Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action, alleging that said officer violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by obtaining warrant that contained inaccurate address of plaintiff’s apartment, where confidential informant told said officer that plaintiff had handgun that plaintiff could not lawfully possess. Record showed that said officer and others broke into apartment that turned out to be plaintiff’s apartment, but was not apartment that informant had stated that plaintiff possessed gun. Franks violation occurred, where officer told warrant issuing judge that he knew plaintiff’s address when he did not, and where officer told judge that there was probable cause to believe that drugs would be found in apartment, when in fact there was not. As such, plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on claim that officer had procured warrant by misrepresentation. Plaintiff was also entitled to summary judgment on claim that officer executed search of plaintiff’s apartment in bad faith reliance on warrant, since officer was either dishonest or reckless in preparing warrant affidavit, even though said officer eventually led search team to correct apartment. Dist. Ct. did not err in granting all defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on existence of qualified immunity, where there was arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff based on discovery of different gun in apartment, based on concept of constructive possession of said gun. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s complaint alleging that defendant prison correctional guard violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for filing grievances against defendant for alleged misconduct. Plaintiff’s complaint contained only threadbare allegations and did not clarify what speech caused defendant to allegedly retaliate against plaintiff. However, Dist. Ct. erred in failing to give plaintiff opportunity to file amended complaint, where: (1) case law states that Dist. Ct. should deny leave to amend only if it is certain that any amendment would be futile; and (2) record did not indicate that defects in plaintiff’s complaint could not be cured.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s lawsuit alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his mental health needs as sanction for, according to Dist. Ct., making unfounded allegations that his continued confinement in solitary confinement and other actions presented him with danger of serious physical injury/self harm so as to support his request to avoid having to prepay filing fees, where plaintiff already had “three strikes” under Prison Litigation Reform Act. While Dist. Ct. held belief that plaintiff had committed “fraud” when making said allegations, Ct. of Appeals, in reversing Dist. Ct., noted record contained 100 pages of mental health notes that supported plaintiff’s claim of attempted suicides and otherwise did not refute plaintiff’s claims of being in potential danger of serious personal injury so as to allow him to proceed without prepaying filing fee. Alternatively, Ct. of Appeals held that even if medical records did not support plaintiff’s claims, it was still error to conclude that plaintiff’s inaccurate claims constituted sanctionable lie, where Dist. Ct. did not make any finding that plaintiff had acted intentionally or in bad faith when making his claims. Moreover, due to plaintiff’s pro se status, Dist. Ct. was required to hold plaintiff to less stringent pleading standards, and Dist. Ct. further erred in failing to consider any lesser sanction.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs-adult entertainment businesses’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction in their action, alleging that defendant-Small Business Administration violated their First Amendment rights by improperly denying them from seeking second round of loans under Paycheck Protection Plan enacted to address economic disruption caused by COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant did so based on statutory exclusion set forth in 25 USC section 636(a)(37)(A)(iv)(III)(aa) that excluded plaintiffs’ category of business from obtaining said loans. Ct. of Appeals found that defendant showed strong likelihood of success on merits, where Congress had simply chosen not to subsidize adult entertainment businesses, rather than attempting to regulate or suppress adult entertainment. Moreover, Ct. noted that: (1) government is not required to subsidize activity simply because said activity is protected by First Amendment; and (2) exclusion of entire category of prurient live performances from government subsidy program does not amount to viewpoint discrimination and does not violate Free Speech Clause.

Ct. of Appeals vacated on mootness grounds Dist. Ct.’s order that denied plaintiffs-eight students’ request for preliminary injunction to preclude enforcement of defendant-University’s policy that required unvaccinated students and faculty to get COVID-19 vaccine or subject themselves to wearing masks and getting regular COVID-19 tests. Record showed that seven out of eight plaintiffs qualified for religious exemption to vaccine mandate, and eighth plaintiff declared that she had no plans to return as student to University. As such, lawsuit was moot, where no plaintiff faced potential consequence of vaccine mandate. Also, Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ contention that mootness doctrine did not apply, because subject of lawsuit is capable of repetition, but evading review, since: (1) capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only if dispute can recur between same parties, and instant plaintiffs will not be aggrieved by defendant’s vaccine requirement in future; and (2) instant vaccine requirement is not in short-lived category, whose application will be complete before court can act.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison guards’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his 8th amendment rights by encouraging another inmate to assault him. Dist. Ct. found that dismissal was required because plaintiff had not filed prison grievance prior to filing instant lawsuit, and that defendant had not otherwise exhausted his administrative remedies. Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies, so as to allow instant action to proceed, where plaintiff stated that his prison counselor had refused his request for required grievance form, and where prison officials had threatened to hurt him if he had filed grievance.

Dist. Ct. erred in entering permanent injunction in plaintiff-prisoners’ class action, alleging that defendants-Illinois Dept. of Corrections officials failed to provide constitutionally adequate mental-health care. Record showed that parties eventually settled case, which required that defendants meet certain hiring and other benchmarks across more than dozen areas of mental health for prisoners. After defendant failed to reach said benchmarks, plaintiff returned to Dist. Ct. and argued, as required by settlement agreement, that defendants' failure to reach said benchmarks itself caused 8th Amendment violation. Dist. Ct. held that plaintiffs made requisite showing in five areas of mental health treatment and eventually entered permanent injunction requiring defendants to hire and maintain specific number of additional staff and imposing other requirements for delivery of mental-health on Dist. Ct.’s timetable. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that injunction had been improperly entered, where, although defendants had failed to meet benchmarks, record showed that, particularly with issue of under-staffing, defendants took reasonable efforts to add additional staff, so as to preclude finding that they had recklessly disregarded known risk for 8th Amendment purposes. Also, injunction violated Prison Litigation Reform Act by prescribing specific staffing levels and treatment timelines, which failed to go no further than necessary to correct any 8th Amendment violation. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for class action certification with respect to three proposed subclasses in his Title VII action regarding defendant’s initial written exam, written situational exam and physical fitness test for hiring correctional officers, where plaintiff alleged that he and others were not hired as correctional officers, because said examinations had disparate and negative impact on black applicants. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff had failed to satisfy commonality factor for class action certification under Rule 23, Dist. Ct.’s analysis did not clearly delineate its reasoning for declining to certify instant subclasses. Moreover, unlike disparate treatment claims, disparate impact claims have greater likelihood of satisfying commonality factor in certification process, where: (1) focus of said claim is on challenged policy that, according to plaintiff, has disparately impacted class members; and (2) concern as to instant subclasses does not pertain to exercise of discretion by many actors, but rather to uniform administration of standardized tests to each class member. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could not inquire into merits of plaintiff’s disparate impact claims to determine instant commonality issue once plaintiff had identified policy that allegedly resulted in discrimination.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity grounds in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants withheld favorable evidence and fabricated evidence in plaintiff’s initial murder trial that resulted in hung jury, where plaintiff conceded that instant 14th Amendment claim was not cognizable under either Lewis, 914 F.3d 472 or Kuri, 990 F.3d 573. However, Ct. of Appeals dismissed defendants’ appeal from Dist. Ct.’s denial of their summary judgment motion with respect to plaintiff’s 4th Amendment claim, alleging that plaintiff was detained for three years without probable cause prior to jury’s eventual acquittal of murder charges at second trial, since there was factual dispute as to whether there was probable cause to support defendant’s arrest and pretrial detention.

Court of Appeals certified following question to Illinois Supreme Court: “Do section 15(b) and 15(d) claims [under Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act] accrue each time private entity scans a person’s biometric identifier and each time a private entity transmits such a scan to a third-party, respectively, or only upon the first scan and first transmission?” In its motion to dismiss, defendant-employer argued that plaintiff’s claims arose first time plaintiff scanned her fingerprint into its system after law took effect in 2008, and as such, plaintiff’s lawsuit was untimely under longest possible limitations period. Dist. Ct. denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, but certified issue for appellate review under 28 USC section 1292(b).