e., plaintiff’s conviction on sex offenses) that were completed prior to Ordinance’s enactment. Remand was required for determination as to whether Ordinance was “punitive” for purposes of application of Ex Post Facto Clause.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant-police officer’s interlocutory appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant failed to intervene in another officer’s use of excessive force on plaintiff during plaintiff’s arrest. Dist. Ct. found that there was evidence supporting plaintiff’s claim that defendant had witnessed other officer both slam handcuffed plaintiff on ground and perform leg sweep on plaintiff, and existence of factual dispute as to whether defendant had realistic opportunity to intervene was question for jury, which precluded defendant from seeking instant interlocutory appeal.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-Governor’s motion under Rule 60(b)(5) to vacate Shakman Decree that had been entered in 1972 to preclude Governor and units of local government from conditioning employment decisions on political patronage. Defendant was able to show that 1972 judgment has been satisfied, where: (1) last significant violation of decree occurred nearly 10 years ago with patronage scandal within Dept. of Transportation, and there was no finding of patronage practices harming individual employees or applicants within last seven years; and (2) Governor’s office has instituted or supported several remedial measures in recent years to minimize risk of political patronage in employment practices. Fact that Dist. Ct. believed defendant could do more to implement Governor’s Employment Plan or that there was still risk of unlawful political patronage did not require different result. Ct. of Appeals also observed that continuing to hold defendant to 1972 consent decree would affront principles of federalism and improperly leave Dist. Ct. with playing role at odds with Case or Controversy limitation in Article III of U.S. Constitution. Dist. Ct., though, is available to consider individual claims alleging unlawful patronage.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of their action under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act involving plaintiffs’ failed attempt to purchase property for worship services, where plaintiffs based reconsideration on argument that was not raised in prior pleadings. Dist. Ct. could properly base denial on fact that plaintiffs could have made same argument prior to Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of their action. Fact that plaintiffs had withstood dismissal in parallel litigation before different Dist. Ct. judge in same federal district did not constitute extraordinary circumstance that would warrant Rule 60(b) relief.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim plaintiffs-parents’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-various state and county officials, children’s hospital, and children’s home, violated their rights to familial integrity, free exercise of religion and due process of law by removing two children from their home and placing them in other residential settings that hindered their ability to raise them in accordance with their Orthodox Jewish faith. Dist. Ct. dismissed certain claims with respect to one child because they accrued prior to applicable six-year limitation period. With respect to other child, plaintiffs, who sued child’s guardian and social worker, only alleged that said individuals authorized release of child’s medical records and approved child’s stay at youth shelter, which did not serve to deprive plaintiffs of their right to familiar integrity or free exercise of religion. Also, social worker was entitled to absolute immunity when she sought successful court order for intervention in child’s case that led to placement of child outside plaintiff’s home. Too, plaintiffs could not proceed against defendants-County or child welfare agency, where plaintiffs failed to establish existence of either express policy or unwritten practice that could subject either entity to liability under Monell.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated their 4th and 1st Amendment rights during incident where police had received 9-1-1 call indicating that defendants had followed victim to her property and refused to leave even though victim had directed them to do so. While defendants arrested plaintiffs on obstruction of justice charges based on plaintiffs failure to provide defendants with identifications when defendants confronted plaintiffs on victim’s property, said refusal was insufficient to establish probable cause for obstruction charge. However, defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs on criminal trespass charge based on victim’s statements to police. As such, plaintiffs could not proceed on their 4th Amendment charge, where there was probable cause to arrest them on at least one charge. Also, plaintiffs could not proceed on their First Amendment claim arising out of their arrests on obstruction charge, where: (1) defendants had probable cause to arrest them on criminal trespass charge; and (2) plaintiffs did not have First Amendment right to withhold their identifications.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-estate’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated decedent’s 4th Amendment rights by subjecting him to false arrest and by failing to protect him from self-harm when decedent hung himself in jail cell. While Dist. Ct. found that defendants had probable cause to arrest decedent on domestic violence charge, defendants could not rely on said charge to defeat false arrest claim, where said charge was not criminal liability statute under Wisconsin law. However, defendants had probable cause to arrest decedent on battery charge so as to defeat false arrest claim, where: (1) police came upon injured decedent’s roommate, who had fallen from fourth-story bedroom window; (2) police observed decedent naked, intoxicated and passed out on bed in disheveled room containing broken glass, broken lamp and drops of blood; and (3) police had previously received disturbance call in which roommate claimed that decedent was aggressor. Also, plaintiff could not proceed on failure to protect claim, where defendant-officer presented evidence that he did not act objectively unreasonable in events leading up to discovery of decedent hanging in his cell, where: (1) officer had no reason to think that decedent was suicidal during screening process, and decedent did not tell officer that he was suicidal; (2) decedent’s general distress and history of psychiatric treatment would not give notice of suicidal risk; and (3) 45-minute gap between last observation and discovery of decedent hanging in his cell was not unreasonable in absence of notice of suicide risk (Dissent filed.)